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ABSTRACT 
 
New information and communication technologies bring the enticing 
potential to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency of 
government administration and services. One theorised outcome of e-
government that has received little empirical attention is its ability to build 
citizens’ trust in government. This thesis contributes to this knowledge 
through a comparative study of the impacts of two Chilean e-services on 
citizens’ trust in the institutions of democratic government. This research 
traces the causal processes from the influence of the e-services on the 
trustworthiness of public sector institutions to how, for whom, and in what 
circumstances the e-services directly affect citizens’ trust in those 
institutions. 
 
The research approach draws from social realist assumptions and, in 
particular, the ontology offered by critical realism. This approach allows 
for the development of a novel e-government and institutional trust 
framework that integrates a wide range of trust theories from political 
science, sociology, psychology, and information systems. Extending the 
framework, the thesis proposes fifteen middle-range causal hypotheses 
that link e-services to institutional trustworthiness and citizens’ trust in 
those institutions. These hypotheses are then empirically grounded in case-
specific hypotheses which are subsequently tested and refined through 
both a within-case analysis and cross-case comparison.  
 
Within limits, this study provides insight into the potentials and limits of 
e-government to improve the trustworthiness of the public sector. 
Furthermore, by adopting a street-level epistemological perspective of 
citizens’ interpretations and explanations of e-service interactions, the 
thesis contributes to the micro-level understanding of the interactions of e-
services and citizens’ trust in public sector institutions. A central finding is 
the importance of self-interested concerns and direct user benefits in 
shaping perceptions and interpretations of the citizen-e-service interaction. 
The findings also provide empirical insight into the theoretical and 
practical importance of discerning between theories of how to build 
trustworthy institutions and trust in those institutions. 
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1  INTRODUCTION: TRUST AND E-GOVERNMENT 
 
Trust has been a concern for philosophers since the ancient Greeks and undoubtedly 
beyond (O'Hara 2004). The trust of everyday vernacular is something that almost 
everyone has experience with, yet is a social intangible that, like describing a feeling, 
often confounds articulation. It is essential to our lives as social creatures, but is most 
powerful when it remains in the background. Only when trust is compromised do we see 
how it weaves its way into our social milieu of interactions, expectations, and 
relationships. 
 
Trust is hypothesised to have almost mythical importance as shown by its various roles in 
contemporary social theory. Without some level of basic trust in the stability of the 
natural and social worlds people would be racked with existential insecurity and would 
not be able to get out of bed in the morning (Giddens 1990). Trust is a key element of 
social relationships and even love (Solomon and Flores 2001). It facilitates social 
coordination by providing reassurance when acting in times of ignorance of others’ 
behaviour (Gambetta 1988a, Offe 1999, p. 43). Trust also provides an alternative to 
coercive methods of control for shaping social behaviour (Coleman 1994, Reed 2001). It 
is considered a public good that “makes possible production and exchange” (Dasgupta 
1988, p. 64).1 Social capital, of which trust is a central component, is theorised to play a 
role in the development of good democratic institutions (Putnam 1993). In short, trust is 
thought to have an important causal, and often stabilizing, influence within the web of 
our social relations.  
 
As the world has rocketed towards modernity, the relevance of trust in society has 
arguably undergone a transformation. The contemporary world is characterised by an 
increased interconnectedness, speeding up, and deepening impact of a variety of inter-
                                                 
1
 For example, taking a macro perspective, Fukuyama (1995) argues that different rates of economic 
growth of countries can be attributed in part to whether they are low or high-trust societies. 
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regional flows (Appadurai 2002, McGrew 2000).2 This increased inter-linkage and 
interdependency brings increased risks (Giddens 1990) extending the vulnerabilities of 
individuals while increased complexities reduce chances for individuals to monitor 
vulnerabilities (Warren 1999c, p. 3). The benefits of a more complex, differentiated, and 
diverse society can only be generated when balanced by trust: 
“Where there is trust there are increased possibilities for experience and action, 
there is an increase in the complexity of the social system and also in the number 
of possibilities which can be reconciled with its structure, because trust constitutes 
a more effective form of complexity reduction” (Luhmann 1979, p. 8).  
Trusting anonymous others and institutions provides the assurances that enable 
coordination of actions over large domains of space and time (Giddens 1990).3 Given this 
role of trust, it is no wonder that trust has become a major area of research in the 21st 
century (O'Hara 2004, p. 23). 
 
Many of the processes of modernisation are not abating as witnessed by the 
contemporary spread of e-government. Given the centrality of information technologies 
to public sector bureaucracies, it is no surprise that the emergence of new ICT and the 
Internet has provide the impulse for a global diffusion of e-government applications 
(Heeks 2005). If Giddens is right, as governments introduce new ICT into government (e-
government), trust will only gain in importance.4  
 
While the introduction of e-government systems may increase the need for trust, their 
impact on building this trust is, at present, both empirically and theoretically unclear 
                                                 
2
 Processes of globalisation and technology are interacting as mutually reinforcing drivers of change 
(Hanseth and Braa 2000, p. 39), fundamentally transforming work and life, at least in the western context 
(Walsham 2000). 
3
 “Trust in abstract systems is the condition of time-space distanciation and of the large areas of security in 
day-to-day life which modern institutions offer as compared to the traditional world. The routines which 
are integrated with abstract systems are central to ontological security in conditions of modernity” (Giddens 
1990, p. 113). 
4
 Several recent theorists have argued that this situation actually makes trust less important, “trust is no 
longer the central pillar of social order, and it may not be very important in most of our cooperative 
exchanges” (Cook et al. 2005, p. 1). This position turns Giddens’ relationship of trust and modernity on its 
head. Giddens argued that with the breakdown of tradition brought along by modernity has made trust a 
central part of one’s dealing with the abstract systems in modern society (Giddens 1990). Instead, Cook et 
al. argue that the “long-term change from small communities to mass urban complexes, mere coordination 
and state regulation have become far more important, we argue, while the actual role of trusting relations 
has declined relatively” (Cook et al. 2005, p. 1). This issue will be taken up in detail in chapter 3. 
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(Avgerou et al. 2006, Kearns 2004, West 2005). The introduction of ICT into 
government and leveraging the interconnectivity of the Internet provide new potential 
avenues for altering,5 perhaps revolutionising democratic forms of governance. These 
changes are, however, double-edged. For example, Castells (2001) argues that at the turn 
of the century, the Internet and new ICT are working to “deepen the crisis of political 
legitimacy” by promoting the “politics of scandal” rather than to foster knowledge and 
participation of citizens. Indeed, competing dynamics are most likely at work in any 
democracy; pulling, pushing, and shaping the resultant institutional social, economic, 
legal, and political framework. 
 
These issues lie at the heart of this thesis. In particular, how do the changes brought about 
by e-government influence the citizen-government relationship and in particular, citizens’ 
trust in government? This chapter provides a brief introduction and overview of this 
thesis. Section 1.1 begins with a discussion of the underlying issues that contextualise 
and justify research on trust and e-government. This discussion motivates the research by 
arguing that there is a significant causal relationship between trust, democracy, 
development, and e-government (1.1.1). Furthermore, the limitations of the theoretical 
and empirical knowledge of the relationship between e-government and trust are 
highlighted, demonstrating a clear gap in our knowledge that will be this research’s niche 
(1.1.2). Then section 1.2 dives into the research on trust performed in this thesis. The goal 
of this section is to provide sufficient detail about the research approach, conceptual 
framework, and research methods to give a working understanding of the thesis. If the 
reader is interested in more details regarding the research methodology, data analysis 
techniques, and research performed, these are available in Appendix I. Finally, section 
1.3 concludes by laying out the structure of the thesis. 
  
                                                 
5
 For example, the shift of citizen-government interaction from citizen to civil servants to faceless e-
services mark a potentially significant qualitative change to a central institutional access point that is 
significant in the negotiation of the citizen-government relationship (Giddens 1990). 
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1.1  ON TRUST AND E-GOVERNMENT  
Trust has become a major area of research and theory in contemporary political science 
given the emergence and spread of democracy. It is especially topical given the myriad of 
states that have transitioned from authoritarian to democratic regimes. The citizen-
government relationship is fundamentally altered in the movement from authoritarian to 
democratic modes of governance. A democratic form of government places government 
at the same level as the rest of society— as the saying goes; it is a “government of the 
people and for the people”. Thus, the government is no longer above and beyond society, 
but instead is on the same plane to be judged with the same criteria that we use for other 
people and other organisations. This change has precipitated the concepts of trust and 
distrust to enter into the world of modern political theory (Ankersmit and te Velde 2006). 
Furthermore, any theory of representation that envisions a legitimate government must 
contain some account of trust (Williams 1998, p. 33). The relative importance of trust 
(and distrust) to democracy depends upon the definition of trust and democracy (Barber 
1983, p. 93, Warren 1999b). However, it is possible to identify several ways that trust is 
intrinsic to democracy; for example, if people have trust in the democratic processes of 
decision making then deliberation rather than coercion becomes possible as a way to 
make policy  (Warren 1999b).6  
 
Not surprisingly, the interlinked concepts of trust and democracy have gained in 
importance for those concerned with governance in the development context. Since the 
fall of the Berlin wall, there has been a new wave of democratisation in the world.7 
Arguably, without some basis of citizen trust in the new regime, a successful transition 
from authoritarian to democratic forms of governance will be threatened (Offe 1999, p. 
43). Trust in a regime helps supply stability that is so crucial during this transition and 
democratic consolidation process (Norris 1999a, p. 27) as the loss of trust is thought to 
                                                 
6
 Cole (1973) identified three ways through which trust enhanced democracy: “(1) trust increases the 
mutual communication essential for a democratic regime; (2) trust makes possible organizations through 
which citizens can promote their goals; (3) conflicts are more threatening, and thus democracy is 
imperilled, among people who distrust one another” (p. 809). 
7
 This is especially significant in Latin America, when between 1958 and 1975 there was a “reverse wave 
of democracy” when several democracies fell to military coups; Peru (1962), Brazil and Bolivia (1964), 
Argentina (1966), Chile and Uruguay (1973) (Norris 1999a, p. 4). 
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imply a loss of support for a regime (Easton 1975, Hetherington 1998) and ultimately can 
undermine regime legitimacy (Hetherington 1998, p. 792). Without a requisite level of 
legitimacy and trust, citizens may withdraw voluntary compliance of governmental 
demands and regulations, or even actively resist governmental policy (Levi 1998, p. 88, 
Nye Jr. and Zelikow 1997, p. 277),  rendering the government incapable of performing 
the tasks required of it (Nye Jr. and Zelikow 1997, p. 276). 
 
Low levels of citizen trust and compliance can form a vicious cycle: low legitimacy 
results in reduced compliance and decreasing government performance that further 
erodes trust (Nye Jr. and Zelikow 1997, p. 277). Without broad public support for 
proactive solutions, problems may be left to linger, further exacerbating the issue, and 
maintaining discontent (Hetherington 1998, p. 804). If hard decisions must be made, low 
levels of trust mean that decisions are perceived as unfair, resulting in bitter politics and 
lower levels of compliance with the law (Mansbridge 1997, p. 152). In no-win situations, 
if there is minimal trust in those who make decisions, the losers are unlikely to view the 
decisions as fair and this results in bitter politics (Lawrence 1997). This dynamic 
relationship between trust, support, politics, and governmental performance implies that 
if trust is lost, it can be difficult to recover, without some exogenous intervention or 
change (Hetherington 1998, p. 791).  
 
Conversely, citizens’ trust in government brings many benefits. For example, trust helps 
to reduce complexity and gain efficiencies in public sector administration (Raab 1998). 
Trust also allows governments to benefit from the voluntary compliance of citizens 
(Tyler 1998, p. 290) as it counters the more resource costly mechanisms of coercion and 
control. For example, in research on tax compliance, several factors (other than coercion) 
were found to be crucial to tax compliance, including feelings of tax duty (obligation), 
trust in government, and trust that others would pay their share of taxes (Murphy 2004, 
Scholz 1998). Furthermore, lack of trust may not only imply non-compliance but it will 
also require the increased building of “non-productive” regulations and bureaucracy to 
counter that lack of trust (Levi 1998). Given the long-term nature of the citizen-
government relationship, forfeited trust may potentially entail larger losses than more 
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short term relationships (Hardin 1993, p. 507). Gambetta summarises the situation as 
follows, 
“… societies which rely heavily on the use of force are likely to be less efficient, 
more costly, and more unpleasant than those where trust is maintained by other 
means. In the former, resources tend to be diverted away from economic 
undertakings and spent in coercion, surveillance, and information gathering, and 
less incentive is found to engage in cooperative activities” (Gambetta 1988a, p. 
221). 
 
Trust also has important implications for the possibilities of social and economic 
development. Higher levels of trust mean warmer feelings for elected officials and 
political institutions and improve the policy mood, providing greater support for 
government spending and activity (Chanley et al. 2000). Citizens’ trust in the process 
increases the ability of politicians to implement long-term policies that might be 
unpopular or not in their direct interests (Hetherington 1998, p. 803, Mishler and Rose 
2005, p. 1052). High levels of trust have also been found to be linked to higher spending 
for egalitarian policies (redistribution, education) (Uslaner 2002).8 Crucially, for 
development, trust helps provide stability, a key component for sustaining consistent 
economic growth with its numerous beneficial developmental impacts.9  
 
Finally, citizens’ trust in the government, when warranted, can arguably be seen as not 
just a means to an end, but an end in and of itself. Trust in government increases a 
citizen’s capability to achieve well-being. Sen writes of trust in terms of “Transparency 
guarantees” that act as an instrumental freedom to “prevent corruption, financial 
irresponsibility and underhand dealings” (Sen 1999, pp. 39-40). Furthermore, trust in 
government can be seen to free up time and resources for the citizen, enabling them to 
engage in other productive activities, 
“Behaviourally, the more trusting an individual is the lower the personal 
investment she will make in learning about the trustworthiness of the trusted and 
                                                 
8
 There is an important question about the causal connection here, does trust bring about good institutions, 
or do good institutions build trust? 
9
 “…in a global economy, political stability attracts capital; education provides crucial skills; basic research 
in science and technology enhances competitiveness and living standards, and protection of intellectual 
property rights become more important. Provision of such public goods depends on effective government” 
(Nye Jr. 1997, pp. 4-5). 
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in monitoring and enforcing his compliance in a cooperative venture” (Levi 1998, 
p. 78).  
The alternative to trust, a “consistent and strategically energetic distrust,” will bring about 
many negative consequences such as suffocating political energy and creativity (Dunn 
1988).10  
 
1.1.1 THE DECLINE OF TRUST AND THE PROMISE OF E-GOVERNMENT 
In the last thirty years, a series of survey studies have indicated that there has been a 
steady decline of trust in institutions of democratic governance (Nye Jr. et al. 1997). 
Trust in democratic government institutions is also low in Latin America 
(Latinobarómetro 2005, UNDP 2004a) where it is especially a concern in countries such 
as Chile, Brazil, and Argentina that have recently transitioned from authoritarian to 
democratic modes of governance.  
 
Enter e-government. From the very beginning of the Internet, people quickly began to 
theorise its potential for social and political transformation (Atkinson and Ulevich 2000, 
Kakabadse et al. 2003).11 The technocratic logic of e-government brings the possibilities 
of many positive changes (e.g., see Table 1). Most significantly, as we will see in Chapter 
4, there are many pathways through which e-government applications might build 
citizens’ trust in democratic institutions of government. E-government might even have 
the potential to bring about a transformative shift in the nature of governance and the 
citizen-government relationship – with significant implications for restoring trust in 
                                                 
10
 Furthermore, living in a society where one believes that people can be trusted in general also positively 
affects one’s happiness (Layard 2005, pp. 64, 69), and in this sense constitutes a development aim in and of 
itself. 
11
 West summarises the zeitgeist as follows,  
“Writers quickly seized on these features to argue that the Internet would usher in a new era that 
would transform government performance and democracy itself. Citizens would communicate 
quickly and easily with public officials. Economies of scale would allow technology to improve 
service delivery in the public sector. Bureaucrats would become more responsive to the concerns 
of the citizenry. Public trust would be restored because government would operate in an effective, 
efficient, and responsive manner. Direct democracy and citizen participation in elections would be 
facilitated because the cost of information acquisition and political communications would drop to 
near zero” (West 2005, p. 165). 
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government (Bellamy and Taylor 1998, West 2005). Could e-government be the 
exogenous factor needed to turn around the trust deficit? 
   
 
 
Table 1  Overview of potential outcomes, adapted from “How can E-government Impact Good 
Governance?” Source: (Bhatnagar 2004, pp. 37-38). 
 
So far, the reality of e-government has yet to match the hype. E-government is still in the 
beginning phases around the world, at most providing information and service delivery 
applications but not truly revolutionizing the citizen-government relationship (West 
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2005). One reason for this is that there have been more failures than successes in the 
implementation of e-government. Heeks (2002, 2003) calculates that developing 
countries have had a success rate of only fifteen percent.12 Comparatively, however, this 
is not drastically worse than the failure rate in industrialised countries which has been 
estimated at around sixty-percent (United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs 2003). Such failures can bring significant negative implications, including the 
potential loss of credibility and trust of citizens in the government (Heeks 2003, Heeks 
2005).  
 
Failures are to be expected as innovators experiment with new technologies. However, 
the high level of failure has not diminished the global demand and spread of e-
government implementations. And with the few successes, the world is just now 
beginning to experience the potential for significant changes to government 
administration and services. Empirically, evidence is emerging that e-government can 
indeed change people’s perceptions of government (West 2004, West 2005). Now is the 
time to begin to assess and understand how these new changes are altering citizens’ trust 
in government. By understanding these initial changes it may be possible to better 
understand the longer-term positive trends that may be emerging as a result of e-
government applications. 
 
1.1.2 THE CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH 
Theoretically and empirically, a good deal of work has been done to try to discern the 
links between governance and perceptions of trust in government (e.g. Braithwaite and 
Levi 1998, Chanley et al. 2000, Cook et al. 2005, Espinal et al. 2006, Hardin 1991, 
Hardin 1998, Hardin 1999, Joseph S. Nye et al. 1997, Levi 1998, Levi and Stoker 2000, 
Mishler and Rose 2001, Mishler and Rose 2005, Norris 1999b, Sztompka 1999, Warren 
1999d). For the most part, research has consisted of macro-level analyses of surveys that 
try to tease out correlation and causality between political, economic, and social factors 
and changes in trust in government. While the research has not developed any conclusive 
findings, it is clear that trust in government and its decline “is a complex phenomenon 
                                                 
12
 Heeks classified thrity-five percent as total failures and fifty percent as partial failures. 
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with multiple potential causes” (Chanley et al. 2000, p. 240). In an overview of the 
current state of research on governance and trust, one conclusion made by the authors 
was the clear need for more micro-level studies of trust to supplement the macro studies 
to better understand the complexities of the phenomenon (Levi and Stoker 2000). 
 
There is considerably less research on and understanding of the connections between e-
government and citizen trust in government. In fact, while progress has been made on 
understanding the impacts of e-government on the internal functioning of government, 
there is very little knowledge about the wider social, economic, and political implications 
attributable to e-government projects (Avgerou et al. 2006, p. 2, Weare 2002). Like the 
political science research, the few studies that do try to link e-government to trust in 
government are also almost entirely macro-level surveys work (e.g., Moon 2003, Parent 
et al. 2004, Tolbert and Mossberger 2006, West 2004, West 2005). It is questionable, 
however, how well these surveys provide an understanding of the underlying dynamics at 
play. The interaction of politics, governmental institutions, ICT, and citizens defy simple 
single-theory explanations (Weare 2002, p. 662). Indeed, it is a dubious proposition that 
the conceptual complexity of trust can be adequately captured by survey work (Gambetta 
and Hamill 2005).13 
 
Two recent studies on trust have heavily influenced and motivated this thesis. These 
studies represent a break from the use of cross-case surveys by applying a more intensive 
case study approach to better understand the dynamics of trust. The first is a recent study 
by Gambetta & Hamill (2005) on how taxi-drivers make trust-judgments of potential 
fares in Belfast and New York. While this study is not related to either politics or e-
government, it provides an instructive example of the advantages of case study 
approaches to studying trust. The second is an empirical study conducted by Avgerou et 
                                                 
13
 It is not entirely clear a priori that the high causal complexity involved in trust rules out survey (cross-
case) designs (Gerring 2007). A better justification for employing a case study to study trust involves other 
considerations, as will be discussed shortly. 
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al (2005)14 for the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) that provides the empirical 
starting point for the research in this thesis. The goal of that study was the development 
of a methodology to assess the potential for e-service applications to impact on citizens’ 
trust. The focus of the IADB study was almost entirely on the institutional component of 
trust; that is, how e-government applications are implicated in the development of 
trustworthy institutions of government.  
 
Overall, the current state of empirical research and understanding of the social impacts of 
e-government matches neither e-government’s pervasiveness nor the theoretically 
inspired discourse that propels it. A strong argument can be made that the state of theory 
is not yet ready for large-N cross-case studies with clearly identifiable dependent and 
independent variables.15 At this stage, it is crucial supplement the relatively nascent set of 
theories that link e-government changes to citizens’ trust in government. This study 
attempts to do just that. 
 
1.2  THE RESEARCH  
This study begins with a relatively simple assumption and research question. The 
assumption is that there is a causal link between e-government services and citizens’ trust 
in government institutions. The research question explores that link: how, for whom, and 
in what circumstances do e-services impact on citizens’ trust in government? Another 
way of framing the question is: what are the causal mechanisms that connect e-services 
to changes in citizens’ trust perceptions of government?  
 
1.2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
As a starting point, this thesis develops a systematic approach to thinking about e-
government and trust. While the current state of theory is not well developed, there are a 
wide variety of disciplines that have a lot to say about the types of causal mechanisms 
                                                 
14
 Disclosure: I was one of the authors of this study, and it forms part of the data and theory that play a part 
in this thesis. This study was later extended (without my participation) to study Brazil’s electronic voting 
system (Avgerou et al. 2007). 
15
 That said, these studies do providing some insight into the relationship between citizens, the activities of 
government, and trust – constituting a theoretical starting point. 
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that might connect e-services to citizens’ perceptions, including theory from political 
science, sociology, psychology, information systems, and public administration. The 
research here exploits the current state of knowledge as a theoretical starting point and a 
means to generate an initial set of research orienting theories. For an overview of the 
objective of the research, areas of discipline, and theory used in this thesis, see Table 2. 
 
Social object Description of research area Sources of theories 
Trust 
• What is trust? What does it consist of? 
What are the outcomes of trust? How is 
trust built/destroyed? 
 
• How do people interpret trustworthy 
cues, which cues do they pay attention 
to? How/why do people turn particular 
interpretations into trust judgements? 
Sociology 
Hardin, Sztompka, Seligman, 
Luhmann, Giddens, Gambetta 
 
Social-psychology, psychology 
Hardin, Braithwaite, Gambetta 
Trust in the state, 
institutional trust 
• What constitutes a trustworthy public 
sector?  
• What types of experiences are important 
for a trustworthy state? 
Political science   
M. Levi, Harding, Cook, Warren, 
Norris, Zucker 
E-government 
(ICT in public 
administration, 
bureaucracy) 
• Changes in public sector agency 
administration and services due to 
introduction of ICT 
Information systems, 
organizational theory, public 
administration 
J. Fountain, J. Kallinikos, 
Dunleavy, Heeks, Weber, 
Bhatnagar 
E-services and 
building trust in 
the state 
• How do e-services influence institutional 
trust? What factors influence the 
perception and use of e-services? 
Empirical work: Moon, West, 
Tolbert & Mossberger, Avgerou 
et al.  
Table 2  Social objects, research areas, and major theorists employed in the development of the 
conceptual framework for thinking about the relationship between e-government and trust. 
  
The ability to draw from such a wide range of sources is made possible in part by the 
conceptualisation of trust in this thesis. Incorporation of a variety of theories is enabled 
by seeing each of the three standard accounts of trust as contributing important 
theoretical and empirical knowledge about causal mechanisms operating in a particular 
area of social reality. While there may be some overlap between the perspectives, the 
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essential focus is different and therefore each of the three perspectives can be integrated 
coherently as contributing parts to a larger whole.16 
 
Building up the conceptual framework for e-government and trust requires three levels of 
theory integration where each level provides the structure upon which the subsequent 
level is constructed (see Figure 1). The first level draws from sociological, social-
psychological, and psychological theories of trust to establish the working definition of 
trust. Three analytical distinctions are made when conceptualising trust that are central 
organising features for this study: 
• Trust and trustworthiness - Trust is split into two concepts that are seen as both 
independent and interrelated: trustworthiness and trust. Consequently, they are 
analysed as both independent from each other (e.g. can we consider the tax-
agency worthy of trust? Do citizens trust the tax-agency?) and related to each 
other (e.g. what does a citizen perceive as trustworthy when making trust 
judgements?) 
• Trustworthiness cues - If trust and trustworthiness are distinct, yet interrelated, 
there must be something that connects them. This connection is conceptualised 
here as the communication from the trusted (the public agency) to the truster (the 
citizen) of indicators of trustworthiness, or trustworthiness cues. 
• Motivation and competence - Analytically, trust can be divided into two 
dimensions of motivation and competence (Kee and Knox 1970). Most research 
conflates these two dimensions that are independent and thus are best assessed 
separately (Hardin 2000, p. 36). 
 
                                                 
16
 The underlying assumptions that make this possible are spelled out in chapter 2. 
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Fig
ure 1  Levels of theory. The starting point for building theory is the general understandings of trust 
from sociology and psychology. This is followed by theories of institutional trust, generally drawn 
from political science. The final layer includes theories of building institutional trust through e-
government, a very specific instantiation of institutional trust. The finally stage of theory requires a 
detailed understanding of the interaction of ICT in the public sector (e-government). This is a 
movement from a core theory of trust to a specific instance of trust.  
 
Building upon the trust foundation, the second level integrates political science theories 
of trust in government, and specifically, institutional trust. This level provides the 
framework of how this research will approach the question of what it means to trust in 
government, and if such trust is even possible. The third level is broken up into two parts. 
The first part provides a theoretical understanding of the dynamics of ICT in the public 
sector providing insight into the types of changes that can be expected with the 
introduction of e-government. The second part of level three then integrates all of the 
theory and draws from empirical work to form the final sets of testable hypotheses that 
connect e-government to institutional trust.  
 
There are two important things to note about the conceptual framework developed and 
applied in this thesis. First, the analytical distinction between trust and trustworthiness 
allows for the tracing of the complete causal chain, from implementation of e-
government to citizens’ trust in government. This can be broken down into three distinct 
but inter-related short-range processes: 1) the implementation of ICT towards the goal of 
building trustworthy institutions of governance, 2) the interaction of citizens with the e-
services and the communication of cues of trustworthy institutions, and 3) the process of 
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perception and interpretation of these cues that change citizens’ trust in institutions of 
democratic governance.17 
 
Second, the movement up the pyramid, from the nadir of trust to the zenith of e-
government and trust, can be seen as a progression from more abstract towards more 
concrete theory. The starting point is trust, which is theorised in its most abstract sense, 
attempting to abstract out the necessary rather than contingent components. The final 
stage is the development of e-government and trust theory that can be thought of as 
specific instances of trust theories. This means that the independent and dependent 
variables (e-service and citizen trust respectively) are disaggregated into a variety of 
component parts. For example, within the analytical distinction of competence and 
motivation, there are many dimensions (e.g. increased efficiency or aligned interests) that 
represent potential causal pathways from the e-service to trust. These theories are then 
extended once more based upon the particularities of the case under study to form case 
specific hypotheses that are now close enough to reality to be empirically tested and 
refined.18  
 
The conceptual framework design provides some benefits. First, it has a tight link 
between different levels of theory. This means that refinements to the case specific 
hypotheses can be used to comment on the more abstract theory. For example, if it is 
found that increased efficiency does not lead to trust for a particular reason, it may 
provide an important modification to the higher level theory relating competence to trust 
                                                 
17
 This focus on short-term processes can be justified on two fronts. First, except for instances of radical 
change, long-term trends are often the product of multiple short-term social changes. This is especially true 
when it comes to the consolidation of new democracies. Political views do not often change overnight. For 
example, it took over twenty years from the end of the Second World War for a majority of West Germans 
to reject the claim that Hitler was one of Germany’s greatest statesmen and take pride in their new political 
institutions (Inglehart 1999, pp. 104-105). Trust in government, as discussed above, is a crucial indicator of 
political support and is thus considered integral on the path to consolidating democratic values and 
democracies themselves. Second, the aim of this research is to extract generalisable knowledge which will 
hopefully contribute to a larger project of systematic knowledge accumulation to enable informed 
application of new e-government projects.  
18
 A word about words – theory and hypothesis are not too different in terms of meaning. Here we reserve 
the word hypothesis for those theories that emerged from the within-case empirical analysis that predict 
particular outcomes. The word theory is used for the e-government and trust theory that is developed in 
chapters 3 & 4. These theories also predict and are tested and refined during the course of this thesis. 
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of which efficiency was a sub-set. It also provides a set of theories that can be tested and 
refined in other research situations by differentiating between more abstract theories and 
their case specific instantiations. This allows for the flexible deployment of these theories 
in a variety of contexts, while remaining tightly enough linked to provide empirical 
feedback on the more abstract theory. There are two other benefits that deserve mention 
as they in part justify the applicability of this framework to the research subject. First, the 
framework provides an account of how to link up macro-level and micro-level accounts 
of trust into the analysis, something that has been lacking in research (Levi and Stoker 
2000, p. 500, Lewis and Weigert 1985, pp. 974-975). Crucial in this linkage is the focus 
on the “demand-side” (from the perspective of the citizen interaction with e-services) of 
e-government, which has also been largely absent in the literature (Reddick 2005). 
Second, there is also a dearth of empirical research that combines theory of ICT with 
theories of bureaucracy (Jain 2004).19 Public administration literature has largely ignored 
the element of ICT for a variety of reasons (Dunleavy et al. 2006), and IS research often 
fails to incorporate disciplines such as public administration and political science 
(Anderson 2004). This thesis integrates theory from across these disciplines and applies 
this integration in the empirical work. 
 
1.2.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY AND DESIGN 
To tackle the research question, a comparative case study research strategy was chosen 
(Gerring 2007, Yin 2003). Two cases of e-government services in Chile were selected: an 
e-tax administration and a public sector e-procurement system. The e-tax administration 
system is the Chilean Tax Authority’s online portal that allows for a wide range of tax 
related transactions. In particular, the case focuses on the online income tax service that 
enables and facilitates the completion of income tax through the Internet. The public 
sector e-procurement system (ChileCompra) is an online portal for public sector 
purchasing currently used by most of the federal and municipal institutions in Chile. The 
portal includes online processes for most stages of the procurement process including the 
public tendering of a purchase order and receiving bids, as well as the publication of 
public sector purchasing activities.  
                                                 
19
 Dunleavy et al. (2006) is a notable exception. 
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The two e-service cases were selected for a combination of pragmatic and theoretical 
reasons. Pragmatically, each e-service was already studied as a part of the 2004 IADB 
study that provided the launching pad for the rest of the research (see 1.1.2). Highly 
relevant data on the trustworthiness implications of these e-services had already been 
collected, as well as having established essential contacts for future research access. 
Theoretically, these two e-services provide a unique research opportunity as they are both 
quintessential success stories with pervasive uptake and impact on Chilean society. 
Indicative of their success is their extensive local and international recognition, having 
received numerous awards and their common description as the biggest e-government 
successes in Chile (e.g. Panzardi et al. 2002). This provides the opportunity to study 
successful ICT implementations in the development context. Studying successful 
implementations arguably has not received enough attention in the literature and can 
provide important and different insights than studies of failures (Krishna and Walsham 
2005). Finally, as both cases are in the Chilean context, this allows for the potential ruling 
out of many exogenous variables as sources of variation.20 
 
The two cases do not adhere to a single, elegantly constructed research strategy, but 
rather consist of the integration of three data rich research studies. The author was 
fortunate enough to participate in two research projects, both of which had the two 
Chilean e-services as a focus of study:  
1. IADB project - a comparative case study of four e-services in Chile and Brazil 
with the goal of developing a methodology for the assessment of the impacts of e-
services on trust. This study provides essential data on the impact of the e-services 
on institutional trustworthiness. 
2. World Bank project – a study of the social impacts of e-services employing both 
interviews and surveys. This study also provides important interview and survey 
                                                 
20
 A benefit, and a problem, for the design is that both cases happened around the same time in political and 
cultural environment. This means that it is possible to hold several important variables constant when 
performing the cross-case comparative. However, it also means it is impossible to eliminate, or to 
completely identify the role of, these factors as influences on the dependent variable.  
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data on institutional trustworthiness, as well as survey data of users’ perceptions 
of the e-services. 
These two pieces of research were then supplemented by the author gathering a new body 
of data with the focus on studying trust from the perspective of the e-service users. All 
three of these sources of data (the IADB project, the WB study, and the author’s 
research) form the inputs to the two e-service cases. 
 
There are a variety of reasons why a case study strategy was chosen. The central reason is 
the appropriateness of case studies for asking in-depth causal how, and why questions, as 
well as for research sites where no experimental control is possible (Yin 2003, p. 5). A 
case study approach also allows for the integration of data from the three different pieces 
of research. Furthermore, a case study can employ the simultaneously theory-
driven/deductive and theory-building inductive approach (George and Bennett 2005, 
Gerring 2007) desired here.21 The key to accomplishing this is to have an orienting 
conceptual framework that includes testable hypotheses and orients theory while 
maintaining a space for some exploration and serendipity during the research process.22  
 
1.2.3 DATA COLLECTION 
Studying trust is not straightforward, and there is considerable debate on the relevant 
dependent and independent variables and the best instruments to measure or study trust 
(Hardin 2002b, Kee and Knox 1970, Levi and Stoker 2000).23 A common approach has 
been the use of surveys that ask some variation of a question that asks for people’s 
                                                 
21
 It is possible for case studies to be used for both theory-testing and inductive theory generation, although 
usually they come at different points in a research programme (George and Bennett 2005, Gerring 2007). 
This is accomplished through a structured, although not rigorous, design. Arguably the state of theory does 
not allow for a more rigorous design at this time, “any rigorous research design in this area would be 
premature and would have to make arbitrary assumptions on the nature of the formation of trust in 
democratic institutions of government” (Avgerou et al. 2006, p. 3).  
22
 Although the original execution of the research was done without the knowledge of the “structured case 
design” (Carroll and Swatman 2000) the approach is highly similar, and has already been applied to e-
government evaluations (Grimsley and Meehan 2007, Irani et al. 2005). The central idea is that research is 
conducted in loops where theory is brought into contact with data and then refined and then the loop begins 
again. Furthermore, the use of process-tracing (see Appendix I) allows for the research to follow what is 
happening on the ground, not just what the theories predict, and is thus helpful in the inductive generation 
of new theories. 
23
 See Hardin 2002, chapter 3 for overview of some of what he sees as the conceptions and misconceptions 
of trust. 
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perceptions of their levels of trust or confidence in a particular institution.24 Others argue 
that what many people often say about trust differs from what their actions imply 
(O’Neill 2002, Solomon and Flores 2001, p. 18). The upshot of this position is that trust 
is better studied by examining people’s actions, not what they say. It is clear that there is 
not a consensus on the approach to study trust. 
 
The perspective of trust adopted here allows for the incorporation of both data points 
(perceptions and behaviours) as potential indicators of trust. Furthermore, we would 
expect people’s responses to correlate with their behaviour, and when they do, the 
evidence for trust (rather than another motivating factor) is strengthened. There is 
evidence that the two do sometimes correspond to each other, lending credence to both 
data sources: 
“Researchers have dropped wallets in the street in different countries, wallets that 
included the name and address of the owner. They then counted the proportion of 
dropped wallets that were returned to the owner – the highest was in Scandinavia. 
These proportions were then compared with how the citizens of the country 
replied about trust. It turned out that the two were closely related: so when we ask 
about trust, we do learn something about whether people can actually be trusted” 
(Layard 2005, p. 69). 
 
This research goes a step beyond those two indicators to also look at citizens’ perceptions 
and interpretations of their interactions with e-services. This adds one more important 
step in the causal chain helping us to see what interactions bring about particular 
perceptions and interpretations, and why. Ultimately, data are collected to comment on: 
a) The implementation of the e-service and its impacts on the public sector entities, 
b) The usage (quantity, nature of) the e-services by citizens, 
c) The experiences, perceptions, and interpretations of these citizens, 
d) Citizens’ resultant trust judgements and explanations of these judgements. 
                                                 
24
 Two examples of survey questions interpreted as commenting on trust: 
“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in them: Is it (4) a great deal of confidence, (3= quite a lot of confidence, (2) 
not very much confidence, or (1) none at all? a) The parliament, b) The government in (Capital 
city)… ” (Klingemann 1999, p. 36) 
“To what extent do you trust each of these political institutions to look after your interests? Please 
indicate on a scale from 1, for the complete absence of trust, to 7, for great trust” (Mishler and 
Rose 2005, p. 1055). 
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To collect data on these issues, this research takes a multi-method approach25 (Mingers 
2003, Mingers and Brocklesby 1997) employing four main data collection methods: 
semi-structured interviews, focus groups, surveys, and relevant document collection.26 
Recall that the data are pooled from three separate pieces of research. The methods 
employed in the three pieces of research focused almost entirely on six different 
stakeholder groups: (1) Chile tax administration employees at the national and municipal 
level, (2) e-tax users (citizens and businesses), (3) the public sector entity that manages 
ChileCompra, (4) ChileCompra private users (suppliers) and (5) ChileCompra public 
sector users (buyers), (6) telecentre employees who have contact with citizen e-service 
users, and (7) other relevant government and civil society entities.  
 
Overall, a total of 84 semi-structured interviews or focus groups were conducted with a 
total of 113 subjects spanning the entire set of actors.27 For the World Bank study, seven 
surveys assessing the social and agency impacts of the services (both internal to the 
public sector and external towards the citizen users) were conducted on all the major 
stakeholder groups as well as a survey targeting the wider society. Furthermore, many 
government documents and reports were included in the data set, along with independent 
research and newspapers articles. 
 
1.2.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
There is an underlying logic to the data analysis; process-tracing. The process tracing 
method “attempts to identify intervening causal processes—the causal chain and causal 
mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the 
dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 206). Thus, the goal is to trace the 
causal pathway from the implementation of e-services and their structure (independent 
variable) to the citizen’s trust judgements (dependent variable).  
                                                 
25
 Multi-method research is not found too often in IS research (Mingers 2003). 
26
 See Appendix-I for details. 
27
 For the World Bank study and thesis research a total of 56 semi-structured interviews or focus groups 
conducted with 76 subjects were conducted. For the IADB study, there were a total of 28 interviews with a 
total of 37 subjects. 
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Crucially, the two cases can be considered “most-likely” cases. A most-likely case is one 
where “the independent variables posited by a theory are at values that strongly posit an 
outcome or posit an extreme outcome” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 121). The success 
of each of these two e-service cases makes them great tests of hypotheses that link e-
services to trust in government. For example, if trust is not built with an e-service that has 
greatly improved the efficiency and transparency of the public sector, then either the 
theory is misguided, or is in need of considerable refinement. Thus, they provide the first 
link in the theorised causal chain,28 and tracing the entire casual process will illuminate 
how and why (or why not) the hypothesis that link e-government to trust are realised. 
 
There are both within-case and comparative cross-case analyses (see Figure 2 for an 
example of the relationship between the theory and analyses). The starting point is to 
analyse each case independently (within-case). For each case, the data analysis is 
structured around the two stages of trustworthiness and trust.29 The goal of 
trustworthiness data analysis is to answer the question, how does the introduction of the 
e-service make the public sector entity more trustworthy? For the trustworthiness data, 
the main source is interviews and surveys with the public sector entities that use or 
manage the e-services, as well as the available government reports and other documents. 
One outcome of this analysis is the development of case-specific hypotheses as to the 
trust building potential of particular trustworthiness characteristics. 
 
                                                 
28
 One way to think about this is that it provides the antecedent A for the “if A then B” format of theories. 
Thus it is possible to explore if, when, and in what circumstances B follows from A. 
29
 More details of the analysis techniques can be found in Appendix I. 
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Middle-range e-government and 
institutional trust hypotheses
Institutional trust theory and
ICT in public sector 
administration theory
Use empirical site to develop 
case-specific hypotheses
Within-case analysis 
Tests and refines
Comparative cross-case 
analysis
Tests and refines
Fig
ure 2  A diagram of the relationship between theory, hypotheses, and within and comparative cross-
case analyses. 
 
For the trust analysis, the goal is to answer the question, what are the differences in 
individual perceptions and interpretations of the trustworthiness of the public sector 
entity and why do they vary? Essentially, this analysis puts the case-specific hypotheses 
to the test by seeing if and how they are perceived and interpreted by users. These data 
are mostly drawn from interviews and surveys with e-service users, as well as interviews 
with professionals who come in contact with e-service users, such as Internet access point 
(telecentres) managers.  
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After performing the within-case analyses on each e-service, the next stage of analysis is 
comparative cross-case. This analysis is done at the level of trustworthiness and trust, 
comparing variations in the independent variables to variations in the dependent variable. 
Here, the empirical data provides a test and refinement of the middle-range e-government 
and institutional trust hypotheses (as developed in Chapter 4). Table 3 provides an 
overview of the different elements of analysis and their orienting questions. 
 
 
Table 3 Stages of analysis as they relate to the analytical distinctions of trust and trustworthiness. 
 
1.3  CONCLUSION AND THESIS STRUCTURE  
The contemporary global surge of e-government applications carries with it potentially 
significant ramifications for the institutional structures of governance. In turn these 
institutional structures play a significant role in shaping a country’s developmental path 
with important consequences for their populations. This path is also shaped by the trust 
citizens’ place in these institutions. To understand how e-government potentially impacts 
on development, it is fundamentally important to understand how replacing face-to-face 
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government services (and the generation of new types of services) with Internet based e-
services alters the relationship of trust between citizens and government. This study 
attempts to contribute to our currently limited theoretical and empirical knowledge of this 
new and important contemporary social phenomenon. 
 
The thesis has eight more chapters, and an Afterword. Chapter 2 provides a detailed 
description of philosophical assumptions that underpin the methodological research 
approach taken in this thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 develop the conceptual framework. 
Chapter 3 lays out an account of trust and the particular instance of trust (institutional 
trust) that provides the theoretical understanding of trust in government (rather than, say, 
interpersonal trust). Chapter 4 provides a theoretical understanding of the interaction of 
ICT in public sector administration and then links this back to the institutional trust 
theory in chapter 3 to develop a set of testable institutional trust and e-government 
hypotheses. Chapter 5 begins the empirical component of this thesis with an overview of 
the Chilean social, political, cultural, and ICT context. Chapter 6 and 7 present the two 
cases: the e-tax administration case, and the ChileCompra. These two chapters include 
the case and within-case analyses where the hypotheses are tested. Chapter 8 develops the 
comparative analysis and a discussion of what the findings from this thesis imply for 
theories of institutional trust and e-services. Chapter 9 concludes with a summary 
overview of the findings, a consideration of their policy implications, suggestions for 
future research, and some final comments on future e-service and institutional trust 
dynamics. Finally, the Afterword is an attempt at an honest reflection on the research, the 
research approach, and lessons learned during the course of the PhD.  
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2 METHODOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
 
“To explain a fact is to exhibit the mechanism(s) that makes the 
system in question tick” (Bunge 2004, p. 182). 
 
A consistent research strategy and methodology flow logically from a series of 
philosophical assumptions that provide the orienting framework for the research. These 
assumptions provide researchers with an answer to questions such as: What is the nature 
of the natural and social world? How can we know it? What is the nature of causality? An 
explicit consideration of these questions helps a social science researcher formulate 
appropriate research questions, determines the relationship between theory and 
explanation, and facilitates the communication of any research findings, among other 
things. In other words, these assumptions permeate through all stages of research.  
 
This chapter presents and justifies the underlying philosophical assumptions that provide 
the grounding for the research goals, strategy, and design, as elaborated in chapter 1. It 
does so in four sections. The starting point, section 2.1, is a description of the 
fundamental tenants of scientific realism, the philosophy of science that is the basis for 
the research conducted in this thesis. The following section 2.2, delves into ontological 
assumptions about the nature of the social world, causality, and technology that are 
central to any information systems research. These ontological assumptions are taken 
from critical realism which is one particular version of scientific realism (see: Hunt 2005, 
Niiniluoto 2002). Having established the basis for research, section 2.3 considers the 
implications of these assumptions for research. In particular, the role of theory is 
considered, as the type of theory used by a researcher fundamentally impacts the nature 
of explanation and outcomes of research (Gregor 2006). Theoretical arguments can only 
go so far, however, and some further justification for adopting this approach is required. 
Consequently, section 2.4 makes a pragmatic argument for the use of this research 
approach by showing that it brings with it considerable research advantage. Finally, 
section 2.5 concludes. 
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2.1  SCIENTIFIC REALISM  
This research is grounded in a scientific realist philosophy of science. More specifically, 
the philosophy is closely aligned to critical realism (Bhaskar 1978, Bhaskar 1998b). 
Critical realism adds several crucial ontological assumptions that differentiate it as a 
philosophy of science (Zinkhan and Hirschheim 1992). These ontological assumptions 
will be discussed in the following section 2.2. First, however, it is helpful to better 
understand the fundamentals of scientific realism. Hunt (1990) identifies four tenants: 
classical realism, fallibilistic realism, critical realism, and inductive realism. 
 
Classical realism is the belief that there must be a reality independent of our knowledge 
of it. This does not necessarily imply the “naïve” realism that is so maligned in the 
literature. According to Bhaskar (1978), reality can be analytically separated into two 
layers, the transitive and intransitive. This is the separation of the world of things and 
structures (intransitive) and our knowledge about these things (transitive). This 
distinction is most valuable for sustaining the assertion that our theories refer to 
something outside of subjective or inter-subjective realities. External reality plays a 
crucial role in adjudicating between competing theories.  
 
The transitive/intransitive distinction is also helpful in demonstrating how it is possible to 
combine an objective world of “brute facts” that are not a matter of subjective 
interpretation (Searle 1995, p. 1) with the fact that knowledge is a social construction 
(Berger and Luckman 1967). This is a combination of classical realism with 
epistemological relativism (Archer et al. 1998, pp. x-xi). Epistemological relativism, as 
viewed here, expresses the assumption that there are many different beliefs or theories 
about the world. However, there is no contradiction in the assertion that beliefs, theories, 
social facts, and institutions can exist subjectively or inter-subjectively (in the minds of 
people) and that they are also epistemologically objective (Searle 1995). In this way, 
critical realism combines ontological positions of both “hard” and “soft” research. 
Fitzgerald & Howcroft divide information systems research into two ontological 
positions, the relativist (soft) position where “multiple realities … exist as subjective 
constructions of the mind” and the realist (hard) position where “the external world 
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consists of pre-existing hard, tangible structures which exist independently of an 
individual’s cognition” (Fitzgerald and Howcroft 1998). Critical realism gives voice to 
both the soft position through the acceptance of epistemological relativism and the hard 
position through classical realism. 
 
Critical realism acknowledges that the process of science and its products is historically 
emergent, political, incomplete, and therefore fallible. This provides the basis for 
fallibilistic realism. While there are many different and potentially competing beliefs and 
theories, not all of these beliefs can be equally fallible. Some ideas or theories may better 
approximate reality than others. This simple idea is central to the possibility of science. 
So, while critical realism is considered “ontologically bold” (it is possible to strive for 
objectivity) it is also “epistemologically cautious” (knowledge is subjective and fallible) 
(Bhaskar 1998b, p. 176). 
 
This position, however, still does not solve deeper philosophical problems with respect to 
the nature of truth. Research, natural and social, is predicated on a search for truth (Bunge 
2003). However, two major questions remain unresolved: what is the nature of truth? 
And exactly how can we determine which theories are more true than others? 
Unfortunately, there is not the space here to delve deeply into these issues. In part, this is 
because the exact nature of truth for scientific realists remains a matter of debate 
(Blackburn 2005, Groff 2004, Hunt 1990, Hunt 2005, Psillos 1999, Willmott 2002, 
Zinkhan and Hirschheim 1992). However, rather superficially, there are a few important 
points regarding the position held here. First, the notion of trust that scientific realists 
accept is nuanced and incorporates the insights of the social construction of knowledge 
(cf. Blackburn 2005, Meckler and Baillie 2003, Proctor 1998, Ryan 2005). Second, this 
notion is a metaphysical conception of truth (Willmott 2002) where truth is “mind-
independent” (Psillos 1999, p. 14); that is, a property independent of what people actually 
believe (Meckler and Baillie 2003). For the purposes of this thesis, I assume a 
correspondence theory of truth.30 The correspondence theory of truth states that a degree 
                                                 
30
 For a defence of correspondence theory, see (Willmott 2002) and for a contrarian perspective, see (Ryan 
2005). 
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of truth (or falsity) is a function of how well it corresponds to the reality it refers to (Hunt 
2005, Meckler and Baillie 2003, p. 276). This position contrasts with the relative 
(constructivist, or post-modern) notion of truth. Relative truth is a function of inter-
subjective agreement rather than external reality, and is thus relative to a person, group, 
or culture (Willmott 2002, pp. 343-344). The crucial point here is that external reality 
works as the ultimate arbiter when striving for objective truth. Of course, researchers 
must remain acutely aware of the difficulties they face in achieving that goal.  
 
The difficulty with discerning truth is a reason why scientific realism is critical. Theories 
are fallible and changeable and there should always be competing theories (Danermark et 
al. 2003, p. 117). These theories should be critically accepted and subjected to testing 
following an objective scientific process (Kincaid 1996, chapter 3). Bhaskar defends the 
possibility of a “judgemental rationality” to choose (test) between competing theories 
(Bhaskar and Lawson 1998). Again, we do not have the space here for a complete 
defence of the possibilities of an objective rationality, as that has been ably performed 
elsewhere (see: Kincaid 1996, Meckler and Baillie 2003). This thesis takes the position 
that objective science is possible through a flexible framework of objective principles 
where the criteria for validity and methods for testing can be adapted dependent upon the 
different methods used and the nature of the objects of study (Kincaid 1996).31 
 
Finally, through the process of science and the long-term success of scientific theories, 
scientific realists come to accept them as true. This is the principle of inductive realism. 
Repeated success provides the “reason to believe that ‘something like’ the entities 
contained in the theories actually exist” (Hunt 1990, p. 10). The more that these theories 
have withstood rigorous testing and the accumulation of evidence, the more apt we are to 
accept their truth value. Of course, in the social sciences, particular social theories may 
be true for only a short time. The social reality that is reflected in these theories may be 
relatively enduring but changes in human practices can change the nature of these 
entities. A classic example is how the reflexivity of modern life results in the constant 
                                                 
31
 There are of course strident objections to the usefulness and objectivity of methods in science, most 
notably (Feyerabend 1993). 
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examination and alteration of social practices in light of new information (Giddens 1990). 
Such more transient theories are then more difficult to establish in the same rigorous 
manner. However, many social objects can be understood as they do persist through time. 
For example, despite the wide diversity of democracies over time, it still is possible to 
develop an understanding of the defining features of democracy (Drydyk 2005). In fact, 
the diversity provides a large amount of comparative information that assists in 
understanding the social workings of democracy itself. 
 
2.2  ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS  
While most scientific realists hold some version of all of the above assumptions, critical 
realism goes beyond with specific ontological commitments. Critical realism began as a 
study of the process of natural and social science and asked the question: “what 
properties do societies and people possess that make them possible objects of knowledge 
for us” (Bhaskar 1998b, p. 13)? These are questions about ontology. This section 
discusses several important ontological assumptions made in this thesis.  
 
To avoid confusion, it is helpful to clarify the two meanings of ontology. Ontology, as 
defined by Merriam-Webster is, 
“1: a branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature and relations of being 
2: a particular theory about the nature of being or the kinds of things that have 
existence”.32  
In other words, it is 1) the study of what is, and 2) a theory about what is. Critical realism 
ascribes to an ontology in that it holds a set of theories about the nature of the natural and 
social world.  
 
Critical realists have been criticised as being overly confident in their ontological 
foundations by critics who argue that more anti-foundationalist approaches are preferable 
(Harding 2003, Kiviven and Piiroinen 2004, Peter 2003). A strong critique of critical 
realists is that while they say that their ontology is fallible (and therefore open to change), 
                                                 
32
 Source: Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/ontology, accessed: Nov. 
31st, 2006. 
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they assert their metaphysical statements as if they are infallible (Cruickshank 2004, 
Harding 2003). However, ontological statements are also just theories. In this way, while 
critical realism appears foundational with its “bold” ontology, it can be better understood 
as anti-foundational in that it is merely one set of ontological theories among many that 
currently exist (Cruickshank 2004, p. 583). This is completely consistent with the critical 
realist position. However, where a critical realist must take a firm stance is the belief in 
the existence of an external reality independent from humans. This belief is the base upon 
which critical realism rests, and is not open to debate for critical realists. Indeed, as 
Bhaskar states, “Ontology – and realism – are inexorable. The crucial questions in 
philosophy are not whether, but which” (Bhaskar 1993, p. 205). Consequently, the 
immanent critique of Cruickshank holds, as there remains an inconsistency in the 
position. 
 
The position taken here is that perhaps there may be no way to solve this inherent 
inconsistency. This inconsistency is a feature of all philosophies of science. Science 
would not be possible without the existence of an external reality. The debate, then, shifts 
to the nature of this reality, as Bhaskar suggests (“not whether, but which”) and this is 
where critical realism provides a promising alternative. Thus, here the ontology of critical 
realism is considered just one of many potential ontological theories, but it is a set of 
theories that: 1) work well for underpinning research and 2) provide a more consistent 
basis for research through the resolution of other theory-practice inconsistencies (Smith 
2006). 
 
Given that scientific theories refer to something in the world, these theories implicitly 
contain ontological assumptions. Consequently, any social theory (such as in information 
systems or information technology for development) necessarily contains a set of 
underlying ontological theories (that may or may not be explicitly expressed) regarding:  
a) the ontological nature of causality (natural and social), 
b) the ontological nature of structure, and 
c) the ontological nature of agency (Smith and Madon 2007). 
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If, as is the case in this thesis, a researcher wants to study the use of information 
technology for development, a fourth set of ontological theories are necessary: 
d) the ontological nature of information technology.33 
 
The following discusses the positions taken in this thesis with respect to the above four 
ontological assumptions. The discussions will be at a relatively high level of abstraction, 
focusing on the defining features. When appropriate, the ontological specifics with 
respect to the two cases will be fleshed out in the rest of the thesis. This especially holds 
for the nature of information technology and technologies applied in government 
bureaucracies in general, elaborated in chapter 4. 
 
Causality  
Causality and explanation are intimately related (Gregor 2006, p. 618). Recently 
philosophers of science have begun to substitute talk about causality for scientific 
explanation (Cartwright 2004). Not coincidentally, causality is an especially significant 
and central component of critical realism (Bhaskar 2002, Groff 2004, p. 138). Bhaskar 
takes the Aristotelian argument that one can only know something when you know what 
it causes (Bhaskar 1978). Consequently, to understand some entity in the world is also to 
know the “why” of the entity; that is, what it causes.  
 
At first glance, it seems improbable that there is a notion of causality that could work 
both for the natural and social sciences. Indeed, humans do not appear to respond 
deterministically in the same way billiard balls deflect off of each other; humans are 
arguably self-determining creatures (Taylor 1994). For all practical purposes, we are 
dealing with the phenomena of non-determinate human behaviour (Fay 1994, pp. 102-
102). Regardless, there are countless examples of relatively predictable human behaviour 
that suggest that it is not necessarily problematic to use causality in the social sciences. 
                                                 
33
 Finally, for the field of IT for development it is necessary to conceptualise not just information 
technology but also human development (Sein and Harindranath 2004), or at least clarify the ontological 
status of possible outcomes. For example, in this research, I am interested in whether or not, how, and in 
what circumstances information technologies bring about a more trustworthy state as well as building 
citizens’ trust in the state. In order to empirically explore these outcomes, definitions of what trust and 
trustworthiness are and how they will be manifested empirically must be clearly stated. 
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The research in this thesis is predicated upon the critical realist account of casuality as 
generative mechanisms. Within the philosophy of science, there are several different and 
competing notions of causality. Of course, it is likely the case that different types of 
causality may prove applicable in different situations (Cartwright 2003, Cartwright 
2004). In fact, Cartwright (2003) documents several notions of causality and 
demonstrates their limitations. It is not the purpose of this thesis to argue that the critical 
realist notion is the one correct account. Rather, I am concerned here with the internal 
consistency of the research, from critical realist assumptions through to methodology. 
This thesis argues that the notion of generative mechanism provides just that. 
 
The generative mechanism account states that there is a causal necessity between event A 
and B if and only if there is a mechanism M that when stimulated by A produces B 
(Bhaskar 1998b, p. 10). Seen in another way, this approach is compatible with the notion 
of a “clear box” explanation (Scriven 1994); the generative mechanisms represent the 
internal causal processes that, when stimulated by particular inputs generate particular 
outcomes (Bunge 2004). 
 
To help understand the flexibility and logic of the generative mechanisms notion, it is 
helpful to consider Cartwright’s distinction between “thin causal concepts” and “thick 
causal concepts”. “Thin causal concepts” are formal specifications of causality (such as 
probabilistic theory, modularity accounts, and efficiency accounts) that while they are 
overly restrictive in some situations, contain important observations from particular 
causal situations to bear and thus are useful in different situations. However, when 
applied, these “thin concepts” are too general and do not provide enough information to 
make further inferences. Given that none of these notions holds for all situations, 
Cartwright concludes that there is most likely no universal notion of causality. However, 
she does note that all the formalised thin concepts have something in common, they 
“provide criteria for licensing claims of the form ‘x causes y’ (in circumstances c)” 
(Cartwright 2003, p. 14).  
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Cartwright argues that what is needed are many “thick causal concepts”. A thick causal 
concept is a higher level description of a cause that provides the necessary detail to make 
useful inferences possible. She notes that such thick causal concepts can be seen most 
commonly in “content-rich causal verbs”, 
“…the pistons compress the air in the carburettor chamber, the sun attracts the 
planets, the loss of skill among long-term unemployed workers discourages firms 
from opening new jobs… These are genuine facts, but more concrete than those 
reported in claims that use only the abstract vocabulary of ‘cause’ and ‘prevent’” 
(Cartwright 2003, p. 12).  
Cartwright has gone from metaphysical notions of causality back to the descriptive terms 
used in everyday research and language.  
 
The generative mechanism notion of causality is a highly abstract notion that can provide 
the ontological grounding for the various, more specific, “thick causal concepts” found in 
the social sciences. Of course, the generative mechanisms notion may be a “thin causal 
concept”, subject to its own particular limitations. However, it very closely resembles the 
causal logic, “x causes y (in circumstances c)”. It is this abstractness that provides it with 
the flexibility to underlie a whole range of useful social science thick causal concepts. 
For these reasons, the generative mechanism notion (or a roughly equivalent notion of 
causality) has been argued for and successfully employed by many other social scientists 
(c.f. Bunge 2004, Cartwright 1989, George and Bennett 2005, Hedström and Swedberg 
1998b, Higgs et al. 2004, Little 1998, Moren and Blom 2003, Psillos 1999, Sawyer 2004, 
Steel 2004). 
 
The critical realist notion of causality is unique as it is based upon a stratified reality that 
is broken up into three ontological domains: the real, actual, and empirical (Bhaskar 
1978, p. 13).34 The real consists of the “realm of objects, their structures and powers” 
(Kazi 2003, p. 23). A structure consists of a set of relations that constitute that structure 
(or system) that is held together by bonds of some sort (Bunge 2004, p. 188). Emerging 
                                                 
34
 This differentiation stems from Bhaskar’s analysis of experimental activity:  
“It is a condition of the intelligibility of experimental activity that in an experiment the 
experimenter is a causal agent of a sequence of events but not of the causal law which the 
sequence of events enables him to identify. This suggests that there is a ontological distinction 
between scientific laws and patterns of events” (Bhaskar 1978: 12) 
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from these relations are the particular capacities to behave (causal powers) that are 
“nothing other than the way of acting of a thing” (Bhaskar 1998a, p. 38). Thus, the 
internal relations that constitute the structure of a thing give it both its qualitative 
properties as well as its causal powers. Consequently, an entity is not reducible into its 
constituent parts. Rather, it is more than the sum of its parts as it has emergent, 
qualitatively distinct, causal powers due to the structure of relations between these parts. 
The classic example is that of water: 
“the combination of two hydrogen molecules with one oxygen molecule results in 
water whose emergent properties are new and very different than those of the 
parts taken separately (Sayer 2000, pp. 12-13)” (Smith 2006).  
Only at the composite level does water have the causal ability to “flow” and “get wet” 
that does not exist in the individual hydrogen and oxygen molecules.35 It is the activity of 
these casual powers, the generative mechanisms, that gives rise to all the states and 
happenings in the world (Bhaskar 1998a, p. 34).36 The level of the actual refers to these 
happenings, that is “what happens if and when these powers are activated” (Kazi 2003, p. 
23). Finally, the level of the empirical corresponds to the domain of human experience of 
the states and happenings in the world. 
 
Causation exists at the level of the real, what happens in the actual, and what we see in 
the empirical. This distinction illustrates the ontological difference between the 
generative mechanisms notion of causality and the event regularity notion of causality 
(Sayer 2000, pp. 14-15). Event regulatory causality works at the level of the empirical as 
it consists of observed events. The difference is the ontological depth (Pawson and Tilley 
1997) that exists between the level of the empirical and the real where structures and 
generative mechanisms are found (see Figure 3). 
 
                                                 
35
 Note the use of thick causal concepts here, “flow” and “get wet”. 
36
 Note that the words causal powers and generative mechanisms are often used interchangeably in critical 
realists texts (e.g. Danermark et al. 2003). There is also some confusion in that a generative mechanism is 
seen as a property of a structure (a causal power) as well as the generative process that brings about an 
outcome (event). For simplicity’s sake generative mechanism is used in both senses in this thesis, as a 
causal power of a structure and a process (what it does when it is activated) that generates an outcome. 
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Figure 3 There is ontological depth between the level of 
observable (empirical) and the activities of the generative 
mechanisms that produce the ebb and flow of empirical events.  
Note that the term “Structures” here refers to the underlying 
structures of reality. 
 
The word tendency is used to describe this notion of causality (Bhaskar 1998a, p. 34). 
This word helps express the non-deterministic nature of generative mechanisms. The 
structure of a particular thing (natural or social) does not pre-determine but rather enables 
what can happen (Sayer 2000, pp. 12, 15, 95). These objects exist within a context of 
other objects (with generative mechanisms) and therefore the extent and nature of their 
activation depends upon these circumstances (Bhaskar 1978, p. 173). Describing the 
generative mechanism approach (where causal powers are equivalent to generative 
mechanisms), Sayer lays out four reasons why this is not a deterministic notion of 
causality (Sayer 2000, p. 95): 
1) The existence of causal powers are contingent on the presence of particular 
structures,    
2) The exercise of these powers is contingent, 
3) The outcomes of the exercise of these powers depends on their interaction with 
other contingent phenomena (i.e. other generative mechanisms in the domain of 
the actual), and 
4) The powers themselves can be altered. 
 
The terminology of tendencies has been used before in the information systems literature. 
Indeed, part of the argument made in this chapter is that notions such as tendency fit well 
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with the empirically non-deterministic nature of social phenomena (Smith 2006, 
Walsham 1995, pp. 78-79). A good example of research that is compatible with the 
tendency notion described here can be found in Bellamy & Taylor’s (1998) approach to 
the interaction of ICT and government. Bellamy & Taylor take a social shaping 
perspective while still allowing for a non-deterministic causal role for ICT. For them, 
ICT are inherently “ambiguous technologies”, neither necessarily good nor bad:  
“[technologies] offer fundamental choices to the institutions which control the 
strategic direction of a society. That is, reflexive electronic technologies 
simultaneously hold within them tendencies towards Orwellian control of 
individuals and tendencies towards enriching the experience of employment and 
the meaning of citizenship. Neither tendency can be entirely suppressed, but nor 
does either represent an overwhelming imperative” (Bellamy and Taylor 1998, 
pp. 31-32). 
 
Structure  
A long-standing debate in sociology has been structure versus agency. Ultimately, this 
debate revolves around an ontological position with respect to social objects and forces in 
the world and if and how they causally interact with individuals. Classically, the debate 
has been between individual and holistic positions (Hollis 1994).37 Individualistic 
sociology denies any role of social entities or forces, whereas holistic accounts argue that 
individual behaviour and social change are the products of social forces and individuals 
have little or no agency (Porpora, 1989).  
 
In contemporary sociology, two new perspectives have emerged with unique ontological 
positions that posit the interaction of structure and agency:  structurational and relational 
theories (Porpora 1998). Structuration theory takes a middle way between individualism 
and holism (Jones et al. 2004). The focus is on the “duality” of agency and structure that 
are “dependent upon each other and recursively related”, ultimately reducing both agency 
                                                 
37
 The term holistic might be misleading for some who use the term to refer to an approach that 
encompasses the interaction of all the components. Here holistic is used to refer to the view that the 
individual finds meaning and purpose with respect to the whole of society, rather than individually. 
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and structure to social practices (Rose 1998).38 Critical realists take a relational approach 
that is fundamentally different from methodologically individualist, holist, and 
structuralist conceptions (Archer 1995, Bunge 2004).39 Critical realists hold that social 
structures, such as gangs, churches, and governments have an ontological existence that 
is both autonomous and independent from individuals. Like natural entities, social 
structures also emerge from relations; the relations between humans and between these 
human relations and nature (Bhaskar 1998b). Crucially, these relations are both necessary 
and relatively enduring, implying that they can be studied (Archer 1995, p. 166).  
 
As discussed, the critical realist ontology incorporates substantial ontological furnishings. 
Of these, perhaps the most contentious is the belief that social entities have an ontological 
status, are autonomous, and causally efficacious (Archer 1995). The emergent properties 
imply that these structures are neither reducible to individuals, contra sociological 
individualism, nor reducible solely to the activities of individuals, contra the structuralist 
perspective (Archer 1995, Bhaskar 1998b). To avoid the critique of the reification of 
social structures, the ontological status is sustained through a concept of emergence. 
Social entities are reproduced and transformed through a dialectical process; people 
experience structures as an objective reality and through human activities transform or 
reproduce these structures which form the new social environment of these individuals 
(Bhaskar 1998b, p. 34). However, social entities also exist prior to human activity that 
reproduces those structures which logically implies that they are at least partially 
independent from those activities (Bhaskar 1998b, p. 25). For example, the London 
School of Economics existed long before my stint as a student and will undoubtedly 
continue in the absence of my activities that in part work to reproduce the institution. 
Consequently, critical realists, following Archer’s morphogenetic approach (Archer 
1995, Archer 1996) suggest that the analysis of social change can follow this dialectical 
                                                 
38
 Structuration theory has been extensively employed in interpretive IS and IT for development research 
(e.g. Heeks 2001b, Jones et al. 2004, Kouroubali 2002, Orlikowski 1992, Orlikowski 2000, Walsham and 
Sahay 1999). This approach has a special appeal because it allows for interpretive research to incorporate 
technology as an “interplay between technology and human action” (Avgerou 2002, p. 56). 
39
 See (Stones 2001) for a counterargument to the realism–structuration divide, and ways that the two 
sociological theories can compliment each other. This conception of structure can be traced back to Marx 
(Porpora 1998). 
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process, tracing the interaction of social structure and agency through time; something 
structuration theory fails to be able to do (Archer 1995). 
 
Bhaskar further makes a transcendental argument for the ontological status of social 
structures. One can assume their existence through the evidence of their causal impacts 
(Layder 1998). In other words, emergent social structures have social properties that 
causally impact on the individuals that constitute them as well as on other social 
structures (macro-micro and even potentially macro-macro) (Bhaskar 1998b, Mayntz 
2004, Sawyer 2002, Sawyer 2003). This is crucial because many social phenomena such 
as class structure may not be directly observed or measured, while their impacts may be 
detectable.40  
 
As mentioned, the ontological position of the existence of social entities is not an 
uncontroversial position (Carter 2002, Hedström 2005, Kiviven and Piiroinen 2004, 
Lewis 2000, Little 1998).41 At the end of the day, the actual ontological existence of 
                                                 
40
 These arguments are reinforced by other arguments for the objective ontological status of social entities 
(see: Berger and Luckman 1967, Searle 1995). 
41
 This is especially controversial for individualists or pragmatists who believe that social reality can 
ultimately be adequately explained by aggregating the activity of individuals (Hedström 2005, King 1999, 
Kiviven and Piiroinen 2004, Little 1998). However, even if social structure can be reduced to the existence 
of “other people”, it still maintains a focus on relations as well as the social constraints they place on 
people (King 1999). King, arguing against Archer’s ontological position on social structure outlines his 
individualist position stemming from interpretivism, 
“The interpretive approach insists that society must be understood in terms of individuals and their 
interrelations alone and that any form of ontological dualism which posits a realm of objective or 
structural features is a mere reification which can at all times be reduced to individuals and their 
interactions … The interpretive tradition fully recognises the constraint which society places upon 
the individual … that social constraint stems from the relationships between individuals which 
necessarily limits the kinds of practices which any individual can perform” (King 1999, pp. 222-
223).  
The core of the issue is that it seems highly misleading if not outright impossible to accurately supply a 
completely non-social (strictly individualistic) account of human behaviour as human behaviour always 
involve social predicates (Bhaskar 1998b). To be completely clear, it is the position of this author that, 
following Archer’s (2000b) rebuttal of King (King 1999), if one assumes that something exists for 
methodological purposes, it is only consistent to assert that it exists ontologically with causal effects.  
It is this causal role that makes understanding the relations of social entities fundamental to our 
understanding of human behaviour. Social structure has causal efficacy shaping human behaviours, indeed, 
arguably being necessary for humans to understand the world as a meaningful reality (Berger and Luckman 
1967, p. 130) and engage in intentional human action (Bhaskar 1998b, pp. 34, 36-37). Thus it is centrally 
important to research to understand the nature of the generative mechanisms of social entities and how they 
causally impact on individuals. 
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social structures may be a moot point. Whether they exist or not, what is agreed upon is 
that it is methodologically very useful to maintain the concept of structure (Hedström 
2005, chapter 4, Kincaid 1996, Mayntz 2004, Moren and Blom 2003, Sawyer 2002, 
Sawyer 2003), if only heuristically (King 1999, p. 223).42  
 
Recall that generative mechanisms of social entities emerge from social interrelations 
(Archer 1998, p. 192). An individual is subject to these mechanisms by virtue of their 
position relative to others within these social entities, and society as a whole. 
Consequently, one’s position in this web of relations structures the possibilities and 
reasoning for an individual’s action through the provision of material resources and 
normative ideas (Archer 1995, p. 212). Bhaskar argues that the point of contact between 
the social structure and the individuals who reproduce or transform it – the link between 
structure and agency – is to be found in positioned-practices; that is “positions (places, 
functions, rules, tasks, duties, rights, etc.) occupied (filled, assumed, enacted, etc.) by 
individuals, and of the practices (activities, etc.) in which, in virtue of their occupancy of 
these positions (and vice versa), they engage” (Bhaskar 1998b, p. 41). Consider the 
following example,  
“In the social world, people’s roles and identities are often internally related, so 
that what one person or institution is or can do, depends on their relation to others; 
thus what it is to be a tutor cannot be explained at the level of individuals but only 
in terms of their relation to students, and vice versa” (Sayer 2000, p. 13). 
 
Unlike the direct push or pull of physical causality, a more apt metaphor for this type of 
causality is the rules of chess or the blueprint of a house (Groff 2004, p. 110). Social 
structures are not voluntary actors in the same way as people (Lewis 2000). Bhaskar 
likens the impact of social structures to the rules of grammar – they “impose limits on the 
speech acts we can perform, but they do not determine our performances” (Bhaskar 
                                                 
42
 This is clear in the King quote above where he implies the existence of relations with causal efficacy 
(constrain and enable), even if they can be ultimately explained by referring to other people. Thus, the issue 
of structure gets shifted from the ontological to the epistemological domain. Hedström (2005), whose 
methodological individualism rejects the ontological status of social entities explains this position, 
“From an epistemological point of view, social emergence refers to social properties that cannot, 
in practice, be predicted by knowing everything there is to know about the pre-emergent properties 
of the parts” (Hedström 2005, p. 74). 
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1998b, p. 36). Instead, social entities have causal influence through how they structure 
the circumstances of the agency of individuals, shaping their choices and capacities 
(Bhaskar 1998b, p. 36, Little 1998, p. 202, Pawson and Tilley 1997, p. 66). They provide 
the objective social influences that “[condition] action patterns and [supply] agents with 
strategic directional guidance” (Archer 1995, p. 196). Of course, individuals who occupy 
particular positions can still act with free-will. People “respond” rather than “react” 
(Moren and Blom 2003). However, their possibilities for action are objectively 
constrained and enabled. A classic example is that an individual is always free to act on 
false beliefs. However, this is risky behaviour that will have objective consequences 
despite the actor’s belief system (Archer 2002, Elster 1989, p. 20). For example, I could 
convince myself that this PhD is already completed, but unless the university structure 
and rules change, I must complete several other activities as dictated by my role as a 
student.  
 
Agency  
The voluntarism of individuals means that social change can only be brought about 
through the activity of individuals; “the elementary actor is the wellspring of action, no 
matter how complex are the structures through which action takes place” (Coleman 1994, 
p. 503). Any theory of action (and consequently of social change) must include individual 
level mechanisms that generate intentional human behaviour  (Bhaskar 2002, p. 21, 
Kincaid 1994, p. 511, Little 1998, Sayer 2000, p. 27). In other words, causal mechanisms 
in the social sciences imply inner states on the part of the individuals (Kurzman 2004) as 
the reasons and resources on offer from the structure are “taken up, articulated and acted 
upon” (Archer 1995, p. 253). There are a myriad of sui generis properties of humans that 
are causally efficacious generative mechanisms including reasons, beliefs (Bhaskar 
1998b, Sayer 2000, p. 27) emotionality, memory (continuity of self), desires, reflexivity, 
sense of self, personal identity, and intentional agency (Archer 2002, Carter and New 
2004). Ultimately, these are psychological and socio-psychological mechanisms that 
mediate the influences of social structures, combining desires, beliefs and opportunities 
resulting in human behaviour (Hedström and Swedberg 1998a, p. 23). 
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Fundamentally, this is a naturalist argument that an individual’s personhood, or agency, 
emerges from the individual’s internal biological and cognitive structure that are 
constantly shaped through their interactions and relations with the world (Archer 2000a, 
Archer 2002). According to Archer, an individual, through positive and negative 
reinforcement develops a value system, i.e. their cares and concerns about three orders of 
reality; the natural, practical, and social. It is one’s relationship with these three orders of 
reality that forms an individuals’ identity (personal and social). For example, “one can be 
healthy and tall (natural), a bad cook and clumsy (practical), as well as a mother, student, 
member of a church, and a citizen (social)” (Smith and Seward 2005). As Sen (2002) 
argues, we all have multiple identities. A person is constantly prioritizing and weighing 
these cares and concerns (values) that constitute their identities. Thus, if we wish to 
understand human behaviour, we must understand how structure interacts with the 
prioritized cares and concerns of people.  
 
The critical realist approach to explanation is only partly naturalist, however, as there 
must always be a hermeneutic component (interpretive understanding) in the social 
sciences (Sayer 2000, p. 17). Critical realism has been criticised for being undersocialised 
(Klein 2004). This critique, while it may be valid to a certain extent, overlooks the fact 
that critical realism works at a different level of abstraction than interpretivism. Critical 
realism metaphysics provides the flexibility for the possibility for incorporating both 
causal mechanisms and meaning. Agential mechanisms like interpretations, beliefs, and 
reasons are both causal mechanisms (Sayer 2000, p. 27) as well as inherently meaningful 
(Groff 2004, p. 124). Thus to casually explain individual actions, one must understand 
them: “The interpretation and understanding of the meaning with which persons invest 
different situations and actions becomes of central significance to causal explanations of 
social actions” (Ekstrom 1992, p. 117). Consequently, critical realists are “obsessed” with 
understanding the motives, world views, meanings, knowledge, etc. that are at play in 
determining people’s behaviour (Stones 1996, p. 65). 
 
An individual level theory provides the point of connection between macro and micro 
level processes. The agential mechanisms mediate an individual’s response to different 
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situational stimuli, for example, priming them to be more or less proactive in their 
relationship with structure (Archer 2000a). It is the inability to cope with the diversity of 
agential mechanisms that has been a major problem with many overly simplistic social 
models, such as the self-interested maximiser of classical economics. Subsequent to 
critiques, economists have slowly incorporated more behavioural complexities into their 
model of man (theories of individual action). It is here, perhaps, that the interpretive 
approach to the social sciences has its greatest contribution. Working at the individual 
level, one can try to identify the major agential mechanisms that interact with different 
structural influences, further expanding the depth and breadth of social theory. 
 
Information technology   
The final causal component to any IS study is technology. It is helpful to think about 
technology-in-use as a set of “standing possibilities” (Kallinikos 2002).43 Technologies, 
like other aspects of physical reality and social structure, offer reasons and resources for 
human action. Thus, technology is not causally deterministic over human behaviour, it 
merely works to constrain and enable behaviour. However, the causal mechanisms of 
technology extend beyond the isolated technical artefact and its technocratic logic. The 
manifestation of a particular tendency is dependent not only on its own internal structure 
but also the specifics of human interaction. Indeed, its active use and impacts can extend 
way beyond its originally intended purpose, subject to its material limits, of course.44 It is 
this openness of possibilities that allows for ICT to be “ambiguous technologies” 
(Bellamy and Taylor 1998, p. 31) in their implementation. 
 
                                                 
43
 This approach can be seen in contrast to the interpretive focus on the social shaping of technology that 
made it difficult to incorporate technological factors into explanations. Fortunately, it is possible to merge 
the insights of “interpretive flexibility” (Orlikowski 2000) or the social construction/shaping of technology 
(Howcroft et al. 2004) with the generative mechanism view of technology. 
44
 Discussions of how a particular technology may be interpreted or used symbolically, for example, mean 
that its causal impact may seem to move beyond its physical materiality. Discussion of its role in discourse 
or as a symbol move completely into the realm of human social interaction, and in its essence, the 
technology is no longer causally active. However, this falls outside of the point being made here. The 
discussion above is limited to the actual causal impacts of technology-in-use. In fact, I would argue that the 
extended impacts of technology (for example, as a projection of power) are a consequence of, at least in 
part, its technological logic. 
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To understand technology, it is useful to try to identify the influential generative 
mechanisms inherent in a technology and to show how they work to shape an individual’s 
situation, and therefore scope of possibilities. An example of a similar orientation to the 
causal powers of technology is put forth by Kallinikos (2001, 2002) whose goal is to 
transcend the human-technology interface to discover the core properties of technology. 
The idea here is that it is helpful to have a theoretical understanding of what these 
mechanisms are in order to theorise and test their potential impacts. Of course, these 
causal properties are generally technology specific. Thus, the details of the generative 
mechanisms of e-government systems will be detailed in chapter 4.  
 
2.3  IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH  
The prior sections described the major ontological commitments made for this research 
approach. These ontological assumptions are more than cosmetic, as they have significant 
implications for the activity of research itself (Pawson and Tilley 1997, chapter 1). This 
section focuses on three interrelated implications for research that make it different from 
the paradigmatic approaches to Information Systems research (positivism and 
interpretivism): the nature of explanation, theory development, and generalisation. 
 
2.3.1 CASUAL EXPLANATORY APPROACH 
Critical realist explanation is causal/explanatory (Fleetwood 2001), predicated on 
locating causal powers (generative mechanisms). This raises several important 
epistemological implications. The first is that it is a rejection of the search for universal 
covering laws as the goal of explanation (Elster 1998, Sawyer 2004). Such laws do not 
exist as event conjunctions are, as discussed, “‘phenomenal’ rather than governing” 
(Little 1998, p.193). This implies a reduced concern with empirical conjunctions of 
events, as they are only potentially indicative of underlying mechanisms (Sayer 2004, p. 
11). While there may be no universal regularities, however, there may be partial event 
regularities that “prima facie [indicate] the occasional, but less than universal, 
actualization of a mechanism or tendency, over a definite region of time-space” (Bhaskar 
and Lawson 1998, p. 13). Thus, we should take such regularities as evidence, “and only 
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one kind of evidence at that—that certain kinds of singular causal fact have happened” 
(Cartwright 1989, p. 2).  
 
Second, it is crucial to note that the social world is an open system. As discussed, this in 
part implies that mechanisms are non-deterministic in the generation of outcomes. 
Consequently, deductive prediction is not the goal of realist science (Bhaskar 1998b). 
This does not imply that some qualified prediction is not possible in some situations. 
Rather, explanation does not necessarily equate to prediction. The goal of a realist 
science is to understand and explain these mechanisms (Houston 2001, p. 850), and 
prediction may or may not follow. 
 
Another important implication is that causal explanations are ceteris paribus partial 
causes. This implies that the identification of any particular generative mechanism is only 
a partial explanation (Dupre and Cartwright 1988, Kincaid 1996, p. 65). All outcomes are 
co-determined by a myriad of interacting generative mechanisms (Sayer 2000, p. 95). 
Furthermore, a generative mechanism may be active in a particular setting but the 
particular outcome may not reach the level of the empirical as events may be 
unsynchronized with the mechanisms (Higgs et al. 2004, p. 93) or other co-active 
mechanisms may inhibit or countervail their activity (Bhaskar 1998b, p. 11). 
Understanding the contextual mechanisms that work to inhibit or otherwise alter the 
quality of the outcomes of generative mechanisms is important knowledge. This is a very 
different methodological approach to explanation than the notion of competing covering 
laws that do not allow for the simultaneous operation of causal forces (Cartwright 1989, 
p. 139). 
 
Finally, there are a range of different outcomes that can be described by causal 
explanations. At the extremes we can find both big and little effects. Thinking about 
different types of effects can help us to see how some situations may seem to reflect more 
nomological characteristics while others are more idiographic (see Figure 4). In critical 
realist terms, a big effect is the activity of a generative mechanism that overpowers many 
other mechanisms in the context. For example, Madon (1992) revealed how cultural 
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influences such as caste membership had a large impact on the uptake and use of 
computers in rural development offices in India. These cultural values worked as 
powerful motivations that overrode other potential individual desires or beliefs to use the 
computer system. Essentially, she identified these cultural values as having a big effect. 
Such effects may be readily identified by statistical methods. However, it should be 
understood that statistical methods are really about the outcomes of causes, not the actual 
causal mechanisms themselves (Dupre and Cartwright 1988, pp. 534). Consequently, 
researchers must always be wary that there can be a variety of different causal processes 
that could have brought about the empirical conjunctions found with the statistical 
methods (Dupre and Cartwright 1988, p. 535). On the other hand, a little effect is where a 
mechanism may be active but is not strong enough to have a broad and relatively 
consistent outcome. It is overpowered and/or altered by contextual mechanisms. Such a 
mechanism may result in a wide variety of qualitatively different outcomes. Of course, a 
big effect in one context may prove to be a little effect in another depending upon the 
nature of the context.  
 
Structures
Generative 
mechanisms
Little Effects
[Idiographic]
Big Effects
[Nomological]
Events
generate
 
Figure 4 Structures and their generative mechanisms can 
create either little or big effects depending upon their ability 
to override other active contextual mechanisms. 
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2.3.2 MIDDLE RANGE THEORIES: HOW, FOR WHOM, AND IN WHAT 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
Adopting the generative mechanism notion of causality propels the role of theory to the 
fore in explanation, although arguably theoretical formalisms are central to all social 
science work (Tilly 2004). A generative mechanism is both an intransitive property of an 
existing structure and an analytical construct (theory) used to represent this property. 
Importantly, we must remember that these theories represent mechanisms with 
ontological depth; they do not exist at the same level of real events. Thus, generative 
mechanisms theories are not theories about real events, but are theories about what 
produce them (Moren and Blom 2003, pp. 47-48). Explanation is found in the 
identification and theorisation of the generative mechanisms that bring about social 
change.  
 
This approach to theory is more or less equivalent to Merton’s (1967) notion of middle-
range theories (MRT), an approach that is compatible with the generative mechanism 
notion of causality (Danermark et al. 2003, p. 125, Moren and Blom 2003, Pawson and 
Tilley 1997). MRT are described as follows:  
 “theories that lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that 
evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic 
efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities 
of social behaviour, social organization and social change” (Merton 1967, p. 39).  
Importantly, such theories “are close enough to observed data to be incorporated in 
propositions that permit empirical testing” (Merton 1967, p. 39). In other words, MRT 
fall between universal theories and empirical data (George and Bennett 2005, p. 266). 
 
Theorisation here is fundamentally based on an ideal-typical approach, where the goal is 
to identify the distinctive core properties of the causal mechanism at work. An ideal type 
theory 1) possesses all the relevant features or dimensions of the type and 2) exhibits 
extreme clarity on all the features (Bailey 1994, p. 19). The starting point of theorisation 
is the underlying relational structure with its emergent generative mechanism that 
produces a particular event or semi-regularity. For example, the following chapter 
theorises trust as a particular type of social relationship, with a unique set of necessary 
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characteristics. Trust as a generative social mechanism emerges from this social 
relationship and consequently enables particular behaviours that were not possible 
beforehand. If we want to know what trust is, we have to clearly define the nature of this 
relationship and its necessary characteristics, as well as the resultant tendencies. Thus, an 
ideal-typical theory of a generative mechanism includes its necessary structural 
components with its generative mechanisms that tend to produce a particular outcome. At 
its core, this is the separation of the necessary causally efficacious features from the 
nonessential ones (Shadish et al. 2002, p. 9). 
 
However, to theorise a tendency (that is, a theory of particular generative mechanisms) it 
must include three components, as found in the formulation “x causes y (in circumstances 
c)”. The ideal-typical theory stated above is acontextual in that it states simply: 
mechanism x tends to generate outcome y. It is a mistake to think that explanations in 
terms of simply the causal power is as far as science can go – it should also include in 
what circumstances they are active (Fay 1994, p. 95). Thus, theorisation must include the 
structure that underlies the generative mechanisms (structure of X), the outcome that 
these mechanisms tend to produce (Y), and finally the elements of context that trigger or 
inhibit the firing of these generative mechanisms (C).45 Any explanation must include all 
three of these elements. The end result is that we are interested in, to paraphrase Carlsson 
(2003) and Pawson & Tilley (1997, p. 210), how, for whom, and in what circumstances 
particular mechanisms generate particular outcomes. Consequently, causal explanation is 
both context sensitive (context is important) while not overwhelmed by the details of 
context (context is not everything). 
 
2.3.3 GENERALIZATION 
Theorisation and generalisation of structures and mechanisms require a different logic 
than induction and deduction. The standard thinking on generalisation is that it is 
ultimately an inductive venture (Lee and Baskerville 2003). Generalisation requires the 
uniformity of nature assumption to be invoked, and consequently is never fully justified 
                                                 
45
 Note that this is the same as the CMO configuration (Context + Mechanism = Outcome) formulation of 
Pawson and Tilley (1997). 
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logically. However, the critical realist mode of theorising does not rely on the inductive 
movement from empirical events in one context to empirical events in another context. 
Rather, it moves retroductively (Archer et al. 1998) from an unexplained phenomenon at 
the empirical level of reality to the deeper level of reality (the real) to hypothesise the 
mechanisms that must exist to generate it (Stones 1996) (see Figure 5). Stones explains: 
“Retroduction, for sociology, involves the postulation of social objects of 
mechanisms, with definable powers, whose existence or activation is thought to 
be making, or to have made, a significant causal contribution to a social 
phenomenon that a sociologist wants to explain” (Stones 1996, p.37).  
 
 
Figure 5 From “Two types of generalization” (adapted from Danermark et al., 2003, 
p. 77). Retroductive inference generalization requires the abstraction of the 
underlying fundamental structures and their causal mechanisms that generate the 
empirical outcomes. 
 
Retroduction does not follow the same logic as induction, the logic underlying the 
standard notion of generalisation (Smith 2006). The external validity of generative 
mechanisms hypothesised through retroduction is not dependent upon the uniformity of 
nature, but rather on the internal validity of the abstracted ideal type theory (House 1991, 
p. 8). Events do not repeat themselves, but there are generative mechanisms that can be 
found in different settings. If the same generative mechanism is found in another context 
it will have the tendency to produce the same effects by virtue of its very nature. 
Therefore, the result of casual explanation that extracts the necessary causal features tell 
us what is generalisable to other situations (Shadish et al. 2002, p. 10). This, of course, is 
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not entirely unproblematic. It is still not possible to prove with logical certainty that a 
particular generalisation is warranted.  
 
However, while the same tendency [M] may be found in more than one context, the 
generative mechanisms of the context [C] may be different. Consequently, generalisation 
results from the identification of the ideal type theory M as well as its contingent 
operation in different contexts (George and Bennett 2005, p. 236, Mayntz 2004, Pawson 
and Tilley 1997). Extending this, one goal of social sciences might be to build up a 
topology of mechanism [M] + context [C] = outcome [O] theories (Pawson and Tilley 
1997). The more knowledge that we have of how mechanisms interact and are modulated 
by specific contextual mechanisms, the more informed will be our generalisations as well 
as policy and practice.  
 
2.4  PRAGMATIC JUSTIFICATION  
This section seeks to justify the research approach offered here through a discussion of its 
benefits as a research approach. I have argued elsewhere that adopting critical realist 
assumptions works to overcome theory-practice inconsistencies in other research 
paradigms (positivism and interpretivism) (Smith 2006). This section puts forth two 
pragmatic arguments for the benefits of adopting this approach.  
 
The pragmatic arguments are based on the advantages that this approach offers for theory 
building and social science research. The first argument is that adopting the assumptions 
discussed above allows for the integration of research across different research paradigms 
through its ability to provide a re-interpretation of these theories and findings in light of 
new assumptions. The second argument lists a series of methodological implications that 
aid in theory development. 
 
Mingers (2004) argues that critical realism “subsumes” positivism and interpretivism. If 
the positivist and interpretivist were to adopt critical realist assumptions, then Mingers is 
right. However, subsumption requires that the research from other traditions be re-
interpreted in terms of critical realist assumptions. In fact, arguably the real power of 
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critical realism lies in this re-interpretation of the activity of science (Ron 2002, p. 140) 
to better explain previous research (e.g. Befani 2005, Fleetwood 2001, Pratschke 2003, 
Ron 2002). The end result can then be considered the natural expression of what 
researchers were doing all along as “social science explanations, currently and 
historically, are inherently mechanistic explanations (Bunge 2004, p. 207, Hernes 1998)” 
(Smith 2006, p. 203 italics in original).  
 
The key to re-interpretation is found in the notion of generative mechanisms. If one 
replaces the empiricist, non-essential, notion of causality implicit in both interpretivist 
and positivist research with the notion of generative mechanisms, then it becomes 
possible to re-interpret research in terms of the search for underlying causal mechanisms.  
 
One objection to this type of integration is that different types of research are based upon 
different assumptions that are fundamentally incompatible (Fitzgerald and Howcroft 
1998). However, through re-interpreting the research with new ontological assumptions, 
these incompatibilities can be resolved. For example, if processes are instead explained 
with generative mechanisms, then interpretive and causal analysis are not opposed but 
rather interdependent (Ekstrom 1992, p. 117). Reasons and beliefs can be considered 
causal mechanisms that in part determine human behaviour. However, we may have to 
understand these beliefs to know how and why they are causal, and how they interact 
with other situational ideas and constraints. Indeed, studies of the process and 
assumptions behind interpretivist research reveal the search for deeper causal processes 
(Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al. 2006).46  
 
There are also several methodological benefits derived from the research approach: 
• Allows for theoretical integration across social science disciplines – Through 
the use of middle-range causal theory, it is possible to integrate research from 
across the social sciences. This is because theories can incorporate causes that are 
                                                 
46
 This is in accord with Walsham’s (2006) suggestion that critical realist assumptions are appropriate to 
underpin interpretive research. Earlier, Walsham specifically referred to the notion of ‘tendencies’ (i.e. 
generative mechanisms) as an appropriate conceptualisation of causality for interpretivist generalisation 
(Walsham 1995, pp. 78-79). 
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micro or macro,47 social or natural, as long as they refer to different parts of the 
social and natural world. This approach encourages bringing in relevant 
theoretical material from other sources (Layder 1998, p. 77).  
• Develops practical theory - Middle-range causal theories are very good for both 
practitioners and policy makers (George and Bennett 2005, chapter 12, Pawson 
2003, Pawson 2004, Pawson and Tilley 1997). Applicable theory that informs 
future action necessary involves causality (Markus and Robey 1988), ideally 
including causal variables that can be influenced by the decision-maker (George 
and Bennett 2005, p. 274). 
• Encourages theoretical reflexivity and testing - The focus on ontology and the 
centrality of theory encourages a dialectical research process whereby the 
researcher is actively engaged in theorising based on data and other information 
as well as critically examining and testing these theories (Layder 1998, p. 77). 
This involves explicit reflexion on important underlying assumptions with the 
potential to improve the quality of research (Smith and Madon 2007). 
• Clarifies the object of study which improves the choice of method - The 
primacy of ontology forces a researcher to have at least a preliminary 
conceptualisation of the object of study before engaging in research. This then 
allows for a more informed method selection process based upon the object of 
study, something that is rarely found in the literature (Sahay and Walsham 1995, 
p. 119, Walsham and Sahay 2006). 
• Encourages methodological reflexivity and methodological pluralism    The 
movement from ontology to epistemology, and not the other way around, 
encourages openness to whatever method is best for the research at hand. This 
opens up the researcher to the possibility of a wide variety of methods. 
 
                                                 
47
 This type of theorising is basically identical with the type of theorising proposed by George and Bennett, 
typological theorising: 
“An important advantage of typological theorizing is that it can move beyond earlier debates 
between structural and agent-centered theories by including within a single typological framework 
hypotheses on mechanisms leading from agents to structures and those leading from structures to 
agents. This allows the theorist to address questions of how different kinds of agents (individuals, 
organizations, or states, depending on the level of analysis) behave in and change various kinds of 
structures” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 245). 
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2.5  CONCLUSION  
Underlying the choice of the philosophical assumptions and research approach taken in 
this thesis is a concern with providing a logical and consistent manner to perform social 
science research. A secondary goal is to develop an approach that a) is able to deal with 
the complexities of social science research and b) allows for the possibility of theory-
testing and refinement and ultimately theory-building. One key component of this 
approach is tying theory and explanation to the generative mechanism notion of causality. 
The end result is a causal/explanatory research approach that aims to uncover the how, 
for whom, and in what circumstances particular mechanisms operate. Now this approach 
can be applied to the question of the relationship between e-governance and trust in low-
income countries; that is, how, for whom, and in what circumstances e-services build 
trust in the state. 
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3 THEORY I  &  II:  TRUST AND INTITUTIONAL TRUST 
 
The following two chapters present the theoretical framework for this thesis.  In its 
totality, the theoretical framework begins with a foundation of trust theory and builds up 
to institutional trust and finally culminates with e-government and institutional trust. This 
chapter establishes the first two components of the framework: (1) the sociological and 
psychological understandings of trust (i.e. the core of trust theory) and (2) political 
science theories of institutional trust. Chapter 4 builds on this foundation to develop an 
integrated theory of e-government and institutional trust. 
 
The conceptualisation of trust begins with the assumption that if one is to study trust, then 
it must exist as a social thing. The discussion in Chapter 1 established that the concept of 
trust warrants attention in research and policy due to its causal role in a myriad of social 
relationships and even as foundational for democratic governance. Implicitly, that section 
also argued for the ontological existence of trust. Trust as a social thing is established 
through the causal criteria of existence; that is, we know that trust exists through its 
causal impacts.  
 
This approach is potentially problematic. There are risks, for example, of combining 
different causal functions under the same label, when they actually stem from 
fundamentally different social objects. This is an unfortunate difficulty in social science 
that further highlights the importance of conceptual clarity. The best theory would be one 
that can explain the whole causal chain, from the structure of trust, to its causal 
mechanisms, to the outcomes that people attribute to trust (such as cooperation). 
Completing this pathway provides greater confidence that a conceptualisation is accurate. 
The goal of these two chapters is to complete that chain as thoroughly as possible. 
 
This chapter has two main parts with five sections overall. Part I develops a theory of 
trust. Within part I, the first section (3.1) explores the core of trust. Trust is revealed to be 
a social relationship with two components: objective trustworthiness and subjective trust. 
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Sections 3.2 and 3.3 consider these two components and how they are causally linked by 
cognitive processes based on values, expectations, and the interpretation and assimilation 
of trustworthiness cues. Part II extends the trust theory by delving into one type of trust; 
institutional trust. This part is divided into two sections, the theory of institutional trust 
(what it is) (3.4) and theories of how to build it (3.5).  
 
3.1  PART I:  THE CORE OF TRUST (AND TRUSTWORTHINESS)  
Given the wide range of functions that trust plays in many types of social relationships, it 
is not surprising that there is no consensus definition of trust (Barber 1983, Grabner-
Kräuter et al. 2006, Jones 2002, Tschannen-Moran and Hoy 2000). Definitions of trust 
bring together a wide variety of seemingly related concepts such as faith, confidence, 
alienation, expectations, risk, honesty, openness, social relationships, and many more (see 
Table 4). Trust is defined in a variety of means and from a variety of perspectives. Often, 
trust is defined in contrast to another conceptualisation of trust. For example, trust has 
been conceptualised as primarily a social-structural versus an individual social-
psychological phenomena (Barber 1983), a product of self-interest (Cook et al. 2005, 
Hardin 1991) versus moral/normative motivations (Braithwaite 1998a), ascribed versus 
earned (Harré 1999, p. 256), unwarranted versus warranted (Warren 1999b), predictive 
versus normative (Hollis 1998, p. 10), and blind versus active (Solomon and Flores 
2001). It also has many social instantiations: interpersonal (Leach and Sabatier 2005), 
public (Moon 2003), political (Cole 1973, Kumlin 2004, Levi and Stoker 2000, Mishler 
and Rose 2001), democratic (Brennan 1998, Warren 2004), and institutional (Mishler and 
Rose 2005, Pavlou and Gefen 2004, Zucker 1986), to list a few.  
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Trust is…
“a judgement, however tacit or habitual, to accept vulnerability to the 
potential ill will of others by granting them discretionary power over 
some good” (Warren, 1999a, p. 311)
“the belief concerning the action that is to be expected from others. The 
belief refers to probabilities that (certain categories of) other will do 
certain things or refrain from doing certain things, which in either case 
affects the well-being of the holder of the belief, as well as possibly the 
well-being of others or a relevant collectivity” (Offe, 1999, p. 47).
“confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set 
of outcomes or events, where that confidence expresses a faith in the 
probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles 
(technical knowledge)” (Giddens, 1990, p. 34).
“a bet on the future contingent action of others” (Sztompka, 1999, p. 25)
“the socially learned and socially confirmed expectations that people 
have of each other, of the organizations and institutions in which they live, 
and of the natural and moral social orders that set the fundamental 
understandings for their lives” (Barber, 1983, p. 165).
“a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent 
assess that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular 
action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his 
capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects 
his own action” (Gambetta, 1988a, p. 217).
“to act in such a way as to give another agent power over us” 
(Dumouchel, 2005, p. 425).
“the subjective assessment of one party that another party will perform a 
particular transaction according to his or her confident expectations, in an 
environment characterized by uncertainty” (Ba & Pavlou, 2002, p. 245).
“the sense of correct expectations about the actions of other people that 
have a bearing on one’s own choice of action when that action must be 
chosen before one can monitor the actions of those others” (Dasgupta, 
1988, p. 51).
 
Table 4  Various definitions of trust found in the literature. Common key words 
found in trust definitions are in bold. 
 
There is an inherent tension when conceptualising trust between the breadth of material 
on trust, the depth necessary for the empirical application of any research concept, and 
any attempt to contribute back to trust theory. To conceptualise trust, a researcher must 
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account for this wide diversity of different theoretical and empirical applications.48 This 
diversity presents a problem. Given the wide variety of conceptions of trust, arguably it is 
“whistling nonsense” to claim that there is ‘one’ true meaning of the term (Hardin 1999, 
p. 26). Furthermore, trust in its many (causal) manifestations is most likely not one thing 
with one source, but takes a wide variety of forms (Levi 1998, p. 79). On the other hand, 
empirical research requires a specific conceptualisation. Indeed, several recent books on 
trust have often applied loose conceptualisations of trust (such as in the vernacular) 
resulting in inconsistent and or overly vague grand claims (Hardin 1999, p. 29). Finally, 
unless there is a connection between the applied theory and the other theories of trust, no 
theoretical contribution can emerge. So how can we make these necessary connections? 
 
The philosophical and methodological developments in Chapter 2 present one possible 
way forward. The goal is not to come up with a grand synthesis of trust theory, an 
outcome which may be inconceivable (Gambetta 1988b). The ultimate goal is to logically 
build up concrete and (ideally) testable propositions that connect to the core component 
of trust. This is accomplished through the use of two levels of theory. On the 
foundational level, the theory of trust is an ideal-type theory of the structures and 
mechanisms that constitute trust.49 This is the core of trust. It contains only the essential 
components and leaves aside the contingent, or unessential, aspects. The assumption here 
is, as Jones (2002) argues, that there is something called trust and that most theories take 
into account this common core. This is encouraged by the fact that at least a “minimal 
consensus about its meaning” has emerged (Levi and Stoker 2000, p. 476).  
 
3.1.1 TRUST IS A SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP 
In the literature, the starting point for any conceptualisation of trust is that trust involves 
at least two social actors: where social actor A places her trust in social actor B (Hardin 
1993, p. 507). For example, in the context of this research, a citizen (A) places trust (or 
not) in a particular institution of democratic governance in Chile (B). In other words, trust 
                                                 
48
 Among the prominent social and political theorists that must be seriously considered are Barber, 
Coleman, Fukuyama, Gambetta, Giddens, Hardin, Levi, Luhmann, Sztompka, and Warren. 
49
 This means that for trust to be trust it must have these core structures and mechanisms to some degree. 
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is a type of social relationship, with two purposive actors (Coleman 1994, p. 96, Harré 
1999, Reed 2001). In general, trust is considered possible between a wide variety of 
social actors such as between individuals, between individuals and systems (such as 
institutions), and even between systems (Barber 1983, p. 18).50 Arguably we can speak of 
“gradual, expanding, concentric circles of trust … from the most concrete interpersonal 
relations, toward more abstract orientation toward social objects” (Sztompka 1999, p. 
42).51 Regardless of this abstractness of the social object, however, the logic is the same, 
“We ultimately trust in human actions, and derivatively their effects, or products” 
(Sztompka 1999, p. 46). 
 
Given this, when talking about trust, it is always in reference to a particular social 
relationship or system (Barber 1983, p. 17). This excludes the possibility to trust in things 
such as your bicycle, car, or computer to function consistently and properly. Instead, 
these beliefs are attributed other terms such as a “reliance upon a regularity” (Offe 1999, 
p. 52) or “predictive trust” (Hollis 1998, p. 10). Fundamentally, this distinction points to 
the human characteristics that underlie trust, such as choice, risk, emotions, and the moral 
dimensions of human behaviour. For example, you might be disappointed in the failure of 
your computer to work properly, but it would be a stretch to feel betrayed (Solomon and 
Flores 2001, p. 33). One of the main reasons for this is because the bicycle cannot know it 
is being trusted (Offe 1999, p. 52). This self-awareness involved in trust helps make trust 
what it is. 
 
Viewing trust as a social relationship has important implications. Social relationships are 
embedded. This means that trust includes the interaction of the two actors within 
elements of structure (the structure of the relationship), and not just a social (emotional) 
                                                 
50
 There are, of course, some theorists (most notably Russell Hardin) who contest the ability of trust to 
extend beyond close personal relationships. This issue will be discussed in more detail in section 3.4.2. 
51
 Sztompka lists these objects of social trust as personal, categorical, positional, group, institutional, 
commercial, and systemic (Sztompka 1999, pp. 45-46). 
 71
practice (cf. Solomon and Flores 2001).52 However, even though we view trust as a social 
relationship, the importance of the component of trust as a practice is crucial if we are to 
understand how trust is broken or built. Recall that the relational structure of society 
holds that social relationships are reproduced or transformed through the actions of 
individuals. Trust, like all social relationships, is always in flux; it can be initiated, 
sustained, broken and repaired (Tschannen-Moran and Hoy 2000).  
 
3.1.2 BOUNDARIES OF TRUST: DISCRETION AND RISK 
There is a component of reliability in trust, the perceived and real reliability of the trusted 
actor’s (B) behaviour. This behaviour, however, is always with respect to a limited 
domain: the “boundaries of trust” (Harré 1999). Thus, we can refine the definition above 
slightly to trust as a social relationship where A trusts B to do C “in matters of D” 
(Hardin 2002b, p. 9), or “to act from a certain motivation” E (Blackburn 1998, p. 30). 
This is the behaviour that is expected of the trusted actor given their role in the social 
relationship (Harré 1999, p. 257, Seligman 1997). For example, you may not trust your 
newborn baby to the care of the bus driver, but you probably would trust the bus driver to 
get you to work safely and on time.  
 
This discussion brings up two important elements of trust: discretion and risk. “As 
virtually all writers on trust agree, trust involves giving discretion to another to affect 
one’s interests” (Hardin 1991, p. 507, Hardin 2002b). Reliance on deterministic 
behaviour does not require trust. For Coleman (1994), trust situations are a subclass of 
situations that involve risk; that is, those situations where the risk one takes depends on 
the discretion and performance of the other. From a rational choice perspective, this 
implies that trust is in some way a weighing off of the risk of potential gains and losses 
when deciding to trust another (Coleman 1994). 
                                                 
52
 To reduce trust to a social practice is to perform what Archer (Archer 1995) would call a “central 
conflation”. This is a parallel to fallacy committed by Giddens’ Structuration theory that Archer argues 
conflates the separate but interdependent aspects of agency and structure into agency. To do so eliminates 
the possibility of analysing the interaction of agency and structure through time (Archer 1995). Indeed, at 
the end of the day, Giddens argues for methodological bracketing that just moves the agency-structure 
dualism from the theoretical to the methodological level, at a minimum admitting to its analytical 
importance (Archer 1995, p. 88). This is a methodological shift from an analysis of solely practices to 
include an analysis of the reasons (both structural and internal to the agent) for trust practices. 
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Using trust as a mechanism for dealing with the discretion of others has benefits. Trust 
shapes future possibilities of action, through the changing of a relationship, thus changing 
the situation within which action occurs. The trust relationship establishes a set of mutual 
rights and obligations for both sides of the relationship (Reed 2001, p. 217). A trust 
relationship provides B with the space for discretion, and A is free to behave as if B will 
complete their obligations with respect to C. Placing trust opens up whole new set of 
possibilities that emerge from this freedom and openness to uncertainty (Solomon and 
Flores 2001, p. 50), for both the truster and trustee (Coleman 1994, see chapter 5). 
 
3.1.3 TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS: TWO SIDES OF A TRUST RELATIONSHIP 
In any one situation, there are four extremes of possibilities relating trust and 
trustworthiness: trust may be given but misplaced, trust may be given and well placed, 
trust may be correctly withheld, and trust may be incorrectly withheld. These different 
possibilities highlight the need to differentiate between the subjective element of trust 
given by the truster, and objective characteristics of trustworthiness held by the trustee. It 
has arisen as important in other theoretical and empirical research on organizational trust 
(Mayer et al. 1995) and trust in the state (Hardin 1993, Hardin 1996, Levi 1998, Levi and 
Stoker 2000).  
 
This distinction is not analytically pure as is made evident by the many writers who 
conflate this important distinction between trust and trustworthiness (Hardin 1993, p. 
512, Hardin 1996, Hardin 2002b, Solomon and Flores 2001, p. 56). The confusion arises 
because trust and trustworthiness are both autonomous of each other and dependent upon 
each other. Objective trustworthy features are only trustworthy with respect to the truster. 
Trustworthiness is both an objective feature of the relationship and simultaneously a 
subjective feature of that relationship; that is, trust and trustworthiness are “mutually 
defining” (Solomon and Flores 2001, p. 56). Consequently, trustworthiness must always 
be defined with respect to the social relationship and to the subjective views of the 
trustee. This has important implications for any research on trust.  
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3.1.4 EXPECTATIONS AND VALUES: LINKING TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS 
Connecting trust and trustworthiness is a necessarily subjective core component of trust: 
expectations. It was Luhmann (1979) and Barber (1983) who developed theory for the 
relation between an actor’s expectations and trust. For Barber, trust and trustworthiness 
can only be understood in terms of the truster’s expectations. Recall the definition of trust 
above, truster A trusts trustee B to do C. Thus, trust placed means that truster A has 
expectations that B will fulfil their requisite obligations.53 
 
The expectations a person holds are determined not just by the situation and obligations 
entailed in the trust relationship, but by the values held by the truster. One’s value system 
sets the range of expected and morally appropriate actions, whether or not the trusted 
shares those same expectations or values. In this way, the objective features of 
trustworthiness are determined by the subjective value system of the truster, 
“…definitions of trustworthiness, with regard to both interpersonal and 
interinstitutional relationships, must always be seen in the context of their 
defining values. Shared or differing values will always be important for 
descriptions and analyses of situations of trustworthy competence of fiduciary 
responsibility” (Barber 1983, p. 66). 
In this way we see that values and expectations are the central link that connects the 
subjective and objective components of trust and trustworthiness in a reciprocal social 
relationship.  
 
                                                 
53
 Barber refers to three types of expectations; “the persistence and fulfilment of the natural and the moral 
social orders”, “expectation of technically competent role performance from those involved with us in 
social relationships and systems”, and “that partners in interaction will carry out their fiduciary obligations 
and responsibilities, that is, their duties in certain situations to place others’ interests before their own” 
(Barber 1983, p. 9). Similarly, Zucker (1986, pp. 57-58) argues that there are two major components to 
trust: background expectations and constitutive expectations. Background expectations refer to the “taken 
for granted” attitudes in daily life that include the set of background social knowledge (shared symbols and 
interpretive frames) that are common to a collectivity. Constitutive expectations are those with respect to 
“the rules defining the context or situation”. Ultimately these expectations set expectations of “rationally 
effective and emotionally and morally appropriate” actions” (Barber 1983, p. 9). Sztompka (1999) provides 
a scale of expected conduct, from least to most demanding expectations; instrumental, moral, and fiduciary. 
Instrumental expectations are expectations of regularity, reasonableness, and efficiency. Moral expectations 
are that we expect people to be morally responsible, kind, truthful, and fair. Finally, fiduciary expectations 
are those based on the person’s obligations to others interests. 
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3.2  TRUSTWORTHINESS  
If a truster bases a trust judgement on expectations of trustworthiness, then what can be 
said about the components of trustworthiness?  With regard to the trust A has in B to do 
C, for B to be trustworthy, B must have both the motivation and the competence to do C 
(Hardin 1999, p. 28, Kee and Knox 1970).54 While these two components constitute 
trustworthiness, arguably it is the motivation behind the action that necessitates the need 
for trust. Dasgupta argues that “confidence stems from ability, and trust from a person’s 
underlying disposition or motivation” (Dasgupta 1988, p. 52: see footnote 3). Recall that 
trust only happens when there is discretion with respect to C. Thus, 
“You trust him only because, knowing what you know of his disposition, his 
available options and their consequences, his ability and so forth, you expect that 
he will choose to do it” (Dasgupta 1988). 
In other words, it is only in areas of discretion, where roles are open to negotiation, 
interpretation, and alternative actions, where trust is necessary (Seligman 1997, p. 27). 
Consequently, the focus in this section is on the source of motivations of trustworthiness.  
 
These sources of trustworthy motivations can be found under different names in the 
literature. For example, Zucker (1986) calls them “modes of trust production” and 
Sztompka (1999) calls them the “foundations of trust”. This analysis starts from 
Williams’ (1988) analysis of cooperation that helps us to analytically consider the 
different types and sources of motivations that encourage cooperation (or in this case, 
trustworthy behaviour). First, it is possible to identify two levels of sources of 
motivations: macro and micro-motivations. These two sources are generally reflected in 
the literature by the dichotomies that emphasise social-structural or social-psychological 
types of trust (Leach and Sabatier 2005). Within each of these levels there are two types 
of motivation: egoistic and non-egoistic.55 This represents another dichotomy in the trust 
literature, that between rational self-interest accounts (Cook et al. 2005, Hardin 1991, 
                                                 
54
 These words have many synonyms in the literature, such as fiduciary and technical competence (Barber 
1983). 
55
 Not surprisingly, these four types of trustworthy mechanisms fit easily into line with the two ontological 
components of social reality a relational structure and agency. Note that this also parallels Sztompka’s 
(1999) three dimensions of trust: relational, cultural, and psychological. 
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Hardin 2002b) and normative, moral, and emotional accounts of trust (Blackburn 1998, 
Lewis and Weigert 1985).  
 
Here we are talking about the actual social and psychological structures that combine to 
generate the motivational tendencies to engage in trustworthy behaviour. These 
motivations flow from the interaction of several mechanisms: internal psychological 
structures, the cultural ideas that provide the normative obligations to trust, and the 
structure of the relationship. Put in other terms, these structures provide the ability 
(physical and psychological), motivation (personal values, norms), and incentives 
(structure, cultural norms) to fulfil the expected obligation. Of course, these influences 
interact, and thus the differentiation between them is not always so clear.  
 
It is useful to categorise these trustworthy behaviour encouraging mechanisms into four 
groups (see Table 5): 
• Relational structure incentive system (Macro-egoistic) – These motivations 
flow from a person’s social position that shapes their structural incentive system 
(the fear of sanctions, the reward of benefits). External motives are social 
constraints (Hardin 1996, p. 31) and incentives to fulfil obligations56 (Dasgupta 
1988, p. 50). There are a whole series of these types of mechanisms. To give a 
relevant example, transparency and accountability mechanisms provide incentives 
for workers to conform to their accepted work practices, or face punitive 
penalties.57  
• Cultural (Macro non-egoistic) - These motivations are the cultural norms and 
values that encourage trustworthy behaviour, for example, the value of ethical 
reciprocity, or of a general duty of fidelity (Levi 1998, pp. 88-89, Williams 1988, 
p. 10). Of course, not all cultural norms are conducive to trust. There may be 
                                                 
56
 Taking an economic perspective Dasgupta writes, “if there is an absence of suitable punishment, that is 
incurred loss, for breaking agreements or contracts, individuals will not possess the appropriate incentives 
to fulfil them” (Dasgupta 1988, p. 50). 
57
 For example, “Effective organizations create a set of monitoring, auditing, and insurance arrangements to 
guarantee maintenance of competence and to forestall or compensate for failures of fiduciary 
responsibility” (Barber 1983, p. 22). 
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cultures – such as in “low trust” societies – where the normative value is not to 
trust in others (Fukuyama 1995). 
• Self-interest (Individual egoistic) – Clearly people have egoistic motivations. 
These self-interest motivations can work to align interests between the truster and 
trustee making the trustee more trustworthy. In fact, it is due to these egoistic 
motivations that trust is necessary; there must be some conflict between values, be 
they moral or self-interested, to even bring about the problem of trust (Dasgupta 
1988, p. 53).  
• Moral obligations (Micro non-egoistic) – The term non-egoistic expresses a 
value that transcends individual and rational self-interest.58 These values are 
linked with emotional cares and concerns that are motivating (Lewis and Weigert 
1985). For example, the emotional desire to be seen as trustworthy can drive 
behaviour (Dasgupta 1988, p. 53, Petit 1995, Tyler 1998, p. 288).  
 
  Types of motivations 
  Egoistic Non-Egoistic 
Level of 
motivation 
Macro 
Relational 
structure 
incentive system - 
“the fear of 
sanctions of the 
sovereign”. 
Cultural norms and 
values of 
trustworthiness such 
as; cooperation, 
honesty, fairness, and 
openness. 
Micro 
(psychological, 
socio-
psychological) 
Self-interest – 
rational 
calculation of self 
interest, emotions 
Moral obligation  
Personal identity, 
moral/value system, 
friendly relations, 
love 
Table 5 Types of motivations and their instantiations at both macro (e.g., culture, institution, 
and group) and micro (individual). 
 
                                                 
58
 These are often referred to as the moral component of trust. Hardin argues that if there is a moral residue 
to trust, this residue most likely pertains to trustworthiness rather than trust (Hardin 1996). 
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These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. For any trust relationship, any 
combination of these elements may be simultaneously coactive. Indeed, the co-operation 
of these mechanisms is often necessary59 and different types of trusting relationships may 
be based upon different mechanisms to varying degrees. For example, interpersonal 
relationships may contain elements of caring about the relationship and its corresponding 
motivation of moral obligation as well as the cultural norm of fidelity to your friends 
(Solomon and Flores 2001, p. 105). Institutional trust, on the other hand, may be based 
more on cognitive considerations of structural incentive systems and self-interested 
calculations than knowledge of individual motives, emotional concerns, or the norms of 
fidelity (Lewis and Weigert 1985, p. 793).60  
 
3.3  SUBJECTIVE TRUST  
While trustworthiness can (to an extent) be considered ontologically objective (i.e. exists 
independent of an observer), trust as a cognitive state is ontologically subjective (Searle 
1995). At some point there is some cognitive activity that decides, calculates, or 
somehow “forms” a subjective state that is trust. Referring to trust as a subjective state of 
mind separates it from its behavioural manifestations (Kee and Knox 1970). The 
subjective/behavioural distinction is not always clear or agreed upon in the literature. 
Often the two are run together, despite their need to be separated (Hardin 2002b, 
Möllering 2001). In contrast, Dumouchel (2005) recently argued that the cognitive 
component to trust does not add any explanatory benefits and instead should be replaced 
by a more simplistic view of trust as an action; as trusting behaviour. Gambetta (2005) 
and Sztompka (2005), in their responses to Dumouchel, rather forcefully took umbrage 
with his proposal, arguing that Dumouchel misunderstood their arguments and then both 
reasserted the importance of the cognitive component of trust. One point that Dumouchel 
makes that is certainly true is that the issue has strong methodological import. 
Fundamentally, Dumouchel’s proposal opts for simplicity and masks over the complexity 
of human cognition by replacing it with a black box, arguing that only the outcome 
                                                 
59
 The classic expression that “‘Every man has his price” demonstrates clearly that “no one awards an 
infinite weight to his own honesty” (Dasgupta 1988, p. 54). 
60
 Here the power of both a relational sociology and viewing theories as partial causes for integrating 
theories can be seen. 
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matters. This approach ultimately greatly restricts the application of quite a lot of 
knowledge and important analytical distinctions that usefully inform research (cf. 
Möllering 2001). 
 
3.3.1 TRUST & KNOWLEDGE 
Trust as a subjective judgement is, by definition, based on information. Trust falls 
between full knowledge and total ignorance. In situations of full knowledge trust is not 
necessary. Trust only comes into play under conditions of ignorance61 (Gambetta 1988a, 
p. 33, Giddens 1990), when there is a choice that is made before one can monitor the 
others actions (Dasgupta 1988, p. 51). This implies that trust requires a suspension of 
belief, some level of faith, that bridges the gap between the unknowable and expectation 
(Möllering 2001).  
 
However, some knowledge is required for there to be trust. Trust that is based on no 
knowledge is not trust, but rather something that is termed faith, “blind” trust (Offe 1999, 
p. 49, Solomon and Flores 2001), “naïve” (Ankersmit 2006), or “pathological trust” (Kee 
and Knox 1970). If there is no information that can work to confirm or disprove a trust 
relationship, then there is no way to alter or change this relationship. Trust, however, 
must be underpinned with some reason, some “warrant”, to trust in the other’s 
competence and motivations (Warren 2004).  
 
Exactly how much knowledge is necessary (or how much is too much) to fall in the trust 
range is uncertain, and to my knowledge, unexplored in the literature. It does, however, 
enter into theorists’ assertions of what constitutes trust and what does not. An obvious 
and relevant case in point is Hardin’s argument that trust in institutions is not possible for 
epistemic reasons (Hardin 1991). According to Hardin we simply cannot know enough to 
trust. This debate will be discussed more thoroughly later (see: 3.4.2) as it carries 
potentially important conceptual and methodological implications for this study. For now, 
                                                 
61
 In Giddens’ analysis of modernity, trust has importance when there is an absence of time and in space in 
social relations.  
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the important point to take away from this discussion is the role of knowledge for trust 
relationships.  
 
3.3.2 TRUSTWORTHY CUES 
The importance of information implies that there must be some means of communicating 
(purposefully or not) the information upon which the subjective trust judgement is based. 
In this study, this communication happens through the signalling and perception of 
trustworthy-cues (Sztompka 1999). The perspective taken here takes the basic ideas from 
Bacharach & Gambetta’s (2001) and Gabetta & Hammil’s (2005) work applying the 
basic notions of “signalling theory” from economics, biology, and game theory, to trust. 
Building on the notion that trust is ultimately supported by some cognition, when people 
make trust judgements, “they look for signs that manifest these properties” (Gambetta 
and Hamill 2005, p. 10 italics in original). In a study of taxi drivers who have to make 
quick judgements on the trustworthiness of potential fares, Gambetta & Hamill (2005) 
found that they did indeed pay attention to particular trustworthy signs. The main details 
of the theory are less important than the underlying insight. That is, potential trustees 
emit, consciously or otherwise, signs of their trustworthiness. These trustworthy cues are 
then picked up on and inform the truster’s trust calculus. In other words, trustworthiness 
cues are gleaned through interaction over time.62 These are the “various clues – reasons, 
predilections, and rules – which make people grant or withdraw trust, and choose specific 
                                                 
62
 The idea of developing trust through interaction has also been developed in Zucker’s notion of process-
based trust (Zucker 1986). Through this a reputation may be built. Reputation is “simply the record of past 
deeds” (Sztompka 1999, p. 71). Thus, reputation is seen as developed through ongoing process of repeated 
interactions that builds up into a “common, and socially held, understanding of a person’s standing with 
respect to trustworthiness” (O'Hara 2004, p. 71). A positive reputation is arguably equivalent to a type of 
capital, and Dasgupta argues that it is economically worthwhile to invest in the building of a reputation of 
honesty (Dasgupta 1988). Reputation can come either through direct contact or from secondary sources 
(Sztompka 1999); such as holding the appropriate credentials and expertise (O'Hara 2004, p. 72). 
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type[s] of trust” (Sztompka 1999, p. 69).63 Of course, a variety of trustworthy cues can be 
coactive and reinforce each other.64  
 
3.3.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF TRUSTWORTHY CUES 
Focusing on trustworthy cues shifts that assessment of trustworthiness from an judgement 
of a person, group, or institution to the assessment of the credibility and informational 
quality of the trustworthy cues that they communicate. Since it is impossible to fully 
know the motives of the trustee (you can not “get into the head of another”), trusters 
always deal with second-best indicators that are necessarily imperfect reflections of 
objective trustworthy qualities (Offe 1999, p. 48). Furthermore, not all trustworthy cues 
are equal; some are more convincing than others. The quality of information is dependent 
upon a variety of factors including: visibility, clarity of criteria (comprehensibility) 
(Sztompka 1999, pp. 82-83), salience, and memorability (Kumlin 2004, p. 13). As 
information is less clear, less visible, and less memorable, we would expect it to be less 
effective as a trustworthy cue. 
 
The credibility of trustworthy cues is also important, by definition – trustworthy cues 
must themselves be trustworthy for them to have an impact. The credibility of 
trustworthy cues varies depending upon at least two variables: the source and the 
possibility of mimicry. There are two types of sources through which trustworthy cues 
can be communicated: direct and indirect (Kumlin 2004). Direct communication comes 
through personal experience and interaction, such as an iterative experience of 
cooperation (Bateson 1988). Indirect trustworthy cues are information that is mediated 
                                                 
63
 Some types of trust are based on the focus of the trustworthy cue. For example, in Zuckers’ (1986) modes 
of trust production she outlines three types of trust that emerge from different types of information: 
information based on processes, characteristics, or institutions. 
64
 In general, we would expect that these cues communicate both the competence and motivation of the 
trusted. Sztompka (1999) identifies six types of trustworthy cues. At the micro-level (information about the 
social actor) there are performance, appearance, and reputation. At the macro-level (information about 
socio-cultural structures) are accountability, pre-commitment, and trust-inducing situations. There is no 
need to elaborate on most of these cues here as their specifics become more relevant when considering a 
particular type of trust relationship. For example, Zucker’s characteristic-based trust is based fundamentally 
on appearance, such as ethnicity, but it might be enhanced in a trust-inducing situation, where “background 
understandings will be held in common” (Zucker 1986, p. 61). Tyler (1998) talks about trust that is based 
on social bonds and shared identities. This trust can draw from a whole range of trustworthy cues including 
reputation, accountability (to a group), and appearance (identity). 
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through a secondary source, such as friends, relatives, experts, politicians, and the media. 
Depending upon the source and the trusters opinion of the credibility of the source, the 
weight of the information as a trustworthy cue will vary. Secondly, the credibility of a 
cue is a function of the ease to fake that cue (Gambetta and Hamill 2005). For example, 
effective con artists exploit easily faked trustworthy cues such as sincerity and concern 
for others.  
 
3.3.4 A STREET-LEVEL EPISTEMOLOGY OF TRUST 
Trust is often considered from the same perspective as truth, as a universal. A good 
example is the differing uses of prisoner’s dilemmas or game theory to analyse the 
situations under which trust may arise. Man is deemed a rational, self-interested creature 
and will (should) act according to objective criteria. This type of exploration has a lot to 
show for it in developing conceptual insights into trust. However, it does not incorporate 
a more intuitively plausible model of man and it does not consider trust as a cognitive 
problem for an individual.  
 
This can be seen by considering the importance of trust representations. Drawing on 
Adam Smith’s notion of the impartial spectator, Ankersmit (2006) argues that man is a 
representational being. Trust, then, is a particular sort of representation of the other in the 
mind of the truster. Rather than a non-socially embedded actor making a judgement based 
upon their self-interest and some limited notion of the other, people form complex 
representations of other social actors, upon which they base trust. This brings into play 
the knowledge of the other, communication, social interaction, etc., that does not find a 
place in the simplistic rational trust games that trust theorists often use (Ankersmit 2006, 
p. 33). This has interesting implications. A trust representation itself is the criteria upon 
which a trust judgement is made. There are no appeals to external universals, or to the 
‘truth’ of the objective characteristics of trustworthiness.  
 
To understand trust, then, we need to understand to some degree the inner workings of 
the mind of the truster. What is needed is a perspective of trust that takes into 
consideration the realities of interpretation (Möllering 2001) and limitations of human 
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cognition and action, as well as a model of how trust is learned (Hardin 2002b). We are 
not interested in the objective characteristics of the trustworthy cues, but rather what cues 
are relevant, why, for whom, and in what circumstances. Hardin recognised this need 
when he developed his “street-level epistemology of trust” (Hardin 1993),  
“For the understanding of trust (and other behaviors as well), we require not a 
philosophically general epistemology of knowledge, but a street-level 
epistemology. The economic theory of belief focuses on the individual believer, 
not on the matter of belief (e.g. the height of Mont Blanc), on the costs and 
benefits to the individual in coming to have various beliefs” (Hardin 1991, p. 
507). 
 
The starting point is the assumption that trust is learned, like any other generalisation 
(Hardin 1991). How trust is learned is not entirely clear. One perspective is that trust is a 
subjective continuum, and that how much trust one has is a point on that continuum (Kee 
and Knox 1970). Others view trust as a “threshold point, located on a probabilistic 
distribution of more general expectations” (Gambetta 1988a, p. 218). Coleman (1994) 
envisioned a trust judgement as a rational calculation based upon the potential loss or 
gain from trusting with respect to the probability of trustworthiness. Hardin uses a 
Bayesian account of knowledge to make his example of how information and experience 
are incorporated into a trust judgement,  
“In a Bayesian account of knowledge, for example, I make a rough estimate of the 
truth of some claim – such as that you will be trustworthy under certain conditions 
– and then I correct my estimate, or ‘update,’ as I obtain new evidence on you” 
(Hardin 2002b, p. 113).  
In general, the basic idea is that new information is entered into the calculus shifting the 
amount of trust (Dasgupta 1988).65  
 
While the terminology used here sounds rational (e.g. rational calculation), this trust 
“calculation” contains elements beyond purely rational considerations. First, trust 
includes a passive element – that is, a surrendering “suspension” – that enables the not 
rationally calculable leap that is necessary for trust to bridge the void of not knowing 
(Blackburn 1998, Möllering 2001). Second, this suspension and calculation includes 
                                                 
65
 Also, this “calculation” is most likely not something that enters ones awareness, instead trust is less of a 
choice and more of something that just happens  (Hardin 2002b, p. 119). 
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more than just calculable economic incentives. Trust involves both cognitive, normative, 
and affective components (Lewis and Weigert 1985, Solomon and Flores 2001). 
Theoretically, combining cognitive, normative, and effective components is easily done 
when the common underlying component is found. The common denominator is values. 
Recall that at the core of one’s personal identity is a set of values that shapes how the 
person relates to the natural, practical, and social worlds. This identity has particular 
concerns such as social status (pride) and respect (social reputation) (Tyler 1998). Not 
surprisingly, Tyler (1998) found that greater pride in work and being treated with respect 
increased voluntary conformity to group rules as well as feelings of obligations to comply 
with laws. Thus, the entire calculation must somehow balance off self-interested loss/gain 
calculations with the loss/gain that comes from following or eschewing one’s normative 
system as shaped by the core of one’s personal identity.  
 
This conceptualisation provides a very rough description of the relationship between 
experience, information, and trust. Here it is helpful to turn to the discipline of social-
psychology and psychology. One of the most agreed upon aspects is the asymmetry of 
trust; trust is easier to destroy than to build. This phenomenon raises some interesting 
questions. Why do some people continue to trust or distrust despite a preponderance of 
evidence to the contrary? What would make them change their mind? To give a 
preliminary answer to these questions, and others, I will discuss a few of the better 
understood individual level mechanisms that shift this dynamic: trusting disposition, 
trusting heuristics, cognitive inertia, the problem of induction, the coercion-trust 
interaction, and finally one’s value system.  
 
Trusting disposition  A common component in trust research is a notion of the 
trusting disposition. This is generally represented as a variable added onto a model of 
trust such as “trust propensity” or “disposition to trust” (e.g. Kim 2000, McKnight et al. 
2002a, McKnight et al. 2002b, Pavlou and Gefen 2004, Warkentin et al. 2002).66 
                                                 
66
 McKnight et al. (2002b) theorise that there are three components of a disposition to trust (faith in 
humanity, faith in professionals, and trusting stance) as well as a disposition to distrust (suspicion of 
humanity). 
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“Trusting disposition” refers to the simple idea that some people are in general more 
trusting than others, they have a greater “ability” to trust (Hardin 2002b). It is a 
personality trait that is thought to be learned from infancy where, for example, people 
who grow up in more capricious and fractured conditions have impeded development 
(Hardin 1993, Hardin 2002b, Sztompka 1999). Giddens (1990, 1991) likens this trusting 
disposition, or “basic trust” in his words, to an individual’s own sense of trustworthiness 
that provides a basis for self-identity (Giddens 1990: 94). In other words, a trusting 
disposition represents one’s own trust in trust (Ankersmit 2006) – that is, trust in their 
own subjective trust representation.67 
 
Trust heuristics A central problem of trust, as indicated, is related to incorporating 
trustworthiness information: the lack of it, its complexity, having too much of it, having 
to get it, and how to process it. To effectively deal with these issues, people employ trust 
heuristics (Hardin 1993). These are cognitive and information economizing tricks that 
allow individuals to make trust judgements in light of imperfect and incomplete 
knowledge, as well as limited cognitive facilities (bounded rationality). For example, we 
might expect citizens to focus on salient low-cost pieces of information (Bianco 1998, p. 
246). Furthermore, Scholz (1998) showed that people can learn a trust heuristic in one 
context and apply it in others, as well as adaptively applying them depending upon 
variations in the context. It is arguable that trust heuristics even produce behaviour that is 
better than rational in that it allows individuals to cooperate in a broad range of 
environments (Scholz 1998). 
 
Cognitive inertia Once a mental representation is created, people tend to stick with 
these representations. There is a plethora of psychological research on individuals’ biases 
towards the preservation of theory, or cognitive inertia.68 People in general have a strong 
confirmation-seeking bias, where they easily accept new confirming information, but 
                                                 
67
 Interestingly, those who are also in general more trusting tend to also be more trustworthy, “… those who 
are more willing to trust other people are likely to be equally trustworthy in that they are less likely to lie, 
cheat, or steal” (Good 1988, p. 32).This disposition also brings with it other benefits, those who are more 
willing to trust are also “less likely to be unhappy or maladjusted, and are typically more liked by their 
friends and colleagues” (Good 1988, p. 32)! 
68
 See  (Good 1988) for an overview. 
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rarely seek disconfirmation, and even do their best to avoid it. Furthermore, ambiguous or 
incomplete data will be interpreted in line with preconceived theory, reinforcing their 
preconceptions. People will also generally fail to re-evaluate old procedures if they fail, 
brushing off new negative evidence. In this way, doubt has the insidious capacity of being 
self-fulfilling, regardless of the evidence. This implies of course, that those who are 
trusting will tend to stay trusting, and those who are distrusting will also tend to remain 
suspicious. 
 
Knowledge and the problem of induction  The existence of cognitive inertia 
would seem to contradict the asymmetry of trust. Why would trust be easier to build than 
to destroy? One potential explanation is that trust suffers from the epistemic problem of 
induction. As Popper argued, it is impossible to prove something, while a single instance 
may disprove.69 The same holds true for trust (Gambetta 1988a, p. 233, O'Hara 2004, p. 
263).70  
 
Coercion, trusting, and trust Humans are incredibly socially adept creatures and 
appear to automatically adjust their own trusting responses to the extent of control 
mechanisms and trust placed in them. The two extremes of any situation of dependency 
between two actors range between fully trusting (if blind) and fully coercive.71 The two 
ends are essentially mirror opposites and excessive reliance on one end results in 
reinforcing cycles. At one end, if one is extended trust, it is an effective way to build 
trust. This is the “cunning of trust” (Petit 1995) and is predicated on satisfying the human 
desire to be trustworthy and perceived as such. Thus, trusting may build trust. At the 
other end, coercion may “crowd out” trust. If people have instrumental reasons for 
performing an action, this undermines the internal normative sense (non-egoistic) of 
obligation to perform that action (Tyler 1998, p. 290).  
                                                 
69
 The relevance of counter arguments to falsification are not relevant to discuss to make this argument. We 
are concerned with the individual epistemology of trust, and thus a single disconfirmation – for example, 
untrustworthy behaviour, can in many situations disprove someone’s motivations. 
70
 Gambetta wrote “while it is never that difficult to find evidence of untrustworthy behaviour, it is virtually 
impossible to prove its positive mirror image” (Gambetta 1988a, p. 233).  
71
 As discussed, each of the extremes does not qualify as trust as in the former there is no knowledge upon 
which to base a judgement and the later leaves no room for discretion. 
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Values  According to the model of man adopted in this thesis an individual’s value 
system forms the core of their personal and social identity. A person’s values shape their 
expectations and in this way what they believe is trustworthy. This has been 
demonstrated in a few studies that link an individual’s value system to trust in particular 
institutions. In a theoretical sense, institutions are inherently about maintaining stability 
and social order. Consistent with their predictions, Devos et al. (2002) found that people 
in general believed public sector institutions that stress stability, protection, and 
conservative values more trustworthy than those that emphasised independent thought 
and change. In a more nuanced study, Valerie Braithwaite (1998b) hypothesised that 
those with different value systems (security versus harmony)72 would respond to different 
institutions differentially. She found, as predicted, that those with value orientations in 
line with the values of the institution found the institutions more trustworthy. Braithwaite 
also shows how this happens: value systems shape expectations that make different 
trustworthy cues salient. 
 
Power and credible commitments  Power, like trust, is a relational concept and 
is a component of all trust relationships (Warren 1999b, p. 324), whether it is evenly 
distributed or highly asymmetrical. While some have argued that horizontal relationships 
involve trust and vertical relationships involve power and compliance (Cook et al. 2005, 
p. 45), others argue that if power is a component of all relationships, trust within 
asymmetries of power must be possible (Farrell 2004). Trust and power are, in fact, 
intimately related. A person in power has more alternatives available in the given 
relationship, effectively making the relationship less attractive. The powerful party can 
extract benefits without fear of reciprocation (Cook et al. 2005, p. 42). This implies that 
the powerful person’s trustworthiness, in terms of motivation, is compromised.  
                                                 
72
 Braithwaite identifies two sets of competing values that are especially salient as they underlie trust 
norms; security and order versus harmony. The harmony value system “brings together social and personal 
values with goals of furthering peaceful coexistence through a social order that shares resources, 
communicates mutual respect, and cooperates to allow individuals to develop their potential to the full” 
(Braithwaite 1998b, p. 49). Security “brings together personal and social goals and modes of conduct that 
are considered important for protecting oneself or one’s group from oppression by others” (Braithwaite 
1998b, p. 49). 
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Power asymmetries have psychological impacts on the truster. People in general will, 
when possible, avoid relationships with extreme imbalances of power as they are unlikely 
to benefit from them (Farrell 2004). Furthermore, those in power and their subordinates 
apply different trustworthy cues in their trust judgements of each other (cf. Tschannen-
Moran and Hoy 2000). While those in power were concerned with competence, the 
subordinates viewed benevolence and openness (indications of the president’s motives) 
as more important.73 Subordinates are also much more concerned with, and spend much 
more cognitive effort, on the issue of trust and “trust violations ‘loom larger’ than 
confirmations of trustworthiness” (Tschannen-Moran and Hoy 2000, p. 573). 
Furthermore, subordinates tend to interpret the actions of the person in power in a 
negative light (Cook et al. 2005, p. 43). 
 
3.3.5 SUMMARY 
Part I of the theory development lays out an ideal type theory of trust that will serve as 
the foundation of the theoretical framework used in this thesis. At its core, trust is 
conceived of as a dynamic social relationship characterised by one actor placing 
discretion in the hands of another with respect to a particular domain of trust (A trusts B 
to do C). To understand the dynamic of the relationship it is essential to both understand 
both sides (A and B) as well as how they are connected. This was accomplished by 
establishing the trustworthiness/trust distinction and showing how they are connected in 
a relationship by the expectations of the truster. Trustworthiness is the objective 
characteristics of the trustee (B) that determine B’s competence and motivations to 
perform according to C. Drawing together macro and micro forces, motivations were 
found to be caused by structural incentives, cultural norms, and individual egoistic (self-
interest) and non-egoistic (moral obligations) mechanisms. Trust, on the other hand, is 
the subjective judgement of the truster (A) of the trustworthiness (competence and 
motivation) of the trustee (B) with respect to C. Trust is a judgement that falls between 
                                                 
73
 This should not be surprising as the differentials in power mean that the president can institutionally 
shape the motives of individuals (making competence the important characteristic), while subordinates are 
subject to the discretion of the president (making his motives most salient).  
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full knowledge and total naivety; it always requires some lack of knowledge and 
therefore a cognitive suspension that enables the trust leap from the unknowable to the 
expected. Since it is a personal subjective calculation, to understand how this process 
occurs, it is essential to take a “street-level epistemology” rather than approach it from a 
top-down perspective. It is theorised that the information that A uses to make this 
judgement is received through the communication of trustworthiness cues that are signs 
of B’s trustworthiness. These signs are then perceived and interpreted subject to a variety 
of psychological dynamics such as trust heuristics, trust disposition, and cognitive inertia 
(see Figure 6). Central to the dynamic, and warranting specific mention, is how one’s 
underlying values greatly shapes trust. Personal values systems determine the balance 
between self-interested (egoistic) and non-egoistic concerns thus shaping expectations of 
others and the types of trustworthiness cues attended to. In this way the truster’s values 
flow through expectations to the trusted in a way that fundamentally shapes the 
qualitative properties of the trust relationship. 
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Figure 6  A simple diagram of the communication of trustworthiness cues (by the 
trusted B) and their perception and interpretation by the truster (A).  
 
3.4  PART II:  INSTITUTIONAL TRUST  
Theoretical and empirical work have identified two basic relationships between the state 
and trust (Ankersmit 2006, Cook et al. 2005, see chapter 8).74 First the state provides the 
background stability against which people can cooperate and learn to trust others in 
society, often called social or generalized trust (Levi 1998, Offe 1999, Pavlou and Gefen 
2004, Sztompka 1999). Second, the state is an institution with some autonomy and 
interests, and thus can also be an object of trust (Levi and Stoker 2000, Norris 1999b, 
Warren 2004). These two may be interrelated, but they are analytically and causally 
distinct. It does not logically follow, for example, that because the state can build trust 
among people that it is also something you necessarily trust (Ankersmit 2006, p. 41).  
 
                                                 
74
 A third relation is that interpersonal trust amongst people help to build strong democratic state 
institutions (Putnam 1993). 
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3.4.1 WHAT IS INSTITUTIONAL TRUST? 
This thesis focuses theoretically and empirically, on the second relation; the state as an 
object of trust. More specifically, this thesis is concerned with trust in public sector 
institutions. This theoretical concern stems from the focus of this study on how citizens’ 
trust in particular institutions in Chile is affected by citizens’ use of e-services. But what 
does trust in institutions – institutional trust – consist of? 
 
First we have to establish that people identify particular institutions as an independent 
social object. Findings from a variety of research attempting to assess citizens’ “support” 
of a government indicate that, in fact, people make a series of discriminations with 
respect to the government. In particular, five aspects have been isolated: the political 
community, regime performance, regime principles, regime institutions, and political 
actors (Norris 1999b). Support for regime institutions is support for political institutions 
such as the parliament, the executive, the legal system, state bureaucracy, etc. In 
concurrence, after a review of the evidence, Kumlin concludes, 
“Decades of both good and bad times teach citizens to distinguish between, on the 
on hand, the democratic system as a set of abstract principles, and on the other 
hand, democratic institutions and political actors as they function in practice” 
(Kumlin 2004, p. 74). 
 
In general, institutional trust is defined as trust in the rules, roles, and norms of an 
institution independent of the people occupying those roles.75 A good starting place is 
Zucker’s (1986) definition of institutional trust, one of the most commonly referenced 
conceptions in the IS literature. For Zucker, institutional trust emerges when “formal 
mechanisms are used to provide trust that does not rest on personal characteristics or on 
past history of exchange” (Zucker 1986, p. 61). Warren (1999b, 2004), trying to 
understand trust in democratic institutions, draws on Zucker’s notion of institutional trust. 
He views trust in democratic institutions as trust in the institutional norms and the 
effectiveness of accountability mechanisms. This requires three conditions: (1) 
                                                 
75
 This is an important distinction. In many studies of confidence in public institutions, pre-1980s, there 
was a weakness in the conceptualization of institutions; on the one hand they were the sets of norms and 
roles of behaviour, and on the other hand it refers to the occupants of those roles (Barber 1983, p. 85). This 
ambiguity results in a discrepancy between what is referred to in the studies. 
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institutions are defined by norms that both the truster and trustee know and the trustee is 
expected to follow, (2) the truster can effectively monitor (or know that others are 
monitoring) the trustee, and (3) the institution has effective accountability mechanisms if 
the trustee diverges from the norms. O’Hara (2004) similarly argues that trust in 
institutions comes from a specific and generally inflexible framework of codes of practice 
and rules (e.g. impartiality) and the credible threat of sanctions, and the institutions that 
impose sanctions must have sufficient power and authority.  
 
These definitions highlight a key component of institutional trust: it is based on 
impersonal institutional mechanisms rather than on people. Indeed, trust in institutions 
arguably does not require any direct encounter with the individuals or groups who are 
responsible for them (Giddens 1990, p. 83). According to this perspective, trust in 
institutions is trust in the “quality of the institutional arrangements within which they 
operate” (Cook et al. 2005). Institutional forms provide “forms of assurance that relieve 
interpersonal and culturally sanctioned forms of trust of the full burden of facilitating 
social and economic exchange” (Warren 1999b, p. 321). For Giddens (1990), trust in 
modern institutions is different than trust between individuals in that trust is bound up 
with faith in the abstract systems and principles of which people are largely ignorant. 
Consequently, the focus of trust is shifted to the correctness of the abstract systems, 
emphasising competence (reliability and credentials) rather than motivation (Giddens 
1990, pp. 33-34, 83-87). 
 
This does not imply, however, that there is no component of interpersonal trust in 
institutional trust (Warren 1999d). There is much agreement that interpersonal trust is not 
a model for cooperation between strangers (Hardin 2002a, Hawthorn 1988, p. 113). 
However, the relationship between people and institutions is arguably still a type of 
person-to-person relation (Harré 1999, Offe 1999). Regardless of the abstractness of the 
social object the logic is the same, “We ultimately trust in human actions, and 
derivatively their effects, or products” (Sztompka 1999, p. 46). Also, from the 
perspective of the truster, “our beliefs about, as well as our affective and social relations 
to, the personnel account for standing in a trust relation to the institution they staff” 
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(Harré 1999, p. 260). As Harré comments, considered abstractly, both interpersonal and 
institutional trust are context-bounded. In the same way that the social context, for 
example, through community sanctions, bounds interpersonal trust, the people enacting 
their institutional roles are also bound by the rules and codes of the institution. 
 
Offe (1999) presents an alternative perspective on trusting institutions. For Offe, trust in 
institutions in terms of trust in rules, roles, and norms is not possible. His focus, like the 
discussion above is the ineluctable role of people enacting these roles and following the 
rules and norms. However, he takes a different tack. Offe argues that trusting an 
institution means trusting in the “ethos” of the institution,  
“My thesis is that it is this implied normative meaning of institutions and the 
moral plausibility I assume it will have for others which allows me to trust those 
that are involved in the same institution – although they are strangers and not 
personally known to me” (Offe 1999, p. 70 emphasis in original). 
This position finds empirical support in the research on the link between values and trust 
in institutions (Braithwaite 1998b, Devos et al. 2002) (see 3.3.4). 
 
3.4.2 CAN WE REALLY TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS? 
Before moving on to consider theories of how to build trust in institutions, we first must 
contend with a very powerful critique of institutional trust. In a recent important piece on 
trust, several leading scholars argue that trust is possible between people, but not between 
people and institutions. The argument draws on earlier work by Hardin (1993, 1998, 
1999, 2000, 2002b) and hinges on their specific “encapsulated interests” account of trust 
(a rational self-interest model). This account, like the account presented here, contains an 
important knowledge component. Their argument is that while trusting in government 
institutions may be theoretically plausible, it is epistemically impossible (Hardin 2000, p. 
34).  
 
The fundamental issue is that citizens simply cannot know enough to trust. Hardin argues 
that very few people actually have sufficient knowledge of the institutional structures and 
roles to understand the incentive structure that indicates trustworthiness (Hardin 1999, p. 
30). Unlike interpersonal trust, a citizen is not judging an individual, but instead attempts 
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to judge the collective behaviour of the institution (Hardin 1993, p. 513). This, combined 
with the complexity of the world of government institutions significantly increases the 
epistemological demands (Hardin 1999). Instead of trust, Hardin believes that citizens 
merely make inductive inferences from past behaviour and thus it is not trust (Hardin 
1999, pp. 30, 39). Instead of talking about trust in government we should speak of 
confidence in government (Hardin 2000, p. 34).76 
 
Ultimately, this differentiation comes down to ones’ assumption as to where confidence 
ends and trust begins.77 This may be splitting hairs. A major problem with Hardin’s 
account, and that of most trust research, is an inability to find that line. When does 
confidence end and trust start? How much knowledge and what types are necessary? The 
literature does not currently provide an answer to this question. 
 
Some have argued that there are situations in which knowledge of the institution and its 
reputation may be sufficient for a true trust judgement (Levi 1998). Here the concept of 
trust heuristics (see 3.3.4) may be central to understanding trust in institutions. Trust 
heuristics may provide people the cognitively efficient manner (whether it is accurate or 
not is another question) to reduce the complexity and epistemic demands and enable trust 
in institutions (Scholz 1998, p. 157). One such solution, for example, may be Offe’s 
cognitively efficient notion of trusting in the institutional ethos. 
 
This research does not pretend to attempt to answer this question definitively, nor is that 
the goal. It may be that trust, so used, is a blanket term that covers a variety of 
                                                 
76
 Furthermore, Hardin argues that in general, we don’t even want trust in government. This is based on the 
same logic that the typical citizen cannot trust unless through mistaken inference (Hardin 1999, pp. 23-24). 
77
 Luhmann is also interested in the issue of trust in large complex institutions and functional systems. For 
Luhmann, trust is less an issue of knowledge, than of perception and attribution (Luhmann 1988). He 
argues that one does not need to trust institutions to participate in them, but merely to have confidence. 
However, trust comes into play when it presupposes a choice and some risk, as well as openness to new 
possibilities: 
“… a social evolution which achieves increasingly complex societies may in fact generate systems 
which require more confidence as a prerequisite of participation and more trust as a condition of 
the best utilization of chances and opportunities” (Luhmann 1988). 
For most of our lives we depend upon large institutions as a normal condition of daily life, and not 
something that we can reasonably opt out of.  
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significantly different cognitive states. The term trust is employed in this thesis based on 
the causal criterion; the massive amount of empirical and theoretical work put into trust 
that provides some level of confidence (trust?) that there is something there and it is 
significant in shaping the citizen-government relationship. Cook et al. affirm the 
importance of citizens’ confidence in government (rather than trust) for cooperative 
citizen behaviour such as consenting to government’s demands and regulations, 
complying with bureaucratic requirements, and even support for redistributive programs 
(Cook et al. 2005, see chapter 8). Therefore, whether or not it is trust or confidence may 
be a definitional issue. For the purposes of this thesis it suffices to call it institutional 
trust.78 
 
3.5  THEORIES OF BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL TRUST  
So, if we proceed with the assumption that trust in institutions is possible than how is it 
built? The definitions of institutional trust in 3.4.1 imply, to a limited extent, a basic 
outline of how institutional trust is built. Trust emerges from some knowledge and 
understanding of the rules, norms, formal mechanisms, and ethos of the institution, and 
perhaps that the truster can intelligibly monitor the behaviour of the institution. However, 
this is particularly vague, and leaves unclear a long chain of causal logic. Namely, how 
do we move from these objective components to perceptions of trust? Exactly what types 
of institutional structures and formal accountability mechanisms are necessary for trust?  
 
Some argue that we do not know what will produce trust in the state (O'Hara 2004). 
Lately, political science scholars are realising the increasing need for gaining a good 
understanding of the attributes of a trustworthy government (Levi and Stoker 2000). Of 
course, this is an inherently difficult exercise. As discussed above, trust and 
trustworthiness are mutually implicated. If trustworthy characteristics are subjectively 
determined by the truster, then how can we state definitively what they are? It may be 
that developing a trustworthy state is context dependent – where in some places, such as 
Latin America, we may find that performance is more important than in more 
“developed” contexts. However, while discerning trustworthy absolutes may not be 
                                                 
78
 This topic will receive a bit more analytical attention in section 3.5.4. 
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possible, we may be able to identify commonalities across people and cultures. For 
example, in an in-depth study of taxi drivers in New York City and in Belfast, Gambetta 
and Hamill (2005), abstracted out a series of trustworthiness cues that were applicable in 
both contexts.  
 
In this section, we draw from a variety of theory and empirical studies to see what are the 
most commonly cited theories of building trust in  institutions (as well as satisfaction and 
trust in government in general) (for example, see Table 6). This theoretical and research 
work generally revolves around two questions: 1) work on what makes a trustworthy 
state or institution, and 2) work on why trust has declined in the West. 
 
Theories of building trust/confidence in government
 “… avoidance of scandal, skilful handling of the economy, and 
alleviation of public concern about crime each may help to restore 
public confidence in government” (Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 
2000, p. 254).
“Citizens are likely to trust government only to the extent that they 
believe that it will act in their interests, that its procedures are fair, 
and that their trust of the state and of others is reciprocated” (Levi, 
1998, p. 88)
“Government reliability is established, reinforced, and conveyed 
through institutional arrangements that reward positive and effective 
interactions with constituents and guarantee due process without 
discrimination” (Cook et al. 2005, p. 162)
“To reverse the trend of distrust in U.S. government that we 
witness, we must … (2) establish reliable measures of government 
performance and believable measures of government corruption, 
and (3) create institutions that encourage citizens to look at 
problems from more than one perspective and that engage them in 
the weighing that hard decisions require” (Lawrence, 1997).
“trust thrives when institutions are structured so as to respond to 
communication. This requires (a) access to information and 
institutions structured so as to provide the necessary transparency, 
and (b) institutional means for challenging the authorities, 
institutions, and trusted individuals” (Warren, 1999a, p. 338).
 
Table 6  Theories of a how to build trust in government. 
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It is possible to distinguish between two types of theories on the determinants of 
institutional trust: cultural and institutional (Mishler and Rose 2001). Cultural theories 
extol the power of exogenous determinants such as political socialization or national 
culture. Institutional theories focus on endogenous determinants such as institutional 
performance. As this thesis focuses on the impact of e-services, we are primarily 
concerned with the latter, institutional theories. Given the possibility that these theories 
represent potentially co-active tendencies they are still considered as potentially relevant 
contextual factors that may come into play and/or interact with the institutional 
mechanisms.79  
 
Cultural and institutional theories can also be further broken down into macro-level and 
micro-level determinants of institutional trust (Levi and Stoker 2000, Mishler and Rose 
2001) (see Table 7). Macro-level theories focus on characteristics of institutions, and 
micro-level theories on individual level evaluations that shape trust responses. While 
Mishler & Rose initially separated the two as independent and explanatorily competing 
theories, they conclude that they are in fact interrelated, 
“The effects of macro-political and economic performance on trust are indirect 
and mediated at the micro level by an individual’s value-laden perceptions” 
(Mishler and Rose 2001, p. 55).  
This is what we would expect, given our trust theory elaborated above. The impacts of 
trustworthiness characteristics are necessarily mediated by personal characteristics. In 
this way, this study is one attempt to bridge the micro-macro divide needed in trust 
research (Levi and Stoker 2000, p. 500, Lewis and Weigert 1985, pp. 974-975). 
 
                                                 
79
 Mishler and Rose (2001) found that institutional determinants were significant, and the theory of cultural 
determinants was “largely contradicted” (Mishler and Rose 2001, p. 55). The two factors (national culture, 
and individual socialization) are included in this study through a consideration of the culture in Chile 
(national culture) and in-depth interviews with citizens that attempt in part to see how individual aspects 
influence trust perceptions. 
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 Cultural and/or  
Exogenous Theories 
Institutional and/or  
Endogenous Theories 
Macro theories 
 
Micro theories 
National culture 
 
Individual socialization 
Government performance 
 
Individual evaluations of 
performance 
Table 7 "Competing theories of the origins of trust and their explanatory emphases" from (Mishler 
and Rose 2001, p. 34). This thesis focuses on institutional theories, combining the macro and micro 
levels. Exogenous theories may shift the disposition to trust a particular institution, but in general 
would represent a longer term trend.  
 
Following the trust theory, we can analytically divide the theories of building institutional 
trust into two general categories: competence and motivation (interests and values). 
Fundamentally these theories fall into one of three types: competence (positive 
performance), overlapping interests, and overlapping values. At this stage, theory will 
remain fairly general, attempting to encompass the major types of theories on building 
institutional trust. More concrete hypotheses will be established when we move to the 
specifics of e-services and institutional trust. Within each of these categories each theory 
will ultimately stretch from the macro to the micro-level, following as much of the causal 
path from trustworthiness to trustworthiness cues to trust as possible. Following the 
presentation of the theories, the mediating aspect of trustworthiness cues requires a brief 
discussion.  
 
3.5.1 COMPETENCE 
Perhaps the best direct indicator of competence is performance. The logic is 
straightforward; if you trust an institution to perform a task C and they do, then this will 
tend to increase trust. In this way, a good track record of delivering on promises is the 
sign of a trustworthy government (Levi 1998, p. 93). Empirically, effective performance 
has been shown to increase the public’s trust in government (Chanley et al. 2000, p. 254, 
Espinal et al. 2006, Mishler and Rose 1997). Conversely, ineffective government will 
then breed distrust (Offe 2006, p. 10). The most common reason Americans give for not 
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trusting the government is that the government is inefficient and wastes money (Blendon 
et al. 1997).80  
 
To translate government performance into assessments of performance, government 
performance must first be perceived (Blendon et al. 1997, Nye Jr. and Zelikow 1997, 
Orren 1997). However, it is not a straightforward problem to communicate institutional 
performance. The central issue is that there are many practical problems with respect to 
ascertaining the actual performance of the government. Bok (1997) lists a few: (1) it is 
impossible to know counterfactuals, that is what would have happened had a program not 
existed, (2) it is difficult or impossible to quantify some elements of government 
performance like “national security”, and (3) the problem of aggregating records of many 
individual programs into a single overall estimate of performance. The difficulties are 
compounded considering that judgements of performance depend on a variety of 
potentially incommensurable scales of achievement (Sztompka 1999, p. 83). Not only is 
it technically difficult to create good measures of government performance, it is highly 
dubious if the public is even well enough informed to make good judgements on the 
performance of the government. Due in part to media influences but also to the human 
bias for negative information, people tend to view government performance as worse 
than it is, and to overestimate many of the costs of government (Bok 1997).  
 
A further complexity is that an assessment of performance is always relative to an 
expectation (Orren 1997).81 Thus, the impact of performance is always relative to the 
particular expectations of the performance of government. One explanation of the decline 
in trust in the West is the expectations gap, that is the gap between expected performance 
and actual performance (O'Hara 2004), or put otherwise, “Satisfaction thus seems to 
derive not directly from performance but from the ratio of performance to expectations” 
(Lawrence 1997, p. 142). Further complicating the picture is that citizens can also have 
conflicting views as to what it wants and expects from government (Nye Jr. 1997).  
                                                 
80
 In the survey, eight out of every ten said that they believe that the government wastes money. 
81
 Commonly, political trust is defined as an evaluation of the government based upon citizen’s 
expectations (Hetherington 1998, p. 791). 
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While that is the case, it is possible to imagine that at times and with some institutions 
there will be a consensus that particular performance measures are the most significant 
indicators of performance. However, given the complexities of macro-level performance 
(e.g., even highly trained economists vary on their assessments of the economy and 
potential future courses of action) there is some evidence that indicates that people apply 
trust heuristics to economise. For example, people tend to be responsive to only a small 
set of macroeconomic indicators of unemployment level, budget deficit, and inflation 
when forming their opinion of the economic performance of the government (Kumlin 
2004). 
 
Competence theory: Good institutional performance that can be communicated and 
understood and that is perceived to meet or exceed citizens’ expectations of performance 
will tend to build trust.  
 
3.5.2 MOTIVATION 
The structure of the institutional arrangement shapes the incentive structure and values of 
public sector employees, as well as, on an emergent level, the interests and values of the 
institution itself. We can break down the theories linking motivation and trust into two 
groups: those based on interest and those based on underlying values.  
 
Interests As would be expected in any self-interest account of trust, citizens trust 
institutions whose interests are more in line with those of the citizens, for example, if the 
institution pursues policy goals that people agree with (Hetherington 1998, p. 793).82 
Expressions of this phenomenon are captured in surveys when people respond that “the 
government is run by a few big interests looking out only for themselves”, “public 
officials don’t care about what people think” (Orren 1997), or the government “spends on 
wrong things” (Blendon et al. 1997, p. 210). For example, citizens may trust welfare 
                                                 
82
 Bianco (1998) found that perceptions of common interest are important factors in citizens’ trust decisions 
of their representative.  
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service providers due to the congruence of interests, whereas it may be significantly more 
difficult to trust legislatures due to the widely divergent interests of its members (Warren 
2004, pp. 23-5).  
 
Interest theory: Aligned interests between an institution’s policies and the interests of a 
citizen tend to build trust. 
 
Keeping institutional interests in line with citizens’ interests often requires accountability 
mechanisms to shape the institutional incentive structure. Hirschmann (1970) talked 
about exit and voice as two important accountability mechanisms. Fundamentally, these 
two mechanisms work to balance the power relationship between the citizen and 
government institution. This balance deters defection from obligations, ensuring interests 
stay in line and providing an environment that improves the possibility of engendering 
trust (Barber 1983, p. 169, Kumlin 2004, p. 57, Warren 1999b).  
 
Interest sub-theory 1: Mechanisms that work to align (such as voice and exit) the 
interests of the institution and citizen tend to build trust. 
 
The power asymmetry that exists between state institutions and citizens makes the 
possibilities of trust difficult. This is because it is easy for the powerful institution to 
renege on an earlier promise at a low cost. A second mechanism that works to keep 
interests aligned is the establishment of credible commitments; that is, ways that help to 
guarantee that the institution will behave as it should. Institutional checks and balances, 
contracts, and other types of pre-commitment are forms of ensuring behaviour, lessening 
the discretion of the powerful institution, and making trust possible in relations of power 
asymmetries (Farrell 2004). Of course, this in part shifts the burden of trustworthiness 
from the state institution to the enforcement agency (Dasgupta 1988).  
 
Interest sub-theory 2: Establishing credible institutional commitments through credible 
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and effective institutional checks and balances that keep their interests in-line with 
citizens tends to build trust. 
 
Embodied values Recall that a value system impacts the epistemology of trust by 
shaping the salience of trustworthy cues, as discussed above (see 3.3.4). Also, recall that 
Offe (1999) argues that institutional trust is dependent upon the ‘institutional ethos’. Thus 
where an individual’s value system is aligned with the institutional ethos, we would 
expect trust would be stronger, as evidence suggests (Braithwaite 1998b, Devos et al. 
2002). A further corroborating piece of evidence is that citizens often express a higher 
level of satisfaction of local than federal officials. Arguably, this is attributable to values, 
where the local officials are “like us” and thus enjoy some benefit of the doubt with 
respect to performance (Nye Jr. 1997).  
 
Overlapping values theory: Overlapping values between the institutional ethos and 
citizens’ values tend to build trust.  
 
The second set of values is independent of the truster; they are the values that are 
embodied by the institution. There are several values that are mentioned in the literature 
as features of trustworthy institutions and often associated with democratic institutions: 
procedural fairness (including policy transparency), distributive justice, and benevolence 
(including treating citizens with respect) (Kumlin 2004, Levi 1998, p. 93, Levi and 
Stoker 2000, Mishler and Rose 1997, Murphy 2004, Orren 1997, Sztompka 1999). 
Conversely, breaking from these values is thought to build distrust and potentially 
scepticism. For example, consider the powerful impact of scandals to destroy trust 
(Chanley et al. 2000, p. 254). Scandals represent a break from benevolence, procedural 
justice, and distributive justice. 
  
We can break these down a bit. Procedural fairness is reflected in several ways including: 
1) that the government ensures that other citizens also do their part, 2) universal criteria 
for recruitment and promotion of agents, 3) impartial institutions, and 4) involving 
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citizens in the policy-making process (Levi 1998). A concern for distributive justice (that 
is, distributional fairness) is also thought to be an inherent quality of man, much like self-
interest. Kumlin (2004), in a study of people’s responses to the welfare state in Sweden, 
found a strong correlation between trust and citizens’ sense of distributed justice as a 
result of the state’s welfare policies.83 This can be seen as an expression of one’s values 
and therefore one’s response will vary depending upon this value orientation.84 
 
Finally, benevolence speaks to a more general human quality of the citizen-bureaucrat 
interaction. Bureaucrats are the access-point for the abstract systems that are public sector 
institutions (Giddens 1990, p. 88), and thus social interactions provide a reflection of the 
values of the institution.85 Interactions that reflect a value of respect for others as 
reflected in the comportment (tone of voice, choice of words, etc.) will tend to build trust, 
whereas hostility from street-level bureaucrats towards clients can be highly 
counterproductive (Levi 1998, Levi and Stoker 2000, pp. 492-493, Tyler 1998).  
 
Democratic Values theory: An institution that embodies and communicates values of 
fairness, distributive justice, and benevolence tends to build trust. 
 
Table 8 summarises all the theories.  
 
                                                 
83
 Of course, Sweden is well known for a culture with a strong sense of social obligation. The results may 
be very different in another culture. 
84
 Recall Braithwaite’s (1998b) two types of values: security and harmony. Those with a stronger harmony 
value set will find distributive justice a more compelling builder of trust. 
85
 It must be noted that Giddens argues that trust in expert systems or symbolic tokens rest upon “faith in 
the correctness of principles of which one is ignorant, not upon faith in the ‘moral uprightness’ (good 
intentions) of others. Of course, trust in persons is always to some degree relevant to faith in systems, but 
concerns their proper working rather than their operation as such” (Giddens 1990, pp. 33-34). 
 103
 
Table 8  A summary of the general theories of building institutional trust. More concrete theories 
can only be generated given with respect to a particular institutional context. 
 
3.5.3 DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT TRUSTWORTHY CUES 
Implicit in these theories above is the communication, perception, and processing of 
trustworthy cues. It has already been established that there are two main means through 
which people obtain trustworthy information: direct and indirect (Nye Jr. and Zelikow 
1997, p. 255). In a study of political attitudes, Kumlin (2004) refers to these as gained 
through direct experience or “sociotropic” perceptions of collective experience, such as 
reputation (see Figure 7). It is not entirely understood which of these two pathways is 
more important, or how they interact, although a lot of research has emphasised the 
sociotropic influences (Kumlin 2004). For example, it is impossible to ignore the 
importance of the media in shaping people’s perceptions (Blendon et al. 1997, Orren 
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1997).86 Certainly, the extra information afforded by collective cognition helps an 
individual fill in the information gap and aids in taking that extra leap required for trust 
(Lewis and Weigert 1985, p. 470).  
 
The extent that people extract broader political judgements from direct experience is not 
entirely understood. Soss (1999), in a study of personal experiences of government 
services concluded that these experiences can be treated as political information. Bok 
found that, “people tend to evaluate the work of government officials and agencies much 
more highly if they have direct contact with them than if they know about them only 
secondhand” (Bok 1997, p. 56). As we will see in the following chapter, most e-
government and trust research assumes that interaction with e-services impacts on 
citizens’ trust judgements. Following this line of thought and in the interest of narrowing 
theory, this thesis focuses on the impact of direct experience on trust judgements.  
 
 
Figure 7 "Personal experience, sociotropic perceptions, and political attitudes" from 
(Kumlin, 2004, p. 10). These are the two main pathways through which 
trustworthiness cues are received, directly or through third-party social interaction.  
 
3.5.4 TRUST, DISTRUST, MISTRUST, AND CYNICAL CITIZENS 
A final conceptual clarification is necessary to clarify the importance of trust in 
institutions, and in particular, trust in democratic institutions. As discussed, trust (or 
confidence) is important to the functioning of democracy. However, almost 
paradoxically, so is distrust. Distrust is taken here to be not the opposite of trust, but 
                                                 
86
 Clearly media has an impact. It may be that confidence in institutions is primarily socially determined 
rather than individually. Blendon et al. (1997) found that people say they rely primarily on the media 
(seventy-two percent) rather than personal experience or through friends. In contrast Cook and Gronke 
(2001) found that the connection between the media and confidence in institutions of government are 
mediated through other variables. It would appear that trust in particular institutions are differentially 
impacted by the media (some are covered more in-depth than others) as well as the particular media source. 
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rather, an attitude where cognitive assumptions are tested and scrutinized (Offe 1999).87 
The opposite of trust is more often defined as mistrust. Institutional mistrust implies an 
actively negative attitude towards the system.88 Thus, it is possible to think of trust as a 
range from cynical mistrust to sceptical distrust to trust. It is the movement from distrust 
to mistrust that is problematic for democracy.  
 
In liberal democratic theory, democratic institutions are predicated on the 
institutionalization of distrust (Braithwaite 1998a). Institutions are necessary to deal with 
the political reality of competing interests. If there is no convergence of interests, the 
conditions for building trust (and thus obtain cooperation and peaceful resolution of 
conflicts of interests) between people are weak (Warren 1999b, p. 312). Democracy as an 
institution provides a framework for a political process that resolves conflicts of interest 
through discursive processes rather than through coercion or force (Warren 1999c). It is 
through the use of institutions that we constrain the self-interest ambitions of public 
sector employees to work in the interest of the citizens (Brennan 1998, Hardin 1998). 
Thus, it is the institutionalisation of distrust in others through mechanisms such as checks 
and balances that makes trust in the democratic process and institutions possible.  
 
There is an inherent tension between the institutionalisation of distrust and building trust, 
however. Excessive recourse to the institutional rules and codes may actually work to 
undermine trust as strict enforcement of rules crowds out trust and engenders distrust in 
the institution (den Hollander 2006). This increase of distrust may require an even stricter 
application of the rules in the future, thus begetting a vicious cycle of distrust (den 
Hollander 2006). A powerful example of this is Peel’s (1998) study of four contemporary 
Australian suburbs where a government predicated on distrust resulted in an environment 
of citizen distrust and apathy towards the government. 
 
                                                 
87
 Distrust is like trust in that it has a cognitive assessment component and that “A distrusts B with respect 
to X” (Hardin 2004). 
88
 As Giddens argues, “bad experiences at access points may lead either to a sort of resigned cynicism or, 
where this is possible, to disengagement from the system altogether” (Giddens 1990, p. 91) 
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However, while we might lament a citizen’s distrust of a governmental institution or 
official, it too has an important role to play in a democracy. Trust in institutions of 
government is only good when it is warranted (Warren 1999b) and when distrust is 
rationally based on a set of realistic expectations it does not have to be destructive 
(Barber 1983, p. 166). Indeed, active distrust can be a normatively appropriate response 
in certain situations (Levi 1998). If distrusting citizens perform a crucial feedback role, 
providing legitimate criticism and participation in the democratic system, then some 
distrusting citizens are essential for democracy as a source for motivating necessary 
reform (Barber 1983, p. 81). Indeed, there is evidence that suggests that trusting people 
are not more politically active than less trusting citizens (Levi and Stoker 2000).  
 
Distrust and mistrust becomes a concern when critical citizens become cynical citizens 
(Norris 1999a). Extended periods of distrust or mistrust can have negative consequences 
such as 1) non-compliance, 2) a non-productive increase of governmental regulation 
(Levi 1998, p. 96), or 3) disaffection, or alienation (Luhmann 1988, pp. 103-104); that is, 
“a falling away from democratic values” (Barber 1983, p. 80). The fundamental 
difference between a critical and cynical citizen is that while critical citizens may not 
trust in a particular political actor, or are unhappy with how current democratic regimes 
are implementing democracy, they still fundamentally believe in values of democracy. 
They are dissatisfied, but dissatisfied democrats. However, a significant period of 
discontent and distrust can lead to a resultant loss of democratic values, and thus a 
conversion to cynical citizens. This is problematic for democracy as support for 
democratic values underlie good functioning democracies (Dahl 2000). At the end of the 
day, to not attempt to improve the trust relationship would be to run a huge risk with 
something as crucially important as the health of democratic institutions of governance 
(Nye Jr. and Zelikow 1997). 
 
This implies that some of the worry over a loss of trust may be overblown. If polls that 
show a reduction in trust “reflect wariness rather than cynicism, the result may be 
healthy” (Nye Jr. 1997, p. 3). It is important to note, however, that social scientists do not 
still fully understand this relationship between assessments of daily performance and 
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opinions of the regime principles (democratic values) (Nye Jr. 1997, p. 4), and the 
relationship has not been empirically established. Espinal et al. (2006), for example, 
found no evidence of any link of democratic values and institutional trust. In Latin 
America, lack of economic and political performance may have lead to dissatisfaction 
with the results of democracy and the political leaders, but it has not resulted in the loss 
of fundamental democratic values (Lagos 2003, p. 163).89  
 
3.5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides the first two layers of the theoretical framework, upon which the 
final piece of theory (e-government and institutional trust) can be placed and integrated. 
Part I sets out the core elements of trust. Part II identifies one particular manifestation of 
trust relevant to this thesis: institutional trust. Institutional trust is conceived of as trust in 
the roles, rules, and norms of an institution, as well as its institutional ethos. There are 
four main ways that trust in institutions is theorised to be built: (1) through good 
institutional performance, (2) by an overlapping of interests between the citizen and 
institution, (3) by an overlapping of values between the citizen and institution, and (4) if a 
institution projects values of procedural fairness, distributional justice, and benevolence. 
Of course, how these are perceived and translated into trust judgements depends upon the 
projection of trustworthiness cues and individual characteristics of the citizen. In the case 
of this research, these trustworthiness cues will be communicated by e-government 
services. To be able to better understand this process, the following chapter builds on this 
theory to develop a series of testable hypotheses that link that implementation of e-
government services to institutional trust.  
 
 
                                                 
89
 This also implies that if we are interested in preserving democratic values, then political socialisation 
may be central to this task. “… early political socialization into trusting beliefs and behaviour is the 
reservoir of diffuse support on which the democratic elite can count as it strives competently and with 
fiduciary responsibility to lead a democratic society” (Barber 1983, p. 89). This parallels Dahl’s (2000) 
argument that a functioning democracy requires subscription to the fundamental principles of democracy. 
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4 THEORY III  &  IV: E-GOVERNMENT AND 
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 
 
“E-government proponents have suggested, however, that with the 
help of new technology, there is hope for turning around this cycle 
of cynicism. Rather than assuming the government is bloated, 
wasteful, and inefficient, technology can improve the public sector 
functioning, increase responsiveness, and deliver services in ways 
that are much more convenient to citizens. The whole idea behind 
electronic governance is that government can remedy long-
standing societal perceptions about the public sector, and 
therefore alter fundamental citizen attitudes in the process” (West 
2005, p. 129). 
 
E-government has received a lot of attention over the last two decades as a promising 
means to improve, reform, reinvent, and even transform the activities and performance of 
the public sector. Without a doubt, the technological logic of e-government suggests 
many tantalizing opportunities such as increased efficiencies and transparency.90 The 
promise moves beyond these more direct effects to include citizen empowerment and the 
reinvigoration of the democratic process, moving towards an e-, digital, or cyber-
democracy (Brewer et al. 2006, p. 477, Holzer et al. 2004, Kakabadse et al. 2003, 
London 1994, Nye Jr. 2002). Especially relevant for this thesis is the argument that these 
improvements will so significantly shift the citizen-government relationship that it may 
provide the impetus to rebuild the currently sagging levels of trust in government 
(Bellamy and Taylor 1998, p. 63). In this chapter, we will explore this possibility. 
  
The previous chapter detailed the concept of trust (part I) and institutional trust and how 
it may be built (part II). This chapter works to link the changes brought about by the 
implementation of e-government services to the theory of institutional trust and does so 
                                                 
90
 Ndou (2004) lists seven such opportunities that e-government can bring to developing countries: (1) cost 
reduction and efficiency gains; (2) quality of service delivery to business and customers; (3) transparency, 
anticorruption, accountability; (4) increase the capacity of government; (5) network and community 
creation; (6) improve the quality of decision making; and (7) promote use of ICT in other sectors of the 
society. 
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in two parts (III and IV). The goal of part IIII is to identify the core aspects of e-
government implementations to understand the logic of how they may bring about 
changes to public administration and services. This discussion is extended to include 
some important implications of how e-government is implicated in changes to the citizen-
government relationship. In the final stage of theory development, part IV integrates e-
government and intuitional trust theory. The trust and institutional trust theory of the 
previous chapter is combined with the theoretical understanding of the impacts of e-
government to generate a series of middle-range hypotheses that provide the structure for 
the empirical investigation in this thesis. 
 
4.1  PART III:  DEFINING E-GOVERNMENT  
E-government has many definitions in the literature (see Table 9). In general, these 
definitions all view e-government as the inclusion of new ICT in public sector 
organisations to improve the administration and services of government.91 These new 
technologies offer the promise for improved government performance and service 
delivery at a lower cost resulting from the technology enabled economies of scale (West 
2005, p. 129). This definition of e-government generally carries with it a normative claim 
that new technologies should be employed to reform government (Bhatnagar 2004, p. 
22). This diffusion can be understood as one in a line of public sector reforms transfered 
from the industrial world to transitional and so-called developing countries (Heeks 2005, 
p. 52), most prominently New Public Management (Dunleavy et al. 2006) and good 
governance (Bhatnagar 2004, Saidi and Yared 2002). 
 
                                                 
91
 Bhatnagar makes a distinction between e-government and e-governance. He defines governance as “the 
manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for 
development” (Bhatnagar 2004, p. 21). Following this, e-governance is:  
“the process of enabling transactions between concerned groups and the government through 
multiple channels by linking all transaction points, decision points, enforcing/implementation 
points and repositories of data using information and communication technologies, to improve the 
efficiency, transparency, accountability and effectiveness of a government” (Bhatnagar 2004, p. 
21). 
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E-government is…
“the use of technology to enhance the access to and delivery of 
government services to benefit citizens, business partners and 
employees” (Silcock, 2001)
 “information and communication technology (ICT) applied to 
ordering at least three kinds of processes. First, it attends to the 
relationship (transaction) between the administration and the citizen 
(customer) and the related re-engineering of the activities internal to 
the administration… A second level regards the way in which the 
boundaries between the state and the market are redrawn, by the 
creation of an electronic, minimal state, more transparent, agile and 
accountable … A third level deals with the purpose of aid policies 
aimed at introducing e-government into developing countries”
(Ciborra, 2005, p. 261).
“defined as the use of technology, particularly the Internet, as a means 
to deliver services to citizens, businesses, and other entities” (Akman, 
Yazici, Mishra, & Arifoglu, 2005, p. 240).
“the communication between the government and its citizens via 
computers and a Web-enabled presence” (Evans & Yen, 2006).
“a government that applies ICT to transform its internal and external 
relationships” (United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, 2003, p. 2).
“the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) to 
improve the activities of public sector organisations” (Heeks, 2004).
“the use of information technology in general, and the utilization of 
the Internet in particular, to provide citizens and organizations with 
more convenient access to government’s information and services” 
(Chang, Li, Hung, & Hwang, 2005, p. 391).
“about a process of reform in the way governments work, shares 
information and delivers services to external and internal clients. 
Specifically, e-government harnesses information technologies (such 
as wide area networks, the Internet and mobile computing) to 
transform relations with citizens, businesses and other arms of 
government”  (Bhatnagar, 2004, p. 22)
 
Table 9  Definitions of e-government in the literature. The common thread is the use 
of ICT in the public sector to improve the activities and services of government 
administration. 
 
The technological logic of e-government implies that e-government will influence a wide 
range of aspects of public administration and services. These changes to government  are 
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in three general, but overlapping, areas: (1) e-administration, the improvement of 
government processes; (2) e-services and e-citizens, connecting citizens and government; 
and (3) e-society, interactions with civil society and the private sector  (Heeks 2001a).92 
 
Theorists have pointed out that in general the implementation of e-government occurs in 
stages of increasing complexity. These run from the straightforward publication of 
information on a web page through to two-way citizen-government transactions to the 
integration of services across government agencies, and ultimately to potential 
transformations of the democratic process (Bellamy and Taylor 1998, Brewer et al. 2006, 
Fountain 2001, Layne and Lee 2001, Moon 2002, Ronaghan 2002, Silcock 2001, Weare 
2002, West 2004, West 2005). For examples, see Layne and Lee’s (2001) model of the 
dimensions and stages of e-government development or Bhatnagar’s (2004) four stage 
models (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8  Bhatnagar's (2004, p. 20) four critical stages of E-government evolution. 
 
                                                 
92
 This is also commonly stated as G2E, G2C (government to citizens), G2B (government to business), and 
G2G (government to government) (Bhatnagar 2004, Ndou 2004). 
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4.2  THEORIES OF E-GOVERNMENT INITIATED CHANGE  
There is a lot of potential for e-government to improve the activities of the public sector 
and provide citizens with added value. However, as the history of information systems 
implementations tell us, final outcomes are far from certain. How can we best understand 
these processes of change? In this section we consider the dynamic from the perspective 
of schools of thought concerning the overall interaction and impacts of ICT in the public 
sector. 
 
Two schools of thought regarding the impact of ICT on the public sector can be 
identified: transformational and incremental (West 2005).93 The transformational model 
suggests that the Internet is an impetus for public sector reform, or even reinvention. This 
perspective follows for the most part the instrumental logic of the technologies and how 
they can bring about these benefits and transformations. The incremental change 
perspective, on the other hand, focuses more on the political realities of implementing e-
government projects in the public sector. Here, the realities of organizational decision 
making, a political process marked by conflict over resources, and the entrenching 
momentum of the status quo of organizational roles and activities constrains and shapes 
the e-government implementation.94 In this case, new ICT are not expected to radically 
transform the administration or democracy. Instead government will be slow to adopt 
new technologies, and they will most likely perpetuate the status quo (West 2005). 
 
It follows logically that one can expect different types of change to be associated with 
different types of e-government implementations. West (2005) lists three types of change 
                                                 
93
 Transformational and incremental changes are better understood as two ends of a continuum of change, 
“Change discussions often focus on the end points of this comparison without looking at other 
types of models. There are lots of ways in which shifts can occur in the middle of the change 
spectrum. Or to put it differently, there are other models of change between large-scale 
transformation and small-scale increments” (West 2005, p. 7). 
In this way, West notes, many small incremental changes can eventually add up to a large-scale more 
transformational change. 
94
 For example, consider the following quote: 
“… the potential benefits of the Internet, and its potential perils, will be strongly influenced by the 
current organizations and institutions of government, for it is within the constraints posed by these 
structural arrangements that government actors make decisions and information networks that 
connect to form the World Wide Web are designed, developed, and used” (Fountain 2002, p. 117). 
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and theoretically links them to the different types of e-government implementations: 
incremental, secular, and transformative (see Table 10). As the implementations become 
more complex and transactional, and therefore more potentially transformational, they 
involve more back-end process changes, inter-agency interoperability, as well as 
potentially revolutionary and citizen empowering changes to the democratic process 
itself.  
 
 
Table 10  Stages of e-government implementation and types of change, from (West, 2005). 
 
While e-government has the theoretical potential to be transformative, empirical 
evidence suggests that governments have yet to reach the transformative stage. In a 
survey of e-government services around the world, West found that most have not moved 
beyond the billboard or partial service-delivery stages of e-government, a finding more 
consistent with incremental rather than transformational change (West 2004, West 2005). 
Consistent with West, Ronaghan95 (2002), Anderson (2004), and Torres et al. (2006) 
                                                 
95
 Ronaghan found that out of 190 countries of the UN and found that that only a few (seventeen of 190) 
had achieved online transaction capacity (the beginning of the transformative stage). 
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have found that e-government implementations have for the most part failed to enter into 
the transformative stages.  
 
Of course, administrative change can emerge from a variety of sources other than 
technology, and can even occur in spite of technology. For example, Madon et al (2004) 
studied the implementation of a self-assessment tax system in Bangalore. They found that 
the outcomes of the implementation and tax reform process was ultimately driven by the 
actions of a variety of players and institutions, often with divergent interests, at both local 
and global levels, rather than a direct consequence of a newly implemented technology. 
 
4.3  THE DYNAMICS OF ICT  IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR  
If we are to understand the how and why of the changes brought about by e-government 
implementations then we need to deepen our theoretical understanding of the dynamics 
between ICT and the public sector. As evidenced from the section above, the outcomes of 
implementing ICT in any organization, including public sector bureaucracies, is subject 
to both the instrumental logic of technology as well as the various political, economic, 
and social contextual influences (Fountain 2001, Heeks 2003, Heeks 2005, Kallinikos 
2006a, Relyea 2002, West 2005). In other words, the causal arrow may run in both ways, 
from the technology to the social system of actors, structures, and activities, as well as 
from the social system to the technology.96 Fountain (2001) famously expressed this idea 
in her theory of IT enactment.97 
 
To understand this dynamic, we have to understand the constituent components and how 
they interact. To that end, this section describes the core characteristics of the two major 
interacting components: ICT and bureaucracy. Then, it lays out the main areas of 
interaction and how e-government is implicated in changes to public administration and 
                                                 
96
 “Technology is a catalyst for social, economic, and political change at the levels of the individual, group, 
organization, and institution. Each technological and related change evolves in its own sphere, but it does 
not evolve alone. Technological and social changes co-evolve” (Fountain 2003, p. 45). 
97
 IT enactment is arguably just a repackaging of a much earlier developed socio-technical systems theory 
(Norris 2003). In this perspective, an information system is a social system where information technology 
is one aspect of that system (Land 1992). 
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service delivery. Finally, it ends with a brief discussion of the theoretical implications of 
ICT in public administrations in the development context.  
 
4.3.1 INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 
ICT brings the potential for at least three basic mechanisms of change: automation, 
informatisation, and transformation (Heeks 2002). ICT can make government both more 
efficient (does more, cheaper, and faster) and effective (works better and is innovative). 
However, from where do these potentials emerge? What are the underlying structures of 
new ICT that have the causal power to generate change? 
 
To penetrate into the change potentials of new ICT it is necessary to understand the core 
aspects of new ICT. New information and communication technologies represent both a 
continuation of and a disjunctive break from prior information technologies such as 
writing, telegraph, phone, television, and radio (Kallinikos 2001). There are at least three 
central features of new ICT that differentiate it from earlier technologies and thus 
embody the instrumental logic behind e-government theory: automating, informating, and 
communicating and networking. 
 
Automating technologies for information processes  New ICT allow for 
the automated handling of information in a manner that earlier was not possible (Heeks 
1999). Computer based systems can replicate manually performed action through the 
encoding of the process in software (Kallinikos 2001). This is enhanced by the increased 
information storage and retrieval capacity of new ICT that allows for the storage of all 
the information necessary to complete these processes. The end result is “faster 
communication, computation, storage and retrieval which leads to greater efficiency in 
any transaction" (Kumar 2003, p. 1). This process of automation requires that the 
information processes be defined and differentiated to a sufficient extent that they can be 
programmed into software and executed by computers. This requires a clear definition of 
the problem to be solved as well as the rules and procedures to follow to solve this 
problem (Kallinikos 2001, p. 38). 
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Informating technologies  The real power of new ICT goes beyond simple 
automation and extends to its unique capacity to handle and process information 
(Kallinikos 2001, pp. 33, 34). ICT have the capacity for symbol processing (Bellamy and 
Taylor 1998, p. 27, Fountain 2001, p. 127, Kallinikos 2001, p. 36). Symbolic processing 
allows for the reflective processing of information that emerges from the already encoded 
software processes. Zuboff (1988) identified the “informate” power of technologies as a 
distinctive feature of new technologies as well as a foundation for innovation as the new 
information produced enables reflection on the organization itself (Bellamy and Taylor 
1998, p. 27). 
 
Communicating and networking information Long distance communication is not 
an entirely novel feature that appears in newer ICT. However, the capacity for 
communicating information between actors in disparate locations has greatly increased in 
scope and form (Bellamy and Taylor 1998, p. 27). The development of new media 
technologies, such as the World Wide Web, has meant the creation of new modes of 
communication and interaction at a distance (Castells 2001, Kallinikos 2001, p. 66). 
Furthermore, the increased information transfer capabilities works to complement and 
reinforce the computational capacity of computers as the processing and structuring of 
information become central to  institutional life (Kallinikos 2001). 
 
4.3.2 BUREAUCRACY 
To understand the impact of ICT on public administration it is crucial to consider it with 
respect to bureaucracy in its historical context (Dunleavy et al. 2006, Fountain 2001, 
Fountain 2002, Jain 2004). Bureaucracy is a “central institution” in modern society that is 
a “distinctive and historically specific form of governing social relations” providing the 
“platform for constructing the social uniformities that ensure the legal and administrative 
accountability of formal organizations and the predictability of their operations” 
(Kallinikos 2006a, pp. 125-126). The invention of bureaucracy solved a central problem 
of organizational control, namely the problem of “how to achieve capacity in complex 
problem solving requiring coordination of a large number of subtasks and functions while 
retaining control over a disparate enterprise” (Fountain 2002, p. 126). This capacity is not 
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outmoded in today’s modern society, although its processes and structure can be altered 
by ICT (Fountain 2002, p. 137, Kallinikos 2004, Kallinikos 2006a). 
 
To understand the interaction of ICT and bureaucracy, it is first necessary to recognise 
that bureaucracies, even without new ICT, are socio-technical information systems 
(Dunleavy et al. 2006, pp. 10-12). Information and information technologies are central 
to bureaucracy in general and public administration in specific. Information is prevalent 
in everything that a government does. There are four major types of information: 
information to support internal management, information to support public administration 
and regulation, information to support public services, information made publicly 
available (Heeks 1999, p. 16). As Heeks states, “If information runs through everything 
that government does, then changing anything in government must mean changing 
information, which must mean changing information systems” (Heeks 1999, p. 17). 
 
So what are the components of these bureaucracies? The starting point of bureaucratic 
theory is found in Weber’s ideal-type bureaucracy.98 Different authors focus on different 
aspects of Weber’s bureaucracy, but in general these include the following: formal 
hierarchical structure, formal rules and procedures, roles, and official files and 
documents. 
 
Formal hierarchical structure For many theorists, hierarchy is the essence of 
bureaucracy (Fountain 2001, p. 48). This includes a hierarchical structure of power and 
authority as well as a rationally derived division of labour (Jain 2004).  
 
Formal rules and procedures The structure of the bureaucracy is supported by a 
formalized set of rules that rationalise and standardise behaviour of the bureaucrats. 
                                                 
98
 An ideal-type theory of bureaucracy lays out the core components that leaves the actual manifestation of 
bureaucracy open to a wide variety of forms and practices (Fountain 2002, p. 47). This can be seen in the 
wide variety of public sector organizations that exist with a highly diverse set of operations, goals, and 
mandates. While they do differ in many respects, the argument is that they do contain to some degree the 
components to be described.  
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These rules are to be applied impartially by a neutral bureaucrat, a mark of 
professionalism in a democratic public institution (Fountain 2001, Jain 2004).  
 
Roles  The functional division of labour is made into organizational roles. A 
central feature of bureaucracy is the separation of the social identity of the person from 
the role they occupy (Kallinikos 2004) making the role, not the person, the fundamental 
component of the bureaucracy (Kallinikos 2006a, p. 134). The standardization of 
behaviour comes through the explicit rules and procedures, specific training, as well as 
bureaucratic socialization of the norms and values of public sector bureaucracies. 
 
Official files and documents Rules and procedures are formalized and made 
possible through the use of files (Fountain 2001, p. 49). Beyond the role that files play as 
a mechanism to impersonalise the processes of administration, “systematically organized 
file registries” are also a key aspect of the information processing system (Dunleavy et al. 
2006, p. 11). File registries form a collective and powerful bureaucratic memory, 
especially with the invention of cross-indexing systems. This storage of information 
along with bureaucratic socialization and the impersonal occupation of roles enable the 
bureaucracy to operate continuously through time (Dunleavy et al. 2006, p. 11). 
 
While there are many dimensions along which bureaucracies may differ, there are two 
basic “types” of public sector bureaucracy that warrant a mention: machine and 
professional. Machine bureaucracies are the quintessential Weberian bureaucracy with a 
strong hierarchy and a focus on standardization of procedures and processes (Dunleavy et 
al. 2006, p. 15). 
“Many of them [machine bureaucracies] focus either on the mass handling of 
forms, benefit claims, tax returns or other documentation submitted by citizens or 
enterprises; or on the delivery of labour-intensive but non-professionalized 
services, those of a more straightforward administrative or techno-bureaucratic 
kind. Machine bureaucracies tend to be the dominant organizational form for the 
biggest users of civilian government IT at national government level, like the 
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taxing agencies, social security agencies and immigration control” (Dunleavy et 
al. 2006, p. 17). 
In contrast, professional bureaucracies such as schools, hospitals, and social services 
departments are dominated by the operating core where the professional staff has, by the 
very nature of their work, larger levels of discretion in their daily activities (Dunleavy et 
al. 2006).  
 
4.3.3 ICT AND BUREAUCRACY 
Now that we have an idea of what the core elements of ICT and bureaucracy are, we can 
theorise their interaction. Recall that information technologies are at the core of 
bureaucratic functioning. Thus it should be no surprise that “Information technology 
affects production, coordination, and control – the nervous system of government” 
(Fountain 2002, p. 137). Here we break up the major areas of interaction into three 
categories: capacity, coordination, and control.  
 
 
 
Bureaucratic capacity  
In a survey of studies on the impacts of ICT on the public sector, Anderson (2004) found 
that about half of all reported impacts, and those with the greatest number of positive 
impacts, were effects of ICT on the “capabilities” of government.99 The most direct 
improvement of bureaucratic capacity through the implementation of ICT is the extensive 
automation of administrative procedures (Anderson 2004). What were once paper-based 
clerical tasks can now be codified into software and implemented much more efficiently 
on computer based systems. This automation needs to be understood historically as the 
continuation of the use of information technology as “important means for work and 
administrative rationalization” (Kallinikos 2006a, p. 156). Part of this process results in 
                                                 
99
 Anderson defines this as “effects on the manner in which the unit (individual or collective) deals with its 
environment, in an attempt to control the environmental effects on its behaviour and to extract value from 
the environment” (Anderson 2004, p. 39).  She categorises the effects into the three categories: information 
quality, efficiency, and effectiveness. Furthermore, a full eighty-four percent of the findings with respect to 
capabilities were positive. 
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bureaucratic processes becoming increasingly partitioned, itemized, and codified 
(Kallinikos 2006a). Thus the system is self-reinforcing as the increasing rationalization 
leads to even greater “rationalization, standardization, and use of rule-based systems” 
(Fountain 2002, p. 62).  
 
Improved efficiency through automation is certainly not guaranteed. As discussed, 
bureaucracies can be highly resistant to change due to a variety of institutional, political, 
and cultural factors. Thus, the implementation of ICT may rationalise particular 
procedures but then be “enacted” in suboptimal ways (Fountain 2002, p. 127). In this 
case, the level of change associated with the technology is limited and may even prove 
detrimental. Furthermore, not all tasks are amenable to automation. More professional 
tasks have not undergone the same level of change as the more easily automated clerical 
tasks (Fountain 2002). Generally, these applications involve knowledge-based or expert 
systems that attempt to systematize and codify the professional knowledge. Up until this 
point, these systems have had limited success, 
“Experience with knowledge-based programs or expert systems demonstrates that 
rule-based systems work well as aids to clearly defined problems but tend to 
produce poor results outside well-bounded domains” (Fountain 2002, p. 128).  
One of the central problems with developing knowledge-based or expert systems is the 
difficulties in capturing and codifying the tacit knowledge that accompanies many 
professional tasks (Kallinikos 2001). This is one reason why new ICT systems have 
pervaded less rapidly in professional than in machine bureaucracies (Dunleavy et al. 
2006): the rules, regulations, and processes of machine bureaucracies are more easily 
codified and thereby more faithfully translated into software. 
 
In the right contexts the implementation of ICT can extend beyond automation and 
supporting existing procedures to innovation and the creation of new processes 
(Andersen 1999). Key to the innovation of new processes is the informate capacity of 
new ICT where information derived from the activities of the system can be processed 
and used to reflect back on the activities of the organisation (Bellamy and Taylor 1998, 
pp. 26-27). The increasing role of codified information signifies the increasing 
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“cognitivization” of work (Kallinikos 1999, Kallinikos 2001). This significantly frees up 
clerical staff from the more mundane information processing tasks to perform more high 
level analytical tasks, or “knowledge work” (Fountain 2002, p. 124).100 This new freedom 
combined with access to a new level of information creates new possibilities for worker 
creativity (Kallinikos 2001). Furthermore, the operation of information on information 
allows for the development of a whole new level of tactical and strategic analysis 
(Kallinikos 2001).  
 
Coordination   
The powers of new ICT for communication and networking bring about a possible 
“disjunctive change” in the very system of coordination and control of the bureaucracy 
itself (Fountain 2002, p. 117). As the costs of communication decreases and the speed 
and richness of communication is enhanced, new opportunities for coordination and 
control at a distance emerge (Kallinikos 2006a, pp. 158-159). Bellamy & Taylor argue 
that it is in the increased communication/networks is where real transformative changes 
begin to happen (Bellamy and Taylor 1998, p. 86).  
 
Coordination is enhanced through a modification of the relationship between information, 
distance, time, and memory (Fountain 2002). The ability to communicate information 
over greater distances means greater opportunities for collaborative action (Andersen 
1999, Fountain 2002, p. 130) and new possibilities for the distributions of activities. 
There can be greater use of cross-functional groups and teams using shared databases and 
electronic communications (Fountain 2002, p. 121). For example, caseworkers can 
perform work previously spread over several positions (Fountain 2002, p. 124). 
Furthermore, with the increased storage and access ability afforded by new ICT (for 
example with knowledge management systems), organisational memory is greatly 
increased as well as the fluidity of activities with respect to time (Fountain 2002, p. 129). 
 
                                                 
100
 It has also decreased the role traditional middle management, and created new positions in IT (Fountain 
2002, p. 124). 
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This increased level of coordination is not limited intra-organisationally. The new 
elements of communication as well as these new representations of reality make it 
possible to establish “new organizational, regional and global architectures of control, in 
which access to, and capacity to act upon and manipulate information figure 
prominently” (Kallinikos 2006a, pp. 158-159). This also has important implications for 
the possibilities of expanded interoperability in which information can be intersected and 
recombined in a variety of new ways (Kallinikos 2006a, p. 159). 
 
Control  
There are several ways that new ICT can alter the balance of control within an 
organization. Standard in the literature is the belief that the potential for increased 
employee access to information and freedom from mundane tasks would bring about 
employee empowerment. However, new ICT also has the ability to reinforce and 
strengthen top-down control (Bellamy and Taylor 1998, p. 43, Smith 2005b, Smithson et 
al. 2000). Employee behaviour is standardised and discretion is limited through the 
solidification of rules and standard operating procedures embedded in software processes 
(Dunleavy et al. 2006, Fountain 2002, p. 137). The advent of computerisation means that 
the embedded operating procedures have become more rigid and more highly rationalised 
than manuals or supervisors were ever able to do (Fountain 2002, p. 130) and is 
considered by some the “zenith of legal rational authority” (Bovens and Zouridis 2002, p. 
181).101 
 
The second means of enhancing top-down control is the improved means of employee 
and process monitoring (Andersen 1999). The emergence of information out of the 
computerised processes is implicated in more than just tactical and strategic 
organizational decision-making. Information essentially makes aspects of the agency’s 
functioning more visible through making available electronic indicators such as overall 
agency performance, production processes, and employee behaviour. This information 
                                                 
101
 In Heek’s (2005) terminology, it is the “deep inscription”, or “deep design” that “often have many 
strong implicit elements – are obdurate and will resist attempts at improvisation during deployment, thus 
reducing the chances of local appropriation or accommodation” (Heeks 2005, p. 65). 
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can be used to provide timely, clear, and accurate feedback measurements allowing for 
benefits such as the bringing together of disparate units and agency divisions in line with 
agency goals (Fountain 2002, p. 131). Ultimately this new information relieves authority 
from physical monitoring allowing for enhanced control at a distance (Fountain 2002, p. 
131). 
 
Interestingly, there is another subtle shift of control away from the government 
employees at all levels and towards the technology itself. The current state of the ICT 
system in government works as an infrastructure that constrains future possibilities of 
bureaucratic action and public policy.102  A good example of this is the prevalence and 
influence of legacy systems in many occidental countries in the operation of 
bureaucracies as well as the deployment of new e-government systems, 
“the design of IT systems can have strong effects in embodying and freezing a 
particular set of administrative capabilities – literally ‘embodying’ since in 
‘legacy’ systems a given set of procedures will be written up in millions of lines 
of programming or code…” (Dunleavy et al. 2006, p. 25). 
 
Changing or reworking such systems is not for the faint of heart, especially when the 
systems themselves may be several decades old. The problem, however, is still true for 
newer systems today, although improved software interoperability means that it may not 
be as acute. Regardless, it should come as no surprise that major policy changes must 
now take into consideration and be timetabled around the operations and changes of 
government ICT systems (Dunleavy et al. 2006, p. 24). 
 
4.3.4 E-SERVICES 
The promises of e-government go beyond the internal capacity, control, and 
communication advantages described above. The efficiency benefits that flow from the 
internal changes outlined above plus the nature of new ICT allow for the possibility of 
“forging new high-tech services” (Bellamy and Taylor 1998). These improved services 
                                                 
102
 This standardisation also occurs through socialisation and training, that provide even more inertia to 
maintain the status quo (Dunleavy et al. 2006, p. 25). 
 124
are offered both at the public sector offices as well as online. For example, the increased 
access to information allows for improved service delivery at the point of interaction 
enabling a public sector bureaucrat to instantaneously access a citizen’s file to answer 
questions or resolve a situation on the spot. Beyond the interaction withinin public sector 
offices, the codification of information and processes and the advent of the Internet 
allows for the placing of services online.  
 
If we follow the technocratic logic of e-government we can identify three improvements 
to government-citizen interaction through the implementation of e-services: more 
efficient service delivery, easier access to information, and improved communication 
(Streib and Navarro 2006). These can bring significant benefits for the end-user (citizen 
and business) such as 24-7 access to information (e.g. better market information, 
knowledge of policy changes) and convenience (e.g. time saved with faster transactions, 
reduced travel time and costs). Of course, achieving these advantages assumes that there 
is a sufficient technological infrastructure in place and that citizens have the requisite 
points of access, be that in a telecentre, a kiosk, the workplace, or Internet in their home. 
Much of these benefits are derived from the first two stages of service provision: 
information provision and transactional services. 
 
Information provision There are many types of information that can be offered 
online. Some examples are (Bhatnagar 2004): 
• Info about rules and procedures governing services; public officials responsible 
for different tasks; citizens’ charter; enhancing citizens’ exposure, 
• Information about decision and actions including outcome and process, 
• Data about individual entities, 
• Performance information; statistical employment, income, trade, performance 
indicators for government departments, and 
• Disclosure of assets, incomes; profiles of election candidates. 
Views on the type and extent of information that the public sector should provide is 
dependent upon your view of the role of citizens and participation in democratic 
processes (Eschenfelder and Miller 2007). With new ICT, information access is improved 
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through 24/7 online access to information through websites. For example, a public sector 
organization can offer access to database information (Landsbergen 2004). This access 
can also be facilitated by the use of search functions, FAQs, expert systems, or other 
knowledge management techniques (Atkinson and Ulevich 2000). In general, studies 
have found that ICT have brought about positive improvements to both data quality and 
data access (Anderson 2004). 
 
The quantity (along with type and quality) of information is another important defining 
feature of information provision. As described above, as a result of the self-referential 
quality of new ICT, the quantity of information available in the modern world is 
exploding (Kallinikos 2006a, Kallinikos 2006b). While ideally the government might 
make information available according to users needs and the norms and values of 
democracy, the realities of what information is put online and how it is expressed is 
highly dependent on a wide variety of factors and political pressures (Eschenfelder 
2004).103  
 
The discussion has been limited here to unidirectional information provision. In theories 
of digital democracy, information provision is the first stage of digital citizen 
participation (Holzer et al. 2004). The information interaction can become more dynamic, 
including citizens’ requests for information or the use of “push” technologies that serve 
up information automatically (e.g. newsletters, e-mail lists). Finally, there are 
opportunities for more advanced interactions where citizens can participate in policy 
deliberations through online polls, forums, or voting (Holzer et al. 2004, Parent et al. 
2005).104  
                                                 
103
 There are of course, many factors that mediate the quality and quantity of information presented by the 
government. In a grounded theory case study, Eschenfelder (2004) found a whole range of political and 
other factors that influenced the nature of information presented on the government agency’s web-site 
including, among others; public education mission, public inquiry burden, top-down directives, review and 
approval process, resources, and management interest and goals. 
104
 The potentials of this dynamic are changing rapidly with the rollout of the Web 2.0. New technologies 
have been enabling participation and influence over politics not previously anticipated. A perfect example 
is the influence of YouTube in the 2006 U.S. mid-term elections. The myriad of ways that ICT may be 
implicated in the shaping of democracy, while an extremely fascinating topic, goes beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
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Transactions  There are a whole range of types and degrees of e-service 
transactions that can be offered online. The two e-services studied in this thesis provide 
good examples of this variety. The tax online system offers a whole range of online 
possibilities, from accessing relevant tax information to filling out tax forms online to 
completing the whole transaction all the way through to making payments. The public 
sector e-procurement system also spans a range of possibilities for businesses looking to 
sell to the government, from the offering of ex-ante sales information to online bids to 
completing the entire transaction through the Internet.105  
 
Of course, the benefits derived from either information provision or government 
transactions online are also dependent upon how a user takes advantage of these new 
services. Just as the bureaucracy shaped the implementation of technology, with e-
services, the users play an important role. While there are many factors that shape 
citizens’ uptake and use of technology, here the most salient factors are identified:  
• The literature points out that Internet and e-service usage can be influenced by a 
variety of personal and social factors including education levels, e-literacy, age, 
gender, socio-economic status, race, and political orientation (Akman et al. 2005, 
Brewer et al. 2006, Carter and Bélanger 2005, Ho 2002, Hollifield and 
Donnermeyer 2003, Jaeger 2001, Jaeger and Thompson 2003, Layne and Lee 
2001, Ndou 2004, Reddick 2005, Silcock 2001, Thomas and Streib 2003, West 
2005). West found that younger and more educated citizens were the most likely 
to visits federal and state web sites, while education and race were the most 
significant predictors for visitors to local websites. In general, “Young people are 
far more likely than older people to access the Internet in general and e-
                                                 
105
 Of course, depending upon the complexity of the transaction, the service requires different degrees of 
back-end changes. For example, the simple offering of information about a public sector institution online 
may not require any back-end changes. However, to place financial transactions information online requires 
much more extensive back-end systems as well as overcoming interoperability issues with external 
financial institutions. 
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government in particular”, a “deviation from the typical pattern with other media 
usage and political participation” (West 2005, p. 126).106  
• Studies employing the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) have shown that 
the factors of perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use greatly impact the 
behavioral intention to use and consequently the actual uptake of new technology 
(Davis 1989, Davis et al. 1989), including e-services (Carter and Bélanger 2005) 
such as electronic tax-filing systems (Chang et al. 2005, Wang 2002). In the 
context of organizations, Davis defined perceived usefulness as “the degree to 
which a person believes that using a particular system would enhance his or her 
job performance” and perceived ease of use as “the degree to which a person 
believes that using a particular system would be free of effort” (Davis 1989, p. 
320). These two factors have also been shown to be dependent upon one’s 
computer self-efficacy, or level of experience with computers (Wang 2002).  
• While this study is about building trust through e-services, perceived 
trustworthiness of the organization has empirically been shown to be a pre-
requisite to the uptake of an e-service (Carter and Bélanger 2005, Pieterson et al. 
2007, Reddick 2005). For the most part, this research was motivated by similar 
findings in e-commerce extending the TAM (Dahlberg et al. 2003, Gefen et al. 
2003, Pavlou and Gefen 2004).107 
• Issues surrounding privacy, confidentiality, and security, along with perceived 
risk appear to influence the use of e-services (Brewer et al. 2006, Heeks 1999, 
Jaeger 2001, Layne and Lee 2001, Wang 2002, Warkentin et al. 2002). Wang 
(2002) in an empirical study of an e-tax system use found that perceived 
credibility, measured in terms of privacy and security of information, was a more 
powerful impact on e-service use than perceived usefulness.  
 
                                                 
106
 Arguably, successful uptake and diffusion needs concerted campaigns, education, and intermediaries 
(Bhatnagar 2004, p. 43, Jaeger and Thompson 2003). 
107
 For those who are interested, see (Silva 2006) for an important critique of TAM. 
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4.3.5 ICT IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
A quick note justifying the above conceptualisation is needed at this point. A case could 
be made that the conceptualisation of bureaucracy used above is more representative of 
the western context and not as relevant for the development context (e.g. Avgerou 1990, 
Peterson 1998). For example Berman and Tetty (2001) argue that post-colonial African 
bureaucracies have three characteristics that differ from the occidental context: limited 
technical capabilities; authoritarian decision-making processes; and the predominance of 
patron-client relationships. Similarly, Peterson (1998) describes the “hub-and-wheel” 
style of management found in African bureaucracies which is “highly personalised and 
has limited delegation” (Peterson 1998, pp. 29-40). Such a style contrasts with the 
Weberian bureaucratic ideal of a strict separation of the personal and professional roles. 
Such differences will, of course, have influence over the implementation and outcome of 
e-government systems. The argument here is that the Chilean public sector (detailed in 
Chapter 5) does qualify as an example of a more traditional impersonal and role based 
bureaucracy, and as such, this conceptualisation holds.  
 
4.4  THE CHANGING CITIZEN-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP  
It is through the improvement of government services where much of the perceived 
transformational power of new ICT lies; the cost of services will go down while quality 
and scope of services and citizen-government interactions increase. This then potentially 
acts as the catalyst for restoring the citizen-government relationship  (Bellamy and Taylor 
1998, p. 64). Whether or not and how the relationship is being “restored” is an empirical 
question that may find a different answer in different contexts. It is, however, possible to 
theoretically identify and elaborate on some important ways through which aspects of the 
citizen-government relationship are being altered.  
 
4.4.1 ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY 
E-government provides a new means for promoting accountability of the public sector 
(Meijer 2007, Wong and Welch 2004). Among other things, the Internet provides a new 
medium for the dissemination of information regarding public sector performance 
(Bhatnagar 2004) and policies and policy intentions (Gelders 2005). There are two main 
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types of information that can be communicated that contributes to transparency and 
potentially towards accountability: information on rules and activities of government, and 
public sector performance information (Bhatnagar 2004),108 that will be referred to here 
as institutional and performance transparency respectively. 
 
New technologies provide a new means to hold the public sector accountable to the 
public, as new channels are opened for downward communication (Weare 2002) 
empowering citizens to monitor the activities of government (Wong and Welch 2004, p. 
276).109 This can potentially work as complementary accountability mechanisms to the 
traditional form of horizontal accountability where an actor must answer for expected 
performance to another actor who has the power to judge and impose sanctions (Meijer 
2007, p. 167). Such accountability in the public sector comes from formalized, 
institutionalized, and hierarchical forms. Accountability towards citizens is problematic, 
however, as it differs from more traditional forms of accountability (institutional checks 
and balances) in three important ways: there is “no formal information provision”, there 
is “no fixed format for debate”, and there are “no formal sanctions tied to stakeholder 
judgments” (Meijer 2007, pp. 168-169). The lack of a formalised process limits the 
quality of information and the availability of accountability mechanisms. Without more 
formal mechanisms in place, citizens can resort to mechanisms such as exit and voice (cf. 
Hirschmann 1970), although exit is often not a possibility when dealing with the state. 
The media also plays a large role using information and publicity as a sanction.110 
 
                                                 
108
 Of course, the quality of the transparency is directly linked to the quality, veracity, completeness, and 
timeliness of the information (Gelders 2005). It also depends upon the amount and type of information 
processing performed.  
109
 Wong & Welch describe this form of vertical accountability,  
“More information delivered in a more timely fashion to citizens is to increase transparency of 
government, empowering citizens to more closely monitor government performance. Enhanced 
interactivity of the technology is also expected to improve government accountability as it makes 
government more responsive to the needs and demands of individual citizens” (Wong and Welch 
2004, p. 276). 
110
 Of course, while negative publicity may result in a renewed focus on quality of service, the public 
organization may simply counter with its own positive publicity (Meijer 2007).  
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4.4.2 PUBLIC SECTOR POLICY AND DISCRETION 
The implementation of ICT in the public sector alters the loci of power in the public 
sector. New technologies shape bureaucrats’ behaviour and subtly shift their roles as 
policy makers and implementers. Just as new technological infrastructures can constrain 
future policy proposals, they also shift discretion away from lower-level bureaucrats to 
the system implementers, with important implications for the citizen-government 
relationship. This process is described as the movement from street-level bureaucracies to 
system-level bureaucracies. 
 
Street-level bureaucrats are defined as “public employees who interact directly with 
individual citizens and have substantial discretion in allocating facilities or imposing 
sanctions” (Bovens and Zouridis 2002, p. 175).111 One role of the street-level bureaucrat 
is of policy creator and enactor through their individual discretion during their daily 
activities. This discretion (and autonomy) emerges from various circumstances intrinsic 
to public administration,  
“complexity and the necessary ambiguity – and sometimes inconsistency – of 
rules to be applied; time pressure and the limited means possessed by the 
bureaucrat to do justice to the specific circumstances; and the impossibility of 
management to completely control the behaviour of their contact functionaries 
with respect to the clients” (Snellen 1998, p. 499).  
For example, “Is the applicant employable in the labor market? Should a deductible item 
be considered when determining the taxable income level? Can the parents of a student 
be qualified as unwilling to pay, meaning that the amount to be contributed by the parents 
may or may not be subtracted from the student’s grant” (Bovens and Zouridis 2002, p. 
175)? Ultimately, the street-level bureaucrat is the link between internal processes and 
the external process of information about the context and needs of citizens (Snellen 
1998).  
 
                                                 
111
 As Bovens & Zouridis (2002) explain, the switch from street-level to system level bureaucracies only 
happens for those public service employees who are “involved in the routine handling of large amounts of 
formalized transactions. Hence, it is not about the delivery of concrete, individual services by teachers, 
health workers, or judges” (Bovens and Zouridis 2002, p. 184 in footnote). 
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The advent of e-services means that these street-level bureaucrats are being replaced with 
a system-level bureaucracy. System-level bureaucracies are the information systems that 
replace street-level bureaucrats through the automation of their duties and decision 
making processes (Reddick 2005, p. 39). In many cases, citizens no longer interact with a 
bureaucrat, but instead with a faceless computer screen, “Window clerks are being 
replaced by Web sites, and advanced information and expert systems are taking over the 
role of case managers and adjudicating officers” (Bovens and Zouridis 2002, p. 175). 
 
As discussed, the increased use of ICT to replace and/or supplement administrative 
processes increasingly constrains the bureaucrats decision-making process (Snellen 
1998).  Ultimately, the former street-level bureaucrats are no longer involved in directly 
handling individual cases, but instead focus on “system development and maintenance, 
toward optimizing information processes, and toward creating links between systems in 
various organizations” (Bovens and Zouridis 2002, p. 178). Furthermore, this also often 
leads to a growing emphasis on quantitative decision criteria (Anderson 2004) . 
 
This rationalisation, while it may lower discretion, does not completely remove discretion 
from the organization. Discretion instead is in part shifted away from the street-level 
bureaucrats to system analysts and software designers (Bovens and Zouridis 2002, 
Reddick 2005). This requires that implementation of policy issues must be considered 
during the policy formation processes (Snellen 1998), decreasing the traditional 
separation between policy and administration (Thiel and Leeuw 2002). Furthermore, 
overly specified algorithms may not have the flexibility to deal with special 
circumstances. In this way, arbitrariness emerges through the back door due to the 
excessive rigidity and inability to take account of contextual details (Bovens and Zouridis 
2002, p. 182). Conversely, if not all details are specified in advance, the discretion falls to 
the system programmer who will generate their own solutions. In such situations, policy 
decisions made at the edges are done in an ad-hoc manner or result as an unintended 
consequence of the complex interaction of the software.112 Finally, in the cases where 
                                                 
112
 Furthermore, in some cases – discretionary authority is intentionally bestowed because “politicians want 
to appease multiple stakeholders or to facilitate executive agents’ work” (Thiel and Leeuw 2002, p. 275). 
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there is not a complete transition to an online service, the increased amount of 
information supplied to a street-level bureaucrat may actually increase their discretion 
and action (Anderson 2004, p. 51). 
 
4.4.3 SURVEILLANCE AND EMPOWERMENT 
Along with the potential for citizen empowerment, new technologies bring possibilities of 
increased surveillance and the threat of a big brother society. This is because of the 
central importance of information in both empowerment and surveillance. There is an 
increasing need for information to maintain today’s society: “Surveillance … is 
fundamental to all the types of organisation associated with the rise of modernity, in 
particular the nation-state…” (Giddens 1990, p. 59). Modern life is more structured than 
ever before and effective social organisation is only possible if there is enough good 
information upon which to order society: “Organisation and observation are conjoined 
twins, ones that have grown together with the development of the modern world” 
(Webster 2002, p. 205). Consequently,  
“… much of the capability of the surveillance society is being created as the 
incidental by-product of processes which are designed primarily to meet non-
surveillance goals, such as reducing fraud, improving efficiency and enhancing 
equality” (Bellamy and Taylor 1998, p. 88). 
This is especially a concern in countries such as Singapore and China, or politically 
unstable democracies, where tight control over information and the Internet allows them 
control over politically relevant information and erodes the public sphere (Anderson 
2004). Ultimately, e-services come with the inherent tension between a big brother 
society and “‘soft sister’ informational innovations which promise to improve both the 
quality and efficiency of public services” (Bellamy and Taylor 1998, p. 87).113 
 
                                                 
113
 As a side comment, the outcome of this process is not yet known, and certainly not pre-determined. It 
may be that the fear invoking notion of the surveillance society that new technologies make possible may 
be countered “through making social life open, visible and accountable to everyone” (Kallinikos 2001, p. 
59). 
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4.4.4 SUMMARY 
Theoretically speaking, the implementation of ICT in the public sector has great potential 
to enhance (and possibly transform) the citizen-government relationship. ICT is a 
disjunctive new technology with its ability to process and manipulate information, 
produce new information from information processes, and make new networks of 
communication and coordination possible. Given that a public sector bureaucracy is 
already an information processing system, the implementation of ICT brings great 
potential to enhance and alter its internal workings. Ultimately, these changes come 
through potential improvement of the bureaucratic capacity, communication, control, and 
the offering of online services with its many benefits to the citizen. Of course, the actual 
outcome of an ICT implementation is highly dependent on a series of social and 
organizational factors and is by no means guaranteed to bring about these benefits. 
Furthermore, the introduction of new ICT into government may result in changes to the 
citizen-government relationship in terms of introducing new possibilities of transparency 
and accountability, shifting the foci of policy discretion, and in the potential e-service 
tension between big brother surveillance and soft sister e-service benefits.  
 
4.5  PART IV:  E-GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST  
This section turns to the final theoretical task of considering how changes to the public 
sector administration and services outlined in part III may be implicated in altering the 
trustworthiness of the public sector and ultimately impacting on citizens’ trust. To 
accomplish this, this section integrates theory from parts I, II and III. Like the previous 
theoretical sections, ideal-type theory is the goal. The result is a series of middle-range 
hypotheses that falls between the more abstract institutional trust theory (part II) and the 
case specific hypotheses that are generated in chapters 6 & 7. In an attempt to build on 
theory, and use theory relevant for the cases in this study, the focus is on extending the e-
government discussion above and presenting the most common theories in the literature 
on e-government and trust.  
 
Before continuing it is important to clearly differentiate between trust in an e-government 
system and trust in government through e-government. Trust in e-government systems 
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research is concerned with building trust in the technological system, generally with 
respect to encouraging e-service use or satisfaction with e-services. Trust in government 
through e-government, the focus of this thesis, is how e-government services alter the 
trust relationship between the citizen and the institutions of government that offer the e-
service. In the trust in an e-government systems literature, security and privacy issues are 
of central concern (e.g. Wang 2002, Welch et al. 2004). Security and privacy issues are 
of both an indirect and potentially direct concern here. Indirectly, security and privacy 
influence e-service use (see section 4.3.4). More directly, security and privacy assurances 
may also indicate the government has the interests of the citizen in mind as well as 
perhaps a level of legislative competence. While these issues are important for e-service 
implementation and undoubtedly play a role, they take a background role here 
theoretically.114 Consequently, security/privacy issues are viewed as contextual 
mechanisms that potentially modulate the activity of the more central mechanisms being 
researched. 
 
Following the distinctions made in part II & III, the following theory is divided into three 
categories based upon the three trustworthiness components: competence, interests, and 
values. Depending upon the qualitative properties of the e-service it may project 
competence (e.g. is the web page made well? Is it an efficient service?), align interests 
(e.g. does it provide me any benefits?), and align values (e.g. is the service procedurally 
just?). In general, the theories presented are focused on the building of trust rather than its 
counterpart; destroying trust. It is assumed that each theory implies it’s opposite, for 
example, if aligning interests tends to build trust, then unaligned interests will tend to 
erode trust. Furthermore, the focus here is on direct trustworthiness cues and not on the 
indirect socio-tropic cues such as the media.115 This part concludes with a consideration 
of some individual-level contextual mechanisms that modulate a citizen’s interpretation 
of their interaction with an e-service.  
                                                 
114
 There are two reasons for this considering the e-services studied in this thesis: (1) there are more salient 
direct mechanisms (transparency/accountability and effectiveness/efficiency) that can be studied and (2) it 
did not emerge as an issue during the course of the study as will be discussed in chapters 6 & 7. 
115
 Also like the theory in part II, this section is concerned with direct mechanisms. The indirect (socio-
tropic) mechanisms – i.e. communicating these cues through third-party – is important but not part of the 
direct impact of e-services theory. Here they potentially play a contextual role. 
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Building institutional trust through e-government theories 
“Responsive, through improved communication and interactions with 
citizens… Accessible, around the clock, seven days a week… Transparent, 
through the posting of information such as data, policies, laws, meeting 
schedules and minutes, and contact information… Responsible, as 
demonstrated by privacy and security statements and policies for handling 
personal information submitted online and government data that are posted 
online… Efficient and effective, through the use of latest technology to 
automate processes, improve service delivery, produce budget savings, and 
save time… Participatory, providing for citizen input” (Tolbert & Mossberger, 
2006, pp. 357-358).
Moon (2003) argues that IT has potential through useful tools to help restore 
public trust through; enhanced transparency, cost efficiency, effectiveness, 
policy participation.
“… agencies may increase institutional trust when they enact internet 
technologies according to democratic norms of equity, transparency, and 
interactivity” (Welch et al., 2004).
“In an increasingly complex information-based society, the provision of more 
information and increased transparency may even obscure public 
understanding and undermine trust through information overload” (Cook, 
Hardin, & Levi, 2005, p. 57).
Increase of transparency has the potential to “improve citizens’ perceptions of 
accountability” (Brewer et al., 2006, p. 484).
“Digital democracy enriches the democratic process and builds public trust. … 
These include increased citizen participation in policy-making processes, the 
ability of public agencies to respond to citizens more quickly and accurately, 
and cost savings related to time and paperwork” (Holzer et al., 2004, pp. 27-
28).
On their results of surveying students responses to e-government web-sites, 
“…it is the quotient of gain (multiplied by its likelihood…) and risk which 
determines trust… familiarity (as) a precondition for trust or distrust does not 
seem to hold” (Riedl, 2004, p. 98).
 
Table 11  Theories of how to build institutional trust through e-government 
implementations.  
 
4.5.1 COMPETENCE 
The starting point for this theory is to recall from the previous chapter how competence is 
theorised to build institutional trust: Good institutional performance that is 
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communicated, understood, and perceived to meet or exceed citizens’ expectations of 
performance tends to build trust.  
 
The most straightforward way that institutional performance is improved through e-
government is the computerisation of internal government processes. This has several 
outcomes that can result in the perception of improved institutional performance. First, e-
services can make the institutional service delivery more efficient and effective. 
Depending upon the degree of digitisation and the type of service, e-services can be faster 
(less processing time, automated processes), more accurate (less chances for human error, 
digital forms can have information checks), as well as bring about substantial cost 
savings (less cost per transaction). 
 
C1 – Competence hypothesis: Effective/efficient service I: E-services perceived to be 
more effective and efficient (faster, more accurate, cost savings) will tend to build trust. 
 
Also, the computerisation of internal processes and access to information for all 
bureaucrats provides a mechanism through which street-level service delivery service 
may improve. While this is not a more efficient “virtual” e-service, the improvement in 
office service is made possible through back-end computerisation. 
 
C2 - Competence hypothesis: effective/efficient service II: E-government services that 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of service at the institution’s physical office tend 
to build trust. 
 
One way that citizens have access to the actual performance of institutions is through the 
publication of performance indicators. Online services provide another medium for the 
communication of institutional performance. Furthermore, as discussed (section 4.3.1), 
the informate quality of new ICT allow for increased monitoring of performance internal 
to the bureaucracy. These indicators, or derivatives thereof (e.g. performance targets), can 
be made public to increase performance transparency. If the published performance 
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transparency information is understood and meets or exceeds expectations, it will tend to 
build trust. However, if expectations are not met, it will tend to decrease trust.  
 
C3 - Competence hypothesis: performance transparency I: Performance transparency 
that meets the citizen’s expectations will tend to build trust. 
 
Performance transparency of institutional goals and mandates, and the performance data 
of how they meet those goals or mandates can also be linked to accountability 
mechanisms. It seems logical to hypothesise that if performance indicators are seen as 
linked to effective accountability mechanisms then this will tend to build trust. 
 
C4 - Competence hypothesis: performance transparency II: Performance transparency 
that is perceived as linked to effective accountability mechanisms will tend to build trust. 
 
4.5.2 INTERESTS 
E-services provide the opportunity for an institution to demonstrate that their interests are 
aligned with the citizens and this will tend to build trust. Recall the first interest theory 
from part II: If the institution’s policies encompass the interests of the citizen, trust will 
tend to be built. 
 
The very implementation of an e-service is a policy. Thus, how can an e-service be in the 
interest of the citizen? The simplest route is through providing user benefits. The 
theoretical discussion mentioned two main benefits: improved convenience (e.g. 24/7 
access to services and needed information), and cost and time savings (e.g. faster 
transactions, no need to travel to the office). It must be said that the literature has paid 
little attention to this aspect of trust, although there have been mentions of it creating 
“good will” (West 2005, p. 125).116 However, from a rational choice perspective, where 
                                                 
116
 The full quote is, “Visitors can access publications, search databases, register complaints, and other 
services. These features create considerable good will among the general public” (West 2005, p. 125). 
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gain/loss calculations come into play in determining trust, one can see how user benefits 
might shift the equation (Riedl 2004).  
 
I1 - Interest hypothesis: user benefits: E-services that bring user benefits will tend to 
increase trust. 
 
Parent et al. (2005) hypothesised that e-service quality117 will influence trust. More 
specifically, Parent et al. hypothesised that perceived quality of the government website 
indicates increased government responsiveness. This seems a bit of a stretch. A better 
way to conceptualise the relationship is that the quality of the website shows that the 
government has the interests of the citizen in mind— that is, that the government wants 
the e-service to be easy to use and useful for the citizen. Parent et al.’s survey results only 
marginally supported this theory.  
 
I2 - Interest hypothesis: e-service quality: Good e-service quality indicates that the 
institution considers citizens’ interests and therefore tends to build trust. 
 
The first interest sub theory from part II is: Mechanisms that work to align (such as voice 
and exit) the interests of the institution and citizen tend to build trust. 
 
The increased capacity for communication through e-government allows for potential 
new citizen-government interactions such as citizen participation (voice). Theoretically, 
increased interaction is a mechanism that suggests institutional openness to input and for 
registering citizens’ interests, thus potentially aligning interests. There are two main 
components that e-services can supply that work to increasing citizens’ possibilities for 
participation: information and open channels of communication to allow citizens to 
leverage that information. So far, the amount of e-services that include truly dynamic and 
participatory citizen-government interaction and communication (for example on policy 
                                                 
117
 To measure the quality of the service, Parent et al. (2005) used the TAM variables of perceived ease of 
use and perceived usefulness of the services. 
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deliberations) is limited.118 A more common method is to providing relatively simple 
online mechanisms for citizen feedback such as emails to public officials, comments, 
online help, etc. Theoretically, the very existence of these feedback mechanisms might 
make the citizen feel that the institution takes the citizen’s concerns into consideration, 
and thus tend to build trust.  
 
I3 - Interest hypothesis: voice: Increased possibilities for voice through the provision of 
information and the e-service feedback mechanisms (e-mail, comments) will tend to build 
trust. 
 
Both of these voice mechanisms work to align interests, but are also an expression of the 
democratic value of involving citizens in the policy-making process (part of procedural 
justice).  Thus we would expect these mechanisms to potentially work on two levels: the 
self-interest calculation (aligning of interests), and procedural justice values.  
 
The final interest sub-theory from part II is: Establishing credible institutional 
commitments through credible and effective institutional checks and balances that keep 
their interests in-line with citizens tends to build trust. 
 
E-government and e-services with their increased informatisation of internal processes 
provides several checks and balances that incentivise potential knaves to behave as the 
proverbial knights. One mechanism is one of the most discussed benefits of e-
government: increased transparency and accountability (see 4.4.1). Increased institutional 
transparency is believed to build trust when accompanied by effective accountability 
mechanisms that keep the bureaucrats interests in-line with the roles and rules of the 
institution. The new level of visibility of internal processes and outcomes means that 
bureaucrats’ behaviour can be subject to both types of accountability: horizontal 
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 There is some theory, most commonly associated with e-democracy around the potential for citizen 
participation to build trust (Holzer et al. 2004, Moon 2003, Tolbert and Mossberger 2006). As this is not 
central to this thesis (it is neither common in e-government implementation or is a part of the two e-
services studied) it will not be discussed here. 
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(independent institutions can monitor activities of institution, such as the office of the 
Auditor General) and stakeholder (information on the processes of the institution can be 
made available online).  
 
I4 - Interest hypothesis: transparency/accountability: Increased transparency of internal 
processes and service outcomes accompanied by perceived effective accountability 
mechanisms will tend to build trust. 
 
Another mechanism for constraining potential knaves is the ability of e-government to 
reduce bureaucratic discretion thus reducing possibilities for corruption. Corrupt 
behaviour is an indication of divergent interests between the bureaucrat, the institution, 
and the citizen. In many countries, small bribes are extracted at the point of interaction 
with the street-level bureaucrat in order to grease the wheels of the government machine. 
Without this interaction, possibilities for corruption decrease. They also decrease through 
the operation of other mechanisms put in place with e-government such as the 
standardization of rules and procedures that reduces the opportunities for arbitrary action, 
increased visibility of actions can improve auditing and analysis, and the opening of new 
service channels increasing competition (Bhatnagar 2004, p. 40). If e-services result in a 
decrease of perceived corruption then they will tend to increase trust.  
 
I5 - Interest hypothesis: reduced corruption: A perceived reduction of corruption due to 
the computerisation and rationalisation of government processes will tend to build trust.  
 
E-services potentially influence the citizen-government relationship in a manner that has 
not received much attention in the literature; by changing the relation of power. The 
greater the power asymmetry, the more difficult it is to build trust. The implementation of 
e-services might serve as a countervailing mechanism. If an e-service provides 
information and potentials for voice and interaction, this may imply a shift of power 
towards the citizen (citizen empowerment). On the contrary, the offering of e-services 
often requires and is concurrent with the increased collection of information that is then 
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centralised in government databases. This increased penetration and knowledge of the 
lives of citizens increases the power of the government vis-à-vis the citizen.  
 
Clearly, the dynamic is complex and dependent on the type of e-service, the amount and 
type of information collected, and mechanisms of credible commitment to restore balance 
to the power asymmetry. If the balance is shifted towards coercion and control through 
the new found power (big brother) then this will tend to destroy trust. If, however, the 
government uses this information for improved services and user benefits (soft sister) 
then theory is inconclusive and most likely dependent upon the focus and sensitivities of 
the citizen; the power differential may be problematic for some, and for others the 
improved services may build trust. Here, the hypothesis is that improved benefits from e-
services will counteract the power dynamic and this will tend to build trust. 
 
I6 - Interest hypothesis: power (big brother): Increased power for institutions vis-à-vis 
the citizen through e-services will tend to destroy trust.  
 
I7 - Interest hypothesis: power theory (soft sister): Increased power for institutions vis-à-
vis the citizen through e-services that results in improved services and user benefits tends 
to build trust. 
 
4.5.3 VALUES  
There were two general paths through which institutional values influence trust. The first 
is: Overlapping values between the institution (institutional ethos) and citizen tend to 
build trust. It is not altogether clear how e-government implementations would alter the 
institutional ethos. To fundamentally alter the institutional ethos would require fairly 
dramatic transformation of an institution. One possibility is when an e-government 
implementation is associated with a set of overarching public sector reforms. New public 
management (citizen as customer), or more citizen (as participant) oriented reforms 
embody different value orientations towards the role of government with respect to 
democracy and the market. Depending upon the transformational success of these 
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reforms, the institutional ethos might also be changed accordingly. Consequently, there is 
no clear hypothesis that emerges here. 
 
V1 - Values hypothesis: institutional ethos: It is unclear how the introduction of e-
government will change this ethos, and therefore it is also unclear how e-government will 
tend to impact on institutional trust. 
 
The second values theory from chapter 3 is: Institutions that embody and communicate 
values of procedural fairness, distributive justice, and benevolence will tend to build 
trust. These will be tackled one by one. 
 
Procedural fairness - There were four components of procedural fairness, and each is 
influenced differently by the introduction of e-services: 
(1) Citizen compliance – If the introduction of e-services increases citizen 
compliance then this will tend to build trust. There are two main ways this can 
occur: facilitating compliance through the reduction of compliance costs and 
increased surveillance and coercion.  
 
V2 - Value hypothesis: procedural fairness (citizen compliance): E-services that increase 
citizen compliance through increased capacities for surveillance and coercion or through 
a reduction of compliance costs tend to increase trust. 
 
(2) Universal criteria for hiring/firing - E-services do not have a direct impact on the 
institutional criteria for the recruitment and promotion of agents. Much like 
changing the “ethos” of the institution, this is an internal policy issue that most 
likely is not impacted by e-government.119  
 
                                                 
119
 One can imagine a specific e-service that would address this issue, such as an online hiring site with 
stated universal criteria, or even just posting the institutional hiring practices online. This is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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(3) Impartial institutions - Computerisation may make the biggest difference to this 
aspect of procedural justice. The automatisation of government processes can 
severely constrain street-level discretion. In fully automated e-services, the 
potential for street-level discretion is completely eliminated by an impartial 
screen-level bureaucracy. In situations where unnecessary discretion was 
removed and is perceived as an improvement over the former service (thus it is 
relative to the type of service and previous service history) it will tend to build 
trust. 
 
V3 - Value hypothesis: procedural fairness (impartial institution): E-services that remove 
unnecessary street-level discretion and increase perceived impartiality will tend to build 
trust. 
 
As discussed in section 4.4.2, the computerisation of government processes and 
services does not entirely remove discretion and arbitrariness from the system. 
One major shift is discretion moving from the street-level bureaucrat to the 
software designers and implementers. Depending on the type of bureaucracy 
(machine or professional) there will be more or less discretion that cannot be 
computerised. Furthermore, highly rationalised systems may not be able to deal 
effectively with the cases at the edges, those that fall outside of the lines of the 
standard operating procedures. This is essentially the opposite of the theory of 
impartial institutions. Thus, we can expect that where such processes are 
perceived to be arbitrary and thus exclusionary in some sense (thus not achieving 
the impartial goal of treating citizens equally) will tend to decrease trust (Welch 
et al. 2004, p. 376). 
(4) Involving citizens in the policy-making process – As discussed above in the 
interest/voice theory, e-services opens up the potential for increased citizens’ 
participation, including in the policy making process. Thus the theories extending 
from this are equivalent to theories I3 & I4 above. 
 
 144
Distributive justice - Distributive justice is another potential trust building mechanism 
that has not received much attention in the e-government and trust literature. One reason 
for this is that there is no apparent direct link between e-services, distributive justice, and 
trust. This is for at least three reasons. First, the value of distributive justice, and what 
that pertains, is not held by all citizens. Second, the distributive effect of an e-service is 
related to larger socio-economic distributional issues that extend beyond the scope of a 
singular e-service. Consequently an e-services impact on distributive justice is indirectly 
mediated by the socio-economic context rather than directly perceived. Finally, an e-
service’s impact on distributive justice is an extension of the distributive impact of 
previously offered government service, modulated by its new online access point. Thus, 
the distributive impacts are relative to the type of policy behind the service being put 
online. 
 
The push for e-services, even with the best of intentions, may adversely affect 
distributional justice. First of all, there are a variety of reasons (mostly socio-economic) 
why not all e-services are made for, benefit, or are accessible to the entire population. 
Furthermore, some e-government theory is taking a page from the commercial sector and 
arguing for the increased personalisation of services as means to increase the efficiency 
and effectiveness of government, as well as predict and even influence behaviour 
(Pieterson et al. 2007). Consequently, there is an increasing tendency towards 
differentiation and personalization (Bellamy and Taylor 1998, p. 88). This can 
conceivably work against the value of distributional justice. Unlike the private sector, the 
government does not choose their customers, and thus e-government must be extended to 
all (Layne and Lee 2001, Silcock 2001). The advent of new electronic government 
services that end up discriminating through the favouring of a particular population or 
that is inaccessible to sectors of the population may actually work to create a digital 
divide, that is, a new set of have and have-nots (Heeks 1999) and potentially creating new 
social segregation (Kakabadse et al. 2003, p. 51).120 The end result is two-tiered system 
                                                 
120
 “Information-age direct democracy poses new social segregation challenges for those who are 
information rich and information poor on an individual and societal basis” (Kakabadse et al. 2003, p. 51). 
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of service provision that goes against the traditional bureaucratic bureaucracy of 
egalitarianism (Bellamy and Taylor 1998, p. 89, Cordella 2007, Kallinikos 2004).  
 
V4 - Value hypothesis: procedural fairness (distributive justice): E-services that are 
perceived to contribute to distributive justice (e.g., provide a service for the poor) and 
the distributive justice value is held by the citizen tend to increase trust. 
 
Benevolence - The movement from citizen and street-level bureaucrat interactions to 
citizens interacting with a virtual office fundamentally changes the qualitative properties 
of the citizen-government interaction. The bureaucrat is replaced by a faceless computer 
screen. Exactly how this will impact on trust is not well known, nor has it been theorised 
(as far as I know). Will the increased depersonalisation of government undermine public 
confidence (Thomas and Streib 2003, p. 99)? Can respect be communicated through an 
online service? Most likely this switch to depersonalised online interaction will have 
differential effects depending upon a series of contextual factors such as the type of 
service, previous experience with the service, personal abilities, and personal preferences 
and expectations. The lack of theoretical direction on this value does not allow for the 
establishment of a coherent hypothesis. 
 
4.5.4 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
The above theories are the direct mechanisms that connect particular trustworthy 
attributes of e-government services to citizens’ trust in the institution. There is a variety 
of literature that in attempting to understand the e-government-citizen trust relationship 
has identified a series of contextual factors that may modulate the impacts of the above 
mentioned mechanisms: 
• Citizens form higher expectations of performance through exposure to private 
sector applications like e-commerce or other communications. These expectations 
are transferred to government (Brewer et al. 2006, Ho 2002, p. 411, Welch et al. 
2004, p. 375). Welch et al. found that those with greater expectations are in 
general less satisfied with government web sites (Welch et al. 2004). 
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• Empirical evidence indicates that one’s political affiliation impacts one’s 
assessment of a government web page (Streib and Navarro 2006, West 2005). 
West argues that it works through a general orientation towards government, 
“This means that those who are confident and trusting in traditional government 
also tend to be positive about e-government” (West 2005, p. 123).121  
• Age was found to impact perception of effectiveness of e-government (Streib and 
Navarro 2006). Interestingly, they found that the relationship is curvilinear, with 
positive appraisals increasing to age 37 and then decreasing thereafter.122 
• A citizen’s prior experience with the Internet impacts assessment of a government 
web page (Welch and Hinnant 2003). Presumably this happens through 
adjustments of expectations and the perceived ease of use of a web page.  
• Trust may be necessary for e-service use (see 4.3.4), but it is also has been linked 
with satisfaction of e-service interactions. Welch et al (2004) argue that trust and 
satisfaction exist in a recursive relation, “trust leads to satisfaction, and vice 
versa” (Welch et al. 2004, p. 377).  
 
4.5.5 SUMMARY: E-GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST THEORIES 
E-government implementations clearly have a wide-range of potential impacts on 
institutional trustworthiness and trust. This final part (IV) has integrated theory from the 
previous three parts to provide a set of e-government and institutional trust hypotheses 
(see Table 12 & Table 13 for overview).  
 
Developing these hypotheses has two important functions. First, it provides some 
structure to complexity. As theory becomes more concrete (compare part II to part IV) it 
increases in complexity. This is not surprising. Reality is complex. Establishing the 
hypotheses prior to the empirical research provides a set of dimensions along which the 
                                                 
121
 Another potential explanation is if your particular party is in power, then you are more trusting of 
government, then it follows that party affiliation might influence e-government trustworthiness. This fits 
Steib & Navarro’s (2006) finding  that Republicans in the U.S. are more open to e-government (when 
Republicans were in charge), while at the same time the left-of centre party people are more trusting of 
government in Chile (see Chapter 5). 
122
 There research was done in the US state of Georgia and it is entirely reasonable to exspect the 
distribution and shape of the curve to be highly contextually (temporally and geographically) specific. 
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researcher can expect to see (or not) causal interactions. Second, these hypotheses fall 
between the abstract institutional trust building theory and the case specific concrete 
hypotheses that will be formulated in the following chapters. By establishing a chain of 
theory, from trust to institutional trust to e-government and institutional trust and finally 
the most concrete case specific hypotheses, there is a clear connection for feedback and 
revision of these theories.123 
 
It is important to notice that the discussion has mostly been from an institutional 
perspective. Their ultimate impact on trust is a combination of both the objective features 
of the e-service and institution and the citizen’s perception and interpretation thereof. The 
role of citizens’ perceptions and interpretations has not received much more than cursory 
attention here. This is due in part to the absence of theoretical work on this area. In other 
words, little is understood of which of these hypothesised mechanisms will be effective in 
building trust, how, and for whom. Exactly how these objective features are perceived 
and interpreted by citizens is a central empirical concern of this thesis. Having 
established the necessary hypotheses, now we can reap the benefits and apply them in a 
study of two e-services in Chile. 
 
                                                 
123
 Recall that these theories indicate tendencies. If an e-service brings about the theorised change (e.g. if a 
service really is faster and more efficient) then it will tend to bring about the indicated trust outcomes 
subject to contextual factors. Furthermore, the opposite mechanisms, while not explicitly discussed, are 
assumed to destroy trust. For example, e-services that result in less efficient services, poor performance, are 
highly opaque, are of low quality, or are subject to arbitrary discretion, to name a few, will tend to destroy 
trust. In reality the qualities of each e-service will fall somewhere on a scale between these two extremes.  
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Institutional trust theory Building institutional trust  
through E-services hypotheses 
COMPETENCE 
 
Good institutional performance 
that can be communicated, 
understood, and that is perceived 
to meet or exceed citizens’ 
expectations of performance tends 
to build trust. 
Efficiency/effectiveness 
C1 - E-services perceived to be more effective and efficient 
(faster, more accurate, cost savings) tend to build trust. 
C2 - E-government services that improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of service at the institution’s physical office tend to 
build trust. 
 
Performance transparency 
C3 - Performance transparency that meets the citizens’ 
expectations tends to build trust. 
C4 - Performance transparency that is linked to effective 
accountability mechanisms tends to build trust. 
MOTIVATION 
 
INTERESTS 
 
If the institution’s policies 
encompass the interests of the 
citizen, trust tends to be built.  
 
(1) Mechanisms that work to 
align (such as voice and 
exit) the interests of the 
institution and citizen tend 
to build trust. 
 
(2) Establishing credible 
institutional commitments 
through credible and 
effective institutional checks 
and balancesthat keep the 
public sector’s interests in 
line with the citizens’ 
interests tends to build trust.  
Considering users interests 
I1 - User benefits: E-services that bring user benefits tend to 
increase trust. 
I2 - E-service quality: Good e-services quality indicates that the 
institution considers citizens’ interests and therefore tends to build 
trust. 
 
Voice 
I3 – Voice: Increased possibilities for voice through the provision 
of information and e-service feedback mechanisms (e-mail, 
comments) tends to build trust. 
 
Transparency and accountability 
I4 - Institutional transparency and accountability: Increased 
transparency made possible through the increased visibility of 
internal processes and service outcomes accompanied by 
perceived effective accountability mechanisms tend to build trust. 
 
Corruption 
I5 - Reduced corruption: A reduction of corruption due to the 
computerisation and rationalisation of government processes tends 
to build trust. 
 
Power 
I6 - Big brother: Increased power for institutions vis-à-vis the 
citizen through e-services will tend to destroy trust. 
I7 - Soft sister: Increased power for institutions vis-à-vis the 
citizen through e-services that results in improved services and 
user benefits tends to build trust. 
Table 12  Trust building through the implementation of e-services hypotheses. On the left are 
theories created from institutional trust theory and the right are the more concrete e-service middle-
range hypotheses (continued on Table 13). 
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Institutional trust theory Building institutional trust  
through E-services hypotheses 
MOTIVATIONS 
 
VALUES 
 
Overlapping values between the 
institution (institutional ethos) and 
citizen tend to build trust.  
 
Institutions that embody and 
communicate values of fairness, 
distributive justice, and 
benevolence will tend to build 
trust. 
Overlapping values (institutional ethos)  
V1 - Trust outcome is unclear; it may be dependent on associated 
institutional reforms. 
 
Procedural justice 
V2 – E-services that increase citizen compliance through 
increased capacities for surveillance and coercion or through a 
reduction of compliance costs will tend to increase trust. 
V3 - E-services that remove unnecessary street-level discretion 
and increases perceived impartiality tend to build trust. 
 
Distributive justice 
V4 - E-services that create distributive justice (e.g., provide a 
service for the poor) tends to increase trust with those who hold 
the distributive justice value. 
Table 13  (Continued from Table 12) Trust building through the implementation of e-services 
hypotheses. On the left are the theories created from institutional trust theory and on the right are 
the more concrete e-service middle-range hypotheses. 
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5 THE CHILEAN CONTEXT  
 
For all the similarities in perceptions about countries in South America, Chile is 
politically, culturally, and geographically distinctive. Geographically it spans about 4,300 
kilometres from north to south while only measuring around 240 kilometres at its widest 
point. It southern most tip is only miles away from Antarctica and in the north it contains 
the Atacama Desert, the world’s driest desert. On the east the border is drawn by the 
Andes, the second highest mountain range in the world and on the west is the Pacific 
Ocean (see Figure 9). It has a relatively small indigenous population constituting only 
4.6% of the entire Chilean population as of 2002 (Pastrana et al. 2004), located mostly in 
Santiago and the ninth administrative region that was never fully conquered during 250 
years of resistance against the Spanish (Manriquez 2003). The rest of Chile has inherited 
the conservative Catholic traditions from the Spanish conquistadors. Geographic isolation 
contributed to this conservatism making it one of the most traditional on the South 
American continent with the Catholic Church historically maintaining strong links with 
the local aristocracy (Valenzuela 1995, p. 84).  
 
Chileans have been characterized as the “Englishmen of South America” who are 
culturally “less imaginative, passionate, and emotional but more practical, patient, and 
thoughtful than Latin Americans elsewhere” (Tiano 1986, p. 77). This staid character is 
represented in its relatively solid, apolitical, and capable institutions of governance, with 
low levels of corruption. Politically, Chile has a long history of democracy stemming 
from the 1830s and in the last 17 years, the democratically run government has been 
effective in modernizing the government, maintaining respectable economic growth rates 
while addressing the pressing social issues such as poverty (Angell 2005b). Not all is 
rosy, however, as income inequality levels remain persistently among the highest in all 
Latin America, and support for democracy over authoritarianism is lower than would be 
expected given the relatively good economic performance. 
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Figure 9 Map of Chile (European Commission, 2001). The research 
was conducted in Santiago and in the region around Temuco. © 
European Union, 1995-2012 
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This brief portrait gives a glimpse into the context within which the introduction of the 
two e-services takes place. This chapter elaborates on this context providing background 
knowledge that is essential to understand the two e-service implementations in the public 
sector and citizens’ responses to them. The following sections delve into several 
important historical and contemporary aspects of Chile as follows. Section 5.1 outlines 
the contemporary political environment, discussing the political history in Chile and the 
state of its democracy and governability as a nation. This is followed by section 5.2 that 
considers the current socio-economic context highlighting the positive social outcomes 
gained in recent years as well as the continued battle with inequality. Section 5.3 
describes the other side of the equation, that is, what is known about Chileans’ 
perceptions of the political and socio-economic environment, including issues of 
institutional and interpersonal trust and corruption. Having described the general social, 
political, and cultural context of Chile, section 5.4 looks more specifically at the history 
of and current ICT policy and e-government in Chile. To complete the Chilean context, 
section 5.5 provides specifics about Santiago, Temuco, and the Araucanía (the 9th 
political region of Chile), the locations of a majority of the empirical research used in this 
thesis.    
 
5.1  CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL CONTEXT:  CHILEAN 
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNABILITY124 
Generally, deeply ingrained social inequalities represent a poor basis for a stable 
democracy (Diamond et al. 1995, p. 24), as evidenced by the historically poor record of 
democratisation across Latin and South America. Chile, however, is an aberration in the 
region with a relatively efficient and consolidated state and strong democratic traditions 
such as the norms of give-and-take, tolerance, and respect for fundamental liberties 
(Tiano 1986, Valenzuela 1995, p. 86). Historically, Chile is unique in Latin America with 
a “public sector with a fairly long tradition of professionalism, efficiency and 
independence from political interference” (Sánchez 2005, p. 233).125 This includes a high 
                                                 
124
 The following two sections on Chile draws heavily on (Angell 2005a, Angell 2005b) and the author 
would like to express thanks for the correspondence. 
125
 Sanchez (2005) lists three institutions that exemplify the strong apolitical independence of institutions; 
the Chilean Central Bank, Controller General, and the SII, Chile’s Federal Tax Bureau. 
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degree of legal and constitutional institutionalisation providing an incredibly stable 
environment with few internal conflicts (Angell 2005b, Valenzuela 1995, pp. 78-80). 
Exemplars of this apolitical autonomy in Chile include the controller general, the Chilean 
central bank, and the SII (the federal tax agency) (Angell 2005b, Moreno et al. 2003, 
Sánchez 2005) . 
 
While this strongly institutionalised and professional state apparatus provides stability, 
ironically, it was a favourable environment for the military coup. On Sept. 11th, 1971, 
Chile’s democratic traditions were put under their most serious challenge, when General 
Pinochet’s military junta assumed control of Chile. However, the strength of the 
apolitical institutionalisation even worked to limit Pinochet. Even after writing a new 
constitution the military junta still felt constrained by the institutions of the state and was 
compelled to work within it providing legal justifications for their actions (Angell 
2005b). The high Chilean regard for impersonal institutions of the state held legality as 
more important than allegiance to a person, even if that person is the commander-in-chief 
(Valenzuela 1995, p. 108). 
 
Ultimately, the same legalism and constitutionalism that enabled Pinochet also opened 
the door to the peaceful removal of Pinochet from power and the return to democracy. 
The 1980 constitution created by Pinochet called for a plebiscite on Oct 5, 1988 to vote 
for a new eight-year term for Pinochet as president. However, even with strong 
crackdowns in the 1980s, Pinochet was unable to fully eliminate opposition political 
parties (Hudson 1995, Valenzuela 1995, p. 105). Pinochet was soundly defeated by a 
12% margin with 92% of the eligible population voting (Valenzuela 1995, p. 108). This 
defeat was achieved through the well-coordinated action and door-to-door campaign of a 
broad coalition of independent, including international, groups (Diamond et al. 1995, p. 
28, Valenzuela 1995, p. 108).  
 
A peaceful transition to democracy following Pinochet’s defeat was in no way assured. A 
crucial step in any democratic transition is negotiating the precarious balancing act 
between democratic reforms and incorporating the concerns of the powerful political and 
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economic elites who could potentially destabilise the process (Smith 2005c). The 
resultant negotiations of constitutional reform ultimately retained many of the essential 
elements of Pinochet’s original 1980 constitution. This process ratified the constitution 
into law (something the military junta never achieved) giving the military a significant 
political victory, along with several other concessions (Hudson 1995). With constitutional 
reforms out of the way, an election was held on Dec. 14th 1989 with Aylwin winning 
decisively (Hudson 1995). Chile’s long history of democracy and compromise added to 
the legitimacy of the restored democracy (Diamond et al. 1995, p. 54). 
 
The path from the Pinochet dictatorship has been slow and incremental, but Chile has 
emerged a leader in Latin America in terms of democratic development. This process of 
re-establishing democratic institutions and traditions included a concerted and prolonged 
effort to overturn and remove the constitutional vestiges that gave Pinochet relatively 
strong sway over Chilean politics. The newly embedded military autonomy provided one 
of the main obstacles to the realisation of more representative democracy (Diamond et al. 
1995, p. 47).  For example, during the first eight years after returning to democratic rule 
in 1990, the Right held virtual veto power over legislation due to constitutional vestiges 
with appointed senators and an electoral system that favoured the political right (Angell 
2005b). However, over the years there have been a series of piecemeal changes to the 
constitution through the standard legislative process. The elections in 1999 are considered 
the first “normal” democratic elections since voting out the Pinochet regime and signify 
an important step in the continued consolidation of Chilean democracy (Angell and 
Pollack 2000). By 2005, the legislature finally agreed to abolish some of the last 
holdovers of Pinochet’s constitution including eliminating the system of designated 
senators, augmenting congressional investigatory powers, and increasing the Presidents 
authority over military appointments (Angell 2005b). Of course, the process is not 
complete, and there are still many democratic deficits, the most pressing being a need for 
more electoral reform (Angell 2005a). However, relatively speaking, the democratic 
reforms have turned Chile from a highly constrained democracy to a fully fledged 
electoral democracy that is leading Latin America in the field of democratic 
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governance.126 As a testament to this fact, the political right in Chile offers a plausible 
governing party alternative within the democratic framework and no longer constitutes a 
threat to democracy (Angell 2005a). 
 
Despite the movement towards more representative governance, structurally, Chile 
remains a highly centralised state. This is the end result of both its strong centralist 
tradition in Latin America with little regional sentiment or identification (Angell 2005a, 
Bland 2004, p. 115) and Pinochet’s authoritarian rule that established a “rigid, vertical 
politico-administrative structure” with high level military commanders at the regional and 
provincial levels as well as appointing civilians as mayors (Bland 2004, p. 98). Indeed, 
the new President Michelle Bachelet stated that it is important to recognize that in Chile 
that there is exaggerated presidential power.127 
 
There has been some decentralisation of power although the process has been slow and 
has yet to realise its potential. In 1988 the municipal reform law granted municipalities a 
central role in community development, where they were tasked with becoming public 
service providers, such as administering national poverty alleviation programs and the 
creation of local projects to meet local needs (Bland 2004, p. 100). In 1991, there were 
the first municipal elections since 1971 (Hudson 1995). Two years later, in July 2001 
there was more electoral reform that provided for the direct elections for mayors 
beginning 2004, allowing for more political participation and potentially strengthening 
the legitimacy of the whole political system (Bland 2004). However, despite some 
devolution of power, decentralization so far is probably best understood as regional 
                                                 
126
 In 1996 Chile was rated a “High Democracy”, by 1999 Chile was rated as an electoral democracy with 
extensive civil liberties, in an exclusive club in the Latin Americas with only Costa Rica, Panama, and 
Uruguay, with Argentina and the Dominican Republic joining in 2000 (Smith 2005c). This list includes:  
• Freedom of expression and belief, including an independent media, 
• Rights of assembly, association, and organization, 
• Impartial rule of law and protection of human rights, 
• Personal autonomy and economic rights.  
In 2006, Chile was ranked as the top in democratic development according to an IDD-Lat 2006 study that 
used the following indicators; “respect for political rights and civil liberties”, “institutional quality and 
political efficiency”, and “the exercise of power for effective governance”. See: http://www.idd-lat.org/. 
127
 The new president of Chile, Bachelet, stated in a speech to Mayors, “‘Es que en este pais, tenemos que 
reconocer, existe un presidencialismo exagerado’” (Angell 2005a). 
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standardization across regional and local differences (Angell 2005a), regional 
governments are appointed, and municipal governments have little real power and 
practically no fiscal autonomy (Angell 2005b).  
 
Since 1990, Chile has also engaged in a series of Weberian public sector reforms 
(Sánchez 2005, Serra 2005). These reforms include a focus on state modernization with 
three pillars: 1) a new organizational culture with a focus on results, 2) the adoption of a 
cumulative change strategy, and 3) reform efforts under control of the executive branch 
(Bresser-Pereira 2004, pp. 177-178). Training of public sector employees took on a new 
importance, with the amount of spending on training quadrupling between 1990 and 
1996.128 The Chilean government has implemented performance targets, and by 1997 
80% of public institutions had defined targets and since 1998, bonuses had been linked to 
the achievement of these goals (Serra 2005). In a comparative study of developing 
countries, Chile was ranked as one of the most aggressive public sector reformers 
(Sánchez 2005, p. 246). 
 
Learning from the earlier experience, the government came up with another three year 
strategic modernization plan based on the principles of probity, equality, efficiency, 
effectiveness, and participatory administration. Following this, in 2000 under the newly 
elected President Lagos, Chile established the Project for Reform and Modernization of 
the State that included the redesign of government procedures, modernization of the state, 
electronic government, and decentralization (Government of Chile 2004).  In the area of 
government administration, the goals were to increase efficiency, citizen participation, 
and the transparency of state activity.129 
 
                                                 
128
 See an unattributed report on State Reform from 2000-2006 at www.modernizacion.cl/1350/articles-
126486_recurso_1.pdf, pg. 17. 
129
 Ibid, pg. 21. 
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The end result of these reforms is a highly effective system of governance that scores 
high on many governance indicators.130 According to a Kaufmann et al. (2006), Chile 
ranked among the best and clearly high above the Latin America average (see Figure 10) 
besting some western countries such as Italy (Angell 2005b). However, it is notable that 
from 1996-2005 Chile has only improved in the areas of voice and accountability, and 
political stability (see Table 14). These improvements are most likely due to the 
constitutional and democratic reforms discussed above. However, Chile has not 
registered improvement in terms of indicators of government effectiveness, control of 
corruption, and regulatory quality.131 This is, on its face, a bit surprising given the myriad 
of state modernization and administration reforms that have occurred in Chile, not least 
of which is the introduction of several e-government services (these reforms are 
discussed later in the chapter). For sure, the lack of improvements is indicative of the 
already general high starting point of effectiveness governance in 1996. Where Chile did 
improve were in the two indicators that started below the 80 percentile mark.  
 
                                                 
130
 Another indicator of the quality of governance is the World Economic Forums’ international comparison 
of national economic competitiveness that includes measures of the quality of mcroeconomic policy, health 
and primary education, higher education and training, market efficiency, technological readiness, and more 
(see: 
http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Global%20Competitiveness%20Report/index.htm). In 2004 
Chile was ranked 22nd, and in 2006-2007, 27th. 
131
 A more detailed discussion on corruption and its nature in Chile can be found in section 5.3.2. 
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Figure 10  Governance indicators for Chile and the Latin American average, source: (Kaufmann et 
al. 2006) 
 
 159
Governance Indicator Year Percentile Rank (0-100) 
Voice and Accountability 
2005 82.6 
1996 75.0 
Political Stability/No Violence 
2005 75.9 
1996 59.9 
Government Effectiveness 
2005 86.1 
1996 86.2 
Regulatory Quality 
2005 90.6 
1996 93.1 
Rule of Law 
2005 87.4 
1996 87.1 
Control of Corruption 
2005 89.7 
1996 89.8 
Table 14  Six governance indicators for Chile, for years 1996 and 2005, 
Source: (Kaufmann et al., 2006). 
 
5.2  SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT  
Economically and socially, Chile’s performance in the last 20 years has made it a Latin 
American success story, especially in terms of poverty reduction (e.g., World Bank 
2001). Between 1988 and 1998, Chile’s per capita GDP more than doubled, poverty fell, 
and social spending has been doubled, especially in the sectors of education, health, and 
housing (Espinal et al. 2006).132 This growth and social spending has had dramatic 
results. Between 1987 and 2000, poverty fell from 45.1% of the population to 20.6% 
(Angell and Pollack 2000). Even with an economic recession in 1999, poverty declined to 
                                                 
132
 From 1990-2001 Chile´s per capita GDP increased 56%, the most in the Latin American region (Espinal 
et al. 2006). During the period since Pinochet, social expenditures have massively increased (Angell 
2005b). 
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18.8% by 2003 and extreme poverty also continued to fall  (UNDP 2004a). By 2005, 
70% of Chileans own their own homes (up from 10% in 1990), a figure that cuts across 
all socio-economic strata (Angell 2005b). Chile’s child malnutrition rate is also the 
lowest in Latin America at 1.9% (the next best is Costa Rica at 6.1%) (Angell 2005a).  
 
The classic cross-country comparative measure for the level of human development, the 
human development index133 (HDI), ranks Chile 38th in the world in 2004 (UNDP 2006b) 
(see Table 15), and has improved steadily since 1975 (see Figure 11). Indicative of 
Chile’s progress is that it is has achieved the same HDI levels as other countries with 
much greater average GDP/capita (see Figure 12). This bodes well for the future of Chile 
as high levels of development in terms of the HDI appears to be a significant predictor of 
a stable democracy (Diamond et al. 1995, p. 22). 
 
Human Development Indicators 2004  
HDI value Life expectancy 
at birth  
(years) 
Adult literacy  
(% ages 15 and 
older) 
Combined primary, 
secondary and 
tertiary gross 
enrolment ratio (%) 
GDP per capita 
(PPP US$) 
1. Norway (0.965) 1. Japan (82.2) 1. Georgia (100)  1. Luxembourg 
(69,961) 
37. Poland (0.862) 26. UAE (78.3) 36. Greece (96) 46. Philippines (81.5) 55. South Africa 
(11,192) 
38. Chile (0.859) 27. Chile (7.81) 37. Chile (95.7) 47. Chile (81.3) 56. Chile (10.874) 
39. Bahrain 
(0.859) 
28. Ireland 
(77.9) 
38. Costa Rica 
(94.9) 
48. Malta (81.3) 58. Malaysia 
(10,276) 
177. Niger (0.311) 177. Swaziland 
(31.3) 
128. Mali (19.0) 172. Niger (21.5) 172. Sierra Leone 
(561) 
Table 15  Human Development Indicators 2004. Chile ranks 38th in the world while its GDP is 56th 
in the world, source: (UNDP 2006b). 
 
 
 
                                                 
133
 This measure takes into consideration GDP, education levels, and life expectancy. 
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Figure 11  Human Development Index through time. Source: (UNDP 2006b). 
 
 
Figure 12  The figure shows that despite Chile’s much lower GDP/capita than Bahrain’s, Chile 
has achieved a comparable level of human development.  Source: (UNDP 2006b). 
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These economic and social gains are often attributed to the legacy of Pinochet’s neo-
liberal policies and decent levels of economic growth. Indeed, following Pinochet, 
President Alwyn took over the best performing economy in the region and kept many of 
Pinochet’s economic policies more or less in place (Hiscock and Hojman 1997, p. 354, 
Hudson 1995). Furthermore, it is argued that most of the poverty reduction can be 
contributed to this resultant economic growth (Contreras 2003, World Bank 1997).  
 
However, such an explanation does not give the Chilean government its due. The well 
performing economy that President Alwyn inherited “rested on precarious foundations” 
of macro-economic disequilibrium and widening social disparities (Angell 2005b). In 
1987, 45.1% of the population was in poverty following cuts in social expenditures 
(Angell 2005b). Furthermore, poverty reduction could not have occurred without the 
intervening social interventions that enabled people to take advantage of the new 
opportunities that economic growth offered (Olavarria-Gambi 2003, World Bank 2001).  
 
Despite these gains, Chile’s social and economic future still faces significant 
challenges.134 It was recently estimated that around 20% of the population still lives at the 
poverty line, with some arguing that the real figure should be higher (The Santiago Times 
2006). Furthermore, the next 20% will probably be the hardest to reach.135 That said, 
among 102 “developing countries” Chile ranks second in HPI, the Human Poverty Index 
as developed by the UNDP (2006b).136 Despite the notable economic growth and poverty 
reduction, income inequality actually increased (Huber and Stephens 2005), a remarkable 
feat considering they were already one of the most unequal in the region (see Figure 13 
for the income distribution levels in 2000) (Angell 2005b, Smith 2005c). This inequality 
                                                 
134
 Angell (2005a), in a discussion of the challenged to the new ruling government in Chile, focuses on two; 
income inequality and strengthening participation. 
135
 Foxley (2004) suggests that while the first stage of poverty reduction was easy, the next component will 
be more difficult, “The ‘easy’ first phase represents a combination of high growth, increased wages and 
minimum wage, expansion in income-support schemes for low-income families, and improved minimum 
pensions with an immediate impact on poverty reduction” (pp. 1-2). Those just below the poverty level 
may be the easiest to reach, while reaching the “hard core of the extremely poor for whom social policies 
are very difficult to reach” (Angell 2005a). 
136
 The Human Poverty Index measures “severe deprivation in health” using; proportion of people not 
expected to survive past age 40, adult illiteracy rate, the unweighted average of people without access to 
improved water source, and the proportion of underweight children under five (UNDP 2006b). 
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can in part be attributed to the long run outcome of the extremely rigid and traditional 
social stratification formed during the Spanish occupation and the culture of hierarchy 
and authority relations that still permeates the society today (Valenzuela 1995, pp. 84). 
However, this does not explain the recent increases in income inequality. 
 
 
Figure 13  The distribution of income in Chile in 2000. Source: World Resources 
Institute.137  
 
This persistent inequality creates an economic and social dualism within Chile that acts a 
barrier preventing the integration and equal access of a large portion of the population 
into economic and political life (Olavarría 2003).138 From a low unemployment rate in 
the early 90s, unemployment has risen to 10% in 1998,139 and has hovered around 8-10% 
since then, falling to around 7.8% by the end of 2006 (CIA 2007). In 2005 the 
government implemented an unemployment insurance system and approximately three 
                                                 
137
 See both http://www.wri.org/ and http://earthtrends.wri.org/. Even more specifically the graph is found: 
http://Earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/country_profiles/eco_cou_152.pdf. 
138
 There is also a gender gap with Chile scoring a 3.46 out of 7 (placing it 48 out of 58 countries) in 
measures of the gender gap in economic participation, economic opportunities, political power, educational 
opportunities, and quality of life (Angell 2005a). 
139
 This is arguably due to the international economic crises in Asia and Brazil (World Bank 2001). Despite 
the economic recovery, however, the Chilean unemployment continued to rise. 
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million people are enrolled (Angell 2005a). The economic concentration in Chile works 
to inhibit the incorporation and development of small and medium-sized businesses so 
crucial for employment (Angell 2005b). Between 1987 and 1994 the difference in years 
of schooling between the richest and the poorest has also increased (World Bank 1997). 
Despite increases in education spending and education reform, educational achievements 
are lower than would be expected (Angell 2005a).140 This is especially disconcerting 
considering that education level is considered by the single most determining factor of 
income equality (Contreras 2003, World Bank 1997).  
 
5.3  CITIZENS’  PERCEPTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT  
This section examines Chilean’s attitudes and behaviour with respect to politics and the 
state, and their personal characteristics that play a role in determining this behaviour. It is 
increasingly understood how socio-cultural characteristics of a country play a role in 
shaping the development of institutions as well as institutional reform. Consequently, this 
section focuses on the most salient features of contemporary political culture in Chile, 
looking at the Chilean democratic culture and the evolving democratic values and 
opinions of the institutions of democratic governance. This includes a discussion of some 
survey work that assesses trust in different institutions of government. Following that, 
and motivated by Putnam’s work on social capital (Putnam 1993), this section details the 
current level of interpersonal trust and civic participation within Chile. Finally, to better 
understand activities and understandings of the citizens, this section finishes with a 
discussion of another significant part of the political culture, corruption. 
 
Over the last fifteen years Chile has undergone substantial political and economic 
transformations that have been accompanied by and have brought about profound cultural 
changes. Among these changes, there has been a rise of individualism and what it means 
to be “Chilean” has become blurred (UNDP 2002). Indeed, not much expresses the 
political and cultural shifts more than the 2006 election of Michelle Bachelet, the first 
women ever to be elected president in Latin America. The mere fact that she is a female 
                                                 
140
 Angell (2005a) argues that this is due probably to inequality and perhaps inefficient expenditures, but 
also that blame must be placed at the feet of the strong teachers union making reform difficult. 
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president is astounding, but in the socially conservative culture in Chile, that she is also 
an atheist and single mother makes it even more remarkable. 
 
The socio-economic successes have meant that Chileans have increased expectations for 
the future based upon perceived improvements in the past.141 In 2004, another UNDP 
survey (2004b) found widespread aspirations and hopes for a better life in Chile. 
However, the inequality divide creates a power imbalance that impacts many people’s 
chances to take advantage of the new potential opportunities (UNDP 2004b). That said, 
in a 2005 Latinobarómetro study, sixty-two percent of respondents answered that they 
would say that Chile is progressing, the next highest is Venezuela at fifty-four and 
Argentina at forty-five percent (Latinobarómetro 2005).  
 
All of these socio-economic improvements by a democratic government do not 
necessarily imply, however, a corresponding increase in support for democratic ideals. 
Interestingly, we find that in Chile, support for democracy is only around average for 
Latin America, despite its exceptional performance (Lagos 2001).142 From 1996-2002, 
support for democracy measured at around the average across Latin America (see Figure 
14).143 The results of another survey show how this breaks down to around 50% support 
for democracy, and a 20% support for authoritarianism, with 20% with no preference (see 
Table 16). More recently, these numbers have improved. In 2005, satisfaction with 
democracy in Chile was at 43% (fairly or very satisfied); with 59% saying that 
democracy is preferable to any other type of government. Sixty-four percent believe that 
democracy is the only way to become developed (Latinobarómetro 2005). Furthermore, 
support for an authoritarian government has fallen to a mere 14% in 2002. 
                                                 
141
 In a 1999 UNDP survey (2000), 48% said their lives were better than five years before, and 56% 
believed their lives would improve in the following five. In this study, the UNDP argues that the rise of 
individualism means that talk of the future and expectations is less about the success of Chile, or other 
collective dreams, but rather individual and familial expectations of well-being. 
142
 There are only three Latin American countries – Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Argentina – with levels of 
support for democracy and institutional trust at levels comparable to the democracies of Western Europe 
(Lagos 2001). 
143
 These numbers are drawn from the Latinobarómetro survey that uses the following three questions to 
assess support for democracy; “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government”, “Under some 
circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one,” “For people like me, it 
does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime”. 
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Figure 14 Support for democracy in Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and averaged across all of Latin 
America. Despite relatively sustained economic performance, Chile’s preference for 
democracy remains about average for Latin Americans. Source: (Lagos, 2003). 
 
 
Preferences 
Mexico  
(%) 
Costa Rica 
(%) 
Chile  
(%) 
Democracy always 49 81 53 
No Preference 26 9 23 
Authoritarianism maybe 21 7 19 
Do not know 3 4 5 
Note: columns may not add up to 100 because of rounding 
Table 16  Preferences for democracy, comparing Mexico, Costa Rica, and Chile in 1998. 
Source: (Smith, 2005, p. 293). 
 
These support numbers obscure an underlying complexity of opinions and factors 
shaping those opinions. If we wish to understand the current dynamic between citizens’ 
perceptions and the democratic institutions of governance we need to unpack these 
numbers a bit. Support for democracy is shaped by a variety of different factors such as 
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government performance and expectations thereof, one’s political orientation, and finally 
ones’ understanding of the term democracy. 
 
Arguably, the largest mechanism in determining democratic support across LA was the 
level of satisfaction for democratic performance (Smith 2005c, pp. 303-308), a finding 
also supported by research in other countries (Espinal et al. 2006). The dip of support in 
2001 can be attributed to the region-wide economic recession of that time that proved 
ultimately temporary for most countries (Lagos 2003). This provides a strong argument 
for the role economic performance as a determinant of democratic support and fact that in 
good economic years, like 1997, democratic satisfaction was higher (Lagos 2003). In 
2002 in Chile, only nineteen percent expressed satisfaction with the economy (below the 
LA average of 24%), although thirty-six percent were satisfied in 2004 after return from 
recession (Angell 2005b).144 In 2004, corresponding to its economic growth, fifty-seven 
percent of Chileans agreed that democracy was preferable to any other form of 
government, up from fifty in 2002, which is just above the LA average of fifty-three. 
 
The link between democratic support and economic performance underscores the 
continued socio-economic divisions in the country. It is a commonly held view that not 
all Chileans benefit from the economic success of the country (UNDP 2000). In 1999, 
eighty-six percent of people thought there was no equality in front of the law (UNDP 
2000),145 and less than a majority have seen improvements in areas such as access to 
health care (forty-two percent), access to justice (thirty-six percent), better jobs (thirty-six 
percent) and better pension (twenty-eight percent) (UNDP 2002).  
 
                                                 
144
 Chile was the leading country in 2004 in LA in terms of support for the way the market economy was 
working (Angell 2005b). 
145
 This is up from 77% who believed there was no equality before the law in 1996. 
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Another dynamic at play may be that the overall improved economic position of Chileans 
means a general shift in the public’s priorities.146 Chileans welcome an active role for the 
state, and have become more aware of the persistent income inequalities as well as 
inequalities in the provision of other state services (Angell 2005b, pp. 35-36). As 
education and expectation levels rise, citizens become more critical and you may see 
increasing discontent in the support for democracy,  
“Chileans are more educated, more accustomed to improvement, and it is quite 
natural that this leads not to contentment but to demands for more” (Angell 
2005b, p. 34).  
However, these demands and expectations do not seem to be met for a large portion of 
the population. In 2005, only thirty-seven percent of people in Chile trust that money 
from taxes will be well spent by the government. While this seems low, comparatively it 
is good in Latin America with only Uruguay and Venezuela ranking higher at forty-nine 
and thirty-eight percent respectively, with the next closest, El Salvador at twenty-nine 
percent (Latinobarómetro 2005). 
 
Another explanatory mechanism might be an individual’s political orientation.  In a 2003 
survey, those sympathetic to the parties on the left approved of democracy at rates of 
fifty-five, sixty-two, and forty-two percent, whereas those affiliated to the parties on the 
right were twenty-seven and twenty-one (Angell 2005b). The supporters of the 
Concertación (the current ruling majority coalition) believed that democracy was the best 
system for a country like Chile with numbers between eighty-seven and ninety-three 
percent, whereas those on the right, only fifty-two percent saw democracy as the best 
system (Angell 2005b). This correlation may only be an artefact of Chile’s recent 
authoritarian past, as this relationship does not hold across Latin America according to an 
analysis of a 1998 Hewlett survey (Smith 2005c, p. 295). Consequently, the Chilean 
results are probably reflective of both the current political regime (you are less likely to 
                                                 
146
 It is interesting to note that the texture of public debate is no longer as single-mindedly focused on the 
more existential issues of jobs etc,  
“A great deal of public debate in Chile is now about ethical and moral issues – the right to 
abortion, to sex education in schools, to greater press and media freedom, to single sex marriages 
and so on” (Angell 2005a).  
That said, easily the most widely discussed topic of the last presidential debates was the issues of 
inequality, considered a serious issues of the candidates across the political spectrum. 
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approve of democracy when your party is not in charge) as well as a remnant of the 
remaining support for the authoritarian regime (Smith 2005c, p. 304).147 
 
Finally, and crucially, to understand the support for democracy data, it is important to 
understand that the results depend upon individuals’ interpretation or understanding of 
the meaning of democracy (Smith 2005c, p. 292). Depending upon ones value system 
that determines what you expect from a government, Smith (2005c) found a “modest by 
instructive relationship” with ones preference for democracy. Those with greater desires 
for political freedoms have higher preference for democracy, and those with a greater 
desire for socioeconomic benefits and lawfulness have a greater tolerance for 
authoritarianism (Smith 2005c, pp. 295-296).  
 
However, this assumes that people have an understanding of what these terms mean. It 
should be kept in mind that a significant percentage of the population may not actually 
know what democracy is and thus are not in a position to have an opinion. In the 
Latinobarómetro survey in 2001, 21% of respondents answered that they “don’t know” or 
have “no opinion” (Latinobarómetro 2001). This is especially significant in the more 
rural areas and less educated population and was reflected in this researcher’s 
experiences. In a non-scientific survey conducted in a slum in Temuco of 100+ 
inhabitants, using the same questions as in the standard Latinobarómetro studies, a large 
percentage did not know the difference between democracy and authoritarianism. 
Furthermore, they also commonly expressed that the change of government had no 
meaning to them as their lives did not seem to differ. 
 
Overall, Chile does not have a strong civil society (UNDP 2004b) or a  very activist 
society whose citizens are unlikely to demand accountability (Smith 2005c). In terms of 
political party participation in Chile, in 1996 it was ranked along side of Peru with the 
                                                 
147
 I had an interesting experience meeting a Pinochet supporter. One interviewee, the president of a large 
business, invited the author for lunch in his presidential lunch room. Also invited was a military attaché 
from another Latin American country. Lunch came with a nice Chilean wine served in “President Pinochet 
1971-1989” wine glasses. 
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lowest percentages of participation (UNDP 2000).148 This general political apathy is also 
evident in a decline in electoral participation during the first decade of democratic 
governance (Olavarría, 2003). The 1998 UNDP Human Develop Report concludes that 
this may be due to insufficient security and the highly unequal distribution of wealth. 
Olavarría argues that the decline may be due to the persistence of neo-liberal economic 
policies and the “justifiable alienation from and distrust of parties, which are seen as 
having abandoned their constituents’ interests – a perception that is particularly 
widespread among youth” (Olavarría 2003). That corresponds to the UNDP finding that 
the willingness to defend your rights was associated with the subjective perception of 
substantial personal power (UNDP 2004b), and that those of higher socio-economic 
levels participate in political parties that those in medium and low socio-economic status 
(UNDP 2000).  
 
5.3.1 INSTITUTIONAL AND INTERPERSONAL TRUST 
As of the mid 1990s, Chile exhibited significant levels of mistrust in the health, social 
security, education, and work systems (UNDP 1998). At this time, the legislative and 
executive branches of government were not fairing much better in the public’s eyes. Only 
thirty-eight percent of the people surveyed Chile thought highly of regime performance, 
with a decrease in the confidence in parliament in the 1990s of 25%149 (Klingemann 
1999, pp. 49-52) (see Table 17 to see the levels of trust in various Chilean institutions in 
1990 and 1999). Low levels of confidence in institutions such as the judiciary, parliament 
and political parties are not unique to Chile as it is common across Latin America (Lagos, 
2000).150 
 
                                                 
148
 That said, the overall participation rate is still relatively high in 2001, when during a mid-term election, 
only 23.9% abstained. From 1978-2004, Chile was among the top five countries in Latin America for voter 
turnout for presidential elections (Diaz and Zovatto 2005). However, voting in Chile is mandatory and 
includes an effective sanction (Diaz and Zovatto 2005), but registration is not, so the high rate is not 
necessarily explained by the obligation (Angell 2005b, p. 15 footnote). 
149
 A UNDP (2000) study found a larger decrease in trust in parliament, from sixty-three to twenty percent 
over the course the 90s.  
150
 One institution that has done well recently is the executive, where around three-quarters of the 
population approve of President Lagos performance when he left office (Rohter 2006). 
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TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS in 1990 & 1999 
(Percentage of a lot and some trust) 
Trust in Institutions World Bank Study 1990 % 
UNDP Survey 1999       
% 
Church 76 81 
Parliament 63 20 
Police 59 58 
Justice tribunals 45 36 
Armed Forces 41 52 
Municipalities  49 
Government  44 
Private enterprises  34 
Table 17  Institutional trust in Chile, 1990 and 1999, source: (UNDP, 2000). 
 
Another relevant variable considering Chilean citizens’ relationship with the democratic 
institutions of governance is social (interpersonal or generalised) trust. Arguably, 
“interpersonal trust lies at the heart of attitudes toward institutions, democracy, politics, 
and the economy” (Lagos 2001, p. 145). Low levels of interpersonal trust may impede 
political participation (Lagos 2001, p. 145) and consequently the development of 
democratic institutions (Putnam 1993).151 
 
Interpersonal trust is not very high across Latin America, with not one single country 
with more than fifty percent of the people expressing trust in their fellow citizens 
according to a Latinobarómetro study in 2000 (Smith 2005c, p. 294). In a UNDP study in 
                                                 
151
 Interestingly, Smith (2005c, pp. 294-295) found that interpersonal trust levels have only a very small 
correlation with preferences of democracy or authoritarianism, only slightly bolstering a preference for 
democracy, if at all. 
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1999, about thirty-three percent of the Chilean people said they could trust people in 
general, and sixty-three percent said that you could not (UNDP 2000). 152 Low levels of 
interpersonal trust have continued, with a similar 2003 poll where only thirteen percent 
expressed general level of trust in other people – the forth lowest in Latin America 
(Angell 2005b).153  
 
5.3.2 PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION 
One indicator of the quality of governance that has gained increasing importance since 
the emergence of institutional theories of good governance is corruption. Since the late 
nineties, corruption has emerged as an explanation for high levels of inequality, slow 
growth, and democratic stagnation found in Latin America (Morris 2004). Furthermore, 
perception of corruption is also an important determinant of satisfaction of democracy 
(which as above influences ones’ preference for democracy), with a pattern across Latin 
America that “the greater the perception of official corruption, the more the 
dissatisfaction with the political regime” (Smith 2005c, p. 307).  
 
We have already noted that Chile performs well on measures of corruption in the 
governance studies. It is possible to disaggregate measures of corruption into two 
components: perception-based corruption and direct experience or participation in 
corruption (Morris 2006).  Drawing on data from the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
from the Transparency International study in 2002 and the direct experience of corruption 
measures from the 2002 Latinobarómetro, Chile stands markedly apart form the rest of 
Latin America with low indicators for both studies (see Figure 15).154 In a 2004 
                                                 
152
 Another UNDP study states that by the mid 90s, Chile exhibited significant levels of mistrust in 
interpersonal relationships (UNDP 1998). 
153
 Indicative of low levels of interpersonal trust is low the relatively low levels of participation in civic 
associations in Chile. In 1990, Chile was at an intermediate position compared to international levels and in 
1996 was 8 of 12 Latin American countries (UNDP 2000), with the predominant type of associations in 
Latin America are religious and sports. Most likely, these numbers are indicative of the continued 
inequality in Chile. Ulsaner (2002) found that the level of economic inequality (the GINI coefficient) had 
the greatest impact on social trust, more so than structural variables such as level of democratization. This 
fits with the fact that interpersonal trust ratings are correlated with socio-economic level with those in the 
low socio-economic statues considerably less trusting of others than in the high socio-economic groups. 
154
 Chileans also believe the electoral process is clean (70%) with low level of vote buying (15%) 
(Latinobarómetro 2005). 
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Transparency International survey of subjective perceptions of the misuse of public office 
for personal gain, Chile ranked 20th of 145, above France and Japan (Angell 2005a) 
 
 
Figure 15  “Scatterplot of participation and perception of corruption in Latin 
America,” source: (Morris 2006). CPI2002 stands for the Corruption Perceptions 
Index of 2002 as implemented by Transparency International, 0 = corrupt to 10 = 
not corrupt. Direct experience is the Latinobarometro measure taken from the 2002 
survey. Chile (CH) and Uruguay (UR) clearly stand apart from the rest of Latin 
America for their low perception of and participation in corruption. 
 
Despite these excellent marks, there is some seemingly contradictory data that requires 
further elaboration. In a 2000 survey, a similar number (around sixty-one percent) of 
Chileans viewed corruption as “very serious” in their country – equivalent to the concern 
in Mexico,155 despite Chile’s much lower levels of corruption (Morris 2004, p. 1). This 
result was also found in the Latinobarómetro survey in 2004 but yet when asked about 
the possibility of successfully bribing a judge, policeman, or civil servant the results were 
twenty, twenty, and nineteen percent respectively, the lowest rates in Latin America 
                                                 
155
 In the Transparency International 2004 survey, Mexico was ranked sixty-fourth of 145. 
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(Angell 2005a).156 However, in a more recent Latinobarómetro survey (2005), people 
said that out of 100 public employees, forty-eight of them would be corrupt.157 However, 
even with corruption a very serious problem, and almost half of the public servants 
deemed corrupt, corruption is not viewed at all as a threat to democracy as it is in other 
Latin American countries (only two percent of people saying it is a threat compared to 
forty and forty-seven prevent in Mexico and Argentina respectively) (see Table 18). 
 
 
Obstacle 
Mexico  
(%) 
Costa Rica 
(%) 
Chile  
(%) 
Corruption 42 47 2 
Government 23 10 7 
Parties 11 6 16 
Poverty 8 9 19 
Passivity 7 3 7 
Lack of education 7 3 12 
Other / don’t know 4 23 18 
Note: columns may not add up to 100 because of rounding 
Table 18  Perceived obstacles to democracy: Mexico, Costa Rica, and Chile in 1998, 
source:  (Smith 2005c, p. 306). 
 
So how to explain this? How can it be that corruption is “very serious”, that forty-eight 
percent of the public sector workers may be corrupt, but also that corruption is not 
perceived as prevalent or a threat to democracy, or is even experienced very much? There 
are a few reasons, probably several of which are working concurrently as partial 
explanations. 
 
                                                 
156
 The Mexican responses were fifty-eight, sixty-five, and fifty-five percent respectively. 
157
 It is the second lowest amount in Latin America, seven points more than Uruguay at forty-one percent 
and fourteen points less than Brazil at sixty-two percent. 
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One factor may be that since Pinochet, there has been an increased politicization of 
corruption in Chile with a Committee on Corruption appointed by the government in 
1993 (Pollack and Matear 1997). This has been accompanied by the increased freedom of 
the media to comment on affairs of the state and a shift from issues of human rights and 
economic survival to concerns for democratic performance where issues of corruption are 
of public concern (Pollack and Matear 1997, pp. 380-381). In January 2003, Lagos 
started a Commission on Transparency and Probity with the task to reform government to 
fight corruption. As we will see, this provided some of the impetus behind the resurgence 
of ChileCompra – as the commission has resulted in many recommendations that have 
become law (Angell 2005b). In 2005, forty-one percent of Chileans believe that much or 
some progress has been made combating corruption in the last two years. This is up 
eleven percent from the previous year (Latinobarómetro 2005) (See Table 19). Chileans 
also estimated, on average, that forty-eight out of 100 civil servants were corrupt. While 
this may seem high, it is markedly below the Latin American average of sixty-eight 
percent. 
 
 176
 
Table 19  Progress in reducing corruption. In 2005, 41% Chileans answered “much” or “some” 
to the question, “How much progress do you think has been made in reducing corruption in state 
institutions during the last two years? Do you think there has been much progress, some 
progress, little, of no progress at all?” Source: (Latinobarómetro 2005). 
 
These reforms are fighting against another aspect of the political culture in Chile. While 
there is high respect for institutional norms and low levels of institutional corruption, 
institutionally there is an underdeveloped culture of transparency (Angell 2005a). Citing 
the director of the Latin American Director of Transparency International, Angell 
describes it as follows,  
“‘Chile exhibits neither the tradition nor the culture of access to information’.158 
And there is ‘secrecy on the part of the authorities who are recalcitrant to deliver 
information and transparency is not an incorporated value’.159 Even if it is true 
                                                 
158
 Translated from ‘Chile no exhibe ni tradición ni cultura de acceso a la información’. 
159
 Translated from: ‘un secretismo por parte de las autoridades, son reacias entregar información y la 
transparencia no es un valor que tengan incorporados’. 
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that the public sector operates in a generally honest way it is risky to depend on 
individual values rather than institutional checks on corruption” (Angell 2005a). 
 
The more blatant forms of corruption, while they may occur on occasion, are not endemic 
to the system itself (Pollack and Matear 1997). Instead, corruption in Chile exists in its 
own culturally specific manner, otherwise known as “corrupción a la Chilena” 
(corruption Chilean-style). This is a low-grade corruption “characterised by the use of 
influence through the manipulation of kinship, friendship or shared ideological, political, 
professional, educational, religious or sectarian values and/or perspectives” (Pollack and 
Matear 1997, p. 372).160 Variants on this theme were expressed to the author during 
subject interviews. The general idea was that Chileans are industrious in their methods 
for circumventing particular constraints to achieve their goals – but that this happens on a 
small scale rather than a large one. “Chileans steal small things, not large things,” related 
one taxi driver. 
 
Understanding “corruption a la Chilena” helps to explain what prima facie appears to be 
contradictory data. As discussed, despite low levels of interpersonal trust, Chile has a 
deepening democracy and a flourishing economy. This is understandable in the light of 
the strong norms and values of respect for the institutions of governance that have such a 
long tradition in Chile. Individual public sector workers may have corrupt tendencies, at 
least on a small scale, but the strong norms and values of institutional respect as well as 
the powerful and mostly apolitical institutions of governance keep these public servants 
in check. Such strong respect for the institutions of governance also explain why 
corruption is considered such a serious problem even though few Chileans have been a 
party to it – large scale corruption is simply not tolerated. 
 
                                                 
160
 Pollack & Matear expressed concern in 1997 that the continuation of the neo-liberal policies and 
political situation in Chile might lead to the “professionalisation” of corruption, moving from “amateur” to 
“professional” status in terms of corruption. As of 2007 it does not appear that Pollack and Matear’s fears 
have yet been realized.   
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5.3.3 SUMMARY 
It is in this environment, and as part of the government’s institutional reforms and social 
packages, that e-services were introduced. The left of center government, while perhaps 
without much influence from the grass roots level, is considered competent and by all 
measures of governance has performed well, overseeing constant and strong economic 
growth, state modernization and reform, the incremental elimination of the non-
democratic vestiges of Pinochets’ constitution, and successful social programs. Chile is 
ranked along side other countries like Argentina, Costa Rica, and Uruguay as the best in 
terms of effort and outcome of their social policy regimes (Huber and Stephens 2005). 
The Chilean Government is not viewed antagonistically by the population. The citizenry 
expects social intervention on issues such as poverty, partisan politics, and lack of 
education which are considered more of a threat to democracy than the government itself 
or issues of corruption. 
 
However, this is all happening with an electorate that is increasingly well educated and 
critical of these institutions, and with social policies unable to directly address the 
persistent and massive income inequality. This results in a perceived, as well as 
undoubtedly real, unequal access to social services and opportunities within Chile. 
Despite the long term existence of an ostensibly two-tiered system of public service 
delivery in Chile (Hiscock and Hojman 1997), it could be that many citizens are 
becoming increasingly impatient with the situation. 
 
5.4  CHILEAN ICT  POLICY AND E-GOVERNANCE  
The process of modernization and reform with Chile has included the use of ICT to 
improve government administration (among other things). Understanding the process of 
modernization and reform and their underlying motivations are necessary to put the 
emergence of the e-tax administration and ChileCompra into its appropriate context. As 
we will see, conducting taxes online are not possible without first overcoming difficult 
obstacles such as inter-organizational interoperability and the sufficient diffusion of 
Internet access. Consequently, while we can isolate particular services for examination, 
their outcomes are highly dependent upon their interconnections with a host of other ICT 
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policies and initiatives,  as well as various other public and private sector organisations, 
just to name a few. To aid our understanding of the implementation context, this section 
goes into more detail as to the type and nature of the ICT policy and context in Chile, 
including a brief overview of Chilean e-government efforts. 
 
5.4.1 ICT POLICY  
The story of ICT policy and diffusion in Chile has been one of relatively rapid 
incremental change spurred by strong government direction and public-private 
collaboration. Immediately after the democratic transition from military dictatorship, 
Chile had ostensibly no policy towards technological innovation, development, or 
research (Díaz and Rivas 2005, p. 480). Thus in the early 1990s, early efforts to work 
with ICT were a disparate few pioneered by a few academics, a handful of public sector 
agencies, and some in the private sector (AED 2003, p. 371). 
 
This began to change in the mid to late 1990s. In 1996 the Science and Technology 
Program161 was instituted, creating technology funds that are the investment institutions 
that are the principle tool used by the government to intervene. It was also around this 
time that the efforts to modernize and rationalize the state began (Díaz and Rivas 2005, p. 
481). In mid-1998, President Frei started a Presidential Commission on ICT and 
development. In late 1998, a Sub-Commission on Citizens and Equity stated, 
“Chile requires conviction from the State. Chile needs a Visionary State: a 
conviction that today’s opportunities can decisively influence tomorrow’s 
economy and society. An Enabler State: identify the required factors for ICT 
development by civil society and economic agents. An Implementer: The State 
must be a model in the adoption of ICTs” (AED 2003, p. 372). 
The presidential commission resulted in a six month investigation that culminated in the 
report, Chile towards the information society (CNICT 1999).162 The report presented an 
actionable short-term plan with the goal to ensure the beginning of the development of an 
information infrastructure. In total, the commission developed eleven guidelines and 
sixty-one specific proposals that fell under the domains of universalisation of access, 
                                                 
161
 In Spanish: Programa de Ciencia y Tecnología. 
162
 In Spanish: Chile hacia la sociedad de la información. 
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development of competitive capabilities, and modernization of the state in the service of 
citizenry. Thus, the institution of e-government was a main component of the larger 
public sector reform and modernization program that included “institutional and political 
reform, public management modernization, decentralization, transparency, and 
participation” (AED 2003, p. 373). In 2000, the momentum continued as the newly 
elected President Lagos maintained an emphasis on the Internet and new technologies 
(AED 2003). In May 2001, a Presidential Instructive on e-government was released, 
detailing guidelines and objectives in the three areas of “Good Government”, democratic 
development, and service to citizens (AED 2003).  
 
By 2003, Chile was already making great strides. A 2003 UN study ranked Chile atop 
Latin America and in the top 25 countries in the world in e-readiness (United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2003). By this point, Chile had many 
concrete results including: 
• Essential new legislation including the Protection of Private Life Law 1999 and 
the Electronic Signature Law 2003, 
• Computers in schools: around 8,000 schools with PCs and about 60% of them 
were connected to the Internet with 85% of the teachers trained in computer 
literacy, 
• Expanded access included some 1,300 infocentres in 317 communities across 
Chile and 368 Internet wired public libraries, 
• By 2001, about sixty percent of Chilean companies were wired to the Internet 
(Hilbert 2001), 
• Reduced Internet access costs, helping Internet users grow from 625K in 1999 to 
3.6 million in 2002 (Angell 2005b), 
• E-government services including 239 public ministry web portals with more than 
170 on-line services available.163 
 
                                                 
163
 Source: Agenda Digital: Te Acerca el Futuro, Feb. 2004. 
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In 2003, the government decided to take stock of the progress and plan for the future. 
Consequently, the Digital Action Group (Groupo de Acción Digital - GAD) was formed. 
The GAD was presided over by the Governmental Coordinator of Information and 
Communications Technologies, and included around 160 representatives from public, 
private, and academic institutions. From the year long collaboration emerged the Digital 
Agenda,164 a national strategy to continue Chile’s path towards the information society. 
Included in the collaboration, every participant promised to work collaboratively to 
realise the common vision, with special concern for those who are marginalised or 
otherwise excluded from Chile’s progress. Overall, the Digital Agenda established the 
2004-2006 Plan of Action that has six major priorities including expanding access, e-
literacy campaign, e-government, digital business development, facilitating the take off 
of the ICT industry, and modernisation the judicial system.165 
 
An important aspect of the digital agenda is the commitment to the social development of 
Chile. ICT are viewed as one means of achieving other aims such as state modernization, 
increased productivity of businesses, improved efficiency of state administration, and the 
reduction of regional inequalities. As evidence, the strategy is highly influenced by the 
principles established in the World Summit on the Information Society166 that focuses on 
the use of ICT as a means to reach the Millennium Development Goals.167 In concrete 
terms, this translates to the digital agenda including objectives such as ensuring and 
increasing individual liberties, improving the quality of life, and creating equal 
opportunities. It should be mentioned that despite the digital agendas socio-economic 
development orientation, it does not include more policy to promote or strengthen 
democracy within Chile. Rather, the concern at this time was capacity building and 
increasing equality of access rather than promoting participation. 
 
                                                 
164
 In Spanish: “Agenda Digital”. 
165
 The action plan had 6 priorities with 34 separate initiatives. 
166
 For more information, see the WSIS web site http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html, last accessed May 17th, 
2007. 
167
 For information, see http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. 
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An important piece of the ICT push and social focus is the governments push for e-
literacy and expanding access. One major component of these policies is the development 
and coordination of a network of separate public and private infocentres. Currently there 
are over 1300 infocentres across Chile.168 These infocentres include capacity building for 
both citizens as well as offering tools for micro and small business to increase 
productivity, online transactions, find new business opportunities, and technical 
support.169  
 
Despite their best efforts, technological diffusion has not successfully reached all 
Chileans. A 2006 UNDP report (2006a) found that half of the citizenry of Chile feels 
excluded from the world of new technologies. On a positive note, however, adolescents 
across Chile have been effectively incorporated, with eighty-four percent of those 
between the ages of fourteen and seventeen years old feel integrated. Woman, retired 
people, and people in low socio-economic levels are the most excluded. 
 
Overall the ICT policy approach can be summed up as incremental, collaborative, 
socially oriented, and politically motivated and sustained. This has resulted in relatively 
rapid and continuous improvements that has in a relatively short period made Chile one 
of the most technologically adept and savvy countries in Latin America. It has also made 
fairly impressive strides in expanding access despite the difficulties posed by the 
structural social and economic inequalities. 
 
5.4.2 E-GOVERNMENT  
A specific component of Chilean ICT policy over the last decade has been a concerted 
effort to develop e-government services. In particular, the digital agenda calls for the 
enabling of the state to deliver digital services to the citizen and to contribute to the 
                                                 
168
 A map of their locations can be found at http://www.infocentros.cl/.   
169
 Examples include www.Sitioempresa.cl, www.RedSercotec.cl, and www.zonaempresas.cl, See: 
http://www.infocentros.cl/index.php?seccion=internet&subseccion=quienes. The Programa Nacional de 
Infocentros Comunitarios emerged in 2001 as a result of a presidential instructive 
(http://www.infocentros.gob.cl/AUSI/respaldo/Descargables/Instructivo_Presidencial.pdf) with the goal of 
strengthening and facilitating access to ICT of small and micro businesses. 
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digital development of the country.170 The push has had significant impacts. E-
government transactions were basically non-existent in 1999, there were 34 in 2002, and 
over 300 by 2005 (Díaz and Rivas 2005, p. 503). By 2002, “98% of public agencies had 
portals or web sites” (AED 2003). One such portal is Portal Trámite Facil (“easy 
transaction”) that by 2001 provided information for about 700 transactions, and citizens 
could perform thirty-two of them online. By early 2002, seventy transactions were 
possible online and there was information for about 1,400 different transactions.  
 
Initial attempts at an online presence were, like e-government web pages in western 
countries, a presentation of the e-bureaucracy rather than taking a citizen orientation. A 
2001 evaluation “concluded that the content of government web-sites are not user-
oriented and that user-focus and service vis-à-vis design, navigation, functionality, and 
interactivity were poor” (AED 2003). This trend is especially acute in municipal web 
sites. A 2006 study evaluated the transparency of the municipality in terms of citizens’ 
accessibility and quality of municipal information that should be, by law at available 
(Horst 2006). Only two municipalities were found that completely complied with the law, 
supplying the requisite access to information. However, no municipalities publish all 
their information online, and only thirty percent that have a web page publish more than 
fifty percent of their information. Horst concludes that there are really two types of 
municipalities, those that are aware that they are obligated to provide information and 
those where the functionaries are not aware of their obligation, with some municipalities 
averse to actually supplying the information.171 
 
Despite the slow progress at the municipal level, since the early 2000s, Chilean e-
government state services have been increasing in sophistication, moving towards more 
citizen-oriented web-sites and fully transactional services in some cases. One of the 
primary movers and examples of e-services have been the development of the Chilean tax 
                                                 
170
 See: www.gobiernodechile.cl. 
171
 Interestingly, she found that the responses did not correspond to either the income per citizen in that 
municipality or the size of the municipality. Six of the thirty-four municipalities studied did not have a web 
presence, and nineteen of the twenty-eight were considered opaque (less than half of the information 
necessary). 
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agencies web portal with its impressive range of transactional services, as we will see in 
the following chapter. Furthermore, ChileCompra, the public sector e-procurement 
platform, developed into a fully transactional cite only after 2002, as will be detailed in 
chapter 7. While the breadth of Chile’s e-government applications is impressive given its 
relatively youthful status, these two applications in particular define the cutting edge of 
transactional and potentially transformative applications in Chile.  
 
5.5  RESEARCH LOCATION:  SANTIAGO ,  TEMUCO AND THE 
NOVENA REGION  
Up until now the discussion has been about Chile in general. However, interviews were 
only performed in a limited area: the capital city, also known as the Metropolitan area of 
Santiago, and in the 9th Region of Chile (the Novena Region) in and around Temuco, the 
capital of the region. Thus, it is important to provide a few more contextual details with 
respect to the current socio-politico-economic status of these two areas. 
 
The predominance of Santiago de Chile shaping the governance of Chile is not entirely 
surprising given the demographics of Chile. Chile has an estimated population of just 
over 16 million people,172 with eighty-six percent living in urban settings in the year 
2000.173 Santiago the political and economic capital is home to approximately 5.8 million 
people (around thirty-five percent of the population) and forty-five percent of the 
country’s GDP (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2005). Santiago is clearly the political 
and economic hub of the country. This is epitomized by the doctrine that “the man in 
Santiago knows best” (Angell 2005b).  
 
The bulk of the citizen interviews occurred in the ninth administrative region in Chile, La 
Araucanía, with its capital city, Temuco, located about eight hours south by train. 
Administratively, this region is divided into thirty-one municipalities. Financially, the 
                                                 
172
 As of July 2007. Source: CIA Factbook. See:  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ci.html. 
173
 Source: Earth Trends Environmental Information (http://earthtrends.wri.org/), World Resources Institute 
(http://www.wri.org/). See: 
http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/country_profiles/pop_cou_152.pdf. 
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ninth region is primarily a rural economy region and is the poorest in Chile. Poverty in 
this region is concentrated in the rural zones where about half of the children live below 
the poverty line (in contrast to 1 in 3 across Chile) (Pastrana et al. 2004). Of the thirty-
one municipalities, fifteen are considered in conditions of extreme poverty, with the 
highest degree in four of the municipalities visited; Nueva Imperial, Padre de las Casas, 
Carahue, Puerto Saavedra (Pastrana et al. 2004).  
 
The ninth region has a population around 870,000, with about one-third of this population 
living in rural areas (Pastrana et al. 2004). About twenty-four percent of the regional 
population is Mapuche, Chilean’s largest indigenous group (Pastrana et al. 2004). Like 
many indigenous populations across Latin America, they are among the poorest groups in 
Chile and have lower levels of schooling.174 Historically, this poverty “can generally be 
traced to decades of neglect, overtly (and covertly) racist policies and government abuse 
often in terms of land policy, which has contributed to a generally degraded position for 
the Mapuche people in Chile” (Pastrana et al. 2004).   
 
Despite the relative poorness of the region, they are just as connected as the rest of Chile 
due in a large part to the Internet diffusion, access, and training initiatives in the digital 
agenda. One local access initiatives, with government support, is a network of 
community networks.175 This network was created in 1997 and is coordinated by the 
Institute of Education Informatics (IIE),176 an institute in the Frontier University.177 The 
project received initial funding capital from the local municipality, the regional and 
federal government, as well as the IIE (Hepp and Garrido 2003). It has also involved a 
large number of partnerships including many governmental entities, NGOs, and a few 
private sector entities.  
 
                                                 
174
 “At the national level, 69.5% of indigenous people under the age of 39 have attained an average of 8.5 
years of formal schooling. This reflects the high drop out rate among young Mapuche of whom 30.4% 
never graduate from secondary school, often leaving before the 8th grade” (Pastrana et al. 2004) 
175
 This network is called the “Red de Información Comunitaria”. See: http://www.redcomunitaria.cl/ for 
details. 
176
 Instituto de Informática Educativa. 
177
 Universidad de la Frontera. 
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The goal of the project was to bridge two types of divides digital (lack of access to 
information and communication technologies) and cognitive (lack of knowledge of how 
to make use of information resources) (Hepp and Garrido 2003, p. 199). To achieve these 
goals thirty-two telecentres were set up as public sites with Internet linked computers that 
offer computer training and free Internet access.178 These activities and training programs 
generally “target women, indigenous communities, the unemployed, seniors, social 
leaders, the handicapped and also, local micro entrepreneurs” (Hepp and Garrido 2003).  
 
Each centre generally consists of two to eighteen computers, a printer, fax and scanner, 
handicapped access kit, and a wide variety of Internet connections depending upon 
availability (Hepp and Garrido 2003). Most often the telecentres are located in the central 
community centres with some of them combining space with other access technology and 
Internet access initiatives such as Biblioredes179. The telecentres themselves are managed 
by local members of the community with generally one manager and perhaps another 
employee. Between the launch of the first telecentre in 2000 and 2002, approximately 
110,000 people used the telecentres and ~5000 were people trained in the use of ICT.180 
 
5.5.1 SUMMARY  
Chile stands out in Latin America as a modern day success story. Politically, 
economically, and socially it is considered the exemplar of the potential of democratic 
reforms, economic liberalism, and expanding social net. Chile also has strong central 
public sector institutions that are in general professional and apolitical. These esteemed 
institutions provide a bulwark against the potential for corruption by providing a firm 
structure where economic and political transactions can take place with relative security. 
This is especially important considering the low interpersonal trust and small time 
corruption that exists. 
 
                                                 
178
 Depending upon the telecentre other things may come with a small charge, for example, printing. 
179
 A Microsoft initiative placing computers in libraries, see: http://www.biblioredes.cl/bibliored/. 
180
 Source Community Information Network of the Araucanía, see: www.redcommunitaria.cl. 
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Despite these successes, inequality both in terms of income and access to public services 
remains a pressing and defining issue. Support for democracy is not as solid as in other 
countries despite Chile’s long democratic traditions and solid performance in the last 
fifteen years. This is undoubtedly related to the recalcitrant inequalities as well as the 
increased expectations that citizens have of the performance of democratic governance. 
 
Recently, the Chilean government has pushed forward with an ICT agenda to bring Chile 
into the information society. This has been a collaborative effort (with considerable 
political support from consecutive Chilean Presidents) which holistically approaches the 
diffusion of ICT throughout the Chilean society. An important component of this project 
has been the implementation of e-government applications. In a very short period, the 
Chilean government has gone from a minimal web presence to developing a broad range 
of online e-services that include several world-renowned transactional e-service 
applications. Two of those applications, the e-tax administration system and 
ChileCompra, are the empirical cases studied in this thesis. Now that we have the covered 
the Chilean context of their implementation, it is time to turn to the cases themselves. 
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6 CASE I: E-INCOME TAX SERVICE 
 
The administration of taxes not only has import for the governance of a state but it 
penetrates into the economic lives of citizens and businesses constituting an important 
point of citizen-government interaction. It is reasonable to posit that changes to tax 
administration would impact citizens’ perceptions of both the tax agency as well as the 
government at large. 
 
This chapter presents the first of two empirical cases, the Chilean e-tax administration 
system and its impact on a) the trustworthiness of the Chilean tax agency (Servicios de 
Impuestos Internos, SII) and b) citizens’ institutional trust in the agency. The case is split 
into 2 parts: a case description (6.1) and analysis (6.2 & 6.3). The case description 
describes both the current system and provides historical context to its implementation.181 
The analysis itself is broken up into two components: trustworthiness and trust. The 
trustworthiness analysis (6.2) considers, from an institutional perspective, the changes 
that have occurred that have resulted in objective changes to the trustworthiness of the 
SII, in terms of the theory laid out in chapters 3 & 4. A series of case-specific hypotheses 
are then developed that predict the trust building potential of these trustworthiness 
outcomes. These hypotheses are case specific manifestations of the hypotheses created at 
the end of chapter four. The trust analysis (6.3) focuses on how citizens’ trust in the SII is 
impacted by the e-service from the perspective of the taxpayers. The goal is to understand 
what, how, and for whom changes in trustworthiness have been perceived and interpreted 
in a way that influences trust.182  
 
                                                 
181
 Note that this is not an implementation study, so there are details of the implementation that, while 
interesting, may not receive mention or deeper consideration, such as employee training, overcoming 
employee resistance, etc. While these of course may have been important for the success of the project the 
concern here is with changes to the institutions trustworthiness. 
182
 This is only the first stage of analysis that will be continued in the comparative analysis in chapter 8. 
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6.1  THE CHILEAN E-TAX ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM 183 
The administration of taxes is central to the operation of any state. Taxes provide the 
revenue source for any state that funds public spending. It is especially critical in 
developing countries to get your tax regime and administration right as revenue is already 
limited.184 The administration of taxes is, of course, not possible without a corresponding 
bureaucracy. Historically, the development of bureaucracy was instrumental in enabling 
the imposition of the first income tax in England in 1799 (Levi 1998, p. 87). The quality 
of this bureaucracy and its ability to administrate taxes is obviously central to the 
efficiency and nature of tax collection.  
 
New ICT provide a unique opportunity to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of tax 
administrations around the world. Indeed, as e-government implementations go, e-tax 
administration systems are some of the first, most common, and most successful e-
government applications (Dunleavy et al. 2006). This is because tax administration is the 
quintessential machine bureaucracy that is highly amenable to computerization of tax 
processes, standardization, and automatisation (Dunleavy et al. 2006, Kallinikos 2001). 
 
This section presents a description of the Chilean e-tax administration case. The first 
three parts (6.1.1 - 6.1.3) provide the background context within which the e-service was 
implemented. It begins (6.1.1) with a brief description of the current tax regime in Chile. 
Then section 6.1.2 describes the current status and history of the tax administration in 
Chile including the processes of reform leading up to the move to implement the e-
service. Next, section (6.1.3) presents a brief summary of a survey conducted in 1996 of 
taxpayers that helps provide both context and a comparative data point for the changes 
that have occurred since. The following four sections (6.1.4 - 6.1.7) describe the system 
and trace its implementation history as well as its impacts. Section 6.1.4 brings the 
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 This section draws heavily on Sanchez’s (2005) PhD thesis on the political economy of tax policy in 
Chile and Argentina. Where there are some pieces of data without citation, it can be assumed to be drawn 
from Sanchez’s work, in particular, chapter 6 “Tax Administration and Reform in Chile and Argentina”. 
184
 Furthermore, a fair and efficient tax system can provide benefits that extend to improving the quality of 
democracy and social justice, 
“Fair and efficient taxation produces benefits whose importance both to government and the state 
are difficult to over-estimate. These virtues improve the quality of democracy, provide resources 
for growth, and enhance social justice” (Angell 2005b, p. 22). 
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discussion up to the present day with a description of the current system. Section 6.1.5 
describes the implementation history. Sections 6.1.6 and 6.1.7 provide an overview of the 
objective (number of users, reduction of tax evasion, etc.) and subjective (a 2005 survey 
of the taxpayers image of the SII) outcomes of the system respectively. Finally section 
6.1.8 provides a brief summary the case. 
 
6.1.1 THE SII AND THE CHILEAN TAX STRUCTURE185 
This case focuses on the online income tax system implemented by the SII, the Chilean 
national authority responsible for tax compliance procedures, audit, and enforcement. 
The SII powers of enforcement entail jurisdiction over the interpretation of tax laws and 
the tax tribunal, the first judicial stage in tax disputes. Their mission statement is as 
follows, 
“The SII is responsible for administering the internal tax system, facilitate and 
control tax compliance, promote reduction of compliance costs and increase of 
taxpayers-economic agents productivity, and strengthening State modernization 
and e-Government development in the country; with a view to enhance tax 
compliance and economic growth of Chile and its people”.186 
The processes of the SII are interwoven with two other authorities with responsibilities 
with respect to the administration of taxes, the treasury, and customs. The treasury is 
responsible for collecting the domestic taxes and customs duties, and customs is 
responsible for supervising custom duties.  
 
The SII is hierarchically structured, with the SII headquarters located in the capital city, 
Santiago de Chile. The SII is headed by a Commissioner appointed by and responsible to 
the President of Chile. Under the headquarters, there are sixteen regional offices (four of 
these in Santiago), one large taxpayer office, and sixty local offices. As will be described 
in further detail later, the SII now has a virtual presence on the Internet at www.sii.cl.  
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 This section draws from many resources available on the SII web page; www.sii.cl. 
186
 www.sii.cl. 
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The Chilean tax regime consists of direct and indirect taxes. Direct taxes are those levied 
on the income or wealth that includes corporate income tax, tax on individuals, and tax 
on non-residents. Indirect taxes are broken into three categories of taxes: (1) taxes on 
sales and services, such as the Value Added Tax (VAT),187 and specific luxury taxes; (2) 
specific taxes (such as the fuel tax and tax on tobacco, cigars and cigarettes); and (3) 
other taxes (such as inheritance and donation taxes).  
 
The income tax and VAT are the two pillars of the Chilean tax system. Income tax 
accounted for approximately thirty-one percent of total revenue in 2005 (up from around 
twenty-three percent in 1993). Income tax consists of taxes on wages, interests, and other 
sources that constitute the total income received or accrued during the tax year. For 
wages, the amount is generally withheld on the income statement. The total amount for a 
tax year is calculated and declared in April of the following year. If the total amount 
withheld exceeds the required level of taxes then a return is issued. Otherwise the 
taxpayer must pay the required extra taxes.  
 
The VAT was introduced by Pinochet and is the largest single component of the tax 
system, contributing almost half of total tax revenue in 2005.188 It is currently excised at a 
flat rate of nineteen percent with no special regimes and few exemptions. The VAT 
requires that the merchants and service providers who pay VAT charge the buyers of 
goods or services an equal amount to the VAT at the point of sale. The total VAT 
accumulated are calculated and collected monthly.  
 
The stated goals underlying the Chilean tax structure are efficiency, simplicity, and 
equity. Taxes should be efficient and cause little distortion in economic activities, they 
should be simple for both taxpayers and authorities, and the criteria for levying taxes 
should be equal for all taxpayers. In Chile, the income tax is progressive,189 while the 
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 In Chile it is referred to as the IVA (Impuestos al Valor Agregado). 
188
 This amount has stayed relatively constant, since at least 1993 when the VAT constituted almost half of 
total tax revenue. 
189
 Income tax levels have eight scales and range from five to forty-five percent, source: 
http://www.santiago.cl/living/insurance.htm and (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez 2007). 
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VAT is regressive, taxing at flat rate irrespective of economic position. In a 1997 study, 
Engel et al. (1997) assessed the taxes and income distribution in Chile. They concluded 
that the high inequality in Chile is unrelated to the tax system (as of 1996), despite its 
overall regressive nature. Likewise, the World Bank (1997) concluded that the tax system 
in Chile appears to be income-equality neutral. While the VAT may be regressive, it is 
highly productive producing the most yield per percentage point VAT in Latin America 
(Alm and Martinez-Vazquez 2007, p. 4). However, the income-equality neutrality of the 
tax system does not imply that the application of the tax is necessarily fair. For example, 
of the top five percent of income earners it is estimated that only half of them pay at the 
proper rate, and the rest manipulate the system to pay at the significantly reduced rate 
(Angell 2005a). 
 
6.1.2 SII AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 
The SII is, and since its formation in 1902 has been, a politically autonomous, 
professional, and powerful institution in Chile. Its political independence is reflected in 
the long average tenure of SII directors. It professionalism is witnessed by the historically 
low levels of corruption which have been episodic rather than systematic (Sánchez 2005, 
p. 234). The SII also holds a position of perceived and real authority and power. In the 
2004 UNDP report, they developed a “Powermeter” to measure the perceived power of 
different institutions in Chile, with ministries of the economic sphere coming in second 
most powerful behind communications media.190  
 
Pinochet’s military regime had a lasting impact on the nature of the SII. Pinochet 
simplified and reformed the tax system introducing the VAT. Pinochet also downsized 
the public sector reducing the SII to almost half-size, degrading its tax collection and 
auditing capabilities (Sánchez 2005, p. 235). This happened in the context of 
international pressure to implement the “Washington Consensus” that called for a 
neoliberal market reforms and the reduction of government expenditure (Smith 2005c, p. 
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 The ratings were: 1) Communications media 8.6, 2) Ministries of the economic sphere 8.3, 3) Major 
business groups 8.0, 4) Central Bank 7.4, 11) Regulators 6.1, 12) Mayors 5.9, 16) Armed forces 5.6, 19) 
Treasury Inspectors Office 5.5, 29) Artists and intellectuals 4.2, 32) Trade unions 3.4. 
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216). Pinochet also “strengthened Chile’s historical tradition of technocratic insulation, as 
part of the military’s larger social project to ‘technify’ society, eliminate rent-seeking 
behaviour on the part of interest groups, and convince the population of the uselessness 
of ‘politics’” (Sánchez 2005, p. 234). 
 
The Aylwin government, the first government after Pinochet, appointed Javier 
Etcheberry, a private sector executive, to be the director of the SII. At the time, the SII 
was considered “the most time-consuming and onerously bureaucratic service in the 
public sector” (Constance 2000). Etcheberry was set on reducing the level of tax evasion 
through two means: improving the agencies operating procedures and increasing 
expertise, and making the system more transparent, simple, and impartial (Angell 2005b). 
They recruited executives for the SII’s top 150 positions, and asked for special 
performance bonuses to make managers’ compensation more competitive with the private 
sector (Sánchez 2005, p. 237).191 These managers were ordered to conduct more rigorous 
performance reviews of all staff, and taking a zero tolerance approach to corruption, they 
periodically fired employees who failed to meet the SII code of behaviour (Constance 
2000). This included the creation of the Controller’s office within the SII who “is 
responsible for presenting the evidence against an employee and proposing appropriate 
penalties to the Director” (Sánchez 2005, p. 238). 
 
These reforms were done without the benefit of extra resources, making increased 
bureaucratic efficiency a necessity (Sánchez 2005). This prompted an entire 
reengineering of the tax administration to “identify procedures that could be eliminated or 
simplified without breaking the law. Virtually all areas of SII activity underwent 
substantial change, including Operation Income, Operation VAT, Appraisals, Taxpayers 
Lifecycle, the tax court, and others” (Sánchez 2005, p. 239). Etcheberry explains, 
“I started out focusing on costs and on the uselessness of many of the procedures 
tax officials were carrying out… Instead of immediately raising salaries and 
asking Congress for a budget increase, I set out to prove that the same staff and 
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 They also introduced a fully merit-based system of recruitment and promotion and increased the real 
salary of the average employ (over 130% in the 1990s) (Angell 2005b) 
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the same budget could be used much more effectively to combat tax evasion” 
(Javier Etcheberry quoted in Constance 2000). 
 
Etcheberry’s reforms brought immediate results.192 For example, income tax evasion fell 
from fifty to forty percent from 1990 to 1993 (Angell 2005b).193 The success created a 
“virtuous cycle” where the Congress became more willing to allocate funds for salary 
increases and other technological investments (Constance 2000).  
 
Since then the SII has continued reforms and improvements based upon its three strategic 
pillars to improve tax compliance: facilitate tax compliance, and strengthening audit and 
prosecution capability. Overall this reflects the goal of implementing tax administration 
with the “vision to permanently contribute to economic development” through the 
reduction of tax compliance costs and reducing unfair and illegal competition based on 
tax evasion and fraud (Toro 2005).  
 
The reforms from 1993 on have yielded similar positive results, although with 
diminishing returns (see Table 20), with the biggest impacts on the reduction of tax 
evasion occurring in the early 1990s,  
“Weberian and managerial reforms to enhance SII capabilities in fighting evasion 
have largely run their course for that particular purpose, and that there have been 
diminishing returns to such a strategy since the mid-1990s. In seeking to 
determine what is needed to reduce evasion levels from the current 24%, all the 
evidence points in one direction: additional human resources for the tax agency” 
(Sánchez 2005, p. 250). 
Despite diminishing returns, the overall benefits were significant. Between 1990 and 
2000, overall tax evasion fell from 33% to 24% and the number of people filing income 
tax nearly doubled (Constance 2000) (see Figure 16). The reduction in tax evasion 
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 Etcheberry did run into resistance from employees and professional accountants, including strikes and 
lawsuits, although he was able to overcome them (Constance 2000, Sánchez 2005). 
193
 In terms of potential revenue, tax evasion levels fell from thirty percent of potential revenue in 1990 to 
18.3% in 1993 (compared to 31.5% Argentina, or 68.2% in Peru, and twenty-three percent in Canada) 
(Angell 2005b). 
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produced sizable gains in revenue generated, resulting in over USD$1 Billion in 
additional revenue with the 1999 evasion rate as compared to the 1991 rate (Angell 
2005a). 
 
Year % VAT % Corporate Income Tax 
1990 70.4 49.8 
1991 73.2 51.6 
1992 77.1 55.5 
1993 81.7 58.2 
1994 80.4 61.3 
.... … … 
1997 80.3 61.5 
1998 78.0 --- 
1999 81.7 --- 
Table 20  Tax compliance in the 1990’s, source: (Serra 2003, p. 
379). 
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Figure 16  The rate of voluntary VAT tax compliance in Chile and Argentina from 1990 to 1998, 
source: (Bergman 2003). 
 
The 1990s also saw a reverse in the downsizing trend, with a thirty-six percent increase in 
number of staff including a thirty-nine percent increase in the number of auditors 
(Sánchez 2005, Serra 2003).194 The SII did continue this expansion and by the late 2006, 
the SII had increased its staff to around 3700, another twenty-five percent increase. It 
must be noted that even with these increases, the SII is considered one of the “leanest and 
most productive tax services in the world” with respect to the number of citizens per tax 
service employee (Constance 2000).195 It was found that each SII employee accounts for 
$3.4 million, a higher amount than most developed countries (Sánchez 2005).  
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 The number of SII employees went from 1,863 in 1981 to 2,785 in 1999 (Serra 2003). 
195
 In 1999, Chile had just one employee for every 4,051 citizens, and by contrast all industrialised 
European countries have less than 1,000 citizens per tax employee (Constance 2000). That said, only some 
2 million citizens pay income tax in a country of 15,000,000, although the VAT does apply across the 
board.  
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In 1996, tax evasion was still considered quite large, with around twenty-seven percent of 
the potential tax base not reported due to loopholes and evasion (Engel et al. 1997). 
Several approaches were taken. During the early nineties the SII began collecting and 
crossing information. They gathered data on taxpayers’ salaries, interest earnings, 
dividends, and selling of stocks. This enabled them to reconstruct both formal and 
informal earnings (Sánchez 2005). For informal earnings, the SII can “contrast declared 
income with the investments that individual or corporation (sic) made during that period” 
(Sánchez 2005, p. 241). Etcheberry also hired a number of outside consultants to research 
at regular intervals the nature and extent of evasion (Sánchez 2005). The SII also 
instituted an incentive system inside the SII where bonuses earned by staff are dependent 
upon tax revenue exceeding a pre-declared benchmark (Serra 2003). These bonuses can 
reach up to twenty-seven percent of the functionary’s salary depending upon their 
position. In line with the other public sector reforms in Chile at that time, performance 
targets were adopted for SII employees.196  
 
The overall success of these reforms is difficult to pinpoint, especially given the 
complexity of any economic system. Data during the 90s suggests that compliance rates 
have gone up. Serra’s (2003) analysis of the improvement of VAT compliance during the 
1990s found that while compliance rates improved during this time the increased 
compliance is partially explained by the strong economic growth during that period.197 
Data from the 1990s shows that the SII has an image of being able to detect non-
compliance (Bergman 2003). 
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 For example, tax employees receive a bonus if tax collection is  last years revenue adjusted by this years 
GDP growth times 1.1 (Serra 2005). The SII, however, has developed its own set of performance measures 
to assess the organisation’s effectiveness given their objectives, which the main ones are: maximising tax 
revenue and minimise compliance costs (Serra 2005). They have other goals that are means to these two 
goals as ends including:  
“improve the agency’s efficiency; promote professional and personal development among its staff; 
reduce levels of tax evasion and avoidance; facilitate tax compliance and improve taxpayers 
services; ensure equity and legal precision in the application of tax laws; strengthen and develop 
greater technological capacity to fulfil the mission” (Serra 2005, p. 119). 
197
 One indicator of tax evasion is the size of the “shadow economy”. Chile has the smallest shadow 
economy in 1999/2000 at only 19.8% of GDP. This is comparable to Western countries like Canada at 
sixteen percent, although double the rate in the US and Switzerland (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez 2007). 
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The desire to reduce tax evasion still forms a central part of the SII’s mission. In 2001 a 
new law was enacted to target tax evasion with the goal to reduce the economy’s global 
evasion rate from twenty-four to twenty percent by 2005 enabling the government to 
finance government programmes without requiring higher taxation. Associated with 
reaching this goal is three objectives: strengthen the capacity to enforce and collect taxes, 
modernize and increase the efficiency of the tax administration organizations, and 
eliminate tax evasion opportunities through the modification of legislation.   
 
One element of reducing evasion is through decreasing costs associated with tax 
compliance. This was done through facilitating the taxpayers experience through the 
computerisation of the procedures of tax administration and services. There was also a 
concurrent concerted effort to improve taxpayer service. In 1996, the SII set nationwide 
standards for public assistance in the areas of income tax, VAT, and other areas, in an 
attempt to improve the quality of the processes of taxpayer assistance. These standards 
were subsequently raised between 1998 and 2002. They also instituted a study of 
taxpayer satisfaction to evaluate and improve performance. One area that was targeted 
was citizen waiting time to realise all “life-cycle’ procedures such as starting a business, 
obtaining a tax id number, or getting invoices stamped (Serra 2005). The SII instituted a 
“Maximum Waiting Time” project to guarantee taxpayers a waiting time of no more than 
30 minutes for these procedures.198 The end result has been a marked and documented 
improvement in that aspect of service (see Table 21). Another significant initiative was 
the 2003 creation of Taxpayer Attention Centres199 in the SII office that acts as the 
gateway for the tax procedures with specialised personal. This also included offering the 
possibility of self-assistance through the placing of computers in the office. This is a part 
of the continued push to integrate services and functionalities into the SII web portal to 
progressively realise the goal of a virtual office.  
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 When a taxpayer enters the tax office, they take a ticket which registers their time. Software records 
several variables such as the amount of people waiting and the number of employees attending the public 
thus allowing for managers to make on the fly changes to improve service and meet the thirty minute 
service goal (Serra 2003). 
199
 Centros de Atención al Contribuyente. 
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 Number of 
taxpayers assisted 
(thousands) 
% waiting longer 
than 30 minutes 
1998  7.2 
1998  0.2 
2000 1,439 0.2 
2001 1,542 0.6 
2002 1,657 1.0 
Table 21  The number of attended taxpayers and the % that had to wait 
more than 30 minutes, source: (Serra 2005, p. 121). 
 
In summary, Chile’s approach to tax reform was a slow institution-building approach and 
its highly institutionalised political environment helped to consolidate the reforms 
(Sánchez 2005, p. 232). Fighting tax non-compliance was a high priority in Chile, 
primarily with the goal to add revenue to the treasury as well as enhance overall 
economic efficiency (Sánchez 2005). This fight had two prongs: improving the capacity 
to prosecute tax evasion and facilitating tax compliance. 
 
6.1.3 THE TAXPAYERS’ “IMAGE” OF THE SII 
An important data point that provides relevant contextual information and a point of 
comparison is an SII commissioned survey conducted in 1996. The goal of the survey 
was to determine the “image” of the SII with respect to their processes of modernisation. 
This was the first in a series of survey snapshots funded by the SII that help to give an 
idea of the progression over time of the change in taxpayers’ opinions of the service and 
the SII itself. One drawback of the 1996 survey, for our purposes here, is that it did not 
target a large section of the citizen or taxpaying population. Instead the survey focused on 
opinions of managers or bosses in large, medium, and small businesses, owners of large, 
medium, and small retailers, and independent professionals.  
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Some of the relevant findings are the following:200 
• SII is a feared organization: First and foremost, the SII is perceived as a very 
serious and often threatening institution with eighty-one percent of citizens 
believing that the SII generates fear in taxpayers. This reality has historical roots. 
The recent history of the Chilean government and the tax authority in particular, is 
one of an authoritarian relationship. The SII historically has been respected, 
feared, and maintained an inordinate power asymmetry between them and 
taxpayers. This perception remains strong even through all the major 
administrative reforms enacted since 1992.  
• The SII is almost universally seen as strict in the completion of its duties (eighty-
eight percent) and rigorous in their work (seventy-eight percent). Less people, but 
still a majority, see the SII as just (fifty-five percent), honest (fifty-nine percent), 
and professional (fifty-nine percent).201 By 1996, they were already regarded as 
modern (sixty-one percent) and having reached a good level technologically 
(sixty-three percent). The SII received just over a majority of positive evaluations 
for their efficiency and attention to the public. Their worst characteristic by far 
was the level of bureaucracy, with only thirty-one percent giving a positive 
evaluation.202 
• Citizens’ evaluation of the SII in comparison: The evaluations of the SII mean a 
lot more when comparable to other institutions. The survey allowed for 
comparisons on twelve factors. Overall, the SII ranks higher than public services 
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 Some other data from the survey: The SII is considered a very important to absolutely essential 
organization (over four-fifths) for the development of Chile, higher than the other five institutions asked 
about including the treasury (seventy-two percent) and municipalities (fifty-nine percent). Around seventy-
one percent think that it is very good or excellent for the country that people pay taxes, with the most 
important reasons being for the development of the country and to help people with little resources. 
Twenty-three percent believe that taxes are low compared to other countries, fifty-eight percent believe that 
you never know where taxes go, and fifty-three percent believe that taxes principally go to help those who 
most need it.  
201
 The auditors are viewed as mostly honest, competent, and strict, with fifty-six percent say that the tax 
inspectors are straight and honest, with only fourteen percent saying that it is easy to avoid taxes through an 
arrangement with a tax inspector, and two-thirds believe that all or almost all who try to invade receive 
fines or punishment. About one-third believe that these punishments/fines are too high, with one-fifty 
saying they are too low, and the last two-fifths either do not know or believe that the fines are just right.  
Fifty-six percent agree that the auditing practice is strict, with only one-fourth in disagreement. 
202
 It is interesting to note that overall, retailers gave a more positive overall general rating of the SII 
(eighty-percent) compared to businesses (sixty-five percent) and professionals (sixty-six percent). 
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but lower than private services.203 It is also helpful to see the trend of taxpayer 
opinion as of 1996 which will help us better understand and causally attribute the 
impacts of changes post-1996. In 1996, the SII had a worse image overall than in 
1992 (see Table 22). The authors of the study argue that one reason for this 
decrease is due to the increased expectations the public holds of the SII as a 
modern, technologically advanced organisation. 
• Tax evasion: The place where the SII had improved since 1992 was that it became 
more difficult to “deceive” improving twenty-eight percent on average (see Table 
22). Despite this, citizens still view tax evasion as an issue with seventy-one 
percent of respondents believing that loopholes are used to avoid paying taxes.204  
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 However, along these same dimensions, the SII ranked lower in 1996 than in 1992. 
204
 Depending upon the question there were some differing responses, with sixty-nine percent saying that 
those with the highest incomes evade the most but also that the wandering retailers are the biggest 
perpetrators of tax evasion. Increased auditing would be welcome with sixty-one percent of the citizens 
believe that that the SII should have more resources to increase auditing capacities to reduce evasion. 
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 Total Businesses Retailers Profes. 
Bureaucracy -21.2 -24.8 -6.5 -17.6 
Efficiency -20.9 -21.6 -17.9 -11.1 
Level of technology reached -20.4 -20.9 -13.7 -11.1 
Development of computational processes -19.3 -22.8 -11.5 -12.3 
Professionalism -17.1 -18.3 -14.3 -11.0 
Modern -14.1 -17.3 -4.9 -13.8 
Attention to public -7.8 -11.8 -2.0 -15.0 
Honesty -5.6 -7.2 -4.4 6.2 
Importance for development of Chile -2.6 -2.7 -1.0 -3.0 
Rigorousness in mission completion -1.4 0.9 -5.7 -5.9 
Strict in mission completing 4.0 4.9 3.9 -5.8 
Ease to deceive 28.4 29.9 23.8 2.3 
Average -8.2 -9.4 -4.5 -7.6 
Table 22  Comparison between results of Adimark 1992 & 1996 survey. Despite the reform, the image of 
the SII in 1996 was on average worse than it was in 1992. The highlighted cells are where the system was 
deemed to improve. 
 
Fortunately for this research, the 1996 survey asked some questions about citizens’ trust 
in the SII. The Spanish term is “tener confianza”, which translates to “to have 
confidence” and “to trust”.205 The results show that the SII is an institution that instils 
trust (or confidence) with around ninety percent responding that they trusted the SII.206  
 
Perhaps the most interesting finding is that, despite the improvements in the SII and their 
service between 1992 and 1996, as evidenced by the objective data, the public on the 
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 Moving from English to Spanish, however, their really is only one correlate for trust, “confianza”. 
206
 The top five reasons for trusting were: good level of professionalism (eighteen percent), it is a regulated 
organization (fourteen percent), they audit properly (twelve percent), they detect abnormalities (eleven 
percent), and they complete their functions (around ten percent). Of the ten percent that do not trust, the 
reasons given were: they do not apply the law in the appropriate manner (two percent), they are dishonest 
(two percent), slow in informing (two percent), bureaucratic (two percent), and not efficient (one percent). 
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whole viewed the organisation and service as getting worse. And even more intriguing is 
the fact that despite this regression, they still maintained very high levels of trust. 
 
6.1.4 THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
The e-tax administration system has three interconnected components: an intra-SII 
network, SII and other public entities, and the SII and taxpayers (the virtual office).  
 
Intra-SII network 
The intranet-SII network consists of the following: 
• Intranet that connects all employees where most internal procedures can be 
carried out, 
• Operating system for procurement control where the entire procurement cycle is 
completed electronically, 
• Internet applications for SII auditors to enable attention to taxpayers in the SII 
offices, 
• Online publication system that permits the publication and updating of the 
content of different pages including new tax regulations. 
 
Interconnectivity between SII and other public entities 
The SII has been developing an electronic platform to connect all public sector 
organizations and enable them to communicate and exchange information. This amounts 
to massive agency interoperability that enables the gathering of third-party information 
about taxpayers such as salaries, interest earned, investment holdings, etc. This 
interoperability brings several significant benefits, including acting as an impulse for ICT 
use across different sectors of Chile, as well as enabling a significant increase in the 
range and type of activities and services that the SII can offer.  
 
Virtual office 
The SII-taxpayer system is often described as SII’s virtual office (see Figure 17). 
Currently, at this site taxpayers can perform a myriad of tasks: obtain a password, check 
third-party information with respect to collected tax return information, check tax status, 
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submit annual and monthly tax returns, make tax payments, and retrieve legally valid e-
invoice for both products and e-receipts (Boleta de Honorarios Electronica) for 
independent services rendered.  
 
 
Figure 17  A screenshot of the SII's virtual office homepage, http://www.sii.cl, May 2007. 
 
The research in this thesis focuses on citizens’ interaction with the SII virtual office and 
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in particular with their experiences with the e-income tax declaration process.207 Online 
submitting and paying of income taxes electronically can happen in one of four ways: 
1. Through basic software that can be downloaded free of charge from the web site. 
2. Through specialised authorized third-party software, also accessible through the 
site. 
3. Through an online interactive tax form where the taxpayer enters the data. The 
form performs the requisite calculations as well as a series of data check to better 
improve the accuracy of the declaration. 
4. A virtual income tax return proposal that has been pre-filled with the taxpayer 
data collected by the SII, as facilitated by the electronic platform. This form 
completes taxes for a wide range of taxpayers, but does not complete the process 
entirely for those who own their own business. The SII tries to make it clear that 
this completed form is a simply a proposal and that it is the responsibility of the 
taxpayer to review the data and confirm its veracity before accepting it.  
 
If taxes are owed, payment can happen through a variety of means, both on and off-line. 
The SII has also established links with the major banks in Chile so that payments can be 
made online directly from taxpayers’ bank accounts. It is also possible to pay online with 
a credit card. Offline, payments can be made with a bank order charged to a bank 
account, or simply through a bank, as you might pay an electric or hydro bill. 
 
Irrespective of who supplies the data (third-party organisations, accountant, or taxpayer) 
for a tax declaration, the ultimate legal responsibility lies with the taxpayer. If the SII 
presents a proposal and discrepancies exist, it is the responsibility of the taxpayer to 
contact the organization that supplied that particular information to the SII and rectify the 
problem. For example, if a taxpayer finds that their interest accrued from a bank account 
is not accurately represented, they must contact the bank and resolve the discrepancy, 
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 The online income tax service is but one of many services offered by the SII. It is, of course, impossible 
to completely differentiate the income tax service from the others services and the entire e-administration 
system. Therefore, while an emphasis will be on the income tax, other relevant details will be included. The 
attempt here is to try to limit the analysis to the direct impacts of the income tax service and bring in the 
others when they appear to causally overlap in some significant manner. 
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which is then reported to the SII. If errors are made, then the punishment is dependent 
upon the severity of the error and usually consists of a corresponding fine. Sometimes, 
other pecuniary incentives are used to encourage the settling of tax matters. For example, 
if a taxpayer who is a small-business owner has taxes that are not completely up-to-date, 
then the taxpayer may be denied the ability to receive billing invoices which restricts 
their ability to do business. 
 
6.1.5 E-TAX SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION HISTORY208 
The computerisation of the tax administration has meant dramatic changes for both the 
administration and delivery of tax related services. The most obvious change has been the 
movement from a paper and microfiche to a computer-based administration. Prior to the 
computerisation of the SII the tax administration entailed a massive amount of relatively 
tedious, and error prone tasks such as the manual entry of all received tax declarations. 
The standard income tax administration process took on average twenty-five days and is 
pictured in Figure 18. 
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 This section draws from a series of external sources such as Sanchez’s PhD thesis, but also is highly 
dependent upon the set of interviews conducted during the IADB study and subsequent interviews of SII 
employees for the World Bank study. 
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Total Time:25 days
4.- Turn in to bank
1.- Design
and print
forms
2.- Distribute
forms
10.- Entry into
SII Database
5.- Sorted in 
clearinghouse
3.- Complete 
form
7.- Data entry9.- Correction
of errors
8.- Verify
data entered
6.- File with SII
 
Figure 18  The paper-based income tax declaration process, source: (FTAA 2002). 
 
In 1994, in the early stages of the Internet, Etcheberry and others in the SII envisioned 
that computers could play a role in improving efficiency and service of the tax 
administration (Sánchez 2005). The use of new ICT and the Internet was seen as a 
strategic option because it helps to fulfil the main objectives of the SII as an institution.209 
New ICT were believed to enable the following benefits: provision of high-quality 
services to taxpayers as an incentive for systematically improving tax compliance; 
minimisation of the costs of tax compliance; optimisation of the SII’s ability to use and 
manage taxpayer’s information; and providing an example for other public sector 
institutions.210 
 
                                                 
209
 Recall that they are to facilitate tax compliance, strengthening audit and prosecution capability, and a tax 
administration that contributes to economic development. 
210
 Source: www.sii.cl and (Toro 2005). 
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When the SII decided to computerise its system they already had created an environment 
that was conducive to success. Prior to the computerisation process, they had spent 
several years massively simplifying the internal tax procedures with the aim of creating a 
more efficient tax administration without increasing costs. This meant a more rational 
and clearly delineated set of tax processes when it was time to computerise and encode 
these processes in software (Constance 2000). They also made the decision to base their 
technological infrastructure on the non-proprietary TCP/IP protocol. This was done to 
reduce reliance on any one IT supplier, but had the fortuitous outcome of making them 
compatible to take advantage of the interconnectivity of the Internet. 
 
The implementation of the tax system was, like other reforms, incremental. It has 
proceeded in three main phases: informational, interactive, and transactional. Starting in 
1995, the SII created their web-site. The goal was to satisfy the general informational 
needs of the taxpayers so that they would not have to go to the tax offices. This 
informational stage “entailed the placement of a significant amount of tax-related 
information online, including guidelines and filing procedures, taxpayer instructions, and 
tax principles and policies” (Avgerou et al. 2005). The second phase, beginning in 1997, 
was the next logical utilisation of the Internet to allow taxpayers to interact with the SII 
online through the incorporation of online help and feedback possibilities. Information 
was organized and made accessible through decision trees and knowledge-based systems, 
and taxpayers could make inquires through email to SII employees. In 2000 they placed 
an electronic help guide that has been incrementally enhanced to include more services. 
At this point, the SII had also expanded its informational capabilities delivering 
personalised taxpayer information. 
 
The transactional stage took the process to its logical next step and marked a significant 
change in the nature of tax administration and the online service. In 1998, the SII 
broached the possibility of filing taxes online with the online form, including the issuing 
of secret access keys that helped to guarantee privacy and authenticity of the information. 
In 1999 the online tax form was authorised as well as providing the possibility to make 
tax corrections via the Internet. As the technology and extent of available information 
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improved, the form was successively built upon until a complete tax proposal emerged. 
Furthermore, the availability of information allowed for the development of more 
extensive data cross-checking and has greatly increased the range and extent of auditing. 
It has also enabled the SII to improve the accuracy and quality of its services, as well as 
expanding the range of possible services, such as the ability to pay online.  
 
Over the following three years, the SII built on their technological platform to 
significantly improve the ease of completing tax obligations. In 2000, they introduced a 
system to enable payments of income tax and VAT online. They improved this system 
the following year whereby the taxpayers could pay by online debt from their bank 
account at the moment of declaring online. This was expanded to include credit cards in 
2002. Furthermore, in 2001, the SII introduced the online tax declaration proposal. 
Finally, in 2002 the SII redesigned the SII portal with the objective of facilitating 
taxpayers in their completion of tax obligations. The standard online income tax 
declaration process is illustrated in Figure 19 below. The process has been reduced from 
an average of twenty-five days to twelve hours. 
 
 
Statement  
Debit Order 
 
Bank Executes Debit Order 
SII 
Treasury 
Deposit 
Report 
Deposits 
Taxpayers 
Debit Order 
Unique Tax Account  
Debit 
Notification Total time < 12 hours 
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Figure 19  The online income tax declaration process, source: (FTAA 2002). 
 
This process has resulted in several changes to the internal structure and activities of 
several groups – a larger internal IT group, and a new department of administrative 
control that was not possible pre-computerisation. This new department monitors the tax 
processes and performance with the system generating “monthly management reports” 
that include indicators for goals for offices and individuals. It also allows for central 
control and monitoring of the different regions and regional performance. As this 
happens automatically, it also saves time for the managers at the regional levels. The 
ability to monitor regional performance from the central office in Santiago has resulted in 
both increased stress as well as improved performance. In one interview, a SII manager 
told of how suddenly they would cover the same amount of cases in two months that they 
had completed the whole year before.211 
 
The ability to gather taxpayer financial information from a variety of external sources and 
cross-check this data has also greatly enhanced the capacity of the auditors. This has 
resulted in a change of focus, scope, and type of activities they engage in. Originally, 
auditors spent a large amount of time worrying about and resolving human errors. With 
the increased accuracy of data and the reduction in human errors, they can focus on 
discrepancies that are more likely caused on purpose. Furthermore, almost 100% of all 
tax declarations are run through an automatic auditing process. This process then allows 
for the highlighting of discrepancies that may warrant extra attention. This allows the 
auditors to have the software highlight those tax declarations that will potentially yield 
the greatest payoff if they are audited, increasing their total reduction of tax evasion 
payoff per case. The auditors are also constantly looking for new ways to utilise all of the 
new information provided by the system.212 
  
                                                 
211
 Interviewee: WB-NL-SII-6-10. 
212
 Interviewee: WB-NL-SII-1/5. 
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Another significant initiative that has emerged in the last seven years is the issuing of 
electronic invoices (e-invoices).213 Before issuing e-invoices, paper invoices were 
numbered, stamped, and issued at the various tax agencies across Chile. A business or 
contractor had to travel to the tax office and receive a packet of SII stamped invoices that 
were then used at the point of sale. Working with e-invoices is significantly more 
complex than paying taxes online. It requires a pc with compatible accounting software, 
an Internet connection, and a printer. The e-invoices are then received and printed and the 
sales totals are kept in the accounting package in the computer. These totals are then 
submitted monthly as the VAT filing. The implementation of the e-invoice began in the 
early 2000s.214 In August 2002, the e-invoice pilot project was launched and already 
proved effective. Consequently, on the 2nd of September, 2003, the SII began the process 
of the diffusion of e-invoices (see Figure 20 for a timeline of the SII tax online 
implementation). 
 
                                                 
213
 In Chile, the e-invoice is called the “Factura Electronica”. The e-invoice was envisioned by the SII as a 
“revolutionary tool for improving productivity in the private sector” ultimately setting up a “standard 
platform for e-commerce in the country which will imply a tremendous transformation for doing business 
in Chile”. Source: www.sii.cl. 
214
 By 2001 had already received the “Award for the Best Public Initiative” in Chile. See footnote 221 for a 
list of other awards the online tax service has received. 
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Figure 20  The SII tax online implementation milestones. 
 
There are two aspects of the implementation process that warrant mention.215 First, the 
SII used a series of incentives to encourage transition to an online system. For example, 
e-filers had extra days to submit (AED 2003). In an attempt to encourage people to pay 
online, in April 2006, a substantial (70%) reduction in owed taxes was awarded if you 
paid online rather than through a bank. Second, the SII had the goal of facilitating the 
taxpayer in completing their obligations. The pinnacle of this strategy is the online tax 
proposal, described as the “red carpet treatment” in one SII manager interview.216 Other 
services are available to facilitate compliance, for example, every year in March and 
April, tax officials will go out to telecentres to help people perform their tax declarations 
online and answer any tax related questions.  
 
                                                 
215
 Two factors that are relevant to the implementation history that have not been mentioned. First are the 
crucial changes in the Chilean legal code to accommodate the system. Two essential changes were an 
amendment to Article 30 of the tax code authorising taxpayers to declare taxes on a media other than paper 
and the digital signature law enacted in 2003. Second, to provide security, the SII implemented a password 
entry system that entails the issuing of a personal secret key to each taxpayer.  
216
 Interviewee: IADB-3. 
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6.1.6 OBJECTIVE OUTCOMES 
Judging from the quantitative data regarding the uptake and use of the system as an e-
service, it is hard to dispute its success. The transition from a paper-based bureaucracy to 
a computerised bureaucracy is almost complete.217 The system is moving towards 
achieving its goal of putting all major tax transactions online. They now receive 100% of 
the third party information electronically (Barraza and Hervias 2006). Furthermore, they 
have almost achieved 100% online filing. Since its inception, online filing has 
experienced a steady increase. In the first year, 1999, only about five percent of taxpayers 
(80,365 of 1,711,782) actually paid through the online form. By 2002, more people filed 
online (over 1.1 million or about 55%) then had filed with paper (925,000). By 2005 the 
SII has almost reached their goal of 100% e-filing with over ninety-six percent filed 
online (almost two million). By midnight May ninth of the following year about ninety-
seven percent of the taxpayers filed electronically, the equivalent of 2,068,001 received 
e-documents (see Figure 21).218 
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 In one interview with an SII employee they described how when they first worked at the SII it was filled 
with papers, there were papers everywhere. Now every employee works on a computer. 
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 Source www.gobiernoelectronico.org/?q=node/4717, last accessed, Sept. 15th, 2007. 
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Figure 21  Total income tax declarations, online versus written (Barraza and Hervias 2006). 
 
The system has proven to be both efficient and robust. Its efficiency is reflected in the 
reduced tax processing time from twenty-five working days to just twelve hours. This 
means that online taxpayers receive their return in terms of days or weeks rather than 
months. The system has also proven to be remarkably robust to a large amount of traffic. 
Not only is it Chile’s number one Internet destination, but it also has been able to process 
large amounts of forms in short time periods, especially around the income tax deadline. 
On May 9th, 2006 the SII received and successfully processed over 25,000 tax 
declarations between 23:00 and midnight.219  
 
During this time, the state has also managed to significantly increase tax revenue. Its 
income tax revenue has increased from 761,450.7 million pesos in 1993 to 3,448,993.7 in 
2005, and likewise its VAT revenue has steadily increased from 1,595,746.8 million in 
1993 to 5,348,265.7 million in 2005. This increase is undoubtedly partially due to the 
general increase in GDP of Chile over this timeframe. However, it is also due to the 
increased tax compliance resulting from decreased evasion. As of 2006, it is estimated 
that the income tax evasion has been reduced from 40 to 30% and in the last five years, 
VAT evasion has reduced from 22% to 11%.220 
 
6.1.7 SUBJECTIVE OUTCOMES: CITIZENS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE SII CIRCA 2005 
The improvements reflected in the objective data regarding SII performance have a 
subjective correlate in the opinions of citizens. Like the 1996 Adimark survey, the 2005 
survey (published in 2006) gives us a comparative insight to changing taxpayer opinions 
over time. The survey asks citizens to assess ten areas of the SII in 2005 (see Figure 22) 
and in every area, they have improved from 1996 to 2005 (see Figure 23). Unfortunately, 
they did not ask questions in 2005 pertaining to trust in the SII, as in 1996. 
 
                                                 
219
 Uptake of e-invoices has been more modest, but has increased in the last few years. In 2006, fifty-four 
percent of the VAT tax returns were completed online each month (Barraza and Hervias 2006). 
220
 Diario La Tercera (24-03-07), source: http://www.sii.cl/SIIPRENSA/2007/2403/01.htm. 
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Figure 22  Evaluation of the SII in 2005  (Adimark 2006). The scale is from very bad=1 to excellent = 
7. There were a total of 718 responses. 
 
 
Figure 23Evaluation of the SII from 1995 – 2005 (Adimark 2006). 
 
The largest improvements came in the areas that reflect the computerisation process: 
computational development of processes, its technological level, and how modern the SII 
is. It has also made decent gains in perceptions of competent performance, gaining more 
than twenty points in the areas of being “strict in completing what it should”, 
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professionalism, and efficiency. Notably, the smallest gains (but gains nonetheless) came 
in the area of motivation and concern for the interests of others with attention to public 
and honesty only increasing fourteen and fifteen points respectively.   
 
When asked a retrospective comparative question about particular specific changes in the 
SII service, a similar trend emerged (see Figure 24). The new technical services received 
the best marks, with manufacturing of the proposed personal tax declaration, information 
delivered to taxpayer, and new services for facilitating taxes rating in the top three. 
Indicative of the improved perceptions of the performance of the system, in another 
question, over ninety-five percent of people viewed the information they received, in 
comparison to a few years earlier, as better or much better in terms of quantity and 
quality.  
 
 
Figure 24  Taxpayers opinions on recent changes in the SII service (Adimark 2006). 
 
There were some data that suggest a qualitatively different response between groups 
surveyed. For example, when asked about the quality of additional information given, the 
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non-professionals are the least positive with only approximately fifty-four percent saying 
that they find it better or much better. While eighty-two percent say that the system has 
much or very much reduced the evasion of taxes, only forty-one percent of non-
professionals hold that opinion (see Table 23). However, non-professionals in similar 
numbers agree that it is difficult to trick the SII (see Table 24). Another significant 
difference between the groups is that non-professionals are the most likely, by a 
significant margin, to deal with the SII in person rather than online (see Table 25).  
 
How much do you think that tax evasion has reduced recently? 
 A lot & enough Very little & nothing 
Total 82% 17% 
Business 83% 15% 
Commerce 85% 15% 
Professional 65% 32% 
Non-professional 41% 55% 
Table 23  Taxpayer perception of the reduction of tax evasion in 2005 (Scale = Nothing, Very Little, 
Little, Enough, A Lot). Source: (Adimark 2006). Non-professionals have a very different perception 
of the reduction of evasion than the rest of the surveyed groups. 
 
How easy or difficult is it to deceive the SII? 
 Difficult & very difficult Easy & very easy 
Total 92% 7% 
Business 92% 7% 
Commerce 95% 4% 
Professional 77% 15% 
Non-professional 75% 20% 
Table 24  Taxpayer perception of the ease or difficulty of deceiving the SII (Scale = Very Easy, Easy, 
Difficult, Very Difficult, Don’t Know). Source: (Adimark 2006). 
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How do you access the SII? 
 Total Business Commercial Professional Non-
Professional 
Internet 86.9 88.3 88.8 77.2 20.5 
Personally, 
SII office 
9.3 7.9 9.0 17.6 53.3 
Telephone 2.3 2.7 1.6 2.8 1.4 
Other /  
I don’t  
1.4 1.3 0.6 2.4 24.8 
Table 25  Breakdown of the how different groups interact with the SII (Adimark 2006). Non-
professionals use the Internet the least at around twenty-one percent while fifty-three percent still go 
to the SII offices. 
 
6.1.8 SUMMARY 
By 1999 the SII had already won an award given by the Chilean Association of 
Information Technology Companies for their contribution to Internet development in 
Chile. Since then they have continued to receive a wide variety of other accolades as one 
of the most innovative e-service initiatives in the world.221 By 2001, the Director of the 
SII claimed that Chile was more advanced in its use of the Internet for tax purposes than 
the USA, France, Spain or Germany (Angell 2005b).222 Of course, these awards are not 
definite indicators of a more trustworthy system, or a system that will necessarily 
generate trust. However, when considered in light of the improvements in revenue 
collection, the decrease in tax evasion (at least in the 1990s), and the swift movement of 
almost all tax payers online, obviously the SII has been doing something right. 
                                                 
221
 Some of the national and international accolades were: 1998 the National Award for Quality in Public 
Services for the development of the best process of Strategic Planning; 1999 Annual Award for the most 
outstanding public sector project, given by the Chilean Association of Information Technology Companies; 
2000 Sun Award for the Great Project of the Year, presented by SUN Microsystems, with reference 
towards the income tax operation in 2000; 2001 Award for the Best Public Initiative of the Year for e-
invoicing; 2002 United nations Public Service Award, in the category Innovations in Public Service, for the 
online tax proposal; 2004 the Wharton-Infosys Business Transformation Award, presented to Commission 
Juan Toro, in the category of Technology Change Agent. 
222
 Etcheberry was quoted from a newspaper article in El Mercurio, February 21st 2001. 
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The current online tax system is undoubtedly one of the most advanced in the world, with 
high levels of efficiency, an impressive online proposal, and a level of interoperability 
with third party organizations and information centralisation that might not be possible in 
other countries. In a relatively short period they have achieved most of their goals of 
increasing tax revenue, decreasing tax evasion, dramatically reducing tax turn-around 
time, all while modernising tax administration and greatly facilitating tax compliance. 
The subjective data suggests that most taxpayers have noticed these changes and the 
image of the SII has gone up accordingly.  
 
These changes imply broader socio-economic impacts. The economic growth in Chile 
over the last fifteen years combined with the improved auditing capacity of the SII means 
that a large section of the society is being incorporated into the system. Increased state 
revenue has helped fund the social and economic programs that have worked to stave off 
the impacts of the massive inequality in Chile. Furthermore, the Chilean society has 
suddenly been thrust, willing or not, into the world of computers and the Internet as the 
SII has played a major part propelling Chile towards their vision of the information 
society.   
 
So how have these changes impacted on the trustworthiness of the SII and citizens’ 
institutional trust in the SII? It would appear that such improvements would indicate a 
more trustworthy institution and that trust would be built accordingly. However, reality is 
rarely that straightforward, and it is the underlying dynamics that are of interest here. So 
let us now turn to consider these changes in light of our theories of institutional 
trustworthiness and trust. 
 
6.2  ANALYSIS:  TRUSTWORTHINESS  
The goal of this section is to establish objective changes to the SII that have occurred as a 
result of the introduction of the e-service. This analysis draws from the data presented in 
the case description, the set of surveys and interviews conducted by the interviewer of the 
SII employees, and other relevant collected documents. These changes are then linked to 
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the theory set out in Chapter 4 to establish concrete trust building hypotheses based upon 
the new trustworthy characteristics. This section will consider the trustworthy 
components in sequence: competence, interest, and values. 
 
6.2.1 COMPETENCE 
The data suggest that SII has relatively consistently increased its bureaucratic capacity 
from the early 1990s until 2006. The improvements began with administrative reform and 
have continued with the computerisation of the tax administration. The culmination of 
this has been the relatively smooth and rapid transition to an online service that accounts 
for nearly 100% of income tax declarations in a short eight years. 
 
Efficiency/Effectiveness 
In terms of objective measures, the SII is an efficient and effective institution, as 
indicated by its status as one of the most productive tax agency per employee in the 
world. This efficiency was already realised before the computerisation process was 
complete. Recall that by 1999, early on in its process of introducing the new technology, 
Chile had one of the best employees per taxpayer ratios and collection rate (see 6.1.2).223 
Arguably, the efficiency and effectiveness has undoubtedly increased since. There are a 
variety of ways through which the administration and tax service has been directly 
enhanced through the new ICT: 
1) The biggest change to efficiency and effectiveness of the institution arguably 
came about during its switch to the transactional stage where citizens could 
complete the tax forms online. This had the major benefits of a) reducing human 
errors (ninety-eight percent of the managers reported that the accuracy and 
consistency of data had improved), b) reducing lost information from transported 
documents, and c) reducing manual data entry. Survey data indicate some of these 
efficiency gains through the new technology. Employees report that their work 
processes are simpler (sixty-eight percent) and a reduced load of data handling 
                                                 
223
 The SII has one employee for every 4,051 citizens, and by contrast, the U.S. has one employee per 2657 
citizens and all industrialised European countries have less than 1,000 citizens per tax employee (Constance 
2000) corresponding to one employee for each $3.4 million, a rate higher than in most developed countries 
(Sánchez 2005). 
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and record keeping tasks (sixty-two percent). Managers also experience benefits. 
Eighty-six percent of managers report a reduction in time to generate reports and 
seventy-eight percent of them believed the cycle time of key processes has been 
reduced. 
2) The ability of managers to monitor the internal processes has greatly increased. 
Ninety-nine percent of managers responded that IT has facilitated adequate 
supervision over employees (sixty-nine percent strongly agree, thirty-one percent 
somewhat agree), and eighty-six percent believe that the ability to monitor 
performance has increased (fifty-six percent strongly and thirty percent somewhat 
agree). Anecdotal evidence from interviews suggest that this internal monitoring 
of processes and the setting of performance targets appear to have improved 
employee performance, especially the accountability of regions which previously 
could not be monitored at a distance. Furthermore, the automatic generation of 
reports has reduced the time spent by managers on collecting and collating the 
data necessary to report to their superiors. 
3) The increased information sources regarding administrative performance has 
improved the ability of the organisation in tactical decision and policy making to 
achieve organizational goals. Eighty-eight percent of managers believe that the 
SII provides good decision support for the government and ninety-three percent 
believe that the policy formulation and implementation has improved with IT.  
4) The auditing capacity has been greatly enhanced with the symbolic processing 
capabilities of computers. The SII has in place algorithms that effectively audit 
every tax form, with algorithms designed to identify potentially high-return 
audits.  
 
This efficiency and effectiveness is ultimately manifested in terms of the service that the 
SII provides, both online and in the office. The automated completion of the income tax 
form by the SII is a significant technological accomplishment that indicates a high level 
of competence. The reduction in the cycle times of significant tax administration 
processes has meant the reduction of tax turnaround time from months to weeks. The 
performance of the system itself has proven quite robust, taking on high volumes of tax 
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declarations with few problems. Office service has also been improved through the 
increased availability of information to the employees. Attendance times have also been 
reduced and held below the 30 minutes time limit. Eighty percent of the SII employees 
surveyed reported a reduced average time to respond to a taxpayer. 
  
C1 Efficiency/effectiveness hypothesis – The existence of the online tax proposal and the 
related improved institutional effectiveness and efficiencies such as  improved tax turn-
around times will tend to build trust. 
 
 
C2 Efficiency/effectiveness hypothesis – The improved in-office service and wait times 
will tend to build trust.  
 
Performance transparency 
The SII website provides some links to articles and other information regarding the 
performance of the SII. These are either found in the form of links to news articles 
written about the SII, awards received, or research concerning taxpayer attention, or 
services, such as taxpayer surveys. News articles and other information are displayed on 
a column on the left side of the page. In general, this data communicates positive 
performance results. 
 
C3 Performance transparency hypothesis – The positive performance data presented on 
the web page will tend to build trust provided it meets or exceeds citizens’ expectations.  
 
It is not clear, however, how these data are linked to accountability mechanisms and 
therefore is not expected to be a contributing mechanism to building trust. 
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C4 Efficiency/effectiveness hypothesis – The lack of apparent accountability 
mechanisms linked to the performance data implies no effect on trust.  
 
6.2.2 MOTIVATIONS: INTERESTS 
There are a variety of changes introduced with the e-service that may indicate that the SII 
takes taxpayers’ interests into account. The most prominent are the realisation of concrete 
user benefits from adopting the e-service as well as potentially increased transparency 
and accountability of the system. However, some other changes are less clear as to their 
impact on trustworthiness, such as changes in the power dynamic that may have distrust 
engendering effects.  
 
Considering users’ interests 
User benefits  There are several concrete user benefits to using the online income 
tax declaration service in terms of time and cost savings. In most cases, for taxpayers 
who are employee income earners without their own business, filing their taxes online 
can be completed in a matter of minutes and with a few clicks of the mouse. Completion 
requires only that they verify the accuracy of the tax proposal and accept it. Those with 
more complicated taxes are still required to complete the tax form, but as much 
information as possible is still completed for them automatically. If they are receiving a 
tax refund it will arrive in the mail, generally within a few weeks, rather than in the 
several months that it took before. If the taxpayer owes money, the complete transaction 
can be done online. For those who do not have a bank account, this requires queuing and 
paying at the bank. If there is an error in the information, however, it is the taxpayers’ 
responsibility to sort out the discrepancy. This requires contacting the source of the 
information (e.g. bank, employer) correcting the mistake and making sure the SII is 
informed of the correction. This whole process reduces the necessity to visit an SII office 
and the time loss associated, including travel time and queuing. Depending upon the 
taxpayer’s location, the time savings can be significant; for those who live in rural areas a 
round trip may take up most of a day. If a trip to the office is necessary, the SII has 
attempted to reduce the time costs associated, promising that you will be attended to 
within thirty minutes, something they have successfully adhered to. Cost savings come in 
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two main forms: eliminating the need to pay an accountant if one was used, and saving 
money associated with travel costs and the concurrent loss of work income.224 Also the 
various incentive systems adopted by the SII to encourage online tax declaration provide 
more user benefits, such as extra days to submit. As an incentive to adopt the Internet, the 
SII offers a seventy percent reduction in tax payments for those who pay online. 
 
Another potential benefit of the e-system is the removal of intermediaries in the tax 
process. A central concern of the SII is the reduction of accountants with the goal of 
financially benefiting taxpayers. Furthermore, there were concerns with the legal 
responsibility— for example, accountants could take advantage of their clients and not 
suffer any consequences as any mistake on a tax form is legally the responsibility of the 
taxpayer. The use of accountants continues despite the movement online to the radically 
simplified taxpaying process. Adjusting to this situation, the SII just designed a process 
to provide an authorized third party with access to the users’ account without having to 
give them the original secret code. This may help reduce abuse by accountants.  
 
User benefits hypothesis: The increased user benefits in terms of time and cost savings 
for those who use the e-service will tend to build trust.  
 
E-service quality The facilitation of tax compliance has been a priority of the SII 
since the early 1990s. Here two aspects of the service quality are considered: ease of use 
and usefulness. Both of these are generally assessed through user opinion surveys and are 
dependent upon a variety of personal factors such as computer literacy and education 
level.225 However, without using such surveys, it is possible to highlight some of the 
characteristics that make the SII both useful and easy to use. The usefulness of the service 
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 Businesses have also arguably benefited in the same way. Furthermore, the introduction of the factura 
electrónica (e-invoices), for those businesses that have incorporated it, has cut down on costs. The 
subdirector of auditing claimed that the “low-end estimate” of cost savings for business moving to the 
factura electrónica is about 2/3rds, source: IADB-3. 
225
 A text readability assessment of the SII main page (www.sii.cl) returned a “Huerta Reading Ease” score 
of fifty-three which falls in the tenth to twelveth (upper secondary) category. See: The Accessibility 
Institute, The University of Texas at Austen,  
http://www.utexas.edu/research/accessibility/index.html. 
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is self-evident. Citizens are obliged to pay taxes, and this service enables them to do so 
much more efficiently. The ease of completing taxes has also been greatly increased. The 
online tax proposal simplifies the tax declaration process as much as can be expected 
without fully completing the process without human intervention. The only obstacles to 
using this service are a) those that impede e-service adoption, b) lack of a secret code 
(can be obtained online or in an office), or c) a more complicated tax declaration (for 
example if you operate a business, but even then as much of the form as possible is 
completed.) The SII has several initiatives to help overcome some of these obstacles. One 
of these initiatives is the training of taxpayers in the use of the e-service, generally 
performed by a SII employee in a local telecentre. Also, around tax time, the SII sends 
employees to telecentres for a day to help citizens who have difficulties with completing 
their tax declarations online.  
 
E-service quality – The high ease of use (completed tax proposal) and the usefulness of 
the e-service (a necessary obligation for taxpayers) indicates that the SII takes the 
citizen’s interests into account and will tend to build trust. 
 
Voice 
The e-service introduces several new means of citizen communication with the SII and 
offers a variety of tax related information online that enables taxpayers to be well 
informed with respect to tax procedures and their rights and responsibilities. The SII 
website contains detailed descriptions of the rules and procedures of tax administration, 
FAQs, and other resources to facilitate the taxpayer to complete their obligations without 
having to come into the office. In the month of April in 2005 there were more than 
600,000 consultations.226 They also provide other means to get information and ask 
questions online or by telephone, opportunities that were not available earlier. A new 
customer service centre was established around 1999 that deals with taxpayer enquiries. 
Despite these new means of communicating information, they do not actually provide the 
means to increased participation in the sense that it shows a potential to influence SII 
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 Source: WB-NL-SII-6-10. 
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policy or an alignment of SII-taxpayer interests. The service does provide easier access to 
information for those that would be interested in tax policy. At best, this information 
provides the increased opportunity to perform tax obligations and potentially question tax 
rulings.  
 
The SII web-site provides new means for providing feedback such as emailing 
complaints, frequent user surveys, and a feedback link on the webpage. The degree that 
these feedback mechanisms actually represent true channels of communication and a 
more trustworthy institution (in terms of taking the feedback seriously) is also not clear. 
Evidence from interviews suggests that a certain percentage of emails and other 
comments are taken seriously, but there is a large portion of comments that represent a 
misunderstanding or confusion on the part of the taxpayer and are ignored. Indicative of 
this, forty-four percent of managers say that citizen feedback is taken into consideration 
for decision making, where forty-four percent neither agree nor disagree, and twelve 
percent disagree. Perhaps, however, the mere existence of the possibilities for feedback 
will engender trust. At worst, it is expected that the feedback mechanisms will build trust 
for those who have had some success in their use.  
 
Voice – The e-services have not introduced any significant changes in terms of the 
opportunities for participation in decisions or policy of the SII. However, the possibilities 
of online feedback and the SII’s use of that information suggest that the SII takes 
taxpayers’ interests into account and therefore will tend to build trust. 
 
 
Institutional transparency/accountability 
The SII puts two types of institutional transparency information online: 
1. Internal instructions (rules of operations) – All of the tax procedures, rules, 
fines, etc. are accessible online. The SII has done their best to assure that all 
information necessary is available to avoid any “hidden” costs that might surprise 
a taxpayer. They also include an organizational chart of the institution that shows 
many of the managers and their positions inside the organisation. During an 
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interview this was expressed as a way for the SII to be less secretive and more 
human. Eighty-five percent of SII employees surveyed found the rules and 
procedures of the SII online to be very or somewhat transparent.   
2. Transaction information – When a taxpayer logs into the web page with their 
unique account and code, they have access to all of the information that the SII 
has of the taxpayers. Previously, this information was not easily available and it is 
a movement away from the previous environment of secrecy that was typical of 
Chilean institutions.  
 
While there is increased transparency, it is not clear that they are linked to effective 
accountability mechanisms. This provides potentially some level of accountability, of 
both the SII and of accountants if they are used. The clarity of the rules, regulations, and 
information make the entirety of the tax process transparent to the user removing many 
opportunities for manipulating the process. For example, if an accountant is used, all the 
information is easily available to the citizen to verify if desired. However, if and when 
there is a significant dispute, the only one recourse for citizens is to resort to the SII 
tribunal. In this instance, the SII is both the judge and adjudicator, and thus is a 
questionable independent accountability mechanism.  
 
Institutional transparency and accountability hypothesis – While the website presents the 
rules and regulations of tax processes as well as increases the transparency of the 
activities of the SII vis-à-vis the citizen, the lack of effective accountability mechanisms 
will tend to have no impact on trust. 
 
 
Reduced corruption 
The SII has neither a reputation nor a real problem with corruption, currently or prior to 
the implementation of the e-system. However, the implementation of the system has 
removed possibilities of small-time corruption. Most of these opportunities existed with 
street-level employee discretion or the manual transfer of data from one place to another. 
For example, if an employee was transferring final calculations of tax arrears to the 
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central office, they could take a bill and sell it to the taxpayer for ½ the price of the 
amount owed by the taxpayer. However, now that the process is entirely digitized and the 
communication happens automatically, these avenues of corruption have effectively been 
eliminated. Of the managers surveyed, fifty-three percent said that corruption has been 
reduced.227 However, given that the overall rate of corruption was low, the actual amount 
of decrease in corruption is unclear. 
 
Corruption hypothesis - The moderate decrease in opportunities for SII employee 
corruption through the computerisation of many tax processes will tend to have a 
moderate impact on building trust.  
 
Power  The SII traditionally has been a powerful Chilean institution with a high 
degree of autonomy and judicial powers over tax matters. Its pervasiveness in society has 
always been felt through the ubiquity of the SII stamped receipts that all business are 
required to give at most points of sale. In the last ten years this power has arguably 
grown. The amount of personal financial information that is collected and processed in 
one location raises the spectre of big brother with a high degree of potential to abuse the 
information for personal or political gain. 
 
This power has arguably been balanced slightly, but it is hard to say to what extent. As 
discussed above, service quality has improved, and there are increased means for citizens 
to provide feedback, but there are no real means of stakeholder accountability. Any 
balancing the citizen-SII power relationship has come through the pre-commitment that 
occurs through making transparent the processes and information that the SII holds of its 
taxpayers. This precludes the possibility of secretive or corrupt practices that attempt to 
manipulate this information. There have been a few symbolic changes also. For example, 
a long standing tradition of the SII employees was to have their desks higher than the 
chairs of the taxpayers in a projection of power. While many employees fought against 
the change, the desks have been lowered to the same height. 
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Power hypothesis (Big brother) – The increased power of the SII vis-à-vis the citizens in 
terms of the collection of information will tend to decrease trust.  
 
 
Power hypothesis (Soft sister) – The increased power is potentially offset by the 
improved services and taxpayer orientation of the SII. The outcome of this in terms of 
trust is unclear.  
 
6.2.3 MOTIVATIONS: VALUES 
Institutional ethos The overarching “mission” of the SII is to collect tax revenue that 
provides the funds for the functioning of the state. During the 1990s and this decade, the 
SII has undergone a series of reforms to improve their functioning. Their approach to 
increasing tax revenue was dual pronged: improving the efficiency and effectiveness of 
tax collection and enforcement, and facilitating the taxpayer. The introduction of e-
services has appeared to enhance the SII’s performance on both aspects. Given various 
values encompassed by the tax administration and their orientation towards tax collection 
(increased enforcement, improve service, provide funds for the state), it is unclear what 
the impact on trust will be.  
 
Overlapping values (institutional ethos) hypothesis – The mixed value systems expressed 
by the SII makes the trustworthiness of the SII in these respects unclear. 
 
 
Procedural justice 
Increasing citizen compliance Increasing citizen compliance has been, as 
discussed, a central component of the execution of the SII’s mandate. The evidence 
suggests that relatively speaking the SII does quite well in citizen compliance. For 
example, the typical firm in Chile reports over ninety-eight percent of their sales in 
contrast to sixty-seven percent in Brazil and sixty-six percent in Nicaragua (Alm and 
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Martinez-Vazquez 2007). The little data that speak to the question of the changes that 
have occurred with the introduction of the e-service is evidence that citizen compliance 
has increased. Income tax evasion and VAT evasion have been reduced between 2001 
and 2006 (see 6.1.6).228 Of the surveyed managers, fifty-four percent believe that fraud 
detection has been improved with thirty-two percent disagreeing (or strongly 
disagreeing). The e-invoice has been a big step in the increase in compliance of smaller 
businesses or retailers. Before, if a business wanted to charge lower prices, all they had to 
do was not keep good accounting books or issue receipts at the point of sale, and auditing 
was extremely difficult for the SII. Computerising small businesses transactions online 
structures this process, rationalises accounting, and links receipts directly to sales 
electronically. 
 
Increasing citizen compliance hypothesis – The increased citizen compliance brought 
about through the improved facilitation of taxpayer compliance and the enhanced ability 
of the SII to enforce tax payment through the introduction of the e-service will tend to 
build trust. 
 
Removing unnecessary discretion The shift to online tax services reduces personal 
interaction between citizens and SII employees. Taking the responsibilities of the 
interaction out of the hands of SII personnel and putting it online removes the street-level 
discretion that comes with a street-level bureaucracy. As the SII managers understood 
and expressed in an interview, the quality of the street-level bureaucrat transaction is 
highly dependent on the personal factors such as the mood of the bureaucrat that day, 
what has happened in their lives recently, etc. Computers are not subject to the same 
whims.  
 
This reduction of discretion occurs both online and when citizens visit the tax office. 
Before computerisation, SII employees had much more discretion over the first stage of 
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source: http://www.sii.cl/SIIPRENSA/2007/2403/01.htm. 
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tax processing. Now, however, even when interacting with a citizen, employee discretion 
is limited given the automated and internally transparent nature of the tax processes. 
Furthermore, the movement of discretion from street-level bureaucrats to software 
implementers does not seem to have increased unnecessary or arbitrary discretion. The 
clarity of the processes of tax administration and their amenability to computerisation are 
helpful in this respect.  
 
It should be noted that there was no evidence to suggest that the introduction of the e-
service introduced any arbitrary behaviour, undermining the impartiality of the 
institution. 
 
Reducing unnecessary discretion hypothesis – The decrease in unnecessary discretion 
when dealing with citizens (through online interactions as well as in more structured and 
controlled face-to-face interaction) will tend to improve trust. 
 
Distributive justice 
Determining the value of distributional justice and how it has changed with the new e-
service is difficult. The fundamental reason is because the overall distributional impact of 
taxes on the society is largely determined by tax and other economic policy. As 
discussed, the income tax policy is progressive and the VAT is regressive, but overall the 
taxes are considered equal in terms of income distribution. In this respect, the 
distributional justice value of the SII is a reflection of the values underlying these 
policies. However, the SII does have jurisdiction over the focus of their enforcement 
strategy, and this will have distributional impacts.  
 
The e-tax service does not benefit the Chilean society evenly, nor does it bring extra 
benefits for those of lower socio-economic status. While the online tax service does 
potentially bring benefits to over two million taxpayers, another six to eight million 
people of working age do not earn enough to file taxes. Furthermore, the use of the online 
system presumes a degree of comfort with computers and the tax system that those 
without computer literacy or easy access to the Internet might not have. Often, these 
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attributes are linked with lower socio-economic status. The Chilean government as a 
whole has attempted to address some of these distributional issues through their inclusive 
ICT policy that attempts to expand access across Chile. Similarly, several SII initiatives 
have attempted to address these issues (such as sending employees to telecentres to help 
with tax declarations). Insofar as these initiatives are perceived as being for the benefit of 
the less well off socio-economically, then the new e-service and the associated services 
may be seen as embodying a value of distributional justice.  
 
Overall, it is unclear what the impact of the e-service is on the institutional value of 
distributional justice. The service is only available for a small percentage of the 
population, and is irrelevant or inaccessible to the rest. An increased concern with small 
business tax evasion made possible with the inclusion of e-invoices reflects more of a 
concern with the goal of increasing tax compliance than distributional justice. For 
example, the SII has been able to incorporate street vendors that have traditionally been 
outside of the system through an interconnection with the municipality. Street vendors 
have to register with the municipality and pay municipal taxes and once they do they 
become incorporated into the national tax system. On the other hand, increased tax 
compliance provides the government the means for the increase in social services and 
other social development policies that have benefited many Chileans over the last 
seventeen years. The SII has also attempted to facilitate taxpayers in lower socio-
economic positions through several initiatives suggesting a concern for those less well-
off. 
 
Distributive justice hypothesis - The implementation of the e-service (benefits small 
percentage of population) combined with contextual influences such as the Chilean tax 
policy (net neutral), IT policy (progressive digital agenda promoting access for all, small 
business growth), Chilean social development policy (progressive), and SII initiatives 
(e.g. providing local help at telecentres) reflect conflicting values with respect to 
distributive justice. The trust outcome is unclear. 
 
Benevolence 
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It is both theoretically and empirically unclear how the e-service has changed the 
benevolence value of the SII. The data collected do not comment on how interacting with 
the virtual office might or might not convey respect for the citizen any more or less than 
contacts at the physical offices.  
 
6.2.4 SUMMARY 
This analysis has been of the changes to the trustworthiness of the SII due to the 
implementation of the e-service. Clearly, the tax online system has brought about 
significant changes in the processes of tax administration and the delivery of services. 
Overall, the analysis indicates that the SII is, from an institutional perspective, a more 
trustworthy institution. However, the complexity of the interaction makes it impossible to 
say definitively that the SII is more trustworthy as there have been differential impacts 
depending upon the trustworthy characteristic.  
 
To make more sense of this complex relationship, the analysis broke down the changes to 
institutional trustworthiness into a variety of areas. There are many areas where the 
computerisation of the tax administration has clearly brought improvements that suggest 
a more trustworthy institution: efficiency and effectiveness (speed and accuracy), user 
benefits (time, cost savings), ease of use and usefulness, transparency (performance 
information and clear rules and regulations), new mechanisms for feedback, increases 
taxpayer compliance, decreased opportunities for corruption, and decreased unnecessary 
discretion (removed street-level discretion for computerised processes). However, there 
are some mechanisms where the e-service changes are less clear in terms of 
trustworthiness, and may even make the SII less trustworth: it increases the power of the 
SII vis-à-vis the citizen, it is a service that only benefits a small portion of the population 
(distributional justice), and there are a variety of institutional mandates that represent 
conflicting values. The end result of the analysis is a series of case-specific trust building 
hypothesis based upon the nature of these trustworthiness changes (see Table 26, Table 
27, and Table 28). 
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 Middle-range institutional  
trust and e-services hypotheses 
Case-specific e-tax  
trustworthiness-to-trust hypotheses 
Efficiency/Effectiveness 
C1 
E-services perceived to be more effective 
and efficient (faster, more accurate, cost 
savings) tend to build trust. 
The existence of the online tax proposal and improved 
tax turn-around times will tend to build trust. 
C2 
E-government services that improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the service 
at the institution’s physical office tend to 
build trust. 
The improved in-office service and wait times will 
tend to build trust. 
Performance transparency 
C3 
Performance transparency that meets the 
citizen’s expectations will tend to build 
trust. 
The positive performance data presented on the web 
page will tend to build trust if it exceeds citizens’ 
expectations. 
C4 
Performance transparency that is linked 
to effective accountability mechanisms 
will tend to build trust. 
The lack of apparent accountability mechanisms 
linked to the performance data implies no effect on 
trust. 
Table 26  Impacts of the tax online system on the trustworthiness of the SII in terms of competence. 
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 Middle-range institutional  
trust and e-services hypotheses 
Case-specific e-tax  
trustworthiness-to-trust hypotheses 
Considering users interests 
I1 User benefits: E-services that bring user benefits will tend to increase trust. 
The increased user benefits in terms of time and cost 
savings for those who use the e-service will tend to 
build trust. 
I2 
E-service quality: Good e-service quality 
indicates that the institution considers 
citizens’ interests and therefore tends to 
build trust. 
The high ease of use (completed tax proposal) and the 
usefulness of the e-service (a necessary obligation for 
taxpayers) indicates that the SII takes the citizen’s 
interests into account and will tend to build trust. 
Voice 
I3 
Voice: Increased possibilities for voice 
through the provision of information and e-
service feedback mechanisms (e-mail, 
comments) will tend to build trust. 
The e-services have not introduced any significant 
changes in terms of the opportunities for participation 
in decisions or policy of the SII. However, the 
possibilities of online feedback and the SII’s use of 
that information suggest that the SII takes taxpayers’ 
interests into account and therefore will tend to build 
trust. 
Transparency and accountability 
I4 
Institutional transparency and 
accountability: Increased transparency of 
internal processes and service outcomes 
accompanied by perceived effective 
accountability mechanisms will tend to 
build trust. 
While the website presents the rules and regulations of 
tax processes as well as increases the transparency of 
the activities of the SII vis-à-vis the citizen, the lack 
of effective accountability mechanisms will tend to 
have no impact on trust. 
Corruption 
I5 
Reduced corruption: A perceived reduction 
of corruption due to the computerisation 
and rationalisation of government processes 
will tend to build trust. 
The moderately decreased opportunities for SII 
employee corruption through the computerisation of 
many tax processes will tend to have a moderate 
impact on building trust. 
Power 
I6 
Big brother: Increased power for 
institutions vis-à-vis the citizen through e-
services tends to destroy trust. 
The increased power of the SII vis-à-vis the citizens in 
terms of the collection of information will tend to 
decrease trust. 
I7 
Soft sister: Increased power for institutions 
vis-à-vis the citizen through e-services that 
results in improved services and user 
benefits tends to build trust. 
This increased power is potentially offset by the 
improved services and taxpayer orientation of the SII. 
Table 27  Impacts of the tax online system on the trustworthiness of the SII in terms of aligned 
interests. 
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 Middle-range institutional  
trust and e-services hypotheses 
Case-specific e-tax  
trustworthiness-to-trust hypotheses 
Institutional Ethos 
V1 
Institutional ethos: Trust outcome is 
unclear; they may be dependent on 
associated institutional reforms. 
The mixed value systems expressed by the SII makes 
the trustworthiness of the SII in this respect unclear. 
Procedural Justice 
V2 
Citizen compliance: An e-service that 
increases citizen compliance through 
increased capacities for surveillance and 
coercion or through a reduction of 
compliance costs will tend to increase trust. 
The increased citizen compliance brought about 
through the improved facilitation of taxpayer 
compliance and the enhanced ability of the SII to 
enforce tax payment through the introduction of the e-
service will tend to build trust. 
V3 
Remove unnecessary street-level discretion: 
E-services that remove unnecessary street-
level discretion and increase perceived 
impartiality will tend to build trust. 
The decrease in unnecessary street-level discretion 
when dealing with citizens (through online 
interactions as well as in more structured and 
controlled face-to-face interaction) will tend to 
improve trust. 
Distributive Justice 
V4 
Distributive justice: E-services that create 
distributive justice (e.g., provide a service 
for the poor) and the distributive justice 
value is held by the citizen tend to increase 
trust. 
The implementation of the e-service (benefits small 
percentage of the population) combined with 
contextual influences such as the Chilean tax policy 
(net neutral), IT policy (progressive digital agenda 
promoting access for all, small business growth), 
Chilean social development policy (progressive), and 
SII initiatives (e.g. providing local help at telecentres) 
reflect conflicting values with respect to distributive 
justice. The trust outcome is unclear. 
Table 28  Impacts of the tax online system on the trustworthiness of the SII in terms of aligned 
values. 
 
6.3  ANALYSIS:  TRUST  
The goal of this analysis is to better understand how and why trustworthiness qualities of 
the SII communicated by the e-income tax service are perceived and interpreted in a way 
that influences citizens’ trust perceptions of the SII. In other words, from the perspective 
of the taxpayer, how do the hypotheses stated above actually play out? This analysis, 
however, does not systematically go through the case-specific hypotheses as developed 
above. Rather the focus is on discerning which trustworthy cues are highly salient for 
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taxpayers trusting decisions, why, for whom, and in what circumstances.229 This analysis 
section includes two parts. First, it details the causally salient trustworthy cues, and how 
they are perceived and interpreted (6.3.1). Second, it briefly covers the marginally or non 
salient (6.3.2) trustworthiness cues. In all, the analysis touches on all of the 
trustworthiness-to-trust case-specific hypotheses. 
 
6.3.1 SALIENT TRUSTWORTHY CUES 
First hand experience of the consistency of good performance  In general, 
consistent performance was a very commonly cited reason for trusting. Once a user made 
the switch to the online service, and the process worked, this experience provided 
taxpayers with an inductive confidence in the e-system. It also seems that this experience 
often is conflated (or spills over into) developing trust in the SII as a competent 
institution. For example, when asked if they trust in the SII or what kind of experience 
have built trust in the SII:  
“The time I have done it, it has been good. It has been good. Without big 
problems.”230 
“No problems. No problems getting on the page, it hasn’t been down. I think the 
confidence is there.”231 
“I do. Because of my personal experiences. Because I have not had any problems 
with the service, and when I had to ask a question, they answered me. Perhaps I 
am lucky.”232 
“…it is the experience that makes you doubt, if they are trustworthy or not. And 
up until now they have been good. No problems.”233 
 
In general, this is related to relatively new users who had used the service for several 
years without any problems. In such a situation people generally respond that they trust 
because they “don’t have or haven’t had a reason to distrust.”234 For those that have not 
used the e-service for several years, their level of trust appears to be either (a) withheld 
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because they had not dealt with them previously or (b) informed indirectly through the 
experiences of their family and friends with the SII.  
 
However, the experience of consistent performance over time does not necessarily “spill 
over” into trust of the institution itself. One interviewee expressed confidence in the e-
service, 
“[I have] all the confidence … because the times that I have declared, it has 
worked.”235 
However, she withheld judgement of the SII, weighing off different factors such as her 
limited understanding of the Internet and the fact that she does not have to travel as much 
when performing the service.  
 
User benefits  The perception of user benefits influences trust in several 
important ways. Almost unanimously, people mentioned the benefits of the system 
including saving time and money. Ninety-eight percent in the WB survey responded that 
they strongly or somewhat agree with the statement that it is convenient to do taxes 
online. Performing taxes has become surprisingly easy, especially for those taxpayers 
who do not have more complex business dealings. The ease of use is so high that one 
highly salient benefit is the fact that many of those interviewed can meet their income tax 
yearly obligation in less than five minutes. In fact, in a testament to at least a background 
level of trust in the competence of the SII (or a high level of fear) many of the citizens 
interviewed did not bother to even review the tax proposal for errors, simply opting to 
accept it as presented online.236 
 
User benefits are arguably the most salient feature of the service. Indicative of this are the 
myriad of responses to question about perceptions of the SII that are turned around and 
answered in terms of user benefits. For example, when asked if the new SII e-service has 
changed their opinion of the government, one taxpayer responded, 
“Yes, for the fact that I have an easier time not having to go to Temuco, in this 
way it is easier. Before whatever document I needed, I had to go to Temuco. If I 
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want to know how an account is, if I want to declare something, the information is 
there… they give me the information that I need.”237 
 
User benefits and consistency of good performance are interrelated. References to good 
consistent performance generally referenced receiving the tax return check in the mail 
after filing online. In other words, the salient component of SII performance was the most 
salient issue concerning taxpayers; receiving their money as soon as possible. It would 
appear that realisation of user benefits provide one normative definition of what “good” 
performance is. What is consistency and efficiency are interpreted from the ego-centric 
perspective of the taxpayer, 
“The trust I have… now I can do a transaction without leaving. This helps me to 
put my time in other things. … In terms of trust, that I will go, do my stuff, and it 
works. And I know that they will always be there, present, if I need more 
information.”238 
“[Q: Would you say that they [the SII] is trustworthy?] Yes – until now, yes. I 
knew – before I had to go to the bank, to stand in line – now all on the Internet – 
you have all your information of what you have done, in terms of taxes, you have 
it there, you look, you can do everything on Internet – you don’t even need to 
have an accountant. Before it was an accountant, you had to pay him so that he 
paid your taxes because one didn’t have time to stand in line – and the 
accountants would go filled with money from all their clients. Now it is much 
easier. A service I have used a lot and I realised that it works well.”239 
In another example, when asked about his opinion on how the increased efficiency has 
built trust, one interviewee responded, “More than trust, improved conformity with the 
efficiency of the service – one does your stuff more rapidly, and that is important.”240 
 
User benefits also have been important for building trust as it influences e-service use. 
People make the switch because of increased convenience, and they then have the chance 
to experience the performance consistency/user benefits outcomes that appear to 
inductively build trust in both the e-system and the SII. Very often, in a very 
straightforward risk/reward calculus, people will engage with the e-service when the 
calculus is right for them. For example, 
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“What interests people at this moment is that they [the government] give the 
services and that they are free.”241 
 
One tax employee recounted a story of a man who refused to pay his taxes online despite 
the incentive of a seventy percent reduction in what he would owe.242 He did not trust 
enough in the e-system, it appears, and the risk of something going wrong was too great 
for him to do it. His risk calculation did not allow him the opportunity to experience both 
the benefits and the effectiveness of the system.  
 
Institutional mission and distributive justice A less common but still salient issue 
for many is their understanding of the purpose of the SII. In this domain there were 
several different interpretations. On one side, people often noted that while the SII was 
very competent, their overarching goal is to get your money. When asked whether the SII 
takes citizens’ interests into consideration, some taxpayers responded as follows: 
“At the end of the day it [citizens’ concerns] should matter to them [the SII], but 
as the sign says, the Servicios de Impuestos Internos – they are there to collect 
taxes, there is no reason for them to watch over the well-being of the citizenry 
because that is not their role. Their role is, as it says, the SII is to collect money 
from the population.”243 
“I don’t think so. They protect the state and the big business, not the little 
workers. In this way it is bad. … For me – it really benefits the SII that the 
taxpayers do their taxes well…”244 
For these taxpayers, the SII represents an adversarial institution. The taxpayers have 
understood the divergence of interests between them and the institution and this 
understanding engenders institutional distrust as predicted theoretically. 
 
This perspective represents a theoretical view of the SII, its mission, and its inter-relation 
with the state and the citizens that greatly impacts a taxpayer’s interpretation of a 
trustworthy cue. This institutional understanding works as a theoretical framework that 
helps them understand and explain SII agency and employee behaviour. For example, 
                                                 
241
 Interviewee: TC-1. 
242
 Interviewee: WB-RL-SII-3. 
243
 Interviewee: SII-5. 
244
 Interviewee: SII-CC-1-3. 
 241
perceived benefits such as an e-service that increases the ease of tax compliance is 
interpreted as means to gather more revenue and increase auditing powers. Indeed, the 
benefits can even be seen as a lure to trap unsuspecting taxpayers into the system, 
“They let me come in – they show me the system – speed, efficiency. But the 
moment that I enter, they close the door behind me. I can’t leave, and I look 
around and say – heck!”245 
 
However, it is possible that the institutional mission of the SII is considered from the 
even wider perspective of collecting revenue for the state which in turn provides valuable 
social services. One interviewee has had positive experiences with the tax online system 
and when asked about the benefits of the system even though it is trying to get you 
money he responded,  
“This is part of – being a citizen; it is a part of growing with the country, a part of 
everything. In the end, we all finance the country. The people who work. Thus it 
is logical that they tax you. Perhaps not to the degree we are paying … But you 
see that the whole country is growing in all aspects, infrastructure… there are still 
needs, of course, but…”246 
This is even the case for those who may be sceptical of the institution as a whole. For 
example, one small business owner is extremely sceptical of the SII, having had a series 
of experiences where an accountant’s mistakes resulted in him being charged large fines. 
When asked if the SII is a competent institution he responded as follows: 
“Good question. The SII should do it [collect taxes] because it is a business that 
collects taxes so that the country works. And if there is flight of capital, the whole 
country loses. … But instead of taking money through fines, they should do it in a 
better – to take the bull by the horns, as they say – that is, to take the correct 
decision and that the professionals that work doing the declarations – they should 
be responsible to the SII”.247 
 
Interestingly, several taxpayers248 appeared to hold both of these understandings in their 
mind concurrently. This appeared to relate to their value of distributive justice. However, 
in general, the resultant trust positions of these taxpayers was based more on an 
antagonistic perspective seemingly driven by a more ego-centric motivation (they want to 
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take my money) rather than the more communal perspective (they provide revenue for 
the state).  
 
Also related to the value of distributive justice is the knowledge and first-hand experience 
of inequality in Chilean society that also shapes the interpretations of the some taxpayers. 
Consequently, evaluations of the SII and the new e-service included considerations of the 
distributional consequences of tax policy and/or Internet access considerations. Who was 
really benefiting from these changes? The end result in this case on the whole was 
increased negative assessments of the SII, with the view that inherent inequalities are not 
helped by the new e-system. This perception of the distributive justice impacts of the 
system can be seen in the Adimark 2005 survey, where only thirty-five percent rated the 
“justice and equality of the process” of the e-system positively, with high negatives.  
 
Efficiency and effectiveness  While the increased efficiency and effectiveness of 
the tax administration was expected to be a major contributor to increased trust in the SII, 
it actually plays an indirect role. When asked about trust, nobody would respond that they 
trusted more because the SII appears more efficient and/or effective. Rather, efficiency 
and effectiveness gains are only be perceived through some external manifestations, for 
example vis-à-vis service quality and user benefits. Specifically in the SII case, there are 
two examples that come up in discussions: speed of receiving the tax return and the 
reduction of waiting lines in the office.  
“Before the system was unmanageable inefficient, there was no efficiency. I 
realised that the SII is … more efficient. For example, in the Temuco office, they 
have a norm – people that arrive will be attended in a time limit. And they 
accomplish that.”249  
These are indirect indicators of increased efficiency as a result of the e-service. 
Ultimately it was these benefits that translated into increased perceptions of efficiency 
and effectiveness for citizens. In other words, for many people, they had no real idea 
about what was going on in the SII itself and taxpayers would just assume that there were 
efficiency increases due to the positive user outcomes. 
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Power  The power differential between the citizens and the SII is clear and 
apparent to people. Between 2000 and 2005 the amount of people who believe that the 
SII has a lot of power has reduced, but only very slightly, from eighty-three to seventy-
six percent. This may mark an improvement but does not represent a significant shift to 
the underlying relationship. This perception is more than just a historic-cultural artefact 
(e.g., a reputation that is difficult to overcome), but is consistent with the objective power 
balance. The power asymmetry was a very salient component of the relationship for 
many citizens. Indeed, strong terms like dictator are sometimes used to describe the SII, 
“You don’t have the right to fight. It is like a dictator – you will never win against 
it [the SII]. … Nobody messes with the SII. As a web page, it is great. As a 
service, it is good but very… You have to be careful.”250 
 
This SII’s impartiality and lack of compassion is no doubt an unavoidable consequence 
of the nature of tax collection, but also of a set of cultivated beliefs inside the SII that 
have been enhanced through the introduction of the e-service. There are two interrelated 
beliefs that underscore the SII’s behaviour: a) that the SII itself does not make mistakes 
and b) if there is a discrepancy it is the result of a taxpayer being purposefully 
misleading. The logical conclusion is that any tax discrepancy must be treated with 
suspicion and punished accordingly.  
 
Not that this suspicion is necessarily misplaced. There are several logical reasons to 
conclude that any particular mistake was not made by the SII. First, the financial data the 
SII processes are received from third party institutions. Consequently, a mistake on a tax 
proposal most likely resulted from a mistake made by the one who supplied the data. 
Furthermore, the ultimate legal responsibility for the information falls on the taxpayer 
who failed to verify the information. Second, it is a common belief that is inherent in 
Chileans is a self-interested motivation to game the system. Exacerbating this situation is 
the poor reputation that Chileans have for doing exactly that – small time corruption “a la 
Chilena” where Chileans are very adept at manipulating the system where and when 
possible – and thus cannot be trusted. Thirdly, the e-service system itself makes it more 
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difficult to enter errors through its automatic error checking system. All three of these 
factors combined make it easy to conclude that any mistake in income tax declaration is 
the result of at least neglect and at worst bad motivations of the taxpayer. 
 
This perception of power differential does colour the SII-citizen interaction in other 
important ways. As mentioned above, it is evident in the interactions where 
accountability flows in only one direction. It also places the citizens in a defensive 
posture, where they constantly feel uncomfortably under suspicion. For example, 
taxpayers in general believe that: a) if one has to go into the SII office then one is “in 
trouble”, b) the SII always believes that if there was a mistake that it was a purposeful 
manipulation, and c) the fines that are applied are excessive and applied remorselessly. 
This understandably creates trepidation in taxpayers who are then highly motivated to 
avoid interaction with the SII when possible.  
“It [the SII] does not have a good reputation. Because the user is a condemned 
person when they make a mistake – they forgot something or whatever, the 
accountant – something – if you have a problem, you are condemned in 
advance… The taxpayer is afraid of the SII. It is an institution of fear. Because 
you know you will lose. They are going to charge you no matter what.”251 
An SII worker who attends to the public described citizens’ reaction as follows, 
“They [the taxpayers] don’t want to come – they send accountants because they 
feel that the SII will always try to find something to try to get them to pay. At the 
end of the day it is about money. If we notify them and ask them to come to the 
office – ‘aah, they are going to charge me. Somehow they are going to charge me 
something.’ This is the image that the people have… some people.”252 
 
Clearly this power asymmetry has psychological impacts on the taxpayer. The taxpayer is 
more prone to give greater weight to negative actions as well as to focus more on the 
motives of the more powerful SII. For the taxpayers, the power asymmetry tends to cause 
them to more easily impute bad motives to the actions of SII. This means that the 
behaviour of street-level SII employees becomes more salient, especially in cases deemed 
to be discretionary.  
 
                                                 
251
 Interviewee: SII-CC-5. 
252
 Interviewee: WB-RL-SII-3. 
 245
Implicit in this discussion is the fact that the power differential also influences the 
behaviour of the SII employees. SII employees are aware of their power.253 One manager 
at a regional SII office was explicitly concerned with the power asymmetry and viewed it 
as a significant problem to overcome. Indeed, one of the potential benefits of the new 
system expressed by the SII managers was the increased impartiality of service delivery. 
Furthermore, many of those interviewed agreed that the SII takes a sceptical position 
when dealing with taxpayers who have to come into the office. Such a sceptical and non-
benevolent position is only possible when there is little dependence of the employees on 
the citizens. Overall this results in a reduction of the expressions of benevolence and 
extending trust, both powerful mechanisms for building trust. 
 
An interesting question that cannot be conclusively answered here is how moving the 
service online affects this dynamic.254 The e-service does nothing to address the inherent 
power asymmetry that has such a profound impact on the citizen-government interaction. 
However, moving online does change the nature of SII-employee interaction and 
therefore citizens’ perception of this power. It reduces in-office SII employee-citizen 
encounters, and given the reputation of the SII, this might be a good thing for trust. 
However, it does not seem to adjust the interactions that reflect the accountability of the 
SII. In fact, it might even be seen to make the SII more impartial, something that may 
only enhance its reputation as unforgiving, damaging trust. 
 
It is also not entirely clear whether or not the user benefits accrued from the e-service 
provided a soft sister counterweight to the power asymmetry. It is clear that there were 
many who enjoyed the benefits and did not appear to even notice or consider that it might 
signify an increase of power. There are several important qualifiers as to why this may 
be. First, Chilean society has a tradition of being deferential to the government, and does 
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not have a strong tradition of protest. This was evident in the number of interviewees that 
did not seem to even consider the ramifications of the new powers the SII wield. Second, 
it is plausible that the new powers were not perceived as a shift beyond the already very 
asymmetrical power relationship between citizens and the SII. There is some potential 
evidence for this. Several respondents, when asked about if they were worried about their 
personal information, responded by stating something to the effect that the government 
already had your their information.  
 
There is a perfectly plausible (untested) counter-hypothesis to the role of soft-sister to 
assuage big brother fears that is supported by the evidence. It may be that citizens in 
general do not notice, or become concerned about power asymmetries unless these power 
asymmetries touch their lives in some way. From the small sample taken here, small 
business owners were the group most concerned with the power differential. This is not 
entirely surprising as they are dependent upon the SII which issues invoices that 
businesses need to legally charge for products or services rendered. Furthermore, these 
small businesses did not have their fears of an all powerful SII assuaged by the improved 
services. People that had past experience with dealing with the SII in the offices also 
noted the fear of people and the palpable power asymmetry. They were worried that they 
would be subjected to the onerous fines levied by the SII for any indiscretion.  
 
Benevolence  It is difficult to comment on the changes that have come about 
online with respect to the SII’s treatment of citizens. It appears that for many taxpayers 
issues of respect emerge where issues of power are more salient. However, one artefact of 
the realities of data collection meant that many of those interviewed had come to the 
telecentres for help in filing of the taxes online. There were two main responses. It is a 
commonly held sentiment that in general, the interaction with the SII in any tax office is 
cold and unforgiving. However, many of those interviewed mentioned the quality of 
personal treatment they received from the SII employee who had visited the telecentre to 
help in filing out tax forms as an important element of the experience. This appears to 
have been at least partially important for them in their assessment of the SII as an 
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institution. One example is that in general, while the SII may be impartial, the SII is seen 
as unforgiving and coldly applying rules regardless of the circumstances, 
“There is no forgiveness. They don’t forgive… If you make a mistake – or 
something bad – through ignorance, or through carelessness, you can end in 
prison. Or paying a fine.”255 
Forgiveness and understanding are components of benevolence. 
 
Ultimately, the transition online is having differential effects, depending upon the past 
history of interaction that the taxpayer has had with the SII. When asked if the web page 
was friendlier than dealing with the SII employees and if they would rather interact with 
the webpage, one focus group of taxpayers responded thusly, 
“Of course. Because you don’t have to have contact with the people… They start 
out from the position that one is acting in bad faith… You come with the attitude 
that if something bad happened—then you are robbing the state.”256 
Overall, people prefer the online experience to the comparatively more unpleasant 
experience of going into an SII office (see Figure 25), most likely for reasons of user 
benefits as well as the removal of the sometimes unpleasant interactions with SII 
employees. A few interviewees expressed concerns with the difficulties of asking 
questions or dealing with complexities online rather than with a person. However, often 
the benefit of the impartiality of online interaction would outweigh other considerations,  
 “If a cold person I’d rather deal online.”257 
However, if moving online further solidifies the impartiality of the transaction it will 
completely eliminate the possibility for any compassionate understanding. However, this 
probably does not make a difference given the SII already is (correctly) perceived as 
coldly applying the rules without much consideration for extenuating circumstances.  
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Figure 25  Adimark (2006) survey, Evaluation of the forms of interaction with the SII. The 
scale is from excellent = 7 to very bad = 1. As compared to the Internet experience, less than 
half as many people have equally positive ratings of interacting with the SII at the offices or 
on the telephone. 
 
Removing unnecessary street-level discretion A concern of some taxpayers is the 
ability of the street-level bureaucrats to engage in discretion when interacting with 
taxpayers. This issue is interrelated with benevolence and power. This concern emerged 
from those who have had a lot of interaction with the SII at the office, and is most salient 
for small business owners who are highly dependent on the SII. 
 
An example typifies the discretion/power/benevolence dynamic. One very savvy small 
businesswoman understood the power dynamic very well. She recounted a story of recent 
trips to the SII to settle some outstanding problems with her tax situation, 
“I thought, today, after I had it all ready, why should I go? Because I will 
probably have some obstacle to getting my invoices stamped after all that – 
because it is what you are accustomed to. And that surprised me today. Thus, I 
went, waited a long time – for the same functionary that was eating breakfast the 
other day when I went – today I had to wait 20 minutes for her to write a letter to 
a friend. Like that, you are there and you have a big smile, very lovingly … and 
what do you say? ‘No, its ok, take your time, don’t worry.’ … It is absurd, but 
you can be sure that if you say, ‘excuse me, just one second, I took a number, here 
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is my number and you should help me and you are writing a card! This is a public 
service.’ If I say that … then she won’t stamp my invoices.”258 
When this is the case, moving online clearly removes this type of unnecessary (and 
unproductive) discretion. 
 
ICT as a tool of modernity  Another reason people interpreted the e-service as 
increasing efficiency and effectiveness is because technology is a symbol of modernity. 
There is a widespread belief in Chile that ICT are crucial for the modernization of the 
state and constitute a stage in the natural evolutionary path of the state. The mere 
implementation of ICT is believed to deterministically improve organizations making 
them more efficient, structured, and reducing corruption. This general belief was evident 
in the interviews where almost everyone asked if they viewed ICT as important for the 
development of Chile responded, “very important”. Of course, those interviewed were in 
general biased towards a positive view of technology as they were generally those who 
had gone to telecentre or worked there.259 However, this belief appears to spread well 
beyond those interviewed. In the World Bank “wider society” survey, a majority (fifty-
six percent) responded that e-services make government more efficient with twenty-two 
percent neither agreeing nor disagreeing. A further seventy-six percent believe that e-
services promote the growth of business.  
 
A few taxpayers, however, hold a slightly more nuanced perspective. While they may 
admit that technologies may improve certain processes, the focus on the fact that 
ultimately, institutional processes must work through humans and humans are flawed. 
These citizens differentiate between the personnel of the tax agency and the structure of 
the system itself. 
“There is a criticism that one makes as a user of the system, but this criticism is 
about the people – not of the general structure.”260 
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In fact, this interviewee argued that the new technology had made the SII workers lazier. 
Consequently, those who take a more social perspective do not necessarily see 
technology as directly improving efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector. 
 
6.3.2 MARGINALLY AND NON-SALIENT TRUSTWORTHY CUES 
The following were mechanisms that did not result in trustworthy cues that had very little 
or nor impact on citizens’ trust judgements. 
 
Performance transparency  Performance transparency online (through the web 
page) did not emerge in any interviews as a significant factor. A few of the more 
politically inclined taxpayers did follow performance in the newspapers and that seemed 
to be significant in their trustworthiness calculus.  
 
Reduced corruption  Only for a few interviewees was the reduction of corruption 
potentially an issue, and that was only when directly asked about it. It did not emerge in 
questions relating to trust. This is not altogether unsurprising. Corruption is not a large 
issue in Chile, and not widely prevalent in the SII.261  
 
Institutional transparency and accountability The transparency of the rules and 
regulations of the SII was not perceived by taxpayers as a highly or even marginally 
important trustworthy cue. While many agree that there is increased transparency (eighty-
five percent of citizens’ surveyed responded that the rules and procedures of the SII are 
clear and sixty-five percent say that decision-making is more transparent) it does not 
appear to be a salient trustworthiness cue. This was to be expected theoretically because 
this information was not linked to a perceived effective accountability mechanism.  
 
Interestingly, however, there were other reasons that emerged as to why the increased 
transparency did not enter into citizens’ trust judgments. For a majority of users, interest 
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in and use of information online was mainly restricted to a need-only basis. When the 
information was needed, it was looked for. The fact that information was there was 
ignored by most people who simply would go and complete their tax proposal. This 
disposition may be a reflection of the group interviewed, although there is reason to 
believe that it is a more widely prevalent phenomenon. Furthermore, the publishing of the 
rules and regulations online may actually work to decrease trust in a few rare cases. The 
SII uses the fact that the information is published online to back up their “ignorance of 
the law is no excuse” policy. A taxpayer can no longer make any excuses that they did 
not realise something or that they had specific obligations. Indeed, the transparency for 
some was simply an improved ability to make sure they completed their obligations 
without an error. 
“I have more power to control the errors that I make. I have less of a margin for 
error because I have more knowledge.”262  
 
Another element of institutional transparency is how the SII lets the taxpayer know all of 
the information that they have of the taxpayer. This was never mentioned or brought-up 
as a relevant trustworthy cue. Intended to reflect openness and as a departure from 
institutional secrecy, this feature was generally overlooked for the benefits and 
convenience that the online proposal offered.  
 
One potential explanation why transparency does not have any impact is because 
regardless of the information shown online, it is clear that that accountability of actions 
only flows in one direction. A commonly expressed understanding of taxpayers was that 
if the SII makes a mistake and takes too much money, then if you can prove it, they will 
eventually give the money back. However, if you make a mistake, then you will be fined 
for it and they suffer no consequences. 
“If you pay too much, they stay silent, if you pay too little, they charge you.”263 
                                                 
262
 Interviewee: SII-CC-6. 
263
 Interviewee: SII-CC-6. 
 252
It is no wonder that citizens do not perceive transparency information as trustworthy 
cues. Without a link between transparency and accountability, placing information online 
will have a minimal impact.  
 
Voice   Voice mechanisms did not factor into citizens’ trust calculations. This is 
not surprising as the SII is considered by many to be an impenetrable institution, 
“They can access my business space, and me, I can’t enter their space. They are 
hermetically sealed.”264  
The e-service, while it has introduced several mechanisms for offering criticism or 
feedback, has not engaged in any truly participatory schemes. Only twenty percent of 
people believed that the SII takes into consideration the interests of the taxpayers when 
making policies and rules.265 While many of those interviewed appeared to like the idea 
of providing feedback in theory, it did not seem that they thought that feedback really 
made a genuine difference at this time. However, the point here is that the introduction of 
the e-service has not appeared to have significantly altered the SII-taxpayer interaction 
dynamic and thus does not seem to have had an impact on building or destroying trust. It 
is merely more of the same.  
 
Citizen compliance  Citizens’ tax compliance emerged as an issue for only one 
interviewee. Rather than with the income tax, the interviewee was a businessman whose 
concern was business compliance with the VAT tax. Those companies that do not pay 
VAT have an unfair advantage over those that do in their ability to lower prices (about 
nineteen percent). Consequently, the businessman viewed the improved levels of 
compliance for VAT as an extremely good thing.  
 
One potential reason that citizen compliance was not an issue is because the SII appears 
so effective in its tax collection that it has been relegated to a background condition. An 
average of ninety-two percent believe that the SII is difficult or very difficult to deceive 
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(Adimark 2006) (see Table 24).266 In other words, compliance might emerge as more 
salient if there is a concern for non-compliance. 
 
6.3.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the first of two e-service cases in Chile. Overall it is fair to 
conclude that in many dimensions the SII has emerged as a more trustworthy institution 
as a result of their new e-tax administration service. Of course, some issues have 
emerged, particularly in concern to the power relationship between the SII and citizen 
and their lack of responsiveness and accountability to citizens. Fortunately for Chileans, 
the SII has remained an apolitical institution with a high integrity for their work.  
 
It is clear that many of the theories of institutional trustworthiness from an institutional 
perspective are not as relevant to citizens, or work quite as first predicted (see Table 29, 
Table 30, and Table 31). In general, citizens appear to perceive and be concerned with 
aspects of the SII that most directly impact on their lives. Paying taxes is an inherently 
unpleasant obligation that impacts on the quality of citizens’ daily lives, especially in the 
lower socio-economic levels. For the more parochial minded taxpayers, their only 
concern with respect to the SII is completing their obligations as quickly and painlessly 
as possible. For the more politically oriented critical taxpayers (a smaller group), 
trustworthy cues extend beyond simple interactions and are incorporated into theoretical 
understandings of the position and role of the SII in society. For both groups, the 
centrality of money to daily existence appears to enhance self-interested values over 
communal ones. 
 
It is possible to probe deeper into the analysis of the impact of the e-tax online service on 
the citizen-SII trust relationship. However, to better understand the dynamics, it is helpful 
to have a comparative case. Therefore, this thesis extends this preliminary analysis of the 
e-tax service in Chapter 8, the comparative analysis chapter. This will allow for a further 
development, refinement, and testing of these theories in comparison to the Chilean 
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public sector e-procurement system studied in this thesis. Having completed the first of 
the two cases, it is time to turn to the second case, ChileCompra. 
 
 Case-specific e-tax  
trustworthiness-to-trust 
hypotheses 
E-tax trust outcomes 
Efficiency/Effectiveness 
C1 
The existence of the online tax proposal 
and improved tax turn-around times will 
tend to build trust. 
Efficiency and effectiveness were indirectly perceived 
through the taxpayers’ perception of user benefits. In 
general, it was not some objective effectiveness of the 
system that was a concern but instead was the 
taxpayers’ normative position that prioritises that an 
efficient/effective system is one that improves user 
benefits. Thus efficiency and effectiveness were 
perceived in the consistency of the delivery of 
delivering user benefits. Furthermore, the belief in 
ICT as a tool of modernity did tend to make people 
believe that the SII was a more modern institution and 
therefore more efficient and effective. 
C2 The improved in-office service and wait times will tend to build trust. 
Improved wait times were perceived as a positive user 
benefit that reflected efficiency gains. 
Performance transparency 
C3 
The positive performance data presented 
on the web page will tend to build trust if 
it exceeds citizens’ expectations. 
The web page data was basically ignored. 
Performance information presented in the media was a 
factor for the more politically minded taxpayers. 
C4 
The lack of apparent accountability 
mechanisms linked to the performance 
data implies no effect on trust. 
There was no perceived impact on trust. 
Table 29  Outcomes of the competence hypotheses for building trust. 
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 Case-specific e-tax  
trustworthiness-to-trust hypotheses E-tax trust outcomes 
Considering users interests 
I1 
User benefits: The increased user benefits in terms 
of time and cost savings for those who use the e-
service will tend to build trust. 
This is the most salient component of the tax system 
to taxpayers. It was significant in building good will 
and trust through acting as a trustworthy cue for the 
improved efficiency/effectiveness of the system. 
I2 
E-service quality: The high ease of use (completed 
tax proposal) and the usefulness of the e-service (a 
necessary obligation for taxpayers) indicates that 
the SII takes the citizen’s interests into account 
and will tend to build trust. 
The ease of use was also seen as a significant user 
benefit. 
Voice 
I3 
Voice: The e-services have not introduced any 
significant changes in terms of the opportunities 
for participation in decisions or policy of the SII. 
However, the possibilities of online feedback and 
the SII’s use of that information suggest that the 
SII takes taxpayers’ interests into account and 
therefore will tend to build trust. 
This did not emerge as a factor. Taxpayers were either 
not interested or did not believe that the new online 
feedback mechanisms made any real impact. 
Transparency and accountability 
I4 
Institutional transparency and accountability: 
While the website presents the rules and 
regulations of tax processes as well as increases 
the transparency of the activities of the SII vis-à-
vis the citizen, the lack of effective accountability 
mechanisms will tend to have no impact on trust. 
Was not perceived to be linked to accountability 
mechanisms. The introduction of the e-service did not 
seem to change this dynamic. 
Corruption 
I5 
Reduced corruption: The moderately decreased 
opportunities for SII employee corruption through 
the computerisation of many tax processes will 
tend to have a moderate impact on building trust. 
Did not appear to make a difference in citizens’ 
judgments. Most likely this is because corruption was 
not originally perceived as a problem. 
Power 
I6 
Big brother: The increased power of the SII vis-à-
vis the citizens in terms of the collection of 
information will tend to decrease trust. 
In general, it does not appear that the increased 
information collection by the SII increased the fear of 
a big brother state. Businesses are more sensitive to 
power asymmetries and for them SII employee 
discretion becomes a more salient issue. 
I7 
Soft sister: This increased power is potentially 
offset by the improved services and taxpayer 
orientation of the SII. 
There were significant soft sister benefits, but the 
impacts on trust vis-à-vis overcoming power 
asymmetry is inconclusive. 
Table 30  Outcomes of the overlapping interests hypotheses for building trust.   
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 Case-specific e-tax  
trustworthiness-to-trust hypotheses E-tax trust outcomes 
Institutional Ethos 
V1 
Institutional ethos: The mixed value systems 
expressed by the SII makes the 
trustworthiness of the SII in this respect 
unclear. 
The institutional mission played an important role for 
several taxpayers. For the most part they viewed the 
SII as an antagonistic agency whose interests were at 
odds with the taxpayer (they want to get our money). 
Sometimes, theoretical understandings of the role of 
the SII in providing revenue for the state were 
expressed, but in general the antagonistic view of the 
SII trumped the communal view. 
Procedural Justice 
V2 
Citizen compliance: The increased citizen 
compliance brought about through the 
improved facilitation of taxpayer compliance 
and the enhanced ability of the SII to enforce 
tax payment through the introduction of the e-
service will tend to build trust. 
This did not emerge as a factor impacting trust. 
However, this may be because the SII already has a 
good reputation for ensuring compliance. 
V3 
Reducing unnecessary street-level discretion: 
The decrease in unnecessary street-level 
discretion when dealing with citizens (through 
online interactions as well as in more 
structured and controlled face-to-face 
interaction) will tend to improve trust. 
SII employees are seen as wielding too much arbitrary 
and unnecessary discretionary power. Moving online 
builds trust for those who have experienced this 
unnecessary discretion. 
Distributive Justice 
V4 
Distributive justice: The implementation of 
the e-service (benefits small percentage of the 
population) combined with contextual 
influences such as the Chilean tax policy (net 
neutral), IT policy (progressive digital agenda 
promoting access for all, small business 
growth), Chilean social development policy 
(progressive), and SII initiatives (e.g. 
providing local help at telecentres) reflect 
conflicting values with respect to distributive 
justice. The trust outcome is unclear. 
A few taxpayers were concerned with the distributive 
justice components of the tax system, mainly with 
respect to the fairness of tax policy. These people 
were generally the same as those who were concerned 
with the institutional ethos. The inequalities inherent 
in the Chilean society and the difficulties perceived as 
a result of the Chilean tax-system (especially for small 
businesses) tend to decrease the perception of 
overlapping values between the citizen and the SII. 
Table 31  Outcomes of the overlapping values hypotheses for building trust. 
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7 CASE II: CHILECOMPRA 
 
"eProcurement will be one of the most radical changes in organisational 
practice in the 21st Century, as new technology enables public sector 
organisations to purchase nearly all goods direct from approved 
suppliers, and totally eliminate costly manual processes. Ultimately these 
systems will drive down administration costs, rationalise supplier 
relationships, and free-up more money for front line public services" 
(Jacobs 2000). 
 
Public sector purchasing plays a behind-the-scenes, yet pivotal, role in the management 
and operation of government and the achievement of social and economic development 
goals. Government purchasing of goods and services provides the necessary inputs into 
the government machine allowing for the proper functioning of government 
administration and the supply of services. The more efficient and effective these 
purchasing processes, the more cost effective are the delivery of services, something of 
special concern for cash-strapped governments. In contrast, poor or corrupt public 
procurement practices can have serious detrimental impacts on state finances, economy, 
health and human safety, environment, innovation, values, and finally trust in the 
government itself, among others (Transparency International 2006).  
 
As the quote at the start of this chapter indicates, the technological logic of ICT provides 
the opportunity to bring about economic benefits to the public procurement processes 
such as lower information costs, lower transaction costs, increased competition, and 
better specialization. The potential gains are substantial. Typically, the public sector 
spends between ten and twenty percent of its earnings on procurement activities 
(Anderson 2004, p. 107). In Latin America, the state is the largest purchaser of goods and 
services (Hussmann 2004). Between 2000 and 2006 the Chilean public sector purchasing 
accounted for between eight to ten percent of Chile’s GDP (DCCP 2006a).267 Even small 
                                                 
267
 This involved over 600 public sector procurement entities conducting approximately one million 
transactions per year with over 40,000 domestic and foreign suppliers (DCCP 2002, DCCP 2006a). 
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savings of a few percentage points translates to savings in the hundreds of millions of 
dollars.268 
 
Beyond efficiency and effectiveness gains, an e-procurement system can potentially 
influence broader social impacts such as improving trust in the government,  contributing 
toward economic growth, improving distributional equity and efficiency of public 
procurement, and stimulating the society to move on a path of modernisation and towards 
a digital society (DCCP 2002, Talero 2001, p. 1). Furthermore, the opening up of the 
public sector purchasing market sends positive signals to international investors. Public 
sector procurement is an activity ripe for corrupt activities due to the large amounts of 
funds whose disbursement depends on the discretionary power of the procurement agent. 
However, placing public procurement processes online can shed light on these corrupt 
practices thereby reducing the ease and opportunities while increasing the risks for 
corrupt behaviour.  
 
The realisation of these benefits is not straightforward, however.269 While an e-
procurement system may hold the promise for restoring faith in the probity of the public 
sector through increased transparency and government efficiency gains, the actual 
outcomes are a matter of empirical study. To explore these issues, this chapter presents 
the second case, an empirical study of Chile’s public sector e-procurement platform, 
ChileCompra (“Chile Buys”). Like the SII’s e-tax administration system, ChileCompra is 
an e-government success story that has altered the dynamics of the public sector 
purchasing system and the government’s relationship with suppliers. Consequently, it 
                                                 
268
 The realisation of efficiency gains in the private sector have provided an enticing incentive to transfer 
these practices to the public sector (Panayiotou et al. 2004). “The adoption of electronic government 
procurement (EGP) appears as an inevitable worldwide trend following the explosive growth of electronic 
commerce (EC) predicted to reach over US $1 trillion in 2004 in developed countries” (Talero 2001, p. 1). 
269
 This is especially true when considering the transfer of a system and practices from the private to the 
public sector. Procurement in the public sector operates under a different set of constraints than 
procurement in the private sector. One fundamental difference is that public sector organisations often have 
to meet multiple, maybe even conflicting goals – and are subject to a variety of financial, legal, contractual, 
and institutional constraints not found in the private sector context (Anderson 2004, Panayiotou et al. 2004, 
p. 84). Furthermore, arguably public funds should serve the ends of better service levels rather than 
manimising costs (Panayiotou et al. 2004, p. 82). 
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provides another unique opportunity to examine the links connecting the implementation 
of e-government to its influences on citizens’ trust judgments.  
 
The presentation of this case follows the same structure and approach used for the SII 
case. This chapter is broken up into two major components, case description (7.1) and 
within-case analysis (7.2 & 7.3). The first part of the analysis examines whether the 
implementation of ChileCompra affects the trustworthiness of public sector entities and 
their purchasing processes while the second part explores whether ChileCompra has an 
impact on trust from the perspective of the citizens who used it. 
 
7.1  CHILECOMPRA:  THE E-PROCUREMENT PLATFORM 270 
E-procurement is viewed here as the process of goods and services acquisition through 
the use of an electronic system.271 The e-procurement process can be divided into three 
main stages: process, decision, and transaction (Anderson 2004). In Chile, these 
processes are almost completely carried out through ChileCompra (CC), the e-
procurement portal. 
  
ChileCompra is an electronic system developed with the goals to make public sector 
purchasing in the Chilean public sector more efficient, effective, and transparent.272 
Fundamentally, the system is best understood as an electronic portal for the public 
procurement process that brings purchasers and suppliers together electronically. Its 
central components are an online catalogue through which purchases can be made 
directly and an online tendering and bidding system. It also acts as an information portal 
publishing a wide variety of public sector procurement information freely online.  
 
                                                 
270
 If not otherwise cited, a large portion of information in this section comes the DCCP management 
reports (DCCP 2003, DCCP 2006a, DCCP 2007), and a set of clearly written guides for the practice and 
management of procurement, produced by the DCCP and placed online at www.chilecompra.cl. Where 
specific data points or quotes are used the citations are given.  
271
 This is a more narrow view of e-procurement that might be better referred to as e-purchasing (Anderson 
2004). 
272
 The DCCP uses the catchword “open-government”, which is one of the key factors of their ICT strategy. 
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ChileCompra is also embedded within a wider political and legal system, with a well 
defined managerial and procedural structure that complements its technological base. 
This section details these components. It begins with a description of the legal and 
political framework surrounding ChileCompra (7.1.1). Next, 7.1.2 outlines in detail the 
public sector purchasing process. These two sections provide the relevant contextual 
details to allow for the description of the relevant technical components of the system in 
7.1.3. The following two sections attempt to convey the changes that have been brought 
about through the implementation of ChileCompra: 7.1.4 outlines the implementation 
history of ChileCompra, and 7.1.5 provides an overview of the outcomes of the system. 
Finally, 7.1.6 summarises. 
 
7.1.1 CHILEAN PUBLIC SECTOR PURCHASING SYSTEM 
Chile’s current public sector purchasing system has undergone fairly significant 
institutional changes since the beginning of this century, many of which are partially 
attributable to ChileCompra. Two contextual factors have shaped the path of change over 
the last seven years. First, traditionally, the public procurement function in Chile was 
characterised by relative institutional weakness. This is especially the case at the regional 
and municipal levels where there is “relatively low esteem for the procurement function 
as reflected in low salaries, which have resulted in inadequate staffing and capacity” 
(World Bank 2004, p. 8). 
 
Second, much of the current public sector purchasing system (PSPS) in Chile was legally 
defined by the relatively new 2003 Public Procurement Law (19.866). This law provides 
the legal framework for the electronic procurement of goods and services.273 The law 
provides necessary legal support for changing practices, as is often the case with public 
sector e-procurement systems (World Bank 2002). It also was a major step towards 
unifying public purchasing practices. The PSPS in Chile consists of a network of public 
sector legal and executive organisations, most public sector organisations, and private 
                                                 
273
 “The Procurement Law 19.866, … provides the legal framework for procurement of goods (with the 
exception of war materials) and services by agencies of the executive branch, the regional and provincial 
governments, the municipalities, the Armed Forces, the Central Bank and the CGR [Controller General’s 
Office]” (World Bank 2004, p. 16).  
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enterprises. These actors are all brought together through ChileCompra, the e-
procurement platform that brings together purchasers and sellers (see Figure 26). The 
2003 law placed ChileCompra at the heart of the PSPS by making the purchase of all 
goods and services through ChileCompra mandatory274 (IADB 2004, World Bank 2004, 
p. 16) for all public agencies, with some exceptions.275 
 
 
Figure 26  Public sector procurement system in Chile, figure adapted from (DCCP 2006a). 
 
                                                 
274
 “[Law 19.886] requires that all invitations to bid, bidding documents, inquiries and responses thereto, 
bid prices, administrative resolutions on award decisions, contract documents and other relevant documents 
for all state and municipal contract, including public works contracts be posted on ChileCompra platform. 
Moreover, all procurement transactions for goods and services should be carried out through ChileCompra. 
Stage agencies are not allowed to award contracts tendered outsider of ChileComrpa” (World Bank 2004, 
p. 18). 
275
 For example, the Ministry of Health can make bids through ChileCompra, but buys a lot of medicine 
through CENBAST, the procurement institution for the health sector with specific expertise the 
procurement of medicines. 
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The public procurement law also placed the federal management of the procurement 
function for goods and services under the jurisdiction of a new entity called the Public 
Purchasing and Contracting Directorate (DCCP - Directorate of Public Procurement and 
Contracting) within the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda). The DCCP acts as 
a facilitator for public procurement with the following mission:276 
“develop policies and initiatives with the object of making transparent and creating 
value in the public purchasing market thorough the introduction of technological 
instruments and excellent management, benefiting businesses, public organizations, 
and citizens” (DCCP 2003, p. 6).277 
 
The DCCP functions in three basic areas: management of ChileCompra, technical 
assistance, and policy and management of purchasing. The DCCP oversees the 
management of the ChileCompra platform whose development, hosting, and technical 
operation is outsourced to a private sector consortium. It is also in charge of managing 
the e-catalogue, a task that includes negotiation with suppliers over set prices for 
commonly used products and services. The technical assistance it provides is to both the 
public sector and the suppliers including; a) stage agency training, b) human resource 
development (including university courses on public procurement management), c) 
technical support, d) national registry of suppliers, and e) support to small and medium 
enterprises (World Bank 2004). Finally, the DCCP also performs other activities such as 
establishing public procurement guidelines, helping to ensure the enactment of the public 
procurement law, and performing evaluative studies. 
 
There are two other major governmental agencies that play an oversight role in the 
procurement process, the Public Procurement Tribunal and the General Controller’s 
Office (CGR - Contraloría General de la Republica). The Public Procurement Tribunal is 
also in the Ministry of Finance and is the entity with the responsibility for resolving 
                                                 
276
 The DCCP has the following strategic objectives; consolidate a transparent and widely accessible public 
purchasing system, increasing the savings and efficiency of public spending, and promoting e-commerce 
and e-government (DCCP 2003, p. 6). 
277
 Translation mine.  
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public sector purchasing complaints or disputes.278 All suppliers have the right to object 
before the public contracting tribunal (DCCP 2002). The CGR acts as the main oversight 
body for the public sector. Consequently it has jurisdiction over the practice of public 
procurement and conducts audits and inspections, among other activities (World Bank 
2004, p. 37).279 In general, the civil society and the private sector trust the oversight 
intervention of the CGR (World Bank 2004, p. 8). 
 
7.1.2 THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS 
In Chile, the public sector procurement process can be broken up into six basic steps: (1) 
definition of requirement, (2) selection of a purchasing mechanism, (3) tendering and 
reception of bids, (4) bid evaluation, (5) bid selection and formalisation, and (6) the 
execution and management of the contract (see Figure 27). Of these steps, steps 3-5 (and 
parts of 6) occur within the ChileCompra system.  
 
 
Figure 27  The six steps of public sector acquisition in Chile. Source: www.chilecompra.cl. 
 
1. Definition of requirements  
Defining the purchasing requirements is arguably one of the most important stages of the 
process. The definition is an attempt to clarify the needs of a public sector organisation in 
terms of what, how, and when one wants to purchase. There are many techniques 
involved in developing good purchasing requirements definitions, such as consulting 
peers, experts, and suppliers to help with defining the key characteristics of the product or 
                                                 
278
 “[The] responsibility of this court is to hear and resolve complaints related only to administrative actions 
or omissions in the bidding process and award of all contracts by government actions or omissions in the 
bidding process and award of all contracts by government agencies covered by the procurement law” 
(World Bank 2004, p. 19). 
279
 “The CGR: (i) carries out ex-ante control of legality (toma de razon); (ii) issue legal opinions on the 
interpretation of matters of its competence; (iii) conducts audits, inspections and prosecutions; (iv) control 
compliance of statutory rules of public servants and keeps a registry of those personnel; (v) keeps the 
national accounts and reviews financial statements issued by stated fiduciary agents; and (vi) reviews and 
keeps a database of laws, treaties and regulations” (World Bank 2004, p. 37). 
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service that is needed. Of course, the complexity of these definitions varies greatly 
depending upon the nature of the product or service required.  
 
The definition acts as the “rules of the game” for both the purchaser and the supplier. 
There are two main groups of characteristics that must be defined: requirements and/or 
restrictions, and differentiation factors. Requirements are those that must be met to satisfy 
the need, for example, the term of fulfilment, product type, expected quantity, and place 
of delivery. Differentiation factors are those that will be used to evaluate the offers to 
determine the best offer, for example, post-purchase services, type/length of warranty, 
experience levels, certifications, quality, and availability of technical service. These 
criteria are detailed along with a percent of the weight for each that criterion in the 
evaluation process. For example, the purchaser may stipulate that price will have the 
heaviest weight at fifty percent, delivery time the next thirty percent while length of 
warranty, and quality are both weighted only ten percent.  
 
It is important to note that the process of requirement definition is supposed to be linked 
with the development of the budget and yearly purchasing plan. This yearly plan attempts 
to predict the needs and hence necessary purchases for the organisation over the course of 
the year. As stipulated in the 2003 law, this plan needs to include at least the following: a 
description or specification of the good or service, ChileCompra category code, quantity, 
estimated cost, method of purchasing, and approximate date for publishing the tender.  
 
2 & 3. Selection of purchasing mechanism, tendering, and reception of bids 
In Chile, the 2003 public purchasing law and regulations established four different 
purchasing mechanisms: e-catalogue, public tender, private tender, and a direct 
agreement or tender (see Figure 28). These mechanisms were developed with the goals of 
maintaining competition and the flexibility to adjust to need. If a purchasing process is 
used inappropriately then punitive action may result.280  
                                                 
280
 For example, if one chooses to make a private tender due to an emergency situation, it is imperative that 
they can prove the urgency of the purchase. Furthermore, for all of the requirements where there is a 
monetary limit determining the purchasing mechanisms, it is forbidden to fragment the purchase into 
smaller contracts to change the selection of a purchasing mechanism. 
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Once a process has been selected and a purchase order tendered, there is a minimum 
period of time that the order is open and offers can be submitted. During the phase of 
tendering and receipt of offers all contact between the suppliers and the buyer should be 
done through the system. For example, if there are any questions or consultations, then 
these are conducted through the mechanisms provided for on the portal, and the questions 
and answers become available for all to see. It is also possible for the acquisitions officer 
to modify the purchasing definition, if necessary, before the closing of the tender, 
although it is suggested that further time is given so that the suppliers can adjust their 
offers accordingly.   
 
 
Figure 28  The four different means for public sector acquisition of goods or services. 
Source: www.chilecompra.cl  
 
The law also established the parameters of the procurement process with respect to the 
costs of tenders. Any procurement process for large contracts (over 1000UTM)281 must 
have a minimum bid period of ten days (and up to sixty days), and must be done through 
a public procurement process. For contracts between 100 and 1,000 UTM the minimum 
                                                 
281
 As of August 2007, 1 UTM = 31508 Chilean Pesos, and 517.5 Chilean Peso = 1 USD. 
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waiting period is five days and may go through any of the procurement processes.282 
Small tenders under three UTM do not require a public tendering process – although the 
purchase order is still done through ChileCompra. 
 
E-catalogue  The Catálogo Electrónico de Convenios Marco (Agreement 
Framework Electronic Catalogue, also named ChileCompra Express) is an online 
catalogue of products and services. When looking to purchase a good or service, the 
public sector organisation is obligated to first look to the E-catalogue.283 Use of the 
catalogue is said to bring various advantages including more competitive prices through 
bulk purchasing contracts, better terms of delivery, direct purchasing eliminating stages 
of the purchasing process, no inventory costs, and trustworthy suppliers. 
 
Public tender  The public tender is the most general and common form of public 
sector purchasing. This process is a competition between bidding suppliers who attempt 
to match their offers to the purchasing requirements. The specifications are provided to 
potential suppliers through downloadable documents. The public organisation must select 
the most convenient bid according to the criteria established in the requirements (see bid 
selection and formalisation below). This process should always be used unless the 
product/service is found in the e-catalogue (or an offer is found that is substantially more 
advantageous), or the purchase corresponds to an exception observed by the 2003 law 
and regulations. 
 
Private tender A private tender is similar to a public tender, except that it is a 
closed competition between a minimum of three invited suppliers. This process will 
occur under the following situations: a) after a public tender without offers,284 b) a 
contract to carry out or finish a previous contract that had terminated before fulfilment 
and is less than or equal to 1000 UTM, c) urgent purchases in case of unforeseen 
                                                 
282
 The law also established that there is to be no difference between non-intellectual services and 
contracting of consulting services (World Bank 2004, p. 17). 
283
 There are some exceptions to this rule; municipalities, the Armed Forces, and the police are not 
obligated to use the e-catalogue, although it is recommended that they do. 
284
 The same product/service requirements must be used. 
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circumstances or emergencies, d) contracts equal to or less than 100 UTM, e) confidential 
services, and f) service agreements with foreigners executed outside of national territory.  
 
Direct agreement of contract The direct agreement of contract is a direct purchase 
from a pre-selected supplier without a bidding stage. This can only be used in exceptional 
situations such as those outlined above for the private tender. There is one special 
exception, and that is for situations where the nature of the contract logically dictates that 
direct agreement is the only feasible purchasing mechanism. For example, a direct 
agreement might be used when the supplier has exclusive (intellectual, industrial) rights, 
where a supplier has special (unique) faculties or characteristics, or has provided 
accessory services to previous purchases or contracts. 
 
4 & 5. Bid evaluation, selection, and formalisation 
The process of bid evaluation differs between the e-catalogue and the other processes 
where multiple offers are considered. For the e-catalogue, this is a relatively 
straightforward process of need identification and looking online for the best deal as 
negotiated by the DCCP on the e-catalogue. At that point in time the purchase can be 
made through the system. The evaluation process for the standard tendering procurement 
processes is more involved.285 
 
The goal of this process is to choose the offer that best fits the needs of the public 
organisation. The evaluation process is supposed to be both quantitative and qualitative to 
compare the offers with respect to the administrative, technical, and economic 
requirements detailed in the tender. This is done with respect to the weighting system 
established in the requirements stage to calculate a total point score. The selection of the 
offer is then made on the basis of these calculations.  
 
                                                 
285
 There are two different evaluation procedures, a two-stage and a one-stage. The two-step procedure 
involves first reviewing the offers for their technical qualifications, keeping the economic details hidden 
from evaluation. Those that do not qualify technically are declared inadmissible. If they pass the offers are 
opened to reveal their economic offer. The one-stage process includes all of the information in the 
evaluation stage. Again during this phase there is to be no contact with the suppliers except through the 
ChileCompra system. 
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When a selection is made the results are then communicated to the suppliers. Ideally this 
includes the points obtained according to the established criteria, the identification of the 
winning supplier, the methodology used, and the information that went into the decision. 
In the case that no offers are chosen the tender is declared “deserted”.286 This can happen 
when no offers are submitted, or when the offers are not deemed good enough fits for the 
purchaser. 
 
6. Execution and management of contract 
Once the offer has been selected, the bulk of the work that happens through ChileCompra 
system has occurred. The execution and management of the contract must be done by the 
public sector organization that made the purchase. This process includes activities such as 
managing the relationship with the supplier, payment, modifications and completion of 
the contract (correct amounts/quality/delivery time), and post delivery services. In 
general, with any tender, the details of the contract should be included as a part of the 
requirement specification.  
  
The DCCP recommends a process of information management after the completion of the 
purchase, with the aims of learning from past experience and improving the efficiency 
and effectiveness of future purchasing practices. The DCCP advises that the public 
organization maintain their own registry of suppliers that keeps track of their completion 
or failure to complete orders, and that this is useful information for future purchasing 
decisions (see Table 32). For example, if a tender was abandoned then the public entity 
should analyse the problem and make the appropriate corrections for the next similar 
tender. Or, if the purchase went through the e-catalogue and there was some 
dissatisfaction with respect to the good/service, the DCCP requests that this information 
is relayed to the DCCP through the “complaints and suggestions” option on the website.  
 
                                                 
286
 In Spanish, “desierta”. 
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Suggested record What to register? 
Contract Contract identification data 
Location Where to find the digital archive 
Name of purchase Name of the purchase 
Type of contract New or Renewed 
Provider Provider identification 
Purchase mechanism E-catalogue, public tender, private tender, direct 
contract 
Purchase amount Purchase amount  
Brief description Brief description 
Convenient delivery of product/service Yes or No 
If not convenient: why? Describe the cause for the inconvenient delivery 
Modifications or extensions? Yes or No 
If modifications or extension, why? Describe cause 
Contract completed as anticipated? Yes or No 
If not, why? Describe 
Supplier grade 1.0 to 7.0 (or other scale) 
Table 32  Suggested information to be recorded as part of the post-contract evaluation process, 
source: www.chilecompra.cl. As of 2006, this information can be entered into ChileProveedores, the 
new online supplier registry (see 7.1.3). 
 
7.1.3 THE E-PLATFORM 
The e-platform is the technical instantiation of the e-marketplace with all of its ancillary 
components and services. A central background feature of the platform is the security 
component including encryption and electronic bid capabilities to help ensure the 
integrity and confidentiality of both the system and bids (Avgerou et al. 2005). Besides 
the security component, there are other aspects that facilitate the procurement processes: 
an e-market, ChileCompra Express (e-catalogue), ChileProveedores, and relevant 
procurement information sources. 
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The E-Market 
The e-market is the online system that allows for public, private, and direct procurement 
processes (see 7.1.2). Currently, almost the entire purchasing cycle can be completed 
electronically, from the presentation of a tender, to emitting a purchase order, to billing 
and electronic payment (see Figure 29). The system now uses the relatively new e-
invoices for electronic billing.  
 
 
Figure 29  The entire procurement cycle on the ChileCompra platform. Figure adapted from (DCCP 
2006a). 
 
For suppliers, the quality of the interaction with the system is highly dependent upon the 
information provided and personalised configuration profile. Registration in the system 
requires Internet access, an email account, and official business status granted by the SII. 
Upon registering, you sign up and provide details of your business including your area of 
business (“rubro”), and the types of purchase tenders you would like to be notified about. 
When a new tender is published that qualifies according to the entered criteria, the 
supplier immediately receives an email notifying them of the potential business 
opportunity. The suppliers can then submit a bid if they choose. Upon the closing of the 
offer, a decision is made and the suppliers who bid are notified of the outcome of the 
selection process. For the winner, a purchase order is sent electronically. The supplier 
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then delivers the good or service and sends the public sector organisation an invoice and 
receives payment. These last processes can occur online if the supplier uses e-invoices 
and has a bank account with an integrated bank. 
 
ChileCompra Express (e-catalogue) 
The e-catalogue is effectively a virtual store where public sector organisations can 
purchase goods and services, and is the first stop for public sector purchasing. The 
catalogue has products and services for set prices, purchasing conditions, and other 
specifications of the products and services, for a determined time-frame. The purchasing 
process is straightforward. A purchaser selects what they want and put the selection in 
their e-shopping cart. They then complete the transaction online and ChileCompra creates 
a purchase order which is then sent to the chosen suppliers. 
 
In general, the e-catalogue is ideal for simple, routine, or standard purchases. This 
catalogue allows the public sector to take advantage of the leverage of bulk purchasing 
agreements to negotiate good deals for the goods and services that are most common to 
the operation of public sector organisations. The DCCP, who negotiates the deals, uses 
information of purchasing practices and needs collected from public sector organisations 
to determine what products and services to incorporate. There is an increasingly 
expanding range of products and services that can be bought online such as office paper, 
renting rooms for events, computers, airline tickets, and English courses.  
 
Often agreements will be reached with several suppliers in the same areas resulting in a 
wider variety of brands and competition. Furthermore, the tenders made by the DCCP for 
purchasing agreements are made available to suppliers across the country. Those who 
obtain the minimum point scoring with their offers can have their products in 
ChileCompra Express. Currently there are more than 130,000 goods and services 
available with around 490 suppliers (national, regional, large and small) across the 
country. 
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ChileProveedores287 
ChileProveedores (“Chile Suppliers”) is the new national registry of state suppliers 
completely integrated into ChileCompra. Currently, it is the window for registering and 
participating in ChileCompra. It offers the service of accrediting businesses as official 
state suppliers. Those that gain accreditation can maintain in one place all the relevant 
information about their business (products, services, projects, certifications, etc.) 
avoiding the process of reproducing the same information every time the business bids on 
a purchasing tender. It also includes an evaluation system where the public sector entities 
can evaluate the suppliers after each acquisition process according to their behaviour and 
the quality of the good or service. 
  
Information services 
The ChileCompra platform makes available a wide range of information such as 
“procurement plans, invitations to bid, contract awards, database of past transactions, 
corresponding search and statistical functions, and a standard product/service catalog” 
(World Bank 2004, p. 3). According to the procurement management manual produced 
by the DCCP, the information provided by ChileCompra (and through improved 
management of information practices) can also contribute to these three goals: a) making 
the public sector organisation more effective (better information for short, medium, and 
long term decisions), b) efficiency gains (better daily management, purchasing 
decisions), and c) increasing transparency and accountability. There is also information 
that is relevant for suppliers such as support and training documents and searchable data 
on prior purchases.  
 
7.1.4 IMPLEMENTATION HISTORY 
It is possible to break-up the implementation history of the ChileCompra portal into two 
stages: a period of inception and failure (1998-2002), and a period of redesign and take-
off (2003-2006). A timeline for the different major events can be seen in Figure 30. 
 
                                                 
287
 ChileProveedores is a new component of ChileCompra as of Jan. 2006. Thus, the data collected in 2005 
and from March-May 2006 do not really comment on this system. 
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Figure 30  Timeline of ChileCompra implementation. 
 
Platform 1 Online Blackboard: 1998-2002 (inception and failure) 
As part of the Modernization of the Public Sector Strategic Plan (1997-2000), the 
committee of Ministers for State Modernisation proposed an e-system platform for state 
procurement of goods and services that would help reform of the public sector purchasing 
and contracting system (World Bank 2004). A pilot system was developed and launched 
in 1999.288 In 2000, the portal was officially launched under the control of the state 
Purchasing/procurement Directorate (DAE - Dirección de Aprovisionamiento del Estado) 
who has historically been the Chilean public sectors’ main buyer. 
 
The first system served mainly as an information blackboard for the ex-post publishing of 
completed bids and contracts.289 This system was upgraded to a contact site, where 
registered providers offered products and public agencies posted requests, and the e-
system matches and sends email to potential vendors (AED 2003). 
                                                 
288
 It was launched under the name www.compraschile.cl (Purchases Chile). It was also developed and 
operated by the same software company who built the SII platform, SONDA. 
289
 The site was the Information System for Public Sector Purchasing and Contracting with several areas: 
acquisitions, requesters, providers, reports, or data. 
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By 2002 the system was not meeting expectations with only about three percent of the 
procurement opportunities being posted and 1/60th of the potential suppliers using the 
system regularly (World Bank 2004) (see Figure 31). From the outset, there were a 
variety of implementation issues resulting in a negative perception and a failure to meet 
the expectations of both the public agencies and suppliers (DCCP 2002). The end result 
was a discredited system, with low perceptions of trust, usefulness, and efficiency (World 
Bank 2004, p. 12) (see Table 33).  
 
 
Figure 31  The evolution of the use rate of ChileCompra from 2001 to end 2002,  source: 
(DCCP 2002, p. 12). 
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General information about ChileCompra Grade (1 to 7) 
General operation of the ChileCompra portal 4.9 
Materialization of expectations generated in your agency 4.7 
Functionality of the ChileCompra portal 4.6 
Helpdesk  5.3 
Training for public agencies 4.7 
Table 33  General satisfaction with ChileCompra in 2002 from a DAE user 
satisfaction survey, Source: (DCCP 2002). 
 
An independent study commissioned by the Chilean Government concluded that the 
principle reasons for the failure of ChileCompra in this period were a lack of leadership 
and adequate management, cultural resistance, lack of political commitment, and 
inadequate knowledge and technical support (World Bank 2004, p. 4). It also appeared 
that many public sector organisations continued with their old purchasing practices, 
resisting the change and potential public scrutiny of transparency (Hussmann 2004).290 
 
E-transactional marketplace: 2002 – 2006 (redesign and take-off) 
Hussmann (2004) argues that there were several significant events that refocused the 
governments’ efforts to establish ChileCompra. First, in October 2002 a series of public 
sector purchasing scandals revealed irregular practices and accusations of corruption.291 
This brought the respected public sector purchasing practices under question and made it 
a political issue. Second was the negotiation of free trade agreements with the European 
Union in 2002, and with the US in 2003. These factors provided the political impulse 
behind the new Public Purchasing Law in May 2003, which had been languishing for 
four years in legislative limbo. Third, a new director of the DAE was appointed who 
radically changed the DAE’s management model and was focused on the process of state 
modernisation reform and ChileCompra.  
                                                 
290
 Also in 2001, the DAE authorized public organizations to publish purchasing tenders through other e-
commerce sites with the effect of diffusing demand and hurting ChileCompra’s chances to reach critical 
mass (Hussmann 2004). 
291
 These corrupt practices had been mentioned in a Commission on Public Ethics in 1994, but never 
received any real political attention (Avgerou et al. 2005, p. 2005). 
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In 2002, a new three year strategic plan292 was developed with the following stated goals: 
attain complete transparency of public procurement in Chile, enhance the efficiency of 
the state, and digitize the purchasing cycle (DCCP 2002). This plan identified several 
other deficiencies of the system including a multiplicity of rules among public agencies, 
low procurement management capacity in terms of experts and technology, little attention 
paid to contracting management, few incentives for improving management, 
misclassification of business areas, and limited transparency in the contracting process.293 
The new plan had the overriding goals of enhancing transparency,294 efficiency, and the 
economy. It has four major areas: a) policy and regulation, b) institutional change, c) 
enhancing ChileCompra, and d) technical assistance to government agents and suppliers 
(World Bank 2004). 
 
Policy and regulation Historically, there was no unified public procurement 
system in Chile, partially due to a lack of one comprehensive law that governs public 
procurement in Chile. The procurement of public works and goods and services generally 
have been “carried out under separate legal, procedural and organizational frameworks” 
(World Bank 2004, p. 11). The “Organic Law of State Administration” allowed for 
ministries, stage agencies, and municipalities to adopt their own procurement regulations 
(World Bank 2004).  
 
                                                 
292
 The 2002-2004 Public Procurement System Strategic Plan. 
 
293
 Arguably, this represented a movement from a more singular technical focus towards a more holistic 
administrative-management reform and change project. This idea was articulated very clearly in the 
interview with DCCP employees,  
“At the beginning of the project it was seen mostly as a technological project, to implement a new 
technological tool and that’s it. It didn’t have a legal aspect either that obligated publication on the 
site... Afterwards began a focus on administration, to provide a technological tool but also to build 
capacity as well. This was a metamorphosis in terms of administration in general and it seems this 
was key to the project’s success. It was an administration/management project, not just a 
technological project,” source: WB-DCCP-1/6. 
294
 This was defined as the 100% timely advertising of procurement opportunities and transactions, uniform 
and efficient procedures, definition and applicability of procurement methods, and rationalization of public 
procurement through aggregation of demand mechanisms. 
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The single most defining policy and regulation change was the passage of the Public 
Procurement Law in 2003 that established the legal framework for public purchasing. As 
discussed (see 7.1.1), this law worked to unify the purchasing system, obliging most 
public organisations to purchase through the ChileCompra Platform starting September of 
2003. Other excluded organisations were incorporated more gradually, according to their 
political and organisational realities. Municipalities were incorporated in three phases 
starting January 2004 depending upon their relative access to resources such as the 
Internet. ChileCompra use for the Armed Forces became mandatory in January 2005, 
except for military (weapons) purchases. 
 
Institutional change  There were major organisational changes to the public 
sector procurement system including the creation of the Public Procurement Tribunal and 
the establishment of the DCCP to take over for the DAE  (World Bank 2004). Besides 
organisational restructuring, another component of institutional change was the 
Programme to Improve Management (PMG)295 that supplied management with 
measurable goals linked to agency and staff financial incentives with the aim of 
rationalising and improving public sector management practices.296 This programme has 
been ongoing since 1998, and began to incorporate ChileCompra in the early 2000s. 
Significantly, the municipalities and the hospital and health services, two of the largest 
public sector purchasers who work under a different budgetary system, are not included 
in the PMG programme. 
 
Enhancing ChileCompra  The site went through a complete redesign and 
important new functionalities were completed in 2003, such as online purchase orders, e-
tendering, and the e-catalogue. The fully functioning market was put online in February 
                                                 
295
 Programa de Mejoramiento de Gestión. 
296
 In this area, the DCCP sets the goals and evaluates improvements. By the end of 2003, 131 agencies 
were included in PMG with ninety-nine of them reaching the fifth and final stage of the procurement 
process programme (World Bank 2004, p. 24). The stages were described as follows: 1) purchasing 
capacity building (norms, use of Information system), 2) using the CC system well, 3) integrate efficient 
purchasing methods into working practices (e.g. e-catalogue), 4) taking advantage of the purchasing plan, 
and 5) identification and working on weaknesses. Source: WB-DCCP-8. 
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of 2004, having increasingly added functionalities since the site redesign.297 The 
following year, 2005, was a year of consolidation for ChileCompra adding new 
functionalities such as the pilot for the e-payment and enhanced usability features. In 
January of 2006, ChileProveedores was launched. 
 
Training and technical assistance  A major component of the activities of the 
DCCP is the diffusion and further consolidation of ChileCompra throughout both the 
public and private sectors. This includes supporting the agencies and enterprises involved 
in using the system. There are several different activities including a programme of user 
access, user training, and technical support.298 
 
7.1.5 OUTCOMES 
For the purposes of the analysis to follow, this part focuses on the outcomes that occurred 
since the inception of the new system and management, 2003, until May-2006 when the 
last user interviews were conducted. This part examines both the amount and qualities of 
ChileCompra usage and the little available data on users’ perceptions and experiences. 
 
USAGE 
By 2003 the execution of the strategic plan had already started to bring changes to 
Chile’s procurement system as witnessed by the massive growth of (now obligatory) 
purchases through the e-procurement system. By December 2003, the DCCP had done 
                                                 
297
 The bid for the platform itself was done online and was won through a open competitive process (in July 
2003) by a consortium of SONDA and i-construye, another Chilean IT company in Chile (DCCP 2003). 
The “new electronic platform of ChileCompra was developed on the basis of experienced gained from the 
operation of the original platform considering the full spectrum of private sector e-commerce facilities that 
makes possible the use of commercial, off-the-shelf software” (World Bank 2004, p. 3). 
298
 Coinciding with all of the other activities to diffuse Internet access to ChileCompra, and in particular 
focusing on micro and small enterprises, the DCCP has engaged in a “ChileCompra Access Program”. 
From 2006 to December 2007, they have the goal of supporting the 50,000 businesses across the country as 
well as adding another 10,000 business to the system. The DCCP, along with other educational entities, are 
offering approximately 1,000 businesses with state management courses, as well as the techniques of 
selling, use of technology, etc. In 2004 and 2005 over 33,000 public sector buyers and 14,000 buyers 
attended training courses. In 2006, the DCCP established a ChileCompra accreditation course for buyers 
and suppliers. In 2002 a help and support desk was established (DCCP 2003). In 2005, 224,268 people 
were attended to by the helpdesk by telephone, and 35,907 in written form (email, fax, web). In April 18, 
2005, they started an online legal assistance service with two external lawyers, where they have received an 
average of eighty calls a month. There is also a complaint attention system started in May 3, 2005, with 978 
complaints in that year (DCCP 2006a). 
 279
well on a series of goals they had set (see Table 34).299 Not surprisingly a majority of 
transactions (forty-six percent) occurred in the Santiago Metropolis (see Table 35). This 
growth continued through 2004, and by the years end there were around 84,000 providers 
in the system and 655 public entities (including 123 municipalities) (Avgerou et al. 2005, 
IADB 2004). 
 
Description Goal Achievements 
State purchases through ChileCompra 100% 87% 
Estimated savings through better prices through 
using ChileCompra 
US$10,000,000 US$80,000,000 
Total % of goods and services purchased through 
the e-catalogue 
10% 12% 
Average # offers/acquisition  3 6.2 
Public sector organizations registered in the 
system 
200 567 
Suppliers registered in the system 30,000 48,000 
Suppliers that generate at least one offer 
annually 
5,000 28,000 
Users who grade the quality of service with a 5.5 
(1-7) or higher  
80% 87% 
Public organizations who have reached stage 5 
of the Programme to Improve Management 
50% 88% 
Table 34  Goals and achievements of the DCCP in 2003, source: (DCCP 2003). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
299
 For example, eighty-seven percent of all state purchases (of the registered entities) were conducted 
through ChileCompra, and  bringing an estimated savings of around US$80 million through a seven percent 
savings on average through better prices (DCCP 2003). The IADB reported that in 2004 the ChileCompra 
Director Campero explained that “ChileCompra is already paying for itself through savings of $3 million a 
year in notices in publications, and because the expenses of entities that use the system have declined by 7 
percent, the equivalent of some $70 million” (IADB 2004). 
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Region Number of Transactions (2003) % of transactions 
I 7273 4 
II 6394 4 
III 6409 4 
IV 6243 3 
V 12088 7 
VI 6090 3 
VII 8237 5 
VIII 11801 7 
IX (Araucania) 9862 5 
X 11973 7 
XI 5427 3 
XII 5671 3 
Santiago Metropolis 84866 46 
Not classified 322 .2 
Total 182656  
Table 35  Amount of transactions through ChileCompra in 2003. The metropolis of 
Santiago, the location of a majority of the federal government organizations clearly 
make the most purchases through the system. Source (DCCP 2003, p. 18). 
 
Since the end of 2004, ChileCompra has continued consolidating and augmenting its 
gains (see Table 36). Perhaps as a mark of ChileCompra’s coming of age, from 2004 to 
2006 it was ranked as the best transactional site in Chile by the Centre of Digital 
Economy Studies, beating out the second place SII website.300  
 
                                                 
300
 Source: www.chilecompra.cl. 
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 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Amount transacted (Millions USD) 1,038 1,933 2,887 3,466 
N˚ of public business opportunities 186,656 254,256 434,154 459,715 
N˚ Purchase Orders - 374,931 917,145 1,230,424 
N˚ Purchasing organisations (accumulated) 348 718 883 ~900 
N˚ Suppliers (accumulated) 48,006 97,262 164,022 213,981 
N˚ Suppliers who submitted bids (per year) - 33,451 58,355 65,344 
N˚ Suppliers selected (per year) - 21,179 37,323 42,974 
Amt transacted ChileCompra (millions USD) 945 1,933 2,877 3,466 
Amt transacted E-catalogue (Millions USD) 5.5 32.1 77.6 204.8 
N˚ E-catalogue Purchase Orders  7,728 41,091 112,642 180.653 
Table 36  ChileCompra statistics 2003-2006, source: (DCCP 2006a, DCCP 2007). 
 
In the first trimester of 2006, the 885 public sector organisations that operate through 
ChileCompra increased their total purchase orders by over seventy percent (over a quarter 
of a million in 2006) and the amount of e-catalogue transactions by about eighty-six 
percent compared to the same period in 2005. By 2006, the municipalities were almost 
completely integrated into the system accounting for forty-three percent of all purchase 
tenders.301 This has increased the usage of the system outside the Santiago Metropolitan 
Region, although public sector organisations in the Santiago Region still account for 
thirty-one percent off all tenders and accounting for over sixty percent of the total amount 
transacted.302 
 
The existence of ChileCompra has opened up the playing field to a wider variety of 
suppliers. In 2005, thirty-seven percent of the registered suppliers submitted a bid (up 
                                                 
301
 Purchase tenders by sector: health twenty-three percent, central government agencies nineteen percent, 
and the armed forces twelve percent. Municipalities and the Ministry of Health emitted over thirty-one 
percent (each) of all purchase orders, while the central government emitted about twenty-four percent. 
302
 Of course, the Santiago Metropolitan Region is home to around thirty-five percent of the total 
inhabitants of Chile. 
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from thirty-three percent in 2004).303 Of all the businesses that bid in 2006, two out of 
every three won at least one competition. In 2006, sales from small and micro enterprises 
(SMicEs)304 increased four percent to thirty-five percent of total transactions, up from 
thirty-one percent in 2005 (DCCP 2007). This percentage is high considering that sales 
from SMicEs represented approximately thirteen percent of the total volume of sales in 
the national economy in 2005 (DCCP 2006b).305 It does appear, however, that the larger 
the enterprise, the more effective their bids (i.e. the ratio of bids to purchase orders) (see 
Table 37). Regionally, sixty-eight percent of the suppliers who received a purchase order 
were from the metropolitan region of Santiago, and over thirty-eight percent were from 
the different regions (an increase from twenty-eight in 2005). 
 
 
 Average per Supplier Active in ChileCompra (2005) 
Enterprise size Bids Purchase orders 
won 
% Effectiveness 
Micro and small 29.5 4.9 16.7% 
Medium 69.9 15.5 22.2% 
Large 208 62.0 29.8% 
Total 31.8 6.7 21.0% 
Table 37  Effectiveness of enterprises by size. The larger the business, the more effective they tend to 
be in terms of purchase orders received per bid made. Source: (DCCP 2006b, p. 12). 
 
Public Sector Cost/Benefit and Perception of ChileCompra 
In 2005, the Pontifica Universidad Católica de Valparaíso won a DCCP bid to perform an 
impact study of the ChileCompra system on the Public Sector (PUCV 2006). The study 
                                                 
303
 However small and micro enterprises (SMicEs) have lower activity rates (around thirty-five percent) 
than medium and large businesses (more than half) (DCCP 2006b). 
 
304
 In Chile there are two types of micro-enterprises. There are the “workers on their own bill” 
(Trabajadores por Cuenta Propia) who use a personal identification number (RUT) and the small 
businesses that are officially established.  
305
 It appears that the SMicEs focus on sales to municipalities and the central government which constituted 
more than sixty-percent of their offers in 2005 (DCCP 2006b). 
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employed an analysis of the data resulting from the use of ChileCompra along with 
surveys of public sector users. The results show both fairly significant savings and 
positive perceptions resulting from the use of ChileCompra.306 The study estimated that 
in 2005 there were significant savings to the public sector (over 1.5 million USD) 
stemming from reduced costs at different stages of the procurement process (see Table 
38). They also found, however, that there were a series of costs entailed in the process of 
incorporating ChileCompra (see Table 39). 
  
Placing a tender Bid Selection Sending the 
purchase order 
Total Savings 
1,026,622 424,974 131,613 1,602,251 
Table 38  Estimated savings during different stages of the procurement process in 2005. Table 
adapted from: (PUCV 2006). Figures in USD at July 30, 2007 conversion rate of 1 USD = 525.250 
Chilean Pesos. 
 
Are there more costs with respect to… Yes No 
Investments in new ICT? 88% 12% 
Working with parallel information systems? 65% 35% 
Integrating information systems? 36% 64% 
Increasing acquisitions personnel? 65% 35% 
Improving the level of training of purchasing personnel? 74% 26% 
Organisational redesign projects? 31% 69% 
Table 39  Summary of the PUCV survey respondents responses 
with respect to the areas of new costs due to using ChileCompra in 
2005, adapted from (PUCV 2006). 
 
In terms of the perceptions of ChileCompra, the study looked at transparency, time and 
resources used for purchasing, as well as global perception (see Table 40). Overall, the 
                                                 
306
 It must be mentioned, however, that the DCCP takes issue with the methodology employed by the study. 
In personal communication with the Mathias Klingenberge of the DCCP, it was asserted that these findings 
are of dubious quality because the survey did not include many opinions of the users with low connectivity, 
and the sample can not be guaranteed to be completely random.  
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general impact of ChileCompra is viewed as positive (sixty-five percent) or very positive 
(twenty-one percent), with very few (seven percent) asserting that the impacts have been 
negative or very negative (five and two percent respectively). They found that eighty-
seven percent of those surveyed believed that there was an increase in the transparency in 
the purchasing processes. Seventy-seven percent believed that the time for purchasing 
had diminished when using the e-catalogue, and sixty-one percent with normal tenders. 
There were also fewer resources used for purchases of both types, with the e-catalogue 
showing slightly better scores (seventy-nine percent) than the normal tendering process 
(sixty-eight percent). Finally, fifty-seven percent report an increase in the perceived 
satisfaction of the internal clients of the acquisition officers, with forty-three percent 
saying that there has been no change.  
 
 No effect / 
decrease 
Slight 
improvement 
Significant  
improvement 
Transparency of purchasing process 13% 22% 65% 
Work time for purchasing through e-
catalogue 15% 29% 48% 
Work time for purchasing through normal 
tender process 39% 35% 26% 
Resources used for purchasing through e-
catalogue 21% 35% 44% 
Resources used for purchasing through 
normal tender process 23% 37% 31% 
Satisfaction of internal clients 43% 36% 21% 
Table 40  Summary of public sector perception results in 2005, adapted from: (PUCV 2006).  
 
Private Sector User Perceptions 
For data of private sector users’ perspectives, there are two surveys conducted in 2004 of 
businesses and the public at large to assess their knowledge and opinions of 
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ChileCompra.307 Businesses across the spectrum had heard of or used ChileCompra 
(seventy-two percent), and have a good opinion of it (ninety-three percent good or very 
good) with eighty-percent saying they would recommend it to other businesses. In 2004, 
the future of ChileCompra looked bright with seventy-three percent of the businesses 
surveyed saying they would use the portal in the future. ChileCompra was also fairly well 
known by the fifty-six percent of the general public308 and had a good reputation with 
eighty-four percent saying that they had a good or very good opinion of it.309 Sixty-four 
percent responded that ChileCompra increased transparency (only seven percent said it 
decreased transparency). The only potential negative that emerged from this survey was 
that around seventeen percent of the people said that the initiative was favoured by big 
business; however, thirty-one percent viewed it as favoured by everyone.310  
 
                                                 
307
 Unfortunately, no more recent surveys could be located. While the DCCP has conducted user surveys, 
the data collected is considered of limited value due to very low response rates and potential bias. 
Consequently the data is not made available for public consumption. However, the DCCP does report that 
in December 2005 they reached an eighty percent user satisfaction level with the diverse services offered 
by the DCCP (DCCP 2006a, p. 15). The two 2004 surveys were conducted by Gemines a market research 
firm (see: http://www.gemines.cl). An in Spanish review of the findings can be found here: 
http://www.edicionesespeciales.elmercurio.com/destacadas/detalle/index.asp?idnoticia=0115032005021X0
040043&idcuerpo=206, and here: 
 http://foros.chilecompra.cl/mail/informativo/1/n25/informativoch_n25.pdf .  Last accessed July, 2007.  
308
 People in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago knew of ChileCompra at a much higher rate overall 
(seventy-three percent). 
309
 The good opinion was fairly evenly spread over the regions covered by the survey. 
310
 While this result was viewed favourably by those in the DCCP suggesting a fairly well informed public 
with respect to ChileCompra, there is some evidence to suggest that these numbers are somewhat inflated. 
While conducting interviews of citizens (those that did not use ChileCompra) in the IX region, it was very 
common to find citizens would not know of the ChileCompra initiative. Perhaps more revealing was that if 
they said they had heard of the initiative, when asked what ChileCOmpra was, the citizensy did not have a 
clear idea what it was. Another example is that sometimes the DCCP receives bad press for the activities of 
public sector organisations whose bad purchasing practices have been uncovered. This is not helped by the 
practice of public sector organisations to sometimes push off the blame on the DCCP. Overall, there 
appears to be some confusion as to the role of the DCCP and that ChileCompra is just a platform that 
facilitates purchasing and selling, but is not responsible for the activities themselves. In 2004, Tomas 
Campero, the Director of ChileCompra put out a press release entitled, It is necessary to distinguish 
between ChileCompra and its users and ending by writing, “Don’t kill the messenger”. Source: Gran Val 
Paraiso: Diario Libertario y Pluralista, 20/12/2004.  
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7.1.6 SUMMARY 
Like the e-tax administration system, ChileCompra as of early 2006 can be characterised 
as a success.311 Despite initial troubles, a large portion of the Chilean public sector has 
adopted ChileCompra, making the purchasing practices more transparent and realising 
significant savings. It has also expanded the possibilities for selling to the public sector to 
a wide range of businesses, increasing business opportunities, breaking down information 
asymmetries, and increasing competition. 
 
7.2  ANALYSIS:  TRUSTWORTHINESS  
Before delving in the trustworthiness analysis, some clarifications must be made. First, 
what institution is made more or less trustworthy? In this case, the concern is with the 
public sector institutions (and their procurement processes) that use ChileCompra. This 
analysis becomes slightly trickier than a consideration of a single public sector institution 
such as the SII. This is because trustworthiness outcomes are most certainly not uniform 
across all public sector organisations. Rather than trying to cover all the diversity of 
outcomes, the goal of this analysis will be to uncover the major tendencies that appear at 
work altering the trustworthiness of the public sector institutions and the process of 
purchasing. This section follows the same format as the trustworthiness analysis in 
Chapter 6 covering the trustworthy components in sequence; competence, interest, and 
values. 
 
7.2.1 COMPETENCE 
Efficiency/Effectiveness 
There are several standard indicators for measuring the performance of an E-procurement 
system that reflect the underlying changes in efficiency and effectiveness of the 
                                                 
311
 The DCCP has received international recognition for their work with ChileCompra included several 
awards and invitations to participate in various international seminars to present on the Chilean model, their 
strategies and achievements, and best practices (DCCP 2006a). Awards include: December 2003 the winner 
of “Best project” in the category of Organisations with high Social Impact in the Digital Chile Challenge, 
Sept. 2004; the OAE recognized ChileCompra as one of the best practices in the region in public sector e-
procurement and was elected as a hemisphere e-procurement leader for 2005; the ICT Development Award 
in 2004 from the Chilean Association of ICT; the award for Best E-practices given by the Centre of Digital 
Opportunity of the APEC, September 2005 the Award for the Best Government Web Sites in the Public 
Service category chosen by leaders in the IT world. 
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procurement process: i) quantitative measures of use of the system as a percentage of the 
total number of public procurement transactions, ii) productivity measures in terms of 
manpower, time, or costs, and iii) measures of savings attributable to the system (Talero 
2001, p. 12). 
 
Usage  The system is highly utilised. By 2006, a majority of public sector 
institutions were purchasing through ChileCompra, with an increasing (although levelling 
off) number of purchase orders. However, two of the largest public sector purchasing 
groups, the municipality and the health sector, are still not fully integrated into 
ChileCompra. For example, as of 2006, about fifty municipalities (of 342) had very few 
or no transactions through ChileCompra. This is due to a variety of local constraints such 
as being located in remote regions, poor technological infrastructure, and a lack of 
internal administrative reform to aid in the use of ChileCompra.312  
 
Productivity  Productivity measures also indicate that there have been, in 
general, some improvements to the procurement process.313 It is clear that ChileCompra 
has eliminated some manual work involved in the procurement process and increased the 
competition between suppliers lowering prices, 
“It [ChileCompra] has facilitated our work a lot… Before there was even more 
work… one receives more offers, there are more possibilities, a better field of 
providers, and they work by taking off all the information from the Internet.”314  
 
Many costly, especially in terms of manpower, components of the purchasing process 
have been replaced by online processes. For example, before ChileCompra, a 
procurement officer might have to spend time searching out deals, even potentially 
having to physically travel to visit potential suppliers. Or, a public agency would place an 
                                                 
312
 The health sector also has not transitioned completely to ChileCompra for a variety of reasons: they 
already have their own purchasing organisation, the presence of big pharmaceutical companies have 
resisted increased transparency, and also the complexity of purchasing health products and services (for 
example the immediate need of purchasing a particular surgical procedure) provides complications that are 
difficult to incorporate within ChileCompra’s standardised procedures. Source: WB-DCCP-1/6. 
313
 We would expect to find productivity gains from an e-procurement system in the cost savings in the 
process of search, order, and payment; increased information for the customer (Anderson 2004). Given the 
centrality of information to the purchasing process, both of these components are related. 
314
 Interviewee: WB-PS-CC-1. 
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advertisement in the paper, suppliers would apply either by fax or by delivering the bid in 
person, and the continued interaction would all be completed either in person or through 
telephone and fax communication.315 This has been especially helpful to small 
municipalities with little funds who might have had difficulties locating providers in 
distant towns.  
 
In terms of cost savings, the increase in competitive bids has reaped large benefits. This 
increased competition is evidenced in the jump in average suppliers per purchase tender 
form an average of 1.7 bids per tender in 2002 to 5.3 bids in 2005 (DCCP 2006a). 
Furthermore, suppliers can use the information online to compare to past purchases to 
make their bids more competitive. The benefit of increased competition has not been lost 
on the purchasers, 
“Now they [suppliers] are more competitive, they transfer some of their 
efficiencies over to us. Before, about five years ago, a provider was with you 
through a contract and better service wasn’t enforced. Now that’s changed 
because they know that with a click we can change providers, so they give better 
service.”316 
“… in my experience, we save sufficiently compared to the system before. 
Because, like I said, before we worked with a group of providers who weren’t 
necessarily the cheapest, but now, no. This is only the economic aspect. In terms 
of economic criteria, many more competitive offers arrive, because the providers 
have access and they can go online and compare, see what their competition has 
offered… so they will lower their process, or do what they need to in order to 
compete. So, we have spent less overall.”317 
 
The e-catalogue reduces these transaction costs even more. There is already a wide 
variety of products and services available, with a wide range of descriptive information 
including brand names and other details. This practically eliminates costs for the search, 
                                                 
315
 The Ministry of Education had a special room and several employees dedicated to receiving and dealing 
with suppliers. Now with the communication all occurring online, these components have been replaced 
with email communication and the automatic delivery of bids. 
316
 Interviewee: WB-PS-CC-2. 
317
 Interviewee: WB-PS-CC-1. Another example,  
“There is the perception of the market that the quality of the products is better than before… There 
is no analysis that I can give you to tell you with certainty that there has been a reduction in prices 
or an improvement of quality of the offers. … I think it has changed, because there is another… 
the perception that they have more competition that makes the provider perform better, offer a 
better service,” interviewee: WB-PS-CC-3.   
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order, and payment functions, as well as eliminating the waiting time for the 
accumulation of bids. The DCCP has calculated that it is about $50 cheaper per 
transaction, in terms of procedures.318 In 2005, the amount of transactions made through 
the e-catalogue was just under half of all total transactions realised through ChileCompra 
(DCCP 2006a).  
 
There are trade-offs to moving online, however. Before ChileCompra, experienced 
procurement officers with well established procurement routines could simply pick up the 
phone and call a familiar supplier finalising a deal in a matter of minutes. There was no 
minimum wait time for the procurement process or a need to make a detailed 
specification of the product or service desired and establishing criteria for bid 
evaluation.319 Also, during the transition time, there are costs associated with the 
acquisitions officers changing their practices to adapt to the new procurement law and the 
new technology, that may initially appear more difficult, complex, or even unnecessary. 
 
Overall, it appears that the general perception of ChileCompra public sector users reflects 
these trade-offs and is slightly mixed, leaning towards the positive side.320 In the World 
Bank survey, fifty-four percent replied that the total work to purchase products and 
services had reduced, with forty-two percent indicating that they had increased (see Table 
41). The 2005 survey (see Table 40 above) was slightly more positive, with a larger 
majority indicating an improvement in the work time and amount of resources used for 
the purchasing processes. The most consistent benefits extend from the e-catalogue which 
                                                 
318
 Source: WB-DCCP-7 
319
 Of course, the inclusion of the e-catalogue with the ability to make instant purchases balances this aspect 
somewhat. 
320
 As another data point, the mixed perception is also reflected in the data on the amount of time from 
publication to closing of a purchase. Interestingly, while on average the amount of time taken to conduct a 
transaction for the public sector was reduced from 2004 to 2005 (from 98.5 to 96 hours) this average was 
skewed by processes involving purchases over 1000 UTMs (reduced from 509.7 hours to 486.6 hours) 
(DCCP 2006a, p. 68). When looking at transaction between 100-1000UTMs, however, the amount of time 
on average increased significantly from 159.8 to 213 hours. Thus, while there may be reductions of the 
time for purchasing for the large transactions, others have been increased. Of course, a majority of this time 
the purchaser is not actively involved in the process and is instead waiting for suppliers to make bids. This 
may skew the survey results shown in Table 41 without actually making the organisation less productive. 
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reached levels of seventy-seven and seventy-nine percent of those surveyed saying that 
there were improvements in these areas.  
 
Have you perceived a change in the total time of  
work required to purchase products or services? 
It has reduced a lot 17% 
It has reduced somewhat 37.3% 
No change 8.7% 
It has increased somewhat 18.1% 
It has increased a lot 13.7% 
No opinion 5.2% 
Table 41  Perceived change in total work for the public 
sector purchasing process. Source: WB Survey. 
 
Another drawback to ChileCompra is that the public sector finds itself often with an 
increased informational gap with respect to many of the new suppliers who enter into the 
newly expanded market space. This stems from the movement away from a more 
personal purchaser-supplier relationship based on reputation and a history of past 
interactions to a more anonymous online relationship. The only information that is 
available online is the identification number of the business, and there is nothing about 
the company’s infrastructure, capacities, or past history. This makes it more difficult for 
the procurement officer to judge the bids, and sometimes results in poor service/product 
delivery.321 
 
                                                 
321
 Two interviewees expressed it as follows, 
“… this type of opening of the market – that has resulted in the inconvenience of not knowing the 
provider in front of you. Effectively, to not have all the elements to be able to judge if the seller is 
good or bad beforehand, that produces a conflict if that service is mistaken or badly management, 
or if they don’t deliver what was estimated,” source: WB-PS-CC-3. 
“A negative part of the system is that many providers are pretty bad and this has happened to us. 
They don’t respond, they make offers and later don’t answer, or they don’t have the thing in stock. 
You ask yourself, why did they participate if they didn’t have it in stock? And this happens a lot,” 
source: WB-PS-CC-1. 
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This information asymmetry also works in the other direction, where new providers are 
not used to the demands and expectations of the purchaser.322 The end result is an 
expanded field of providers that increases the risks of engaging in transactions with 
untrustworthy providers, resulting in increased costs associated with an incomplete 
purchase tender. These include the losses to the public sector entity not having the 
product/service available in a timely fashion and the transaction costs in terms of time 
and manpower to repeat the tender process. 
 
This informational gap has resulted in some local adaptations (and consequent increases 
in transaction costs). Some public sector organisations deal with this situation by 
maintaining a parallel information system that keeps track of particular suppliers and 
their performance.323 Larger institutions have to take a slightly different approach as the 
deal with many de-centralised entities that may do their own purchasing. The Ministry of 
Education, for example, has set up a feedback loop where programmes that receive 
services report back to the purchasing department to “close the circle”.  
 
The e-catalogue provides a solution to these problems. A challenge undertaken by the 
DCCP, rather than the purchasers, is to ensure that providers comply with their 
agreements. To do so, they have a point system they maintain based upon supplier 
performance. Furthermore, the e-catalogue provides a lot of information about products, 
such as brand name, that provides a level of confidence in the product. Thus, purchasing 
through the e-catalogue solves two major information asymmetries – the quality of the 
product and supplier. 
                                                 
322
 For example,  
“[It] also produces a lack of knowledge on the sellers’ part of what it is that the Ministry wants in 
terms of quality of service, and of the interaction inside the Ministry. This produces a gap with 
respect to the level of certitude that you can have with respect to the quality of a provider,” source: 
WB-PS-CC-3. 
323
 For example,  
“We have a system – our own departmental system. We have a book of providers that we keep 
marking down. We give three opportunities… we put down, provider X didn’t complete the offer, 
and the people who choose orders know, and now some orders come in and they [the purchasing 
officers] don’t even pay attention to them, they throw them out,” source: WB-PS-CC-1.  
Or were planning on implementing, e.g., “That is an area that we are developing, evaluation of 
providers…” source: WB-PS-CC-2. ChileProveedores was introduced to deal with this very situation 
providing an online service to keep track of supplier testimonials. 
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Another important component of improving effectiveness is the potential for the e-
procurement system to aid in the adoption of improved and more strategic procurement 
practices (Anderson 2004). Overarching all these changes is the influence of the public 
sector purchasing law of 2003 that worked to standardise purchasing practices. This 
forced public sector organisations to follow standard practices to comply with the law, 
necessitating local rule changes.  
 
ChileCompra forces the rationalisation and increased effort on the development of 
product/service specifications. Also significant was the introduction of the annual 
purchasing plans and their publication online. Concurrent with this is the series of 
procurement training courses and management programs that have been offered. These 
factors have helped establish an increasingly rationalised and planned, rather than 
reactive, purchasing process.  
 
A key outcome of all of these components was the professionalisation of the procurement 
officer position in the public sector.324 The job has been slowly transformed from an 
administrative to a skilled position.325 One reason for the increased prominence of the 
position is that often bonuses for a whole public sector organisation are tied to the 
achievement of public procurement targets. Furthermore, the incentives become even 
greater considering that some people can even be fired for not completing the 
programme, or meeting PMG goals. While there are no data that directly attest to the 
improvements brought about through the training program, the head of the PMG 
programme at the DCCP stated that there is a big change between those who have 
completed the PMG programme compared those who have not, that you “especially 
                                                 
324
 The professionalisation of the procurement office was a stated goal of the DCCP, source: WB-DCCP-8. 
This professionalisation has been slowly institutionalised into the system through, in part, the offering of 
professional training courses (e.g. the programme for management improvement, and other procurement 
training courses). 
325
 As one DCCP manager explained,  
“The people who work in purchasing (the procurement office) are no longer in a low position in 
the organization, they have to know things, they have to have skills. It’s a professional job. … One 
of the most rewarding surprises is that the purchasing officers feel more recognized, their position 
has gotten greater stature and they’ve developed new and more specific skills that are sought 
after” WB-DCCP-8. 
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notice when you compare their budget management to those who are not in the 
programme.”326 
  
Further helping in the transition, and movement towards more professionalised practices, 
was the transitioning in of new employees into the procurement positions in public sector 
organisations. In both of the municipalities interviewed both had new procurement 
officers brought in at around the time that the ChileCompra use became obligatory. Thus, 
for these organisations, it was less of a matter of changing practices than learning new 
ones.327  
 
There are indications that the procurement practices have become, in general, 
increasingly rationalised and planned, rather than ad-hoc and reactive. One important 
piece of data that reflects an improved purchasing process is the reduction of urgent 
purchases, which fell from just above six percent of all purchases in February of 2004 to 
just over two percent in December of 2005 (DCCP 2006a).328 
 
Finally, increased transparency of the purchasing process has meant more opportunities 
for the discovery and correction of errors by internal auditors. With ChileCompra, the 
capacity for internal auditing is greatly increased making poor and unclear purchasing 
                                                 
326
 Interviewee: WB-DCCP-8. This of course, like any incentive system, runs the risk of distorting 
behaviour. In fact, while there may be some increased integration of the procurement process into the 
awareness and activities of the institution as a whole, it has also created increased work and demands that 
sometimes are irrelevant or inappropriate for the institution, thus hurting productivity, 
“There are many demands of the PMG – that don’t have any relation to the institution to be able to 
respond to the demands. The institution may be very limited in their ability and resources to fulfil 
requirements. They are asking for a lot of information, a lot of additional work and the institution 
cannot absorb this without more resources. It produces an excess of work for the employees that 
are there, and this can cause errors, etc. … You also have people who see the PMG as a tool to 
receive a bonus the next year. People may get involved to improve the processes only because 
they want a bonus. … those that take on the responsibility of the PMG are those that end up 
running around to complete the requirements of the PMG,” source: WB-PS-CC-3. 
327
 This process is summarised by one interviewee, 
“The wanted to make this department [procurement] a more professional career department. And 
in this case, the person that worked here before was just an administrator, that had risen up, and 
they changed her – last year, when they changed the personnel here. All the people that work here 
now are new; there is no one from before,” source: WB-PS-CC-1. 
328
 With an average of 2.3% in 2005.  
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orders more visible. Thus, auditing can work actually not just correct errors, but also help 
to improve the purchasing process, 
“If anyone makes a poor use of the concepts of the offer – and evaluates a 
provider badly, this can be un-transparent, the evaluation. The processes are not 
guaranteed by the portal. What the portal does permit is that if some information 
on the portal is wrong – it can be discovered with greater possibility than 
before.”329 
 
Savings Overall the changes have resulted in creating significant financial savings 
for the public sector, to a tune of an estimated USD$70 million in 2004 (DCCP 2006a). 
As discussed, it is apparent that the public sector has benefited from both increased 
competition and thus better prices. This is clearly working with the use of the e-
catalogue, where the DCCP is able to negotiate highly competitive prices for a large 
variety of goods.330 One municipality remarked that they had seen products up to fifty 
percent lower through the e-catalogue.331 Overall, it does appear that there are both 
significant efficiency and effectiveness gains made in the public sector purchasing 
process.332  
 
This analysis indicates that the changes to the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
procurement process are the results of interactions and trade-offs between a variety of 
goals and realities: transparency, effectiveness, efficiency, competition, and the 
modification of old practices. As a result, some potential efficiency or effectiveness gains 
are sacrificed for the benefit of other goals, for example, when increased competition 
leads to increased possibilities of poor service delivery. It does appear, however, that the 
                                                 
329
 Interviewee: WB-PS-CC-3. 
330
 One of the largest potential savings from e-procurement stem from lower prices due to centralised 
spending (Panayiotou et al. 2004) that help to obtain value discounts (Anderson 2004). As of early 2006, 
there were an estimated 350 business included in the e-catalogue. Source: WB-DCCP-7. 
331
 Source: IADB-28. 
332
 Another potential reflection of the positive contributions of ICT to the public sector purchasing process 
is seen in the survey responses to the question “Do you believe (after using ChileCompra) that new ICT can 
be used to improve public sector administration?” where an overwhelming 91.7% responded yes. Of 
course, the use and benefits accrued from ChileCompra differ by institution, and therefore the changes to 
institutional trustworthiness must be considered contextually dependent. For example, the excluded 
municipalities will obviously not have reaped the benefits or the negatives of the transition to online public 
purchasing. 
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greatest benefits are gained through the e-catalogue, which does not appear to come with 
any unintended disadvantages.333  
 
C1 - Efficiency/effectiveness hypothesis: Overall it appears that ChileCompra has had a 
positive efficiency/effectiveness impact indicating that it would tend to build trust. The e-
catalogue brings larger efficiency/effectiveness benefits and thus will tend to build trust. 
 
C2 - Efficiency/effectiveness hypothesis: N/A. There is no “in office” service to 
improve.334 
 
Performance transparency  Indicators of performance can, like the e-tax 
system, be found online. There is a “Citizens Portal” with an “Information Centre” where 
you can find, among other things, reports, studies, news articles, and a box with statistics 
entitled “Figures ChileCompra 2007”.335 The most noticeable indicators of performance 
that can be seen on the page are the levels of growth in usage, the amounts transacted, the 
numbers of participants, as well as testimonials from users as to their positive 
experiences.336 These numbers have met the DCCP’s expectations, although it is unclear 
what citizens’ expectations are. It also does not appear that there are any accountability 
mechanisms linked to these high-level measures. 
 
                                                 
333
 However, as we will see, it does run into some tension when considering the overall distributional 
impacts of ChileCompra. 
334
 Hypothesis C2 is: E-government services that improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the service at 
the institutions office will tend to build trust. 
335
 The information in the “Figures” section are: total number of registered suppliers, total number of active 
providers, number of public organisations registered, amount transacted through ChileCompra, amount 
transacted through the e-catalogue, the number of orders, and the number of orders through the e-catalogue.  
336
 Other indicators of performance that represent the ChileCompra goals such as an increase in 
transparency, or reduction in corruption, are difficult to quantify and often rely on citizen’s perceptions. 
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C3 - Performance transparency hypothesis: The indications that ChileCompra has 
achieved positive performance outcomes will tend to build trust if they have met citizens’ 
expectations. These indicators are not linked to any accountability mechanisms. 
 
C4 - Performance transparency hypothesis: Performance indicators are not linked to any 
accountability mechanisms. 
 
7.2.2 MOTIVATIONS: ALIGNED INTERESTS 
 
Considering User’s Interests 
User benefits  Three potential, and interrelated, user benefits of the system are: 1) 
the increased availability and access to relevant procurement information, 2) increased 
potential business opportunities, and 3) reduced transaction costs of sales. ChileCompra 
forces the placing of highly salient business information online such as the publication of 
new purchase tenders and the details of past government purchases. These two pieces of 
information provide the increased potential number of business opportunities and 
information to improve the quality of resultant bids. Furthermore, the online access 
reduces transaction costs that existed previously such as making calls, looking in 
newspapers for sales opportunities, faxing bids, and travel to public sector institutions. 
According to the World Bank survey only a very few (at most nineteen percent) 
responded that the time or costs have increased as a result of using ChileCompra. On the 
other hand, forty-two percent believe that total work time has decreased, and thirty-one 
percent that total costs have decreased (see Table 42 and Table 43).  
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Have you perceived a change to the total work time required to… 
 Has 
reduced 
a lot 
Has 
somewhat 
reduced 
No 
changes 
Has 
somewhat 
increased 
Has 
increased 
a lot 
No 
opinion 
…search for 
business 
opportunities? 
12% 28% 34% 8% 5% 14% 
…participate in 
the purchasing 
process? 
16% 26% 25% 8% 7% 18% 
Table 42  Private business' perception of the changes due to ChileCompra of the time involved in 
searching for new business opportunities online and participating in the procurement process, 
source: World Bank survey. 
 
Have you perceived a change to the total costs required to… 
 Has 
reduced 
a lot 
Has 
somewhat 
reduced 
No 
changes 
Has 
somewhat 
increased 
Has 
increased 
a lot 
No 
opinion 
…search for 
business 
opportunities? 
9% 23% 37% 12% 3% 17% 
..participate in 
the purchasing 
process? 
9% 22% 32% 15% 4% 18% 
Table 43  Private business' perception of the changes due to ChileCompra of the total costs involved 
in searching for new business opportunities online and participating in the procurement process. 
Source World Bank survey. 
 
I1 - User benefits hypothesis: Increased access to relevant procurement information, 
increased business opportunities, and perceived reduction of transaction costs will tend 
to increase trust. 
 
E-service quality337  ChileCompra is highly useful for businesses that wish to 
sell to the public sector, expanding their potential business opportunities. The current 
                                                 
337
 Recall that e-service quality is related to both usefulness and ease of use. 
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system has several features that facilitate selling to the public sector. For example, a 
government supplier can sign up in particular “rumbos” (business areas) to receive emails 
regarding new business opportunities that arise. Also, there are a number of search 
functions that allow the perusal of the archive of past purchases. Comparatively, it is 
much more useful than was the system up to 2002, when mostly only ex post purchasing 
information was posted online.  
 
Ease of use is more difficult to objectively discern because it is highly relative to the user. 
Our survey data of the users, both public and private, indicates that a majority (sixty-six 
and fifty-nine percent respectively) view it as very easy or somewhat easy to navigate the 
ChileCompra web page. Only ten percent suggest that it is somewhat or very difficult. As 
with the e-tax online system, there have several concurrent efforts to facilitate the ease of 
use, such as extensive training programmes available for businesses and a site redesign in 
2003.  
 
Is it easy to navigate the ChileCompra website? 
 Public 
Sector Businesses 
Very easy 30.7% 29.7% 
Somewhat easy 35.1% 29.3% 
Not easy nor difficult 23.6% 27% 
Somewhat difficult 8.4% 8.5% 
Very difficult 1.4% 1.9% 
No opinion 0.9% 3.5% 
Table 44  Ease of navigating ChileCompra as one indicator 
for ease of use. Source: World Bank survey. 
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I2 - E-service quality: The high level of usefulness and ease of the use will tend to build 
trust.  
 
Voice 
ChileCompra provides a wide range of information that helps suppliers to increase their 
level of interaction and participation in sales to the public sector. Public tenders are 
available online and will arrive by email if the business is correctly registered with 
ChileCompra. The data from past purchases allow businesses to better assess their 
competitive position vis-à-vis other suppliers and to make better strategic decisions. 
Overall, this information increases the chance for a wider range of opportunities for 
businesses across Chile. However, this information does not provide any clear link to 
possibilities of participation in policy decisions, or increased interaction with the 
government, except in terms of market transactions. 
 
The fundamentals of the public sector-supplier interaction, in terms of allowing suppliers 
a voice, have not dramatically changed with introduction of ChileCompra. There are two 
principle types of feedback, only one of which is facilitated by the system. The first type 
is complaints or suggestions about the system itself. These can then be processed by the 
DCCP. The second type is complaints with respect to a particular procurement process. 
These complaints fall out of the jurisdiction of ChileCompra, which simply refers the 
complaint to the appropriate public sector entity. In this sense, the introduction of 
ChileCompra has not changed the mechanism for feedback with respect to any particular 
procurement process since contact still needs to be made with the institution.  
 
I3 – Voice: The public procurement information provided through the ChileCompra 
portal and the marginal changes to the feedback mechanisms suggest that it will tend to 
have a marginal impact on trust. 
 
Institutional transparency/accountability  
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A story that was related twice by interviewees to describe the increased transparency of 
ChileCompra ran something like this: in 2002, President Lagos asked how much paper 
the government buys each year, and nobody could answer the question. Now, however, 
the answer can be found through ChileCompra. As discussed (see 7.1.3), there is a 
plethora of state procurement information that can be found online (see Table 45) 
including information on all purchases made through ChileCompra, the terms of the deal, 
and the name of the supplier.338 
 
The Lagos anecdote indicates that there has been a significant change from the situation 
before ChileCompra.339 This can also be considered to be highly effective transparency, 
as the information is almost instantaneous, of relatively high quality, and accessible to the 
entire public.340 When surveyed about the transparency of the purchasing process through 
ChileCompra, eighty-seven percent of the public sector procurement officers believed 
there was either a significant or slight improvement in transparency (sixty-five and 
twenty-two percent respectively).  
                                                 
338
 The director of the DCCP, Tomas Campero wrote in 2004, 
“Thanks to ChileCompra today whatever person can know to whom and for how much a contract 
was made, with indication of prices and times, as well as the background documents that 
constituted the process, that is to say, the basis for the tender, questions and answers, offers, 
resolutions and other pertinent documents”. Source: Gran Valparaiso: Diario Libertario y 
Pluralista, “Hay que distinguir entre ChileCompra y sus usuarios”, 20/12/2004. 
339
 As one DCCP employee described it, 
“Before, the process to make a purchasing offer [tender] was closed to those who bought and the 
few providers that participated. Now any person can look and see what’s out there and they can 
make offers. Now more bad practices are obvious. That also has an impact because it creates more 
noise, but its because people are waking up to what is happening… and that should happen less 
and less because the rules ensure more calm because everyone can see the portal and what is 
happening with buyers and sellers,” source: WB-DCCP-1/6. 
340
 “Effective transparency in public procurement depends on the timeliness, quality, and accessibility of 
procurement information” (Talero 2001, p. 6). 
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ChileCompra Information Sources
The portal contains information from all purchases made through 
ChileCompra including: procurement definitions, terms of reference, price, 
suppliers, etc. The portal includes a basic search feature where users can 
search for purchases according to the business area, purchaser, and supplier. 
There is also an advanced search feature where users can search for several 
criteria simultaneously including name and number of an acquisition, stage 
of an acquisition, data of publication or closing, purchaser, supplier, region, 
etc.
Information from management support documents, management 
improvement programs, legal support materials, and portal training modules.
Yearly purchase plans of public sector organisations.
Frequently asked questions from providers and suppliers.
Diverse news on seminars or meetings in which suppliers/providers may 
participate.
Quantitative information in management reports from the DCCP, statistics 
on purchasing and contracts from public sector organisations.
Information on registered suppliers.
 
Table 45  Information provided through ChileCompra. 
 
Despite improved transparency of some aspects of the procurement process, the quality 
of the information may be compromised. One factor is that the information entered into 
and displayed on ChileCompra is ultimately a superficial representation of quite complex 
background processes. One public sector user explains,  
“By definition there must be better transparency for the improved flow of 
information. At a more concrete level, what there is behind the process, if there is 
an advance, the relationship is not direct, I would say. Because you can have a 
transparent process in the definition of the use of the portal, because they publish 
the purchasing specifications, the evaluation criteria, the evaluation, and the 
tender. But this doesn’t guarantee that what is behind the design of the 
specifications, the evaluation, and the choice of the offer is transparent.”341 
 
                                                 
341
 Interviewee: WB-PS-CC-3. 
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Of these procurement stages, the bid evaluation is typically one of the most difficult 
stages to be carried out fairly and transparently (Transparency International 2006, p. 42). 
In Chile, the procurement law obliges the public services to say what criteria they are 
using to decide between bids. It does not, however, oblige them to show how and why 
they chose particular criteria, nor how they used the criteria to make their decision. Often 
this means that the public sector purchasers provide terse explanations of their bid 
selection rather than detailed explanations, 
“…they are supposed to give a reason to the provider about their decision, but 
they are ready-made sentences, for example, ‘because it matches best the criteria’ 
and that is all, it doesn’t really tell the provider anything.”342 
 
Furthermore, the quality of the online information with respect to purchasing decisions is 
relative to the amount of subjective variables employed to make the decision. This means 
that, in general, the evaluation of services is less transparent than the evaluation of many 
other products. For example, printing paper can be easily specified in terms of its size, 
type, and price. There is not a large variation in other aspects such as quality. However, 
more subjective judgements are needed to evaluate providers of some services such as 
research consultants. 
“For example, if you want to hire a consultant – experience, creativity, they are 
not an objective variable.”343 
 
Overall, while some areas remain not entirely transparent,344 what was an almost entirely 
opaque process is now considerably opened up to outside scrutiny. To some extent this 
provides for stakeholder accountability. The media has used ChileCompra to follow the 
purchasing practices of the public sector, although this has often lead to confusions in the 
past with blame being placed on the DCCP rather than the public institution. Businesses 
can also use this information and the existence of the tribunal to litigate any disputes. 
                                                 
342
 Interviewee: WB-DCCP-8. 
343
 Interviewee: WB-PS-CC-2. 
344
 Another complication with the decision making process can occur when purchasers use parallel 
information systems that supply information that enter into the decision making process. For example, if a 
supplier has developed a bad history with a provider and they no longer consider that supplier is no longer 
considered in the bid evaluation process, as their bid is removed without consideration. The supplier may 
continue unknowingly submitting bids that don’t have a chance to be considered. 
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However, it is difficult to dispute subjective data that can always be rationalised after the 
fact, thus limiting the possibilities for accountability. 
 
Institutional transparency and accountability hypothesis: The increased institutional 
transparency and potential for accountability will tend to build trust. However, the low 
quality of data with respect to several stages of the procurement process represents 
lower levels of transparency that might mitigate this effect 
 
Reduced corruption  
The focus on transparency for e-government procurement is generally with the goal of 
reducing opportunities and incentives for fraud (Talero 2001). Interestingly, given the 
already low level of corruption in Chile, and in the public procurement process,345 
ChileCompra’s focus was more on transparency rather than the reduction of 
corruption.346 This does not mean, however, that ChileCompra has had no impact on the 
amount of corruption in the public sector. Fifty-nine percent of the public sector 
purchasing officers surveyed responded that they somewhat or strongly agree with the 
statement that ChileCompra eliminates corruption, while twenty-percent neither agree nor 
disagree (see Table 46).347 
 
                                                 
345
 It is important to keep in mind that the starting point of ChileCompra was a system that was already 
comparatively low of corruption: “Chile’s public procurement system is considered generally free of 
corruption supported by probity of the civil servants, decentralization, and good budgetary and control 
systems” (World Bank 2004, p. 1). 
346
 Source: WB-DCCP-1/6. 
347
 It must be noted that this is potentially a misleading outcome given the nature of the question; a better 
question would have been if ChileCompra reduces corruption. 
 304
How much to you agree with the following statements? 
 Strongly 
agree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
No 
opinion 
ChileCompra 
eliminates 
corruption 
21% 38% 20% 13% 7% 1% 
Table 46  Public sector procurement officers’ responses to the statement, ChileCompra eliminates 
corruption. Source: WB survey. 
 
ChileCompra has introduced two mechanisms that work to reduce corruption: increased 
access of the internal auditors to purchasing process information and the reduction of 
provider-supplier personal interaction. For any Chilean public sector agency, there are 
two main auditors, the internal controllers that are a part of the institution, and the CGR 
who is the main federal controlling agency. Both have access to ChileCompra and can 
use the system to perform their duties. This has meant a general improvement in the 
quality and timeliness of information used for auditing improving their ability to hold the 
purchasing officers accountable.348 In fact, ChileComrpa has even built in functions 
specific to the needs of the auditors, 
“For example, we’ve created other functionalities for auditors – they have a 
password and they can see everything that is going on within the organisation that 
they work in and have crosschecks through databases. They administer or check 
the law.”349  
The theory is that this increased visibility will deter corruption. 
“Today, if I work for a public service and I want to buy something, there is a 
monitor that is also online who has a password and can see all of my activities 
every day. You can’t even know when you are being monitored or not. There is a 
‘big brother’ so this intimidates people away from corruption.”350 
 
It appears to work. Public sector purchasing officers know and understand that 
participating online opens them up to greater internal scrutiny: 
                                                 
348
 “The other thing from the point of view of the auditors is that it is much easier for an internal auditor to 
hold accountable processes within the organization from the beginning to end,” source: WB-DCCP-1/6. 
349
 Interviewee: WB-DCCP-8. 
350
 Interviewee: WB-DCCP-1/6. 
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“Now they have more tools to be able to check on us. Before they didn’t do much 
auditing of this department. Now with ChileCompra they have more 
opportunities. Why? Because the system is open to whomever – so they can go in 
and see what we are doing.”351 
 “…you know that if you pass the first obstacle there will be other barriers that 
you can’t control and afterwards they can demand the clarification of the 
information that is obscure.”352 
 
This appears to result in a reduction rather than an elimination of the possibility of 
corruption. One can continue to sell to a particular seller and justify the sale ex-post.  
“100% [transparent]? No, because, like I said, someone can always continue with 
particular providers… One can always say that they worked with these particular 
providers because these providers have responded well.”353 
This possibility for corrupt activities increases given the use of the more subjective 
variables applied in the evaluation (as discussed above in transparency and 
accountability). Also the use of non-public purchase orders makes it easier to conduct 
corrupt activities. However, if you sell too often to one seller, or if you make too many 
private purchase orders, such activities are more readily noticed and may raise a red flag 
for the auditor or for other businesses to complain.354 
 
The other means of reducing corruption comes through the decrease in personal contacts 
that provide situations ripe for corrupt activities. Personal interaction has been, for the 
most part, replaced by interactions through the portal, reducing the potential for the 
development of personal relationships that enter into the bid decision making process. 
When asked why ChileCompra reduces corruption, one public sector purchasing officer 
responded as follows, 
                                                 
351
 Interviewee: WB-PS-CC-1. 
352
 Interviewee: WB-PS-CC-3. 
353
 Interviewee: WB-PS-CC-1. 
354
 The DCCP also understands this still existing possibility of corrupt practices, but believes that there has 
been a shift in the ability to track poor purchasing practices, “One could do it maybe once, but in the long 
run one can’t keep up bad behaviour,” source: WB-DCCP-1/6. A purchasing officer in another public 
sector entity agrees, 
“In Chile people are always looking to help themselves, take advantage of opportunities… I think 
facing this, when there is an agreement between two people, when there is collusion, it can always 
occur. So transparency, at the moment, one can bypass. The difference is, if one isn’t transparent, 
people can take notice, there is an implicit risk,” source: WB-PS-CC-2. 
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“Because now there is no contact with the provider. Because before… what 
causes the corruption? It was because the public sector employee went out to get 
quotes from the vender and they begin to talk and they become friends… now 
today they can’t it happens through the Internet or on the telephone…. For me, 
nothing strange has ever happened… before the providers would come, sit down, 
they’d come with a present. Now today … if they send us small things, like a 
calendar or something, we take that, but … before the conditions were better for 
producing corruption.”355  
 
Corruption hypothesis: The moderate decrease in opportunities for the public sector 
purchasing officer to engage in corrupt purchasing practices will tend to moderately 
increase trust.  
 
Power  Whether there has been change in the power relations between the citizen 
and the public sector due to ChileCompra is not entirely clear. On the one side, the light 
of transparency shown on the government’s activities and increased accountability 
potentials constitute a shift of power to businesses, and the public at large, over the 
government. However, this shift comes at a cost for some businesses. Incorporation into 
ChileCompra, for example, shines the light of transparency on the suppliers, especially 
when considering the creation of ChileProvedores. Those companies that have benefited 
from close personal or working relationships with government entities might lose some of 
that power. Furthermore, those micro enterprises that had avoided the scrutiny of the SII 
are required to register as a business with the SII in order to do business online. Thus, 
they are subject to the relatively large imbalance of power with that entity.  
 
Competition is another mechanism that impacts on the power dynamic. The increased 
competition between suppliers constitutes a shift of power back to the public sector as 
they shed dependencies on any one particular supplier. Overall, there is no way to 
comment empirically on the extent of the shift of power in either direction. As there does 
not seem to be a major power differential between the suppliers and the government, it is 
not possible for user benefits (soft sister) to balance out a power discrepancy. 
 
                                                 
355
 Interviewee: WB-PS-CC-1. 
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Power hypothesis: The shift in power relationships due to ChileCompra is unclear. No 
trust effects are expected. 
 
7.2.3 MOTIVATIONS: VALUES 
Overlapping Values (Institutional ethos)  The overarching ‘mission’ of 
ChileCompra is three-fold: improved fairness of the procurement process through 
increased transparency and improved procurement processes (see procedural justice 
below), improving the efficiency of the public sector through improved competition, and 
distributive justice in terms of increased opportunities for micro and small enterprises 
(see distributive justice below). Each one of these values is concurrently expressed by the 
DCCP, and to some significant extent, embodied into the technology. However, the 
values of distributive justice and improved efficiency through competition are often at 
odds. Not everyone can win. Competition inherently implies some winners and some 
losers, and thus the extent of the value of distributive justice will be in part determined by 
the outcomes of the competition.  
 
Overlapping values (institutional ethos) hypothesis: The ethos of improved efficiency and 
of distributive and procedural justice will sometimes be at odds, and therefore the 
outcome is unclear.  
 
Procedural justice 
Recall that, theoretically, three mechanisms were identified that could change the 
procedural justice of the public entities: increasing citizen compliance, increasing 
arbitrary discretion, and the removal of unnecessary discretion. Of those three, only the 
removal of unnecessary discretion appears to have an impact. Increasing citizen 
compliance is not applicable to public sector purchasing, and there is no evidence that the 
system increases arbitrary discretion.   
 
Removing unnecessary discretion  As discussed in the transparency and 
corruption sections above, there remains – necessarily – some discretion in the 
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purchasing process, particularly in the areas of market research and product/service 
selection decisions (Talero 2001). The question is if the introduction of ChileCompra has 
increased impartiality, despite the necessary discretion.  
 
It does appear as if the standardization of the process, the imposition of the evaluation 
criteria and the regulatory framework work to increase the impartiality of the process. In 
many decisions, the procurement officers are constrained by the increased rigors of the 
process:  
“… if you are working without the portal, you had certain tricks that allowed you 
to play with time, for example. Now with the portal, you have to set dates … it 
limits your flexibility – the capacity of each employee over the purchasing 
process.”356 
“You can’t leave from the technical specifications of what you are asking for. … 
We bought a printer. And you had a specification, that it must be [this and that] 
and we bought from the provider who made the cheapest offer.”357 
Of course, while possibilities for corruption exist, it appears that the increased formal 
requirements work to increase the impartiality of the procurement process over what 
existed before ChileCompra. 
 
Reducing unnecessary discretion hypothesis: While complete impartiality is impossible, 
the use of ChileCompra and the regulatory framework work to increase impartiality of 
the procurement process.  
 
Distributive justice  
A major selling point of ChileCompra was the promise of increased business 
opportunities for small businesses, upon which it is believed sustainable economic 
growth rests. 
“We tried to present it as an opportunity for small businesses – that they would 
not only have access to a bigger market but that they would also learn a new 
technology that is here to stay.”358 
                                                 
356
 Interviewee: WB-PS-CC-3. 
357
 Interviewee: TC-11. 
358
  Interviewee: WB-DCCP-9. 
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However, as discussed above, while ChileCompra does supply increased opportunities to 
small businesses it has also meant increased competition and lowered prices, causing 
difficulties for some suppliers.  
 
The data suggest that small businesses have in fact gained from the implementation of 
ChileCompra. In Chile, micro-enterprises participate in ChileCompra at a greater 
percentage than they do in the national market. Between 2004 and 2006, small and micro 
enterprises increased their sales moving from twenty-four to thirty-nine percent, while 
large businesses fell from sixty-one to forty-three.359  
 
Of course, these benefits are not uniform, and there are some components of 
ChileCompra or the market that make for differential impacts on the involvement of 
small businesses. For example, the DCCP has had a hard time negotiating good deals 
with small businesses for the e-catalogue. Experience has told them that there is a trade-
off between increasing opportunities for small and medium businesses and obtaining 
good prices and service, 
“…another issue is what role the catalogue should have in the economy… we try 
to get providers of all sizes but there is a tendency and a temptation to attract big 
business. If this were a private initiative, we’d get 50 companies and stick to that 
because we know that they’d be the ones to give good prices, good logistics, good 
quality services. If they paid me just to make the catalogue efficient, then it 
wouldn’t be worthwhile to include small and medium business. So the question is 
how to create a balance between the efficiency of the system and securing access 
for small and medium enterprises.”360 
 
Furthermore, sectors are impacted differently, with some being more or less 
advantageous for small businesses. For example, in the education and health sectors, 
interviewees indicated that their market of suppliers remain mostly unchanged, 
“The fact is that the same providers that were there before continue today, but 
through the system. … Effectively the incorporation of new providers has been 
limited – but above all in the specialized materials, for example, the printing 
service.”361  
                                                 
359
 One potential explanation is the high amount of small purchases made by the state that small businesses 
can take advantage of given their new access to the business opportunities. Source: WB-DCCP-1/6. 
360
 Interviewee: WB-DCCP-7. 
361
 Interviewee: WB-PS-CC-3. 
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Distributive justice hypothesis: Overall, the increase in the representation of small 
businesses in ChileCompra will tend to build trust with those who hold the distributive 
justice value. 
 
7.2.4 SUMMARY 
As with the e-tax administration system, it appears that even a conservative estimate of 
the data presented indicates that the implementation of ChileCompra has increased the 
trustworthiness of the public purchasing process (for an overview see Table 47, Table 48, 
& Table 49 below). The most significant changes brought about by ChileCompra are 
improvements to the competence (in terms of efficiency and effectiveness) and the 
transparency of the public sector purchasing processes. It also has altered the 
fundamental values of this process by making it more impartial and by increasing 
distributional justice. Of course, there are some elements that may limit the overall 
trustworthiness of the process such as the inability to clearly codify and represent the 
entirety of the procurement processes online and the conflict between competition and 
distributive justice. Overall, however, ChileCompra appears to represent a dramatic 
improvement over the almost entirely un-transparent and fairly unprofessional 
procurement process that existed prior to ChileCompra. 
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 Middle-range institutional  
trust and e-services hypotheses 
Case-specific ChileCompra  
trustworthiness-to-trust hypotheses 
Efficiency/Effectiveness 
C1 
Efficiency/effectiveness I: E-services 
perceived to be more effective and 
efficient (faster, more accurate, cost 
savings) tend to build trust. 
Overall, it appears that ChileCompra has had a 
positive efficiency/effectiveness impact indicating that 
it would tend to build trust. The e-catalogue brings 
larger efficiency and effectiveness benefits and thus 
will tend to build trust. 
C2 
Efficiency/effectiveness II: E-
government services that improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of service at 
the institution’s physical office tend to 
build trust. 
N/A 
 
Performance transparency 
C3 
Performance transparency I: Performance 
transparency that meets the citizen’s 
expectations will tend to build trust. 
The indications that ChileCompra has achieved 
positive performance outcomes will tend to build 
trust.  
C4 
Performance transparency II: 
Performance transparency that is linked 
to effective accountability mechanisms 
will tend to build trust. 
The performance indicators are not linked to any 
accountability mechanisms and thus will have no 
impact on trust. 
Table 47  Impacts of ChileCompra on the trustworthiness in terms of competence. 
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 Middle-range institutional  
trust and e-services hypotheses 
Case-specific ChileCompra  
trustworthiness-to-trust hypotheses 
Considering users interests 
I1 User benefits: E-services that bring user benefits will tend to increase trust. 
Increased access to relevant procurement information, 
the increased business opportunities, and those who 
perceive a reduction of transaction costs will tend to 
increase trust. 
I2 
E-service quality: Good e-service quality 
indicates that the institution considers 
citizens’ interests and therefore tends to 
build trust. 
The high level of usefulness and ease of the use will 
tend to build trust. 
Voice 
I3 
Voice: Increased possibilities for voice 
through the provision of information and e-
service feedback mechanisms (e-mail, 
comments) will tend to build trust. 
The public procurement information provided through 
the ChileCompra portal and the marginal changes to 
the feedback mechanisms suggest that it will tend to 
have a marginal impact on trust. 
Transparency and accountability 
I4 
Institutional transparency and 
accountability: Increased transparency of 
internal processes and service outcomes 
accompanied by perceived effective 
accountability mechanisms will tend to 
build trust. 
The increased institutional transparency and potential 
for accountability will tend to build trust. However, 
the low quality of data with respect to several stages 
of the procurement process represents lower levels of 
transparency that might mitigate this effect 
Corruption 
I5 
Reduced corruption: A perceived reduction 
of corruption due to the computerisation 
and rationalisation of government processes 
will tend to build trust. 
The moderate decrease in opportunities for the public 
sector purchasing officer to engage in corrupt 
purchasing practices will tend to moderately increase 
trust. 
Power 
I6 
Big brother: Increased power for 
institutions vis-à-vis the citizen through e-
services tends to destroy trust. 
The shift in power relationships due to ChileCompra 
is unclear. No trust effects are expected. 
I7 
Soft sister: Increased power for institutions 
vis-à-vis the citizen through e-services that 
results in improved services and user 
benefits tends to build trust. 
N/A 
Table 48  Impacts of ChileCompra on the trustworthiness in terms of overlapping interests. 
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 Middle-range institutional  
trust and e-services hypotheses 
Case-specific ChileCompra  
trustworthiness-to-trust hypotheses 
Institutional Ethos 
V1 
Institutional ethos: Trust outcome is 
unclear; they may be dependent on 
associated institutional reforms. 
The ethos of improved efficiency and of distributive 
and procedural justice will sometimes be at odds, and 
therefore the outcome is unclear. 
Procedural Justice 
V2 
Citizen compliance: An e-service that 
increases citizen compliance through 
increased capacities for surveillance and 
coercion or through a reduction of 
compliance costs will tend to increase trust. 
N/A 
V3 
Remove unnecessary street-level discretion: 
E-services that remove unnecessary street-
level discretion and increase perceived 
impartiality will tend to build trust. 
While complete impartiality is impossible, the use of 
ChileCompra and the regulatory framework work to 
increase impartiality of the procurement process and 
will tend to build trust. 
Distributive Justice 
V4 
Distributive justice: E-services that create 
distributive justice (e.g., provide a service 
for the poor) and the distributive justice 
value is held by the citizen tend to increase 
trust. 
The increase in the representation of small businesses 
in ChileCompra will tend to build trust with those 
who hold the distributive justice value. 
Table 49  Impacts of ChileCompra on institutional trustworthiness in terms of overlapping values. 
 
7.3  ANALYSIS:  TRUST  
Given the details of the improvements in trustworthiness it should be no surprise that for 
the businesses surveyed, only a very few (thirteen percent) have a worse opinion of the 
government after using ChileCompra. Forty-two percent responded that their opinion of 
the government has improved a lot or somewhat after using ChileCompra and thirty-
seven percent have not changed their opinions (see Table 50). Overall, these results 
represent the generally positive, although somewhat mixed responses of suppliers to the 
system. Interestingly, these responses are fairly uniform across all sizes of businesses (see 
Figure 32). A question remains, however, as to ChileCompra’s influence on trust 
judgments of the public sector entities and their procurement process. This analysis seeks 
to answer this question. The same approach is taken as in the e-tax case, where the 
analysis is broken into two components: the salient and the non-salient trustworthy cues. 
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Has your image of the government improved or 
worsened after using ChileCompra? 
It has improved a lot 10.3% 
It has improved somewhat 31.8% 
No change 36.8% 
It has worsened somewhat 6.6% 
It has worsened a lot 6.2% 
No opinion 8.3% 
Table 50  Suppliers’ image of the government after using 
ChileCompra. Source: WB survey. 
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Figure 32  Suppliers’ image of the government after using ChileCompra by size of supplier, source: 
WB survey. 
 
 
7.3.1 SALIENT TRUSTWORTHINESS CUES 
Institutional transparency/accountability 
As the trustworthiness analysis indicates, the implementation of ChileCompra represents 
a huge jump in institutional transparency in terms of information about government’s 
purchasing process, especially ex post. However, suppliers have questions about several 
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stages of the purchasing process, and in particular, regarding the bid selection process 
(see Table 51). For example, the same percentage (thirty) of suppliers responded that 
transparency of the public sector purchasing process has improved as has become worse. 
Even less, (fourteen percent) believe that the bid selection process is more transparent 
with ChileCompra, while forty-one percent find it less transparent. On the more positive 
side, improvements have been noticed (forty-seven percent) in the area of the 
transparency of the rules and procedures, as might be anticipated with the establishment 
of an online procurement system that codifies many of the rules of the game. 
 
How much do you agree with the following statements? 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
agree 
Nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
No 
opinion 
The bid selection 
decisions are 
transparent 
1% 13% 15% 15% 26% 31% 
ChileCompra adds 
transparency to the 
public sector 
purchasing 
processes  
11% 19% 15% 19% 11% 25% 
The rules and 
procedures of 
ChileCompra are 
clearly defined 
18% 29% 20% 13% 2% 18% 
Table 51  Business perspectives of ChileCompra from the World Bank survey. 
 
It must be mentioned that the results from this question are potentially misleading. Notice 
that the highest numbers are “no opinion” responses. One explanation for the high “no 
opinion” is the lack of understanding of exactly what “transparency” means. This became 
clear in several interviews when interviewees were asked questions with the word 
transparency and this caused some confusion. For example, when asked what 
transparency meant to the subject, they responded: 
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“I don’t know, I think that in the moment that you give a value, you have to 
respect those values… I don’t know in what other way they mean it. The values of 
the products, that they can’t change them, they are written down on the Internet 
and afterwards they can’t change it. … I don’t find it something revolutionary.”362 
However, these survey data do generally match up with interview data. 
 
As anticipated by the trustworthiness analysis, the transparency of the purchasing 
process, and in particular the bid selection component, is generally perceived as not very 
transparent. This emerged as a much more salient cue than the ex post purchasing 
information for accountability purposes. This perception of a lack of transparency 
emerged for several reasons. First, it appears that the public sector does not always make 
the best effort to explain the selection process itself.363 Second, often those interviewed 
had first-hand experiences that imply potentially less than impartial activity occurring 
during the purchasing process. For example, when a business wins a bid through not 
entirely transparent means: 364 
“Once the mayor asked me on the street – check over CC because we are going to 
have a tender for something. [Question: Did you win?] Of course, because the 
mayor gave me the code, and it is the only bid that I have won.”365 
 
Many of those who took issue with the transparency of the bid selection process did so 
because they could not understand why they lost a particular bid. For example, 
“We put our best effort forward and when we haven’t won we ask, what 
happened? … It is not obvious when one of our competitors beats us out. We 
                                                 
362
 Interviewee: CC-1. 
363
 As on DCCP manager explained,  
“They [the suppliers] think that purchases have to be at the lowest price, or because the public 
sector doesn’t put down all the information they should … such as why they chose an offer… 
With the providers there is some apprehension about transparency, that the buyers are not 
transparent, but in what sense? That the criteria isn’t always clear, they don’t give all the 
information, sometimes they put the offer in Friday and award someone the contract on Monday, 
which makes people think it was arranged ahead of time,” source: WB-DCCP-9. 
364
 One more example, 
“In terms of transparency – it is only going to be with respect to the person in the institution of the 
government, it has to do with the person who adjudicates the tenders. … I think that, in general 
terms, the purchasing processes are more transparent, but for a small municipality … I made an 
agreement with someone in the municipality for a project, they chose me [it was pre-arranged]. 
Something like 15 projects [came in his email] throughout the whole country, but they are pre-
arranged. So why am I going to bid? … In Chile the problem is that the system is … it was like 
this before. Now it is the same, although it is ‘transparent’ through the Internet, but at its core, it 
isn’t. It’s formalised, is all,” source: SII-CC-1/3. 
365
 Interviewee: CC-1. 
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don’t really know why. It is obvious in the sense that there is a notation where 
they say – in ChileCompra they put the mechanism of evaluation – and this 
mechanism is 30% price, 30% history, 10% CV. Thus, when you see that another 
institution wins, you think – what would have happened to make them so much 
better than I?”366  
“…the muni calls me and says, ‘I need a video – ok? … You have to bid through 
CC.’ We have the business all ready – 10 others may bid, but the deal is already 
set. So it is all the same. I am bored of bidding all over to realize some 
opportunity, to compete.”367 
 
Fitting with these data is the nature of the complaints received by the public sector. One 
of the most common complaints made to the tribunal is that the purchase order or the 
selection criteria were not clear.368 In particular, confusion often results when the 
cheapest bid does not win. While price is not the only comparison point in any selection 
criteria, this is not always well understood.369 
 
A common theme that emerges from the analysis is that perceptions of transparency 
resulting from ChileCompra are influenced by the information, activities, and outcomes 
of the procurement activities of the state that are highly relevant to the activity of the 
business. In other words, the transparency that is related to the provision of information 
allows for increased participation. Evidence for this comes from the reasons given for 
                                                 
366
 Interviewee: SII-CC-10. 
367
 Interviewee: SII-CC-11. Here is another example, 
“Always, when I bid on something in the south. With lower price, quality, what they needed. And 
someone won who inside of what you can see, or read, because you can see the people who bid – 
so, somebody won with a price much higher, then mine, and I saw that most of the people – all ten 
of us had a price more or less the same. And the person who won did not have the same price, 
because – there was a max price of 5,000,000 pesos – I bid 3,5 someone else 4, someone else 
3.7… so all about the same. The guy who won bid 4,999,999. [Question: why did he win?] I have 
no idea. … They don’t explain why some person won and another person did not,” source: SII-
CC-11. 
368
 As one DCCP employee related, 
“…this morning I was working on claims against municipalities and the focus of the claims are 
that the municipality didn’t choose a provider, despite them being the cheapest. But this isn’t the 
only criteria/variable that is relevant under the law,” source: WB-DCCP-1/6. 
369
 For example,  
“They [suppliers] do call to complain when we don’t choose them. Yes, they call a lot, especially 
if they are the most economical. So I have to tell them that it is not always the most economical – 
it is generally our first priority, but we also have other priorities, quality, delivery time, and other 
factors to evaluate. So you explain this to the providers. But anyway, they say, no, and they 
sometimes get mad, saying that they were the cheapest, and they don’t understand the other 
reasons, I explain it, but they don’t understand,” source: WB-PS-CC-1. 
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why and what information suppliers view as important. While online public procurement 
information may be important for providing incentives for appropriate behaviour in the 
public sector, it is not given much importance by suppliers, at least for the theorised 
purpose of stakeholder accountability.370 No citizens interviewed had taken the time to 
actually analyse government purchases online. While some people interviewed may have 
been aware of the data (not everyone was), nobody expressed an interest in following this 
up in terms of accountability measures. Rather, transparency of past purchases emerged 
as highly salient in relation to future bidding activities, allowing suppliers to strategically 
create and price bids to be more competitive in the marketplace.371 Ultimately, the 
perception of transparency is a result of the opening up of business opportunities to all of 
Chile; an extremely practical concern for all businesses.372 At the end of the day, it 
appears that transparency becomes relevant to private businesses when it somehow is 
linked in with the ultimate interest of the business: the bottom line.373  
 
Reduction of corruption and increased impartiality While the public sector 
employees surveyed believed that corruption was reduced, the businesses that use(d) 
                                                 
370
 Not surprisingly, this is realised by the DCCP,  
“Citizens, although not many of them take the time to do so, can see what is going on. Some 
complain that ChileCompra isn’t transparent, that public organisations aren’t doing this or that, but 
the reasons they know so much about what is going on with ChileCompra is because it is so 
transparent,” source: WB-DCCP-1/6. 
371
 For example,  
“I know that CC has a history, I go look up all the similar work offers in 2005 – let’s say they 
haven’t done any digital printing offers in 2005, I look for a public sector organization that is 
similar – because they are more or less the same. And from there it is a bit of shrewdness, I think,” 
source: SII-CC-6. 
“One doesn’t know what is the reason why another organisation won it [the bid], but it is more 
transparent because you have the option to participate, see what questions the other participants 
made, how the evaluation is structured, this, including the other participants and to whom they 
awarded the tender,” source: SII-CC-10. 
372
 For example, 
“Why does it obligate them to be more transparent? Because they have to open the process to a 
series of actors that know that they can provide the service,” source: SII-CC-10. 
“It [transparency] means that it is easier as a consultant or if you want to work for the state – to 
find what to do – because you can see on ChileCompra, and there appears, for example, work with 
iron, which I do, we need to fix a window, I dunno, fix a structure. One looks and it is easier to 
offer your services. And this helps, it is more direct,” soruce: SII-CC-5. 
373
 Exemplifying this statement, one telecentre manager opined, 
“I believe that it is very important that the municipality that there is transparency so they don’t 
engage in strange behaviours, but for the supplier, I think that it doesn’t matter too much for them. 
For them, what they want is to sell their product,” source: TC-5. 
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ChileCompra did not come to a general consensus on the matter. In fact, only ten percent 
believe that ChileCompra eliminates corruption, while forty-five percent disagree with 
that statement (see Table 52).374 
How much to you agree with the following statements? 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
agree 
Nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
No 
opinion 
ChileCompra 
eliminates 
corruption 
5% 10% 21% 22% 23% 18% 
Thanks to 
ChileCompra, the 
public sector is 
better controlled 
15% 27% 19% 16% 6% 17% 
Table 52  Private businesses responses when asked if ChileCompra eliminates corruption and if the 
public sector is better held in check with ChileCompra. 
 
One reason why people perceive that ChileCompra does not eliminate corruption is 
intimately linked to the problems with transparency— the inability to make the entire 
purchasing process transparent. In particular, two phases emerged as important: the 
establishment of the tender (establishing the product/service specifications and evaluation 
criteria) and the actual decision making process. This lack of transparency combined with 
the discretion that is necessary when drawing up bid specifications and during the 
evaluation process means that there is always room for deviation from the purchasing 
norms for a motivated public procurement officer. This issue becomes increasingly 
important given that the information regarding these phases is highly relevant for the 
businesses. Furthermore, as discussed above, several of those interviewed had benefited 
or otherwise personally experienced such discretion. 
 
While it is commonly agreed that there is some space for manipulation of the purchasing 
process, it is also commonly agreed that the total potential for corrupt practices has been 
                                                 
374
 It must be noted that this is potentially a misleading outcome given the nature of the question; a better 
question would have been if ChileCompra reduces corruption. 
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reduced. Ultimately, this issue comes down to the increased impartiality of the 
procurement process that is not, at least in part, perceived to be determined by objective 
rather than subjective features,375 
“There still exists a space in which people can do a little trickery to be able to 
benefit a friend or something. But it is not that easy to do it. For example, when 
we once – with FONASA, I remember, they told us, look you have to do work X 
and we want you guys to win because the your quality is better, you are on time, 
etc. etc, we make the bid, and after they said – you know what, we can’t give you 
the work because we have to disclose – remember what variables there are – and 
so it wasn’t that easy to just give us the offer, because they have to justify it.”376  
“I would say that with CC there is almost zero corruption – because there is no 
way. If we bid, and I complete these requirements… if the higher price is yours, 
they aren’t going to be able to give it to you.  Before it wasn’t that way. … of 100 
proposals, they are probably 10 they can manipulate.”377  
 
While this reflects the view of the public sector in the trustworthy analysis, the perception 
of decreased corruption and increased impartiality appear to differ in terms of degree. 
This is especially clear in the difference in the survey responses. One possible 
explanation emerges for why there is a disjuncture in the perception of the reduction of 
corruption between the public sector and the suppliers. At the point of specification and 
decision making, some discretion remains. Given the salience of this information to the 
suppliers, this discretion is highly likely to be perceived and interpreted. All of the other 
constraints that shape the purchasing process are less relevant to the suppliers. Indeed, 
some constraints will not even be noticeable, for example, the internal auditing capacities 
of the government. However, it appears that through some particular experiences, such as 
losing a bid that you expected to win after hearing about it from the municipal 
procurement officer, seeing that the lowest priced product wins a majority of the time, or 
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 Other examples include, 
“The way it worked, is the way it works now. The only difference is that they have organized their 
house a bit, today there is a bit more restriction, they can’t just by like that. If I need what you 
have, but I can’t just buy it from you. I am going to buy it from you, but first I have to fill out the 
paperwork of requirements, and all that,” source: SII-CC-11. 
“Yes, also, because the municipality has always bought from people in the same sector. Thus, 
these same people insist that the people register because the municipality can’t transact with them 
if they aren’t registered in ChileCompra. It is obligatory to register in ChileCompra. They always 
buy from the same people in the same sectors,” TC-5. 
376
 Interviewee: SII-CC-6. 
377
 Interviewee: SII-CC-8/9. 
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through the existence of a proper bid decision justification, some suppliers do realise that 
the evaluation criteria play at least a partially constraining role.  
 
Efficiency/Effectiveness 
Along side the substantial improvements in transparency, gains in efficiency and 
effectiveness were the largest impacts of ChileCompra on the processes of the public 
sector. The question here is whether or not and how these changes were perceived and 
interpreted by the suppliers. Two cues emerged that indicate to people that there were 
changes to the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector: bid specification and 
payment period.378 
 
Bid specification The fact that the public sector had to go through the process of 
specifying a bid indicates that the public sector is thus obliged to organise their internal 
processes. This is regarded as an improvement in the effectiveness of the process. 
 
Payment period  A major concern for many private businesses that deal with the 
public sector is the period of time that it takes for the public sector to pay. This is 
especially relevant for small businesses who may invest capital in providing a product or 
service, and if they are not paid soon enough they enter quickly into financial problems. 
This is exacerbated by the fact that municipalities, with whom small businesses deal with 
most frequently, are typically the worst offenders in this area. Indicative of this and the 
importance of the payment period is that the institution that is most complained about are 
the municipalities, and the largest complaint are related to the timing of payments.379 In 
contrast, not paying on time indicates that they are still internal management issues which 
implies that despite ChileCompra not much has changed for these public sector entities, 
“…at the end of the day the clients are the same – there are good clients, and bad 
clients. Because one will pay when it matters and the others – they don’t. In the 
end it is a lot like it worked before.… It is more impersonal, but all the same, 
those that paid in little time, continue to pay in little time, and those who were 
bad, they are the same. …”380 
                                                 
378
 Interestingly, the increased gains from the e-catalogue were never mentioned. 
379
 Source: WB-DCCP-9. 
380
 Interviewee: SII-CC-8/9. 
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However, not all businesses attribute the reduction in payment time to the introduction of 
ChileCompra. Recently, the President declared that all federal public sector services have 
to pay in thirty days.381 When asked if there have been any efficiency changes to the 
public sector thanks to ChileCompra, one interviewee responded thus,  
“No. In fact, the opposite. Today, in some things ... well, now that the public 
sector has to pay in 30 days, maximum – this is important because they wait 6 
months and they don’t pay their providers. Today, thanks – not to ChileCompra, 
but to the position of the President. Nothing to do with CC.”382 
 
Distributive Justice  
As the trustworthiness analysis showed, the increase in representation of small (and 
micro) businesses indicates that ChileCompra has had positive distributive impacts. Thus, 
we would expect at least the businesses with increased opportunities to perceive and 
appreciate these benefits. This was found to be the case, 
“It is a free and open forum – because any Chilean can bid on a purchase order. 
Those that don’t, don’t because they don’t have the information. … We 
considered it a good policy of the government so that those businesses who don’t 
have as much weight in terms of infrastructure and things could be able to make a 
mark in a very objective way without being discriminated, you can compete – we 
compete with big businesses of publicity and we win, too.”383 
 
However, not everyone took such a positive perspective on the distributional impacts of 
ChileCompra. Understanding the distributive justice impacts can only be done with a 
consideration of competition, one of the fundamental mechanisms at work with 
ChileCompra. Many of the small businesses interviewed felt the pinch of increased 
competition, and not everyone could win.384 One business told a story of dashed 
expectations – how he was excited about the increased potential opportunities but after a 
while he realised that nothing had changed, there was no real increase in sales.385  
 
                                                 
381
 Note that since it is a federal mandate it does not apply to municipalities. 
382
 Interviewee: SII-CC-11. 
383
 Interviewee: SII-CC-6. 
384
 Even the large business interviewed admitted that margins had been decreased. They compensated by 
increasing volume, something that is inherently difficult for a smaller business to accomplish. 
385
 Interviewee: SII-CC-11. 
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A common conclusion of those who have problems winning bids is that it is very difficult 
for small businesses to compete with large businesses, and that ultimately big businesses 
will win,  
“… there was a job X, and the costs of the material alone was Y pesos, and they 
were charging less than Y, and how is that possible? How do they live or earn? 
We felt that they were people who made a bid exclusively to knock out the 
competition, and after they would be the only ones there. They have the resources 
to hold out, but we sure don’t. This is a weakness in the system, one imagines that 
the system is looking for, above all, transparency, in the second place, to bring 
about a better distribution of resources, in that – hopefully we all get a piece of 
the pie.”386  
“… even though there is a diversity of suppliers today, it is not easy that the 
public sector generates – such strength that some suppliers will benefit always – 
they get better scores because they are getting stronger. And a few actors remain. 
It is happening with the banks. It is something natural. It is happening with the 
supermarkets.”387 
 
This fact leads some to believe that the system itself was designed for big businesses in 
the big city, without taking into consideration the situation of the small businesses.388 
Evidence for the pervasiveness of this belief is an expression has emerged as a play on 
the name ChileCompra (“Chile Buys”): “Chile Buys, Santiago Sells”.389 
 
User benefits  
There are several benefits that businesses can derive from the system, for example, the 
use of the online information to improve strategic future bidding and the increased 
opportunity of business. However, tangible benefits are dependent upon the outcome of 
the interactions with ChileCompra. Lowered transaction costs, and increased business 
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 Interviewee: SII-CC-5. 
387
 Interviewee: SII-CC-10. 
388
 For example, 
“As I told you, there are technologies that, perhaps for some regions of the world, they can be 
much more useful than in others. For some countries more than others. The same with CC. If you 
are big, it can be tremendous. If you are small? Not so much. This is comparable to technology in 
general… It wasn’t something spectacular that changed our lives. …I think the big ones will 
always win. For the small and medium… there is not much of an advance,” source: CC-1. 
“It isn’t a problem of trust, it is a programming problem. Perhaps it was a good idea, but poorly 
programmed. Better for a big city, but not for the small business. Before the businesses depended 
on the municipality, and suddenly they put ChileCompra and things are cheaper outside of 
Triaguen,” source: TC-12. 
389
 Interviewee: WB-DCCP-9. 
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opportunities are only potential benefits unless they result in sales. Understandably, 
businesses are not pleased when they do not win,390 
“The provider that says he has given the best offer and doesn’t win ends up 
unsatisfied. We have an average of five offers per purchase order, so there are 
always four that are angry because they didn’t win the sale.”391 
Thus, the extent of the user benefits are most easily perceived by those businesses that 
win bids through ChileCompra. 
 
Interestingly, those who have not won bids, have notably differing interpretations of the 
impacts of ChileCompra on questions of transparency, corruption, and distributive justice 
than those who have won. Almost all the losers found the system to be opaque, saw few 
changes to corruption, and disparage the distributive justice outcomes of ChileCompra. 
One common underlying thread to these perspectives is that these businesses have not 
derived any increase of sales through ChileCompra. In other words, they have not 
realised the potential user benefits. Even potential benefits to the public sector are 
outweighed in the minds of those who have not reaped the benefits. For example, when 
asked if he thought that there were efficiency and effectiveness changes to the public 
sector, one interviewee responded thusly, 
“Yes, it [the procurement process] is better ordered. But, the benefits for the small 
businessman is not there. That is my personal experience. Perhaps – for some it 
has worked, for me no.”392  
At the end of the day it appears that, for many, issues of efficiency/effectiveness gains, 
distributive justice, and transparency take a back-seat to the tangible user benefit of 
increased sales. 
 
However, those who do realise the benefits of increased sales take a more sanguine 
position. A good example is a group of business people who saw ChileCompra as greatly 
advancing transparency, even in the area of the purchasing decision, 
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 Another example, 
“I have seen – in Traiguen – I think that practically 99.9% disagree with ChileCompra. … The 
problems are that to win the proposal, you have to be the best, the cheapest. But suddenly the 
person [public sector organisation] needs something iron, and if it is cheaper form Temuco, 
Temuco wins,” source: TC-12. 
391
 Interviewee: WB-DCCP-9. 
392
 Interviewee: SII-CC-11. 
 325
“It has made the purchases more transparent. I believe this was the starting point 
that has been completed; they have to buy through the system. Now the system 
doesn’t assure that they will buy at the lowest price, because the lowest prices 
aren’t always of the best quality. What is happening now with CC? There are 
evaluations of the providers, and they publish this. We want them to publish this, 
because this is another parameter of evaluation, not just price.”393 
“The system is so transparent that you can see at what price, when they reject 
your bid, you can go and see why they rejected you. Generally the variable is 
price. You are more expensive and the cheapest bid won.”394  
This is especially interesting for a few reasons. Aspects of the system that are generally 
regarded as the most confusing and least transparent are interpreted as positive sources of 
transparency.395 For example, where normally the fact that the lowest price doesn’t 
always win is a sign of discretion, here it is a cherished feature of the system. 
Considering that this situation has brought these company increased sales, it is not a great 
surprise that they view it in a positive light. 
 
What makes both of these comments even more intriguing is that both of these businesses 
actively engage in the continuation of personal contacts with the public sector entities 
outside of the scope of ChileCompra to influence purchases. In other words, they engage 
in activities that subvert the transparency of the system (much like other suppliers 
interviewed) and yet these suppliers see the purchasing process as increasing 
transparency.396 
 
7.3.2 MARGINAL OR NON-SALIENT TRUSTWORTHY CUES 
Ease of use While ease of use may be a factor that inhibits or promotes uptake, it does 
not appear to greatly impact trust judgements. However, for some, the ease of the system 
is an issue for people in the rural areas and for people without much computer 
experience. That said, very few found the system difficult and it is also commonly 
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 Interviewee: WB-CC-1. 
394
 Interviewee: SII-CC-6. 
395
 Recall that the purchasing decision process is commonly agreed to be one of the least transparent 
aspects of the system. 
396
 Consider for example the following statement, 
“… we call the buyers and we say – help me because you are cutting into our margins, because the 
logistics costs. And so they have helped us, in a form that, in the end, we win a bit in the 
competitiveness - they improved the conditions, they help us with certain costs,” source: WB-CC-
3. 
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believed that people can learn it quickly. The few concerns with complexity of use that 
were expressed influence user perspectives of the public sector through its interaction 
with distributive justice values. Some people interpreted the complexity as a sign that the 
service was not made for the small towns, but instead is something made for the bigger 
cities.397  
 
Usefulness There was no real indication that a consideration of the usefulness of the 
system played any role beyond the issues of distributive justice and user benefits 
discussed above.  
 
Voice  There did not appear to be much consideration of the mechanisms of voice 
how feedback mechanisms indicated aligned interests. This was anticipated by the 
feedback hypotheses as ChileCompra does not provide a significant change in the overall 
set of feedback mechanisms. This is evidenced in the fact that the total number of claims 
per month is considered rather low.398 Furthermore, other means of voice, such as using 
the tribunal requires the ability to hire a judge, a fact that limits a good section of the 
small businesses. In fact, even the large business interviewee, with many more resources, 
found the system impenetrable. 
 
Performance transparency  There was virtually no-one who perceived (or at 
least mentioned) the performance data on the ChileCompra portal. It is possible that the 
lack of an easily apparent accountability mechanism limited the impact of the 
performance data, although the data indicate that for the most part people were not well 
aware of the performance data. 
 
                                                 
397
 For example, 
“On all the pages, including ChileCompra, the terminology they use is not the best for micro-
enterprises that have little education. Perhaps for the chief of sales for a business, but for a micro-
enterprise business person, that sells something like wood or furniture… the pages should be made 
to fit the people not the people to the pages. … with all the experience that I have, it is still 
difficult for me. But for the common person, it is much worse,” source:  TC-9. 
398
 Source: WB-DCCP-1/6. 
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Power (Big brother/soft sister) As hypothesised, the relationship of power between 
the businesses and the public sector did not emerge as a salient issue. 
 
Overlapping values  The values of improved efficiency and procedural justice 
did not appear widely held by the suppliers (or at least as a central concern), although not 
much data were collected to comment on this aspect. Values did seem to overlap with 
respect to distributive justice, and the potential for ChileCompra to increase opportunities 
for small businesses. However, as predicted in the trustworthiness analysis, often this 
value was outweighed by the increased competition.  
 
7.3.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the second of the two e-service cases in Chile, ChileCompra. 
Overall it is fair to conclude that along many dimensions the public sector purchasing 
process has emerged as more trustworthy as a result of ChileCompra. Most significantly, 
improvements have been made to the competence and transparency of the public sector 
procurement activities. Like the SII, however, there were some potentially confounding 
issues, such as some opacity in bid specification and selection and the increase in market 
competition. 
 
These improvements do not directly translate into positive trust perceptions (see Table 
53, Table 54, & Table 55). In fact, where trustworthiness changes have appeared most 
powerful, the relative perception and interpretation of resultant trustworthiness cues have 
been weak. A major reason for this is that the most salient cues are those that are 
ultimately related to tangible user benefits. Indications of improved benefits to the public 
sector and the activities of the public sector are for the most part irrelevant unless they 
can be used to benefit the supplier. Furthermore, the interpretation of other 
trustworthiness cues appears altered by the realisation (or not) of user benefits. For 
example, transparency is problematic if you lose a bid and do not understand why, but is 
interpreted positively if it aids in improving future bids or if you are winning bids. 
Efficiency and effectiveness are perceived in terms of when payments are made, and 
judgements on the distributional impact of the system appear to depend upon the 
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business’ relative success with the system. Interestingly, the potentially confounding 
factors (e.g., competition, opacity in bid selection) that emerged in the trustworthiness 
analysis proved to be highly salient for this very reason – they are directly related to the 
personal benefits derived from the system. 
 
 Case-specific ChileCompra  
trustworthiness-to-trust hypotheses ChileCompra trust outcomes 
Efficiency/Effectiveness 
C1 
Efficiency/effectiveness I: Overall, it appears 
that ChileCompra has had a positive 
efficiency/effectiveness impact indicating that 
it would tend to build trust. The e-catalogue 
brings larger efficiency and effectiveness 
benefits and thus will tend to build trust. 
Changes to the efficiency and effectiveness were 
perceived through two main cues: 1) the tender 
specification that indicated that there must be some 
increased internal order to the purchasing process and 
2) the timeliness of payments which, depending upon 
the changes (or lack thereof) shaped suppliers’ 
perspectives. There was no discussion in this sample 
of the improved prices and efficiency gains from 
ChileCompra for the public sector. 
C2 Efficiency/effectiveness II:N/A N/A 
Performance transparency 
C3 
Performance transparency I: The indications 
that ChileCompra has achieved positive 
performance outcomes will tend to build trust.  
Performance transparency was not a relevant cue for 
people’s judgements of trust. 
C4 
Performance transparency II: The 
performance indicators are not linked to any 
accountability mechanisms and thus will have 
no impact on trust. 
N/A 
Table 53  Outcomes of the competence hypotheses for building trust. 
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 Case-specific ChileCompra  
trustworthiness-to-trust hypotheses ChileCompra trust outcomes 
Considering users interests 
I1 
User benefits: Increased access to relevant 
procurement information, the increased 
business opportunities, and those who 
perceive a reduction of transaction costs will 
tend to increase trust. 
Highly salient but the extent of the benefits depends 
upon the ability to win bids. Those who have not won 
a bid see little benefit. Furthermore, this experience 
shapes interpretation of other trustworthiness cues. 
I2 E-service quality: The high level of usefulness 
and ease of the use will tend to build trust. 
The ease of use was not relevant, except for those who 
are predisposed to view ChileCompra as irrelevant for 
the rural businesses. The high level of usefulness was 
not a relevant cue except when considered in 
conjunction with relevant information (see I3). 
Voice 
I3 
Voice: The public procurement information 
provided through the ChileCompra portal and 
the marginal changes to the feedback 
mechanisms suggest that it will tend to have a 
marginal impact on trust. 
The information provision that allows for suppliers to 
improve their bidding is viewed positively, however 
this is because they are directly applicable to the 
bottom-line: sales (see I1). Voice mechanisms did not 
emerge as a trustworthiness cue. 
Transparency and accountability 
I4 
Institutional transparency and accountability: 
The increased institutional transparency and 
potential for accountability will tend to build 
trust. However, the low quality of data with 
respect to several stages of the procurement 
process represents lower levels of 
transparency might mitigate this effect. 
The inherent purchasing discretion was often 
interpreted negatively by businesses, especially when 
the bid was lost. The ex post purchasing information 
was relevant for future bidding processes (see I3) and 
not as transparency mechanism.  
Corruption 
I5 
Reduced corruption: The moderate decrease 
in opportunities for the public sector 
purchasing officer to engage in corrupt 
purchasing practices will tend to moderately 
increase trust. 
Corruption is perceived as slightly reduced but the 
inherent discretion in procurement process indicates 
that corruption possibilities remain. This appears to 
build trust, but only slightly. 
Power 
I6 
Big brother: Te shift in power relationships 
due to ChileCompra is unclear. No trust 
effects are expected. 
N/A 
I7 Soft sister: N/A  N/A 
Table 54  Outcomes of the aligned interests hypotheses for building trust.  
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 Case-specific ChileCompra  
trustworthiness-to-trust hypotheses ChileCompra trust outcomes 
Institutional Ethos 
V1 
Institutional ethos: The ethos of improved 
efficiency and of distributive and procedural 
justice will sometimes be at odds, and 
therefore the outcome is unclear. 
Improved efficiency and procedural justice were not 
highly important values held by suppliers. Suppliers 
were concerned with distributive justice mostly when 
they had trouble selling to the public sector. 
Procedural Justice 
V2 Citizen compliance: N/A N/A 
V3 
Remove unnecessary street-level discretion: 
While complete impartiality is impossible, the 
use of ChileCompra and the regulatory 
framework work to increase impartiality of 
the procurement process and will tend to build 
trust. 
Due to the existence of the bid and evaluation 
specifications, there was a perceived increase in 
impartiality in the procurement process, although, 
some discretion remained. 
Distributive Justice 
V4 
Distributive justice: The increase in the 
representation of small businesses in 
ChileCompra will tend to build trust with 
those who hold the distributive justice value. 
Perception depends upon personal outcome. A 
positive outcome tends to build a positive perception 
of the increased opportunities for small businesses. 
Increased competition leads to interpretation of the 
system as big business friendly and inappropriate for 
the rural context. This tends to decrease trust. 
Table 55  Outcomes of the aligned values hypotheses for building trust. 
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8 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
A comparative analysis necessarily glosses over minor variations and focuses on broad 
tendencies that are similar or different between the cases. At this level of analysis, case-
specific hypotheses are no longer tested and refined (as in chapters 6 & 7). Rather, the 
goal is to try to move up one level of abstraction and test and refine the e-services and 
institutional trust theory by comparing how the predicted outcomes of the individual 
theories vary across both cases. Of course, this level of theorisation is still close to data 
and relies on the evidence from the two cases. Consequently, it is best understood as 
working with middle-range theories that include a causal mechanism, its interaction with 
the context, and the resultant outcome. This is a refinement of the e-services and 
institutional trust hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. A less jargon laden way to capture 
the level of abstraction and explanation attempted here is Tilly’s (2006) notion of 
“superior stories”.  
“Like everyday stories, superior stories simplify their causes and effects. They 
maintain unity of time and place, deal with a limited number of actors and actions, 
as they concentrate on how those actions cause other actions. They omit or 
minimize errors, unanticipated consequences, indirect effects, incremental effects, 
simultaneous effects, feedback effects and environmental effects. But within their 
limited frames they get the actors, actions, causes, and effects right. By the 
standards of a relevant and credible technical account, they simplify radically, but 
everything they say is true” (pp. 171-172).  
The goal of this chapter is to tell a superior story of institutional trust across the two e-
services. 
 
The chapter proceeds in two parts and then implications are discussed. Section 8.1 
systematically compares, refines, and discusses the manifestations of the institutional 
trust hypotheses in the two e-services. Section 8.2, entitled “Trust in the Balance”, delves 
deeper into the differences and similarities in the interactions between the two e-services, 
user experiences, and the inherent value conflicts that exist in any democratic system. 
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Finally, section 8.3 considers the implications for the theoretical understanding of the 
relationship between e-services and institutional trust. 
 
8.1  CROSS-CASE COMPARISON FOR TESTING ,  REFINING ,  AND 
GENERATING E-GOVERNMENT AND TRUST THEORIES  
Not all of the e-service and institutional trustworthiness-to-trust hypotheses were 
subjected to confirmation, refutation, or refinement in the within-case analyses. This is 
because several case-specific institutional trustworthiness-to-trust hypotheses predicted 
that trust would not be built as the trustworthiness characteristic was not sufficiently 
established. For example, imagine if a trust building theory suggests aspect A (e.g. a 
highly interactive system) will build trust B. If, however, for a particular case, A is not 
realised (the system is not interactive) then we would not expect B to result. Obviously, 
in such a scenario, it is impossible to comment on the ability of A to bring about B. Only 
when the antecedent (A) is manifested should we look to see if the consequent is 
subsequently manifest. The theories can be categorised and considered in three groups: 
those where the antecedent is not manifested in either case (8.1.1), those where the 
antecedent is manifest in only one of the two cases (8.1.2), and those where the 
antecedent is manifest in both cases and therefore the consequents can be compared 
(8.1.3). Finally, section 8.1.4 seeks to strengthen the validity of the findings by providing 
a coherent theoretical explanation for the results of the comparison.  
 
8.1.1 NON-TESTED THEORY 
There were two theories where the antecedent was not manifest in either case. While the 
data cannot comment on their trust building potential, it is interesting to note them as they 
indicate potentially difficult to establish trustworthiness attributes through e-services. 
 
The first of the two theories was performance transparency linked with evident 
accountability mechanism (C4). The non-existence of this trustworthy factor in either 
case is not surprising given the nature of performance transparency. Performance 
indicators that can both be understood and presented in an easily accessible format are 
generally macro-level aggregate indicators. Indeed, this is the type of data that is 
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displayed on both e-service websites. However, as these indicators become coarser in 
their granularity, direct accountability becomes more difficult. Only a few high ranking 
officials can be held accountable, at best, even in times of crises, extended poor 
performance, or out of political exigencies. Like voting, there is only a possibility for a 
gross accountability mechanism to work effectively, if one exists.  
 
The second theory not tested was the theory of overlapping values to build trust (V1). It 
was clear from the theory development stage that the technological logic of the e-services 
did not necessarily embody or signal any one particular value. This is not surprising when 
considering that there are always competing values systems in a democratic system. 
Thus, the inclusion of technology at best shifts the relative emphasis on these values, but 
does not remove the overall tension. This is not a trivial issue, and it is discussed in 
greater detail in section (8.2). 
 
8.1.2 THEORY TESTED IN ONLY ONE CASE 
Each theory that has been tested in only one case has already been analysed in each case 
study chapter. Here the idea is to discuss them with respect to the larger data analysis 
picture that is emerging. 
 
One of the four competence theories was manifested by only one service. The SII had 
(C2) improved efficiency and effectiveness of a service offered at a real office. Clearly, 
such improvements are only possible for services offered at government offices, which 
was not the case for ChileCompra. For the SII case, the improved services did appear to 
make a positive difference for a few interviewees, in particular with respect to the wait 
time reduction. While nothing conclusive can be gleaned from the rather small amount of 
data on this aspect, it does lend credence to the importance of the user benefit trust 
building mechanism discussed in 8.1.3. 
 
There were two interest hypotheses that were also manifested by the e-tax service and not 
ChileCompra, the big brother (I6) and soft sister hypotheses (I7). Power asymmetries 
played a critical role in the perception of the SII, but it was not clear how the introduction 
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of the e-tax service shifted the trust balance. It appears as if those who are most sensitive 
to the discretion of the SII (such as business owners) notice power asymmetries the most 
and it seems that improved services did not make a great difference in that respect. 
Drawing from the broader discussion, a new hypothesis can be suggested: power 
asymmetries plus negative consequences will tend to destroy trust. Soft sister benefits 
should be considered a subset of user benefits, but will not necessarily build trust unless 
they outweigh the manifested negative consequences. 
 
The last two theories that were only manifested in one case are the value theories of 
improving citizen compliance (V2) and distributive justice (V4). Improving citizen 
compliance is only an issue with taxes, and is not a concern with ChileCompra. Overall, 
it does not emerge as a highly perceived factor for building trust, for reasons elaborated 
in the e-tax administration case. A tentative hypothesis is that citizen compliance as a 
trustworthiness cue (performance indicators) is not easily gleaned from direct interaction 
with technology. That said, one would expect that those who would most like to avoid 
taxes, and no longer can, would be the most likely to notice the compliance ensuring 
mechanisms.399 
 
Finally, while the value of distributive justice is arguably manifested through 
ChileCompra (increased participation of small and micro businesses) it has differential 
effects. The suppliers who win bids appreciate the increased opportunities for small 
businesses. On the other hand, those who do not win bids do not perceive the distributive 
justice effects and instead focus on other aspects such as increased competition and the 
benefits for large businesses. Again, this reinforces the importance of direct user 
outcomes. 
 
8.1.3 THEORY COMPARED ACROSS CASES 
For the remaining theories, the antecedent trustworthiness requirements are manifested to 
some degree by both e-services. For these theories it is instructive to compare differences 
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 If this is the case, it probably would bring about ambiguous trust outcomes given the already 
antagonistic stance the citizen would have towards the government.  
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in outcomes and how they relate back to the service. It must be kept in mind that while 
the antecedent components are considered to exist, there are necessarily some variations 
between their manifestations. Where these differences are believed to make a causal 
difference, these differences will be mentioned. The theories are considered in order: 
competence, interests, and values. 
 
The theories of improved efficiency and effectiveness (C1) and performance transparency 
(C3) are manifested by both e-services. It was clear from the within-case analyses that 
both e-services brought about significant improvements to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public sector entities along a variety of dimensions. The greatest gains 
for the SII are capacity improvements resulting from automatisation of previously manual 
processes. The gains from ChileCompra came mainly from the improved information 
flow by use of the inter- and intranets that reduces information asymmetries, brings 
together a wider variety of suppliers, and leverages centralised buying (e-catalogue) to 
take advantage of improved market competitiveness. 
 
How were these internal procedural improvements perceived? In the case of the e-tax 
system, people noted the improved effectiveness of the system through fairly tangible 
outcomes such as consistent service, reduced time to receive tax returns, and shorter wait 
times at the SII’s offices. For ChileCompra, the most relevant cues were the unchanged 
time to receive payment for goods and services rendered. This implied to the suppliers 
that despite the technology, the technological changes were mostly cosmetic and that the 
procurement process continued as before. Indicative of this is the fact that the greatest 
efficiencies achieved, such as through the e-catalogue, did not emerge as a trustworthy 
factor for suppliers. Furthermore, in neither of the cases did people refer to the 
performance transparency information on the web page as a source of knowledge about 
the efficiency or effectiveness of the service. The overarching theme is that internal 
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changes were generally not perceived directly (how could they be?), and instead users 
relied on tangible outcomes of the services to place their judgements.400  
 
The e-service qualities of offering user benefits (I1) and having a high e-service quality 
(I2) were perceived and interpreted in roughly the same manner. User benefits are by 
definition tangible outcomes of the service. Therefore, it is not surprising that they 
proved to be highly salient trustworthiness cues. It is instructive to compare the two 
services, however, to see how they were perceived as delivering user benefits differently 
and what the resultant outcomes were. The e-tax service delivered several unambiguous 
user benefits such as time and cost savings. The benefits from ChileCompra on the other 
hand were mostly potential benefits found in increased opportunities. The key factor, 
over time, was whether or not these benefits were realised. If a business made a sale, then 
they perceived the benefit and viewed is as positive. If not, then other interpretations, 
generally less positive, ensue.401 E-service quality was also perceived and interpreted 
much as a user benefit. For the e-tax system, ease of use was the equivalent of a direct 
user benefit – less personal effort required. For ChileCompra, the service was viewed as 
useful to the extent that it provides potential opportunities. For example, suppliers would 
take advantage of the online information, considered highly useful, to improve future bid 
prospects and better understand the market.  
 
The possibilities for voice, (I3) while existing and used in both e-services, did not prove 
to be a relevant trustworthy cue for those interviewed. There are a few possible reasons 
for this. The most straightforward explanation is that in neither case was there a chance 
for truly participatory interaction. The communication channels for feedback are mostly 
limited to complaints and questions. While this may be helpful at times, perhaps it only 
weakly indicates an alignment of interests and does not impact on the underlying policy 
reality.  
 
                                                 
400
 Glaser argues that “gains in efficiency and productivity go unrecognized by the average citizen (Glaser 
1999, p. 50). 
 
401
 The nature of this dynamic will be taken up in more detail in the Trust balance section below (8.2). 
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There are some alternative explanations. First, this may be a unique Chilean cultural 
artefact, given their relative deference to authority. Second, it could be a manifestation of 
the subgroup interviewed, most of whom were of lower socio-economic status. This 
group may already feel limited in their inclusion in the overall economic system, 
reducing their motivation to complain or give feedback. Finally, the inability for online 
feedback to truly alter and align interests may be a due to the currently inherent level of 
non-responsiveness of public service bureaucracies that are not designed to respond to 
citizen input. Simply introducing new channels of communication does not 
fundamentally alter the nature of the bureaucracy. 
 
Institutional transparency and accountability (I4) were manifested to a limited extent in 
both cases. For the e-tax system, the posting of the rules of the game and the information 
that the SII had on the citizens do constrain what the SII can do, where legal recourse was 
theoretically possible if the SII deviated from the rules. This is a form of constraint 
through pre-commitment. This, however, was not perceived at all by citizens as a means 
of transparency and accountability. ChileCompra, on the other hand, was designed 
specifically with transparency in mind and has dramatically increased the transparency of 
the public sector purchasing process. Notably, according to the survey data, the e-tax 
system is perceived as more transparent than ChileCompra. This is also especially 
curious given that ChileCompra appears to bring the potential to hold public sector 
entities to account for their purchases whereas there is not much potential accountability 
with the SII (citizens fear and are accountable to the SII, not the other way around). 
 
The data offer one explanation of this phenomenon that also helps to indicate how 
institutional transparency and accountability might impact on trust judgements. Consider 
the e-tax system. An analysis of what people noticed about the respective e-services is 
instructive here. For the SII, the information offered online (namely, the rules of the 
game, the information held by the SII of the taxpayer, and the activities of the SII) was 
generally perceived on a need-to-know basis. Many taxpayers simply would accept the 
tax proposals made by the SII without giving it much more than a cursory check. Others, 
who had more detailed tax dealings, would go online looking up information pertaining 
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to them. For ChileCompra, the ex post purchasing information was most relevant for 
businesses in terms of structuring future business proposals rather than as an 
accountability mechanism. Furthermore, the very relevant bid decision process was 
salient for every business person. The common thread here is that the most relevant 
information is not seen as a means to hold an institution accountable, but rather as a 
means to accomplish a personal end, be that understanding ones tax situation or 
improving future bids. 
 
The perception of reduced corruption (I5) differed between the two services: it was 
negligible for the e-tax service while it had a differential impact stemming from the 
inherent discretion that remained in the procurement process. For the SII, it had most 
likely had no impact as the SII started from a relatively low level of corruption, and as a 
result there was no direct interaction of people with corrupt practices, before or after the 
e-tax system. The public sector purchasing process also is not considered corrupt. For 
ChileCompra, most interviewees reported that corruption was reduced to a limited extent, 
but that highly motivated procurement officers could engage in improper practices if they 
desired. More poignant, however, was the number of suppliers who noted the inability of 
ChileCompra to reduce corruption entirely, with some arguing that the procurement 
process was fundamentally unaltered. In particular, suppliers focused on two cues: their 
own experience engaging in under the table practices and the inability of ChileCompra to 
make the bid selection process transparent. This was perceived negatively by those 
suppliers who had difficulty winning bids. The key here is that in the ChileCompra case 
there remained a highly noticeable degree of discretion that limited the extent to which 
corruption could be reduced. The perception of that reduction then depended highly upon 
the outcomes of the process. Those who win do not focus on corruption as an issue and 
those who that do not win bids find corruption a central problem. 
 
The theory that removing unnecessary discretion tends to build trust (V3) is akin to the 
theory of reduced corruption (I5) and power asymmetries (I6). In this case, many 
taxpayers had previously had unpleasant experiences interacting with SII employees who 
were seen as wielding too much discretionary power. This produced an environment of 
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fear of potential arbitrary behaviour. While the extent of the arbitrary behaviour is 
unknown, the psychological factor of the power imbalance and fear implies that most 
interactions will be interpreted in a negative light. Moving online, in this case, represents 
a reduction in this discretion, and was thus welcomed by those who had the unpleasant 
prior experiences. The discretion in the public sector purchasing process is situated in the 
two stages of tender specification and bid selection. For most, the technology only works 
to partially constrain this discretionary power. Consequently, moving online has not 
made a major difference in this respect. The major difference between the two services is 
that the e-tax service addresses the source of the discretion directly, and ChileCompra 
does so only partially. Overall, however, it did not seem to play a huge factor in 
influencing trust opinions.  
 
An overview of the findings with respect to all the theories established in Chapter 4 can 
be seen below in Table 56, Table 57, and Table 58. 
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Institutional trust and  
e-government hypotheses 
Impact on institutional 
trustworthiness 
Impact on institutional 
trust 
C1 Efficiency/effectiveness I: E-
services perceived to be more 
effective and efficient (faster, 
more accurate, cost savings) will 
tend to build trust. 
Increased efficiencies and 
effectiveness found in both e-
services, mostly through process 
automation. 
The only perceived internal 
efficiency and effectiveness 
changes were those 
associated with direct user 
cost/benefits. Otherwise, 
citizens did not appear to 
notice internal changes. 
C2 Efficiency/effectiveness II: E-
government services that improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the service at the institutions 
office will tend to build trust. 
Only relevant for the SII with 
improved information for front 
line civil servants at point of 
contact and reduced wait times. 
Reduced wait time was a 
trustworthy cue indicating 
improved competence. 
C3 Performance transparency I: 
Performance transparency that 
meets the citizen’s expectations 
will tend to build trust. 
Macro-level performance 
indicators were placed online. 
These indicators did not 
serve as trustworthy cues.  
C4 Performance transparency II: 
Performance transparency that is 
linked to effective accountability 
mechanisms will tend to build 
trust. 
Macro-level performance 
indicators online, but no link 
with accountability mechanisms. 
Not tested in either case. 
Table 56  Comparative findings of trustworthiness and trust outcomes with respect to competence 
theories. 
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Institutional trust and  
e-government hypotheses 
Impact on institutional 
trustworthiness 
Impact on institutional 
trust 
I1 User benefits: E-services that 
bring user benefits will tend to 
increase trust. 
E-tax system brought cost and 
time savings to the citizen. 
ChileCompra brought potential 
opportunities for suppliers. 
Real user benefits were powerful 
trustworthiness cues, whereas 
theoretical potentials were only 
cues if realised. 
I2 E-service quality: Good e-
services quality indicates the 
consideration of the institution of 
the citizen’s interests and 
therefore will tend to build trust. 
Both services improved ease of 
service. Both services are 
obligatory and therefore useful 
in that respect. 
Ease of service and usefulness 
were interpreted with respect to 
user benefits. 
I3 Voice: The provision of 
information that enables increased 
participatory interaction and 
increased possibilities for voice 
through e-service feedback 
mechanisms (e-mail, comments) 
will tend to build trust. 
Voice mechanisms were 
manifested in both e-services, 
through e-mail and online 
complaint systems. 
Voice mechanisms were not 
perceived as trustworthiness cues. 
This hints at the difficulties of 
feedback to align interests. 
I4 Institutional transparency and 
accountability: Increased 
transparency made possible 
through the increased visibility of 
internal processes and service 
outcomes accompanied by 
perceived effective accountability 
mechanisms will tend to build 
trust. 
Evident in ChileCompra case 
through the publishing of public 
sector procurement processes. 
The information made 
transparent by the SII (rules of 
the game, citizen information) is 
an indication of credible 
commitment.  
Did not emerge as a salient 
trustworthy cue because people 
did not view the information in 
terms of accountability. For 
ChileCompra, people were highly 
sensitive to the limits of 
transparency (areas of discretion 
such as bid decision).  
I5 Reduced corruption: A 
perceived reduction of corruption 
due to the computerisation and 
rationalisation of government 
processes will tend to build trust. 
Technology constrains 
corruption for both services. The 
e-tax system reduces potential 
for corruption during the manual 
transfer of data. ChileCompra 
constrains discretionary activity 
of public procurement, although 
within limits. 
Not perceived with e-tax system, 
probably because corruption was 
not an issue. For ChileCompra, 
impact was limited due to 
remaining discretion surrounding 
pivotal stages of public 
procurement (e.g., bid selection).  
I6 Big brother: Increased power 
from e-services through the 
accumulation of information 
results in increased coercion and 
control will tend to destroy trust. Both I6 and I7 are only relevant 
for the e-tax service. 
 
Power differential were not 
perceived by most users. Data 
was inconclusive on the impacts 
of improved services in reducing 
the impact of power asymmetries. 
It may be that power asymmetries 
are only noticed when they 
manifest negative consequences.  
I7 Soft sister: Increased power 
from e-services through the 
accumulation of information 
results in improved services and 
user benefits will have differential 
effects depending upon the focus 
and sensitivities of the citizen. 
Table 57  Comparative findings of the trustworthiness and trust outcomes with respect to aligned 
interests theories. 
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Institutional trust and 
e-government theory 
Impact on institutional 
trustworthiness 
Impact on institutional 
trust 
V1 Overlapping values: It is not 
clear a priori how values will 
overlap as they are associated 
with a wide variety of institutional 
factors. Trust outcome is therefore 
unclear.  
Unclear outcomes due to 
conflicting value systems 
evident in both e-services. 
Not tested. Too ambiguous an 
original theory.  
V2 Citizen compliance: If an e-
service increases citizen 
compliance without being 
perceived as an overly invasive 
big brother institution than this 
will tend to increase trust. 
Only applicable to the e-tax 
system. Objectively increased 
citizen compliance. 
Not a salient trustworthy cue. 
V3 Remove unnecessary street-
level discretion: E-services that 
remove unnecessary street-level 
discretion and increase perceived 
impartiality will tend to build 
trust. 
Decreased discretion in e-tax 
system as compared to dealing 
with SII employees. 
Procurement officers have 
limited discretion through CC, 
although it still remains in the 
specification and selection 
stages. 
Same responses as to I4, except 
that those who had previously 
negative personal interaction with 
SII employees preferred to move 
online.  
V4 Distributive justice: E-services 
that create distributive justice 
(e.g. provide a service for the 
poor) and the distributive justice 
value is held by the citizen will 
tend to increase trust. 
ChileCompra increases 
opportunities for small 
businesses and therefore should 
build trust. The e-tax system is 
embedded in a system with 
competing values. 
Resultant judgement was 
generally dependent upon the 
citizen’s success with the system. 
Table 58  Comparative findings of trustworthiness and trust outcomes with respect to aligned values 
theories. 
 
 
8.1.4 DISCUSSION: A TRUST HEURISTIC 
A pattern emerges from the comparative analysis: people perceive trustworthiness cues 
and use them to make judgments of the public sector based upon experiences or 
information that is highly relevant to their lives or business. This finding matches with 
other studies that show that citizens use direct personal interaction with government 
officials and agencies as a source of political information (Bok 1997, Kumlin 2004, Soss 
1999). Recall that Bok found that people evaluated government agencies more positively 
if they had direct contact with them rather than only through secondhand information. 
This shows that direct contact is an important source of information for judging 
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government agencies. The significance of relevant experiences or information is also 
indicated by the importance given by users to direct user benefits. For example, 
achievements of transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness were commonly perceived 
through the lens of received payments, tax returns completed in a timely manner, the 
ability to find out how to do a more complex tax process, and how to better price a future 
bid.  On the other hand, online information that is not relevant to achieving a goal (e.g., 
performance indicators, information about rules and regulations that are unrelated to an 
individuals’ tax proposal, information about public sector sales) is either not noticed, or 
plays at best an indirect role in determining people’s perceptions.  
 
The theory of trust established in Chapter 3 provides some insight and theoretical support 
for these findings. Recall that trustworthiness cues are second best indicators of 
trustworthiness as it is not possible to fully know the true underlying motivation behind a 
person or agency’s actions. The point of that discussion was that making a trust judgment 
is an epistemic problem of assessing the meaning and relative trustworthiness of 
trustworthiness cues. This raises issues of the visibility, clarity of criteria 
(comprehensibility), memorability, and ease of imitation (is it easy to fake?) of these 
cues. The trustworthiness cues relied upon by the e-service users score high on all of 
these criteria. What is more visible to a user than a direct user benefit? Who could miss 
the fact that they received their tax return in the mail in two weeks when before it took 
months? Who would not notice or appreciate a shorter waiting line or a sudden increase 
of sales activity to the public sector? Not only are these examples visible, but they are 
both easily understood and memorable. You may not understand the tax systems rules 
and regulations, but you can understand the experience of completing a once onerous tax 
process for free and in five minutes. Finally, these factors are almost impossible to fake. 
The municipality either sends the payment on time or it does not. You either wait for 
under thirty minutes or you do not. The computer either gives you the information you 
need to inform a future bid, or it does not. It can not act like it gives you the information, 
but not really give it. Perhaps one might believe for a while that the e-services are 
intentionally (or through incompetence) providing inaccurate information. This 
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information, however, is open to verification against one’s knowledge of the market and 
any future use of the information to make successful bids. 
 
The other trustworthiness cues do not satisfy these criteria so well. For example, consider 
the central form of transparency behind ChileCompra; that is, the publishing of public 
purchases. Theoretically, such information should build trust as it opens up the public 
sector entity to public scrutiny. However, while it may influence the motivations of civil 
servants working in the public sector entities, citizens do not appear to rely on it as a 
trustworthy cue. This cue may be relatively visible (through a bit of exploration on the 
website for the motivated citizen), but it is certainly not easily understood. Understanding 
implies the ability to make a normative judgment of the appropriateness, quality, and 
price (among other factors) of the purchases. However, on what basis would a citizen 
judge this information? How can they possibly know enough to make an informed 
judgement as to the qualities of any particular purchase?  This was expressed by one CC 
user, 
“I understand transparency as – to say, in this case, to show the amounts that the 
state spends. But not if we have bought well or bought poorly, or according to the 
norms. The numbers are there… No one knows if it was necessary or not… In 
reality, nobody knows if the purchases were well done because nobody is expert 
enough to know…”402  
 
Performance transparency indicators are also relatively visible (on the web page, perhaps 
on the front page),403 easily understood (distilled into macro indicators), and memorable 
(e.g. public sector savings were high). However, performance indicators are problematic 
for building trust. This is potentially for several reasons: (a) indicators are easily 
interpreted as susceptible to manipulation,404 (b) as governmental complexity grows, so 
does the complexity of the development and comprehension of performance measures, 
and (c) governments have multiple performance objectives and most citizens do not have 
                                                 
402
 Interviewee: SII-CC-11. 
403
 That said, in these two cases, the data placed online was not highly visible as people generally did not 
spend much time perusing the web page, instead proceeding as straightforwardly as possible to achieve 
their objective. 
404
 Especially if you subscribe to the expression, “There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and 
statistics…” – Samuel Clemens 
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the comprehension of these dimensions and their associated societal implications to 
effectively judge (Glaser 1999, p. 49). In this sense, it is logical that the more direct user 
benefits would prove a more powerful information source. Furthermore, many of these 
outcome indicators may not refer to direct benefits to the particular user, which if the 
findings here hold, further weakens it as a trustworthy cue.  
 
Fundamentally, transparency as a trust building mechanisms is ambiguous. For example 
good performance may be deemed poor due to inflated performance expectations (Miller 
and Listhaug 1999). Transparency may make processes more visible, but this increased 
transparency may lead to increased distrust if it increases exposure of flaws, or corruption 
that otherwise would not seen the light of day (O'Hara 2004, p. 257). 
 
This discussion so far has been predicated on the assumption that the problem of 
institutional trust, for a user, is how to make a judgement about the internal workings of a 
public sector institution without having access to that information. The user might have 
only limited knowledge about how government bureaucracies work. As Hardin (1991, 
1998) argued, this is an epistemically difficult problem. However, it appears that citizens 
have found a way around this problem. Users employ a relatively simple trust heuristic 
that is exceedingly rational and cognitively efficient. People’s rationality and time are, of 
course, limited. Thus, rather than engaging in a theoretical analysis of the impacts of ICT 
on the public sector bureaucracy, they use the simple technique of interpreting 
trustworthy cues of service outcomes that directly impact on their lives. While this is 
certainly not a radical insight, if taken to heart it alters how we might think about e-
services and institutional trust, as discussed below (section 8.3).  
 
While this trust heuristic relies on information that is readily available without extra work 
and easy to incorporate cognitively, the cues are not always accurate portrayals of what is 
happening in the public sector. In the case of assessing the performance of the SII, 
judgement based on the speed of the tax return does appear to reflect real internal 
efficiency improvements. Judgements that ChileCompra limits discretion and corruption 
but does not eliminate it also correspond with the trustworthiness analysis. However, 
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objective data show that small businesses have increased their participation in the public 
sector market but that this information is not perceived by all suppliers. Instead, their 
personal experience of success or failure leads to a generalisation beyond their situation 
to the set of small businesses in general. Trust heuristics may be cognitively efficient, but 
this epistemic efficiency leaves room for error. 
 
8.2  TRUST IN THE BALANCE  
Thus far the discussion has been relatively limited in its consideration of the interactivity 
of different trustworthiness cues and individuals’ interpretations. A deeper analysis 
reveals that there are some dynamic tendencies that shape people’s interpretations and 
can help to explain some of the variation in responses to the e-services. This dynamic is 
described here using the metaphor of a balance (or a scale) to express the idea that a 
user’s trust judgment can tip one way or another, depending upon what side you place the 
most weight. In this case, the two sides of the balance are the conflicting values that 
provide logical and plausible explanations for users’ interactions with the e-service. What 
often tips the scale in favour of one explanation or the other is the user’s experience in 
terms of the direct benefits of the system. The resultant explanation then constitutes the 
citizen’s trustworthiness assessment of the institution. 
 
8.2.1 ICT IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND VALUE CONFLICTS 
The discussion so far has not delved deeply into the role of users’ values systems in 
shaping their expectations, perceptions, and interpretations of their interactions with e-
services. Recall that expectations emerge from an individual’s personal value system, and 
trustworthy cues that reflect different values will have differential effects depending upon 
their overlap with the user’s values. Given this, no institutional trustworthiness and trust 
analysis is complete without an analysis of the diversity of interests and values that are 
met and represented by the institutions and activities of government.  
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A central feature of democratic governance is the institutionalisation of processes to settle 
conflicts of interest discursively rather than coercively.405 Democracy, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, is in its essence an institutionalisation of distrust. This implies that the points 
of conflicts between interests and values are precarious points for trust. Here we can learn 
from the post-modern approach to the study of public administration that seeks to “bring 
out the inherent contradictions of Western political systems that formally subscribe to 
clearly defined constitutional forms whilst actually these forms are deeply flawed in 
practice” (Taylor 1998, p. 27). Taking such a perspective, Frissen (1998), lists several 
ways that ICT implementations in the public sector have contradictory tendencies. One 
implication of this perspective is that the outcomes not only fall on a continuum from 
incremental to transformative, but that they can also be both normatively positive and 
negative (Bellamy and Taylor 1998, Brewer et al. 2006, Frissen 1998). In the same vein, 
e-services can be concurrently trustworthy and not trustworthy, depending upon the 
interest or value perspective taken by the user. 
 
Significantly, the existence and influence of value conflicts emerged as a central and 
recurring theme in this comparative analysis. It is well understood that technology, 
including software and hardware, can embed political values (Introna and Nissenbaum 
2000, Winner 1986), and in the public sector, these political values “have constitutional 
importance” (Nye Jr. 2002, p. 14). Ultimately, any policy represents a conflict of interests 
and values on some level as it alters who gets what and when, and an e-service is no 
different (Brewer et al. 2006). In general the introduction of technology either magnifies 
or alters the foci of already existing contradictions. 
 
There were several identifiable value conflicts, or points of tension, that emerged across 
both studies. The nature of these conflicts differed according to the e-service. Several 
value conflicts were identified: 
                                                 
405
 Furthermore, what the inherent values of democratic institutions are is not entirely uncontested. 
Consequently, there are several normative models of the scope and goal of government; that is what 
government should do (Nye Jr. 1997). There are, for example, a variety of notions of public interest and 
consequently competing claims to trustworthiness (Barber 1983, p. 67). Complicating the matter is that 
users can also hold conflicting values simultaneously. For example, in the US, people can simultaneously 
demand lower taxes and higher spending (Nye Jr. and Zelikow 1997).  
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• Transparency (fair and impartial) versus necessity of local discretion 
(partiality) – Where there is necessary local discretion, for example in 
professional bureaucracies, transparency is at best ex post and limited. Complete 
transparency is difficult as it requires a description of a subjective decision 
making process involving difficult to quantify activities such as intuition and trust 
stemming from past experience. There are also situations where time constraints 
restrict the possibility of real-time transparency, such as a week-long open public 
procurement process. For example, in the health sector, sometimes medicine 
needs to be purchased immediately and thus some transparency is sacrificed to 
meet these ends.406 Such situations run an increased risk of being seen as partial 
or corrupt. Thus, there is a balance between the level and nature of transparency 
and the exigencies of real-time bureaucratic activity.  
• Competition and efficiency versus equality (social and economic justice) – 
Some e-government applications can bring the benefit of hard-coding equity into 
the system (Reddick 2005). However, this is not always the case. Two central 
goals of ChileCompra are (1) to promote social and economic justice by providing 
opportunities for small and micro enterprises to sell to the public sector, and (2) to 
create efficiencies in the public sector through increased competition. From the 
perspective of the DCCP, positive strides have been made in both these directions. 
However, from the perspective of the supplier, these goals may be seen to conflict 
(Hussmann 2004, p. 34). For all suppliers, increased competition means lowered 
profit margins if they make sales. For those small and micro businesses that are 
able to sell to the public sector, ChileCompra has increased their opportunities. 
However, for those that cannot sell to the public sector given the increased 
competition or other difficulties, it is not viewed as a benefit for small or micro 
enterprises. This tension is also found in the use of the e-catalogue to obtain 
higher efficiencies. The most efficient approach for the DCCP is to incorporate 
several large suppliers and not bother with the small businesses that may not have 
                                                 
406
 As explained by one public sector CC user,  
“You have to understand what one is trying to make transparent, one cannot put transparency 
before the urgency of health care. There are emergencies, people need medications and they are 
often not manufactured in Chile…” source: WB-PS-CC-4. 
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the resources to make large scale deals with the government at reduced prices. 
Thus, from the perspective of the user, the quest to gain efficiencies through 
market mechanisms is in tension with the goal of increasing opportunities for 
small businesses. 
• Self versus communal interest (greater good and fairness) – This tension 
emerges from the ability of the e-tax system to increase citizen compliance. From 
a citizen’s perspective, increased tax compliance through enhanced technical 
capacities can be seen as positive (it is an obligation to pay taxes and it can result 
in a social good – communal interest) and negative (now I have to pay taxes – 
self-interest). In fact, it appears that a person can hold both of these opinions 
concurrently. An important component of a citizen’s view of the communal 
interest appears to be their perception of fairness that extends beyond the scope of 
the technology. For example, the perception of the e-tax system was altered by the 
taxpayer’s understanding of the fairness of the existing tax regime (is it 
progressive or regressive?), the perceived fairness of fines or penalties as a result 
of not fully meeting tax obligations, and how taxes are spent by government (do 
they receive adequate services for their taxes?) Especially critical is the citizen 
judgment if the technology applies equally to differing groups – for example, does 
the increased tax compliance come at the expense of taxpayers in a lower socio-
economic status and leave big businesses out of it? 
• Power versus improved services – The tensions between big brother 
technologies and their concurrent emergence with high-quality e-services has 
been discussed in detail. The fundamental tension here is that while the SII has 
increasingly improved its services (potentially improving trust) it has increased its 
power making trust more precarious. A classic example of this is the balance 
between efficiency and accountability. If an agency prioritises efficiency (to get 
better services) it must reduce control mechanisms (accountability) of key 
processes and therefore increases its own discretionary power over those 
processes (Pegnato 1997). 
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These four tensions illustrate how the introduction of technology into democratic 
governance structures may shift conflicts of interests and values. There are probably 
more tensions that were not mentioned here.407  
 
What makes these points of tension so important is that each value system gives rise to 
the possible set of available explanations users employ to understand the e-services. For 
example, depending upon your perspective,408 personal value system, and available 
information, it is possible to interpret ChileCompra as a) beneficial for the state in that it 
brings transparency and increases efficiency, b) not really increasing or changing the 
transparency of public procurement, c) good for small businesses who have increased 
opportunities, and d) fundamentally biased against small businesses due to increased 
competition and lowered prices. Likewise, the SII can be seen as a) providing a great user 
benefit, b) a compassionless institution focused on maximising their tax revenues at the 
expense of the taxpayer, c) a benefit to society as it provides funds for government 
services, and d) an expanding instrument of power that perpetuates a fundamentally 
unequal society. To add to the complexity, it is possible for one person to hold several, 
even conflicting, interpretations at the same time (Lakoff 2002, pp. 14-16).  
 
8.2.2 PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 
One question still remains: what makes a user decide on these different possible 
interpretations of the e-services? What is it about an e-service that may tip a person to see 
one value over another? The answer proposed here is direct user experience, and in 
particular, user benefits – the centrally salient trustworthy cue – that provides the weight 
to tip the balance. 
 
The argument here is simple. The first aspect has been established in the earlier analysis, 
but merits reiteration. Personal experience, and in particular, user benefits are a highly 
salient and forceful trustworthy cue when citizens make judgments about the activities of 
                                                 
407
 For example, there might be an emerging tension between the increased ease of use of a service and the 
generation and encouragement of informed and involved citizens. 
408
 Major determinants of this perspective are your position relative to the rest of society (Sen 1993). 
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the public sector.409 The importance of the experience of user benefits (and costs) is that 
they appear to highly colour the resultant interpretation of trustworthiness cues.  
 
Examples of this interactive dynamic between user benefits and other trustworthiness 
cues were scattered throughout the within-case analysis. For example, one cue that was 
visible, memorable, easily understandable, and hard to fake was the efficiency gains 
made by ChileCompra through achieving better prices. While this could be seen in a 
positive light if the supplier would take a broader perspective, it is instead interpreted as a 
challenge to their bottom line. In the worst case scenario, it is seen antagonistically as a 
tactic of big businesses driving out opportunities for small businesses to compete. The 
key, however, is that this later interpretation is made by those who were not able to sell to 
the public sector. This dynamic has not gone unnoticed by some members of the public 
sector. For example, as one DCCP manager described,  
“When a provider is the one that benefits from these actions, they are all for it, but 
when it is someone else’s turn to win an offer, ‘the system is corrupt!’”410  
“…the subject of transparency is relative… what’s been the riskiest thing is that 
people can do things that… they can imagine things… that’s why you have to try 
to do everything as objectively as possible.”411 
 
Another example is how power asymmetries between the SII and citizens became salient 
for small business owners. Their experiences of losing the ability to issue invoices as a 
punishment for late taxes brought this power asymmetry into stark relief. This contrasts 
with the many citizens who would freely enjoy the benefits of a much improved tax 
service, without worry about the big brother implications. Those who were subject to 
punitive damages were much more likely to focus on the power and unaligned motives of 
the SII and citizens than were those who had not had similar experiences. 
 
It is now possible to be clearer about how these experiences colour interpretations; they 
provide evidence for one competing explanation over another. For example, the 
                                                 
409
 Exemplary of this, when asked about the trustworthiness of the SII one user responded, “I think so. 
Because it is the experience that makes you doubt, if they are trustworthy or not. And up until now they 
have been good. No problems,” source: SII-CC-8/9. 
410
 Interviewee: WB-DCCP-9. 
411
 Interviewee: WB-PS-CC-2. 
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application of a harsh fine is evidence for increased power and callousness rather than 
increased benevolence as represented by an easy to use e-service (it also negates to some 
extent the user benefits). In fact, one might interpret the new easy to use e-tax service as 
an extension of their desire to collect more money from citizens rather than an effort to 
make taxpayers’ lives easier, as several interviewees did. Conversely, if you have only 
had easy experiences with the SII and the e-service and your return checks have been 
received in the mail on-time, then this is evidence that they are capable and upright. Or, if 
your small business is able to increase its sales to the public sector then this is evidence 
for the increased opportunities for small and micro enterprises (see Figure 33). 
 
User 
Experience
“ChileCompra is made for 
big businesses in Santiago.”
Explanation
“ChileCompra provides 
opportunities for small 
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Figure 33  A depiction of the trust balance; the dynamics of user experience, values, and resultant 
user explanations. 
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The final step in this dynamic is that these competing explanations represent judgments 
of the value system of the activities of a public sector entity. You can see the tax agency 
as fundamentally benevolent or malevolent (aligned versus competing interests). For 
example, ChileCompra either increases small business opportunities or favours large 
businesses, it is either transparent or nothing has changed. The evidence for adopting an 
interpretation in line with these competing values is the information gleaned from user 
experience. This evidence is then incorporated into a set of beliefs that align with that 
value and provide a coherent explanation for that behaviour. This explanation, then, is the 
user’s interpretation of the interaction and the consequent “knowledge” that they have 
gained to incorporate into their trust judgement.  
 
This dynamic highlights an important insight: not all value tensions are equal with 
respect to their importance for e-services and building institutional trust. The data here 
suggest that those value tensions that are more directly linked to direct outcomes will be 
more important to the trust dynamic. This gives a clue to when these different value 
tensions will become relevant. For example, the two value tensions that emerge with 
ChileCompra (equality versus competition, discretion versus transparency) are directly 
visible to suppliers through day-to-day interaction. Almost every transaction is an 
important data point that provides support for one explanation or another. On the other 
hand, both sides of the e-tax value tensions are not subject to the same amount of data 
points. For example, power/improved services dynamic only becomes an issue if there 
have been costs associated that bring attention to the power asymmetry. The self versus 
communal interest tension is predictably subjected to a lot of experiences that weigh in 
the self-interest value side, but precious few, if any, on the communal benefits side 
(especially considering the indirect nature of the benefits of taxes). Such a dynamic 
would explain why ChileCompra has a wider set of divergent opinions than the e-tax 
system. 
 
It must be reiterated to avoid the risk of misinterpretation that this simplistic dynamic 
represents a tendency. There are, most certainly, a variety of other sources that will alter 
the dynamic, including previous experiences with the e-service and institution and 
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relative (to the individual) importance of the competing values. The argument here is that 
the power of user benefits is strong, and thus this pattern should be empirically evident in 
any study of the impacts of e-services. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that e-
services such as the tax online system and ChileCompra represent a significant enough 
discontinuity from the previous services. At the moments of discovery and interaction 
with new e-services, it seems as if user benefits are also powerful and salient trustworthy 
cues. 
 
8.2.3 OTHER EVIDENCE 
The validity of the findings here in terms of the existence and operation of the trust 
balance depicted above is strengthened if they are also evidenced in other research. One 
study, conducted by MacManus (1991) provides evidence for the importance of personal 
position and experience in the shaping of their evaluation of interaction with the 
government.412 MacManus conducted a survey of over 3,000 businesses in the US to find 
out what they thought of selling to the US government. Two of the relevant findings 
were: 
• Firms that had never received a contract were the least likely to see practices as 
fair and impartial. 
• There was also a sentiment by one-fourth of the firms that too much competition 
pushed prices too low for their firms to compete. Most interestingly, however, 
“…businesses that saw themselves as noncompetitive were most likely to lay 
the blame on the procurement process, not on themselves. They were likely to 
believe that they would have been competitive if government purchasing 
decisions were based on more than just price” (MacManus 1991, p. 335).  
In other words, like ChileCompra, suppliers’ evaluative judgement of the procurement 
process depended upon their specific outcomes and took the form of competing values, in 
this case between fairness and competition. 
 
8.3  REVISITING E-SERVICES AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST  
If the above findings hold, there are interesting theoretical implications for how we 
should think about the institutional trust and e-services: a) institutional trust is relational 
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 Note that the MacManus study was found after the analysis was completed. 
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and dynamic, b) a major component of citizens’ trust is predicated on inductive 
experiential learning from tangible service outcomes rather than theoretical 
considerations, c) self-interest considerations will tend to dominate, and d) the relative 
importance of competence and motivation will differ depending upon the level of salient 
discretion remaining in the e-service. 
 
Before delving into these implications, it is important to keep in mind two limiting 
aspects of this discussion. First, we are talking about institutions that are using e-services. 
Second, citizens are directly interacting with the institution through this e-service. This 
eliminates many institutions such as the judicial branch and the parliamentary body. 
Furthermore, there are, as mentioned, indirect influences that are certainly important, but 
not of concern here. 
 
8.3.1 TRUSTWORTHY VERSUS TRUSTED INSTITUTIONS 
Definitions of institutional trust in the literature are incomplete. The definitions focus on 
particular institutional structures and characteristics in which it is argued that citizens 
should or should not (do or do not) place their trust. However, this notion of institutional 
trust does not fit with citizens’ experiences and behaviours. Recall that institutional trust, 
according to Warren, requires three conditions: (1) institutions are defined by norms that 
both the truster and trustee know and the trustee is expected to follow, (2) the truster can 
effectively monitor (or know that others are monitoring) the trustee, and (3) the 
institution has effective accountability mechanisms if the trustee diverges from the 
norms. However, as Hardin argues and as is evident in this thesis, citizens appear to reach 
their judgments based on very little information (contra condition 2), without knowledge 
of the rules and norms that define the institution (contra condition 1), and in institutions 
with non-obvious accountability measures (contra condition 3). 
 
The notion of institutional trust promulgated in the literature is a normative institution-
centric position. The argument is that if a democratic process were fair, impartial, and 
participatory, rational citizens would trust them. Given this formulation, if a citizen does 
not trust in such a process, it might be explained away as a result of a mistaken 
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judgement based on a limited rationality and access to information. The argument is that 
if the citizen really knew what was going on, they would trust the process.413 This, 
however, is not a theory of institutional trust, but rather a theory of institutional 
trustworthiness. That is, institutional trust has been defined from some abstract 
“objective” understanding of how trust ought to be. This is not a standard for measuring 
institutional trust. Rather, it is a recipe for institutional design to create trustworthy 
institutions. 
 
If, as appears to be supported by the data in this thesis, trustworthiness is relative to 
individuals and their expectations and values, then institutional trustworthiness is not 
necessarily a good theory of institutional trust. The movement from trustworthiness cues 
to trust is where institutional trust is built or destroyed. These two theories, then, need to 
be understood separately. On the one hand, we need a theory of how to build objectively 
trustworthy institutions that perform competently and hold to higher democratic values 
such as inclusion and impartiality. On the other hand, we need a theory of how to build 
trusted institutions. How an institution engenders citizens’ trust is, as we have seen here, 
clearly not necessarily connected with some universally recognised notion of 
trustworthiness.  
 
8.3.2 THE EXPANDED ROLE OF INDUCTIVE TRUST  
The differentiation between trustworthy and trusted institutions brings attention to what 
constitutes the object of trust. For arguments sake, consider the implications of accepting 
institutional trust as it is commonly defined. If a citizen trusts in an institution, they trust 
in the institutional rules and norms, and the impartiality of particular institutionalised 
processes. However, when talking with citizens, there does not appear to be some “shared 
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 For example, institutional trust should satisfy Baier’s “expressibility test” where “If one did know the 
conditions of the trust relationship and would nonetheless remain in the relationship” (Warren 1999d) 
(emphasis in original). 
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knowledge of institutional rules” that are well enough known to underwrite trust.414 This 
implies that citizens must place their trust based on a theoretical understanding of the 
working of a public sector administration that is perhaps reinforced through personal 
experience. While theorists are theoretical, e-service users appear more reality based. As 
Hardin argues, citizens have little if any first hand knowledge of the actual operation of 
these processes. Citizens’ trust judgements appear based on an inductive inference of 
trustworthiness gleaned from information from personal experiences rather than from 
theoretical knowledge of the rules and processes of a particular bureaucratic entity. 
Rather than the power of theoretical understanding of the role of technology, it is the 
power of real outcomes that appear to shape people’s perceptions the most. The evidence 
here points to the epistemic issue that it is impossible – and probably irrational – to judge 
the trustworthiness of a public entity based upon a theoretical understanding of the 
potential of technology. People understand that computers may constrain civil servants’ 
discretion, but they do not internalise that reality until they experience it somehow 
themselves. Computers may bring efficiency, but citizens do not realise it until they see 
the tangible improvements in service. Thus, when thinking about building institutional 
trust through e-services, theorists need to shift their focus to include not just the 
theoretical potential of technology, but instead the tangible outcomes of the technology as 
they are manifested and relevant to individuals.  
 
It should be noted that citizens do not focus mostly on practical user outcomes because of 
a conscious choice or some disposition against theoretical understandings. Of course, 
some people will have a more theoretical understanding of technology and the public 
sector and may incorporate that in their trust judgments. The reason the citizens 
interviewed in this study focus on the user outcomes is simply because it is the easiest 
and most salient trustworthy cue, for all the reasons discussed above (see 8.1.4). 
                                                 
414
 In the conclusion of an edited book on democracy and trust, Warren, discussing trust in institutions, 
wrote,  
“This shared knowledge of institutional rules gives the information I need to extend trust. Because 
the rules of an institution can be known and generalized to a very large number of strangers, the 
truster can extrapolate these rules to individuals about whom he has little direct knowledge. … 
Thus, to ‘trust an institution’ means that the truster knows the normative idea of the institution, 
and has some confidence in the sanctions that provide additional motivation for the officials to 
behave according to this idea” (Warren 1999a, p. 349) (emphasis in original). 
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8.3.3 SELF-INTEREST 
The data here also concur with Hardin’s “encapsulated interest” formulation of trust, that 
it is fundamentally self-interest, rather than other communal values, that are decisive in 
people’s institutional trust decisions. This is not to argue that people are inherently 
selfish. Rather, the argument is that the most salient information is based around personal 
experiences and their associated costs and benefits. The individuals’ interpretation of that 
interaction with the government then tends to be perceived positively or negatively based 
upon the outcomes of that experience. People base trust-judgements on self-interest 
because it is the most efficient trust heuristic they have.  
 
Riedl’s (2004) findings support the focus on self-interest for institutional trust. Riedl 
surveyed students’ responses to e-government web-sites and concluded, “it is the quotient 
of gain (multiplied by its likelihood…) and risk which determines trust… familiarity (as) 
a precondition for trust or distrust does not seem to hold” (Riedl 2004, p. 98). It seems 
reasonable that as the movement away from trust based on familiarity and close-relations 
and towards impersonal institutions that there is a concurrent movement in the balance of 
trust building mechanisms. Where there is no familiarity, no close-ties, there is no reason 
to look for trustworthy cues in areas such as moral obligations; no need to be seen as 
trustworthy or emotional motivations to act trustworthy. Thus when removing those 
sources of trustworthy behaviour from the equation, those that are left are more rational 
and calculating.  
 
It is also possible that this finding is an outcome of the fact that the two e-service cases 
trigger self-interest values in people. At the heart of both services is that fundamental 
component of today’s societies: money. Either you are giving it away (taxes) or trying to 
earn it (ChileCompra). Having money on the mind can change short term subconscious 
orientations. For example, research shows that when people are psychologically primed 
with the idea of money, they show reduced helpfulness (Vohs et al. 2006). Consequently, 
users of these services might focus more on the self-interest outcomes than others. The 
implication of this argument is that other e-services might evoke different responses. That 
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is entirely plausible. For example, Soss (1999) found that how welfare recipients were 
treated was a crucial component of citizens’ political judgements. Arguably, this may 
reflect a higher level value and not self-interest, at least in the narrow economic sense.415 
However, arguably, self-respect is a form of self-interest in that it is an egoistic concern 
with a component of one’s self-identity, rather than a non-egoistic concern for the 
communal interest, for example, 
 
Other research indicates that this self-interested perspective extends to other types of e-
services. For example, West (2005, p. 173) found that ordinary people do not appear that 
interested in engaging with the Internet to change the public sector, but instead are more 
interested in using it to improve their own personal lives. Thomas and Streib (2003) 
argue that use of e-government websites is a new form of citizen-initiated contact. They 
found that citizen-initiated contacts are prompted by several factors including specific 
perceived needs, and those who have a greater stake in governmental services, as well as 
a correlation to socio-economic status. The underlying idea here is that, at least with the 
current set of e-services offered today, self-interest is the motivating factor behind 
citizens engaging with e-services. Consequently, it is not surprising that e-service 
interactions would be viewed through self-interest coloured lenses. 
 
8.3.4 COMPETENCE AND MOTIVATIONS 
Another implication is the importance of distinguishing between the competence and 
motivation components of institutional trust. Each aspect appears to play a role at 
different times. Generally speaking, users saw the SII as competent, even if they saw it as 
an institution with competing interests. Of course, the SII was also generally seen as 
impartial and consequently as not deviating from standard practice. This implies that 
citizens already believed that the SII was limited in their discretionary activities, 
impartially adhering to the tax code. In such a case, issues of motivation did not emerge 
as centrally important as a trustworthy cue. Users of ChileCompra, however, focused 
mostly on motivations behind the bid decision process, and issues of competence were 
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 Although, equally plausible is the explanation that showing respect hits on the most fundamental self-
interest: the citizen’s ego. 
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hardly mentioned. Theoretically, this fits roughly with how we would expect users to 
react to these two e-services. Where there is discretion, the motivation behind the choices 
become the focus of trust. Where there is little or no discretion, trust becomes more like 
the confidence one has in a machine – there is confidence as long as it does the job it is 
supposed to do.  
 
8.3.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
As a final note, it is important to stress that the argument here is not that direct user 
outcomes are the only causal factor; they are not. There are other factors are important, 
such as the individual’s past history, trust disposition, socio-economic position, etc. The 
argument here is the following: when citizens interact with e-services, direct user 
outcomes are powerful trustworthy cues that can be highly influential in shaping citizens’ 
resultant interpretations of the behaviour of the public sector agency. 
 
Perhaps the central outcome of this analysis is the necessity of an analytical distinction 
between institutional trustworthiness (the study of what makes institutions trustworthy) 
and trusted institutions (why citizens view institutions as trustworthy). The two may 
overlap, but they are most certainly not necessarily equivalent. What institutions are 
trusted is necessarily a relative proposition (trusted by whom?) involving personal 
calculations of one’s interests and values and the perceived outcomes of the activities of 
these institutions. This implies that the development of trusted institutions is necessarily 
problematic in a democratic system where there are inherent conflicts of interest and 
values. Technology will not be able to resolve these issues. Rather they alter the foci of 
the value conflicts, creating a new configuration of user interpretations and trust 
judgements. 
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9 CONCLUSION 
 
“… by changing the terms of trade-off between efficiency, 
effectiveness, quality and democracy, ICTs offer, in turn, a further, 
particularly alluring promise: that of shifting the so-called ‘trust 
deficit’ between governments and citizens from red to black” 
(Bellamy and Taylor 1998, p. 63). 
 
This thesis is concerned with how e-services are implicated in the process of building 
trust in institutions of democratic government. Drawing on the findings, chapter 8 
discusses some theoretical implications for e-services and trust. This chapter moves 
beyond that discussion to consider implications for policy and future research and 
concludes with comments about the future of e-services and trust.   
 
To facilitate the discussion, section 9.1 summarises the findings of this thesis and 
discusses their potential generalisability. Drawing from these findings, 9.2 considers 
policy implications for building trustworthy and trusted institutions. Of course, there 
remains a significant gap in the knowledge. Acknowledging this gap, section 9.3 suggests 
some hypotheses and outstanding research questions that have been raised in this thesis. 
Finally, section 9.4 brings the chapter and thesis to a close with final thoughts on the 
future of e-services and trust.  
 
9.1  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND GENERALISABILITY  
This thesis began with a straightforward, but ultimately complex, question: how, for 
whom, and in what contexts do e-services build trust? The first step to scoping this 
complexity was to build a conceptual framework that provided structure for the research 
process. Drawing from a variety of disciplines, the framework postulated linkages among 
trust, institutional trust, and ICT in the public sector. From this framework, a series of 
fifteen middle-range hypotheses emerged connecting the implementation of e-services to 
trust building outcomes.  
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These hypotheses were then put to the test in two specific cases: an e-tax system and an 
online public sector procurement system. For each case, more concrete case-specific 
hypotheses were developed that link trustworthiness changes brought about the e-service 
to predicted trust outcomes. These hypotheses were then tested and refined in terms of 
how, for whom, and in what contexts the trustworthy characteristic interacted with 
citizens’ trust judgements of the institutions behind the e-services. Finally, a comparative 
analysis was done that attempted to draw more general conclusions from the two studies.  
 
9.1.1 SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In terms of trustworthiness, the clearest impacts of ICT were on the internal capacity of 
the government, where the efficiency and effectiveness gains with the largest impacts 
stemmed from process automation (e-catalogue, online tax proposal, automated auditing 
of taxes). This translates into positive service outcomes, such as improved service 
delivery with subsequent time and cost savings for the users, decreased information 
asymmetries between suppliers and the government, and increased participation of micro 
and small businesses in sales to the public sector. Gains in transparency were also 
achieved, as well as reduced corruption, and opportunities for internal and external 
monitoring of public sector activities. Overall, the two e-services have clearly improved 
the internal operations of the public sector in Chile. 
 
The effects of the e-services on building trust were less clear. Increased transparency and 
the internal efficiency and effectiveness gains were not readily perceived by citizens, 
contrary to the middle-range and case-specific hypotheses. Several cues such as 
performance transparency and online feedback mechanisms were hardly perceived at all 
and did not appear to be linked to citizens’ trust judgements. The only theory that had the 
predicted results was that the delivery of user benefits would be perceived and treated as 
positive trust building cues. Often, other predicted trustworthiness cues were not 
perceived directly, but instead were interpreted by users through the lens of a direct 
benefit/cost to the user. For example, efficiency gains were perceived through the lens of 
the user benefit of decreased wait times, and effectiveness gains through payment times. 
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This behaviour can be interpreted as the use of a powerful and highly cognitively 
efficient trust heuristic: “What have you done for me lately?”  
  
Several broader conclusions were also drawn from the study: 
1) Trust in institutions is relative, generally based on personal experience of the 
cost/benefits of a service. 
2) The relativity of trust in institutions implies a disjuncture between institutional 
trustworthiness and trusted institutions. Trustworthy institutions, according to a 
democratic theory rationale, for example, are not necessarily the best designed 
institutions to build trust. Consequently theories of institutional trustworthiness 
need to be disassociated from theories of trusted institutions. 
3) There are structural limitations – or at least inherent difficulties – to building trust 
through e-services. The nature of democratic governance as institutionalising 
discursive solutions to conflicts of interests cannot satisfy all people all the time. 
This places a structural impediment to building trust in the institutions of 
government because conflicting interests and values are breeding grounds for 
distrust. Technology does not change this fundamental equation. 
4) These competing interests and values are decisive points for the formation of 
trust. Competing explanations of the outcomes of e-services are consistent with 
belief systems of competing values and interests. Citizens’ experiences with e-
services provide evidence supporting one explanation over another, tipping a trust 
judgment one way or the other. 
 
9.1.2 GENERALISABILITY OF THE FINDINGS? 
Before delving into policy considerations, it is important to qualify the findings in terms 
of their potential applicability to other e-services and other contexts.416 This study was an 
attempt to understand the dynamic between e-services and trust that is built or destroyed 
through direct interaction. There is certainly a whole range of important indirect 
trustworthy cues that act as causal factors that influence trust judgments. For example, 
                                                 
416
 As we will see, considering the limitations of the generalisability of this research raises many questions 
that would make for interesting future research. 
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the role of the media is undoubtedly crucial when considering the impacts of 
transparency and accountability.417 The focus on direct influences places significant 
qualifications on the findings in terms of the strength of the causal mechanisms outlined 
above. The fundamental problem is that, from this research alone, it is impossible to 
judge the strength of personal experience as a trustworthy cue compared to other cues. 
This raises several interesting questions: If indirect evidence contradicts personal 
experience, what would be the interaction? Are different government agencies judged 
differently in terms of the types (indirect versus direct) evidence that people use as 
trustworthy cues? 
 
There are several other considerations that scope the potential generalisability of the 
findings, and also suggest future avenues for research: 
1) While it may be possible to draw inferences of causal mechanisms from a single 
case (Smith 2006), the generalisability of these mechanisms may be contingent 
upon the particular qualitative features of the case. In this study, the question is if 
there is a qualitative difference between the e-tax administration and 
ChileCompra services and other government institutions and services that would 
alter the operation (or existence) of the causal mechanisms discussed in the 
findings.  
2) The Chilean context provides a unique environment because it already has 
relatively trustworthy institutions of government. Perhaps this results in the 
reduced salience of trustworthy cues such as impartiality. It is unknown what the 
dynamic would be in a distrusted government. Indeed, it is conceivable that the 
findings here are completely irrelevant in such a situation.  
3) The subgroup interviewed reflects mostly citizens and suppliers in the lower 
socio-economic demographic. It is conceivable that these users are more sensitive 
to cost/benefit calculations as they weigh more heavily in their daily activities.  
4) This study was a snapshot of a short time frame in Chile during a period of fairly 
substantial change. Therefore it does not capture the dynamic of trust as it 
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 Indeed, this thesis potentially underscores the importance of third-party information sources in providing 
digestible information for forming trust judgments beyond the scope of citizens’ direct experience. 
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changes through time and citizens’ expectations adjust to the new realities. The 
dynamic may also radically change once some familiarity with a new e-service 
has developed.  
 
9.2  POLICY IMPLICATIONS:  RESTORING TRUST IN GOVERNMENT  
The motivation for the research question asked in this thesis was a concern with how e-
services may or may not play a role in building trust in the institutions of government. 
What do the outcomes of this research tell us about the potential for e-services to act as a 
catalyst to restore trust in government? This section considers what policy implications 
we may draw from this research with the goal of exploiting e-services for the goal of 
building trust in institutions of democratic government. Of course the applicability of 
policy implications are constrained by the qualifications of section 9.1.2 above. The logic 
here is – if the findings are true, then what could the government do? 
 
Given the institutional trustworthiness/trusted institution distinction and the relativity of 
trust, there is a lot of weight to Hardin’s argument that rather than concerning ourselves 
with trust in government we should really be concerned with developing governmental 
trustworthiness (Hardin 2000, p. 152, Hardin 2002b). This is especially true considering 
that trust may be misplaced and we most certainly do not want to increase trust in 
institutions where it is not warranted (Hardin 2000). Policy should, at a minimum, focus 
on mechanisms to assure that the governments actually do their duty in a competent 
manner.418 While this seems a reasonable approach, it only deals with one half of the 
equation and, of course, does not directly address issues of lost confidence. A highly 
competent government with no political support is not one that can perform to its 
potential, and lacking support, will have difficulty undergoing trustworthiness enhancing 
reforms. Consequently, any policy approach should take both building trustworthy and 
trusted institutions into account.  
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 Hardin writes,  “… if confidence in government is declining, we should address that problem by 
enhancing government competence” (Hardin 2000, p. 36) 
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9.2.1 BUILDING TRUSTWORTHY INSTITUTIONS 
The straightforward analysis indicates that new ICT can significantly improve the 
trustworthiness of the public sector across a variety of dimensions. There is no need to 
belabour that discussion, except to note that there are currently limitations to the potential 
to codify public sector processes. Potentially future improvements in expert systems and 
other artificial intelligent applications may bring possibilities to further remove human 
discretion from public sector processes. If this were to happen, it would raise a number of 
other important implications: as government becomes more programmatic and front-line 
discretion disappears, what happens to the role of trust? 
 
With the backdrop of improving the trustworthiness of democratic states, this discussion 
will focus on a fundamental component of democratic states: checks and balances. How 
can e-services contribute to improved checks and balances? The mechanism that receives 
the most attention is that of transparency. In the two cases, transparency altered the 
incentives of the public sector bureaucrats in two main ways. First, the increased 
computerisation of processes and the concurrent transparency allowed for the increased 
possibility for intra- and inter-institutional horizontal accountability. Second, it appeared 
as if the potential for outside monitoring from citizen or other stakeholders such as the 
media played into the reasoning of the civil servants. There was the potential that their 
data could be monitored, and discrepancies found. This is similar to what Meijer (2007), 
encountered in a case study on transparency in Dutch schools and hospitals. Meijer found 
that information transparency did indeed have an impact on the activities of the public 
service organizations, only not as originally envisioned. The fear of negative publicity in 
the media prompted action by the public service to try to improve upon the performance 
indicators being reported on. The public sector did not seem to react to citizen 
stakeholder exit and voice mechanisms, but instead picked up on the transparency itself 
as the motivating signal.  
 
With new e-government applications the focus of the light of transparency and resultant 
accountability mechanisms that are brought to bear undergo a change. The introduction 
of e-services shifts some discretion from policy makers and front-line civil servants to 
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software designers and engineers. Software code becomes policy. Consequently, the 
implementation of an e-government service should be subject to accountability measures, 
at a minimum making algorithms and computer processes transparent (Bovens and 
Zouridis 2002).  
 
An important question still stands: how might we turn the light on the government and 
bring in a new age of government accountability to citizens? The findings in this thesis 
do not paint a positive picture of the potential of the average citizen to watch the 
government. It does not seem reasonable to expect citizens to get involved in analysing 
and holding government to account for a variety of reasons including a) the epistemic 
difficulties of understanding the relationship between transparency and government 
activities, and b) the limited set of mechanisms available to citizens to hold governments 
accountable. One a day-to-day basis, this role seems best left to civil society agencies and 
the free press. 
 
Citizens can, however, be an effective watcher of the government. Seeing how requires a 
rethinking of what it means to hold the government accountable. Taking a street-level 
epistemological perspective and the evidence from this thesis, one can hypothesise that 
citizens would be able to provide effective accountability feedback on service delivery. 
Citizens are the best placed to pass judgement and offer essential feedback on service 
delivery, in particular with respect to their direct perceived user benefits. If this is the 
case, it opens up a new set of interesting possibilities for ICT based interactive 
accountability mechanisms between citizens and public sector institutions.  
 
9.2.2 E-SERVICES AND BUILDING TRUSTED INSTITUTIONS 
The first step to building a trusted institution is to accept that any attempt to do so is 
limited in a democratic society where there are interest and value conflicts over the role 
of the government.419 Indeed, these inherent conflicts are the reason why distrust (in the 
                                                 
419
 Of course, as Warren (2004) argues, trust is more inherently problematic the more directly political the 
institutions are. This is in contrast to those institutions that provide welfare services and those that regulate 
airlines and air pollution that might be complex but not inherently problematic in terms of value conflicts. 
The argument in this thesis is more directly related to the delivery of e-services. 
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form of checks and balances) has been institutionalised into democratic institutions. This 
naturally leads political scientists to concern themselves with issues of procedural justice 
to ensure that the processes are at least impartial and inclusive. This, however, will not 
necessarily build trust. 
 
The evidence in this thesis suggests a different perspective. To underscore this 
perspective, it is helpful to draw a parallel to the argument of the classic book, How to 
Make Friends and Influence People (Carnegie 1982). Carnegie’s central lesson is that 
one will be more successful making friends and influencing people if they really put forth 
an effort to see the world from the other person’s perspective. The power of the ego 
cannot be overstated, especially in terms of focusing attention and therefore openness to 
trustworthy cues. Government institutions looking to build trust should bear this in mind. 
Rather than taking an institutional approach to building trust, with horizontal and vertical 
modes of accountability, institutions should orient themselves to be accountable to 
citizens. This accountability should be with respect to the delivery of services where: 1) 
there is interaction with the citizens, 2) citizens are well placed to provide feedback, and 
3) the cost/benefit calculus that is so important for trust occurs.  
 
A theoretical framework that overlaps with this perspective is that of public value. Public 
value is a theoretical perspective “rooted in people’s preferences” that considers 
governments’ outputs in terms of what people want, and can be used as an analytical 
framework to evaluate public sector activities (United Nations 2003). While the UN 
report identifies three categories of public value – outcomes, services, and trust – the 
argument here is that positive outcomes from services will be directly causally related to 
building trust. The trust engendering power of the SII came from the delivery of the ‘red-
carpet treatment’.420 ChileCompra, on the other hand, has a more difficult time building 
trust through direct interaction on a consistent basis. At best it can foster increased 
opportunities, but it can not guarantee positive outcomes for all.  
 
                                                 
420
 Of course, there will always be a subset of people who assess good performance but will never trust, for 
whatever reason (Glaser 1999). 
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If the state cannot completely control the balance of winners and losers, such as with 
ChileCompra, maintaining trust may be largely a combination of performance and 
managing expectations (Miller and Listhaug 1999, Orren 1997, p. 103). Controlling 
expectations, however, is most likely difficult for a variety of reasons. First, 
improvements to some areas of government might raise expectations in other areas. For 
example, in one interview, an older man told of how when he saw the e-tax service by 
watching his niece do her taxes online, he became disgruntled with the current online 
Armed Forces pension system that required him to print out his application and mail it in. 
Once he realised that such smooth and convenient interactivity was possible, suddenly 
the current level of online service offered by the Armed Forces was unacceptable. 
Second, ICT bring with them an already high level of expectations, as they are associated 
with the progress of modernity. This was a common perception for the Chileans 
interviewed,421 and has been seen elsewhere in Latin America (Avgerou et al. 2007). 
Finally, if there is distrust of the government, there will be distrust of the governments’ 
message. A public awareness campaign is certainly not guaranteed to shape expectations 
in the desired. 
 
Expectations, recall, are rooted in people’s value systems. Thus, the more fundamental 
job is one of managing values systems, rather than expectations. If we want people to 
react to the cues of trustworthy democratic institutions, such as impartial and fair 
processes, the norm of fairness needs to override self-interest for those who lose out. In 
other words, can we “create institutions that encourage citizens to look at problems from 
more than one perspective and that engage them in the weighing that hard decisions 
                                                 
421
 For example, one Telecentre manager described people’s perceptions as such, 
“The people see it [e-services] as a part of modernization. It is necessary. It goes with the 
economic growth, globalization, with development. The people see it, more or less, as positive. I 
don’t observe negative commentaries about the state services. Perhaps – with the difficulty of 
navigating the pages. They are very complicated still. But, with all the services that the 
government delivers through the Internet, the people would like that there were even more 
services!” source: TC-9. 
In other example, while ChileCompra was not universally well received, seventy-eight percent of suppliers 
in the World Bank survey responded that after working with ChileCompra they believed that new ICT can 
be used to improve public sector administration. Only twelve percent responded negatively. Most likely, 
viewing ICT as a necessary tool for the modernisation of the state will play a role in the shaping of the 
expectations that citizens have regarding the technology. 
 370
require” (Lawrence 1997, p. 152)? Can you lose a public procurement bid and realise that 
the general competition is good for the country rather than assume that the process is 
rigged? 
 
It might be possible to shift people’s values. Perhaps civic education could stress more 
communal thinking, for example, through promoting democratic values a strong sense of 
national identity. Another approach might be to improve the government’s “framing” of 
the issues. For example, it is possible to describe taxes as a moral duty and social 
investment rather than as a ‘tax’ – that is, something taxing or painful. This evokes a 
communal rather than the self-interested frame (Lakoff 2002, pp. 189-192). It is 
impossible to state here what the impact of such attempts would be. 
 
However, approaches that attempt to manipulate citizens’ values might be swimming 
upstream against several powerful currents that commingle with the implementation of e-
services today. The first influence is the value system that underlies market capitalism 
that coexists with modern democracies. While the economic expansion that has come 
with market capitalism arguably aids in the stabilisation of democracy, the inherent 
necessity of inequality is always in tension with the egalitarian ethos of democracy (Dahl 
2000).422 The consumer capitalism that co-exists with western democracies promotes a 
self-interested value system over communal values,  
“Markets advance individualistic, not social, goals and they encourage us to speak 
the language of ‘I want,’ not the language of ‘we need.’ Markets preclude ‘we’ 
thinking and ‘we’ action of any kind at all, trusting in the power of aggregated 
individual choices (the ‘invisible hand’) somehow to secure the common good” 
(Barber 1998, pp. 72-73). 
 
Thinkers in the philosophy of technology point towards another trend with a similar 
effect. Borgmann (1984) argues that technology makes a commodity out of reality. 
Technology works as a device that prioritises the production of outcomes and hides the 
underlying processes from view,  
                                                 
422
 Dahl goes on to argue that market-capitalism favours democracy up to a point (polyarchal democracy as 
he defines it) but that its adverse effects on political equality inhibits further deepening of democracy. I 
expect that this will become more acute in the near future as access and control over information becomes 
more and more contested. 
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“In a device, the relatedness of the world is replaced by a machinery, but the 
machinery is concealed, and the commodities, which are made available by a 
device, are enjoyed without the encumbrance of or the engagement with the 
context” (Borgmann 1984, p. 47).423  
E-services abstract users’ interaction with the government one further level away from 
the institutional processes in which they are supposed to place their trust. Users will have 
less direct experience with the actual processes and more with the outcomes of these 
processes. This means that the reliance on inductive personal experience from e-service 
outcomes will become an increasingly relevant currency upon which citizens make 
political judgements. Such a reality brings self-interested concerns to the fore. 
 
It appears that the adage “all politics is local”424 will not become any less true in the near 
future, despite the new levels of interconnectivity enabled by the Internet. At least for the 
near future, it is safe to assume that self-interested evaluations of e-service outcomes will 
remain a very powerful means of gauging trustworthiness. Thus, if we wish to build 
trusted institutions, the best a government can do is be accountable to citizens through the 
provision of high quality services.425 
 
Importantly, it must be understood that this is not an argument for the government to treat 
the citizen as a customer, as is commonly found in recent approaches to e-government 
that attempt to extend private sector philosophies into the public sector. These 
approaches, such as new public management models, incorporate private sector ideals at 
                                                 
423
 Borgamnn, in 1984, went on to write the following about microcomputers,  
“… microcomputers are being used more and more widely because they are becoming ‘friendly,’ 
i.e., easy to operate and understand. But such ‘friendliness’ is just a mark of how wide the gap has 
become between the function accessible to everyone and the machinery known by nearly no one. 
And not only lay people are confined to the side of ignorance of this gap, but so are many, perhaps 
most, of the professional programmers” (Borgmann 1984, p. 47). 
424
 The expression comes from the title of the longtime U.S. Congressman and Speaker of the House 
Thomas P. (Tip) O’Neil’s (with Gary Hymel) book, “All politics is local: and other rules of the game”, a 
primer for campaigners.  
425
 Of course, when engaging in the development of new interactivity and feedback channels, policy makers 
must be aware of the potential downsides to simple accountability mechanisms based on a few quantitative 
variables. A major risk is the perversion of incentives, or “perverse learning” (Meijer 2007). This is what 
happens when an administration, driven to achieve particular accountability goals, maximizes one or a 
small group of outcome indicators. The end result are negative unintended consequence due to the 
sacrificing of other essential organizational activities and potentially the overall effectiveness of the agency 
(Meijer 2007, O’Neill 2002, Thiel and Leeuw 2002). 
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the expense of democratic values (Cordella 2007). For example, increased personalisation 
of services as means to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of government, as well 
as predict and even influence behaviour (Pieterson et al. 2007) can be seen as a shift from 
the traditional values of public bureaucratic value of impartiality and social 
egalitarianism (Bellamy and Taylor 1998, p. 88, Kallinikos 2004).426 To ignore these 
values not only goes against a central role of the public sector bureaucracy, but it also 
promotes self-interested values (the customer is always right!). This is not to say that a 
government can not take citizens’ perspective into consideration; indeed they should. 
Rather, it is crucial to be aware of how implementing e-government systems shifts the 
points of tension between the competing values. For example, it may be possible to 
improve efficiency to a certain extent with new technologies without sacrificing equality. 
It is when increases in efficiency mean sacrifices in equality where the public sector must 
take notice, as opposed to the private sector. A democratic government must strike a 
balance between improving services, responsiveness to citizens, and the other values of 
democracy (Glaser 1999, Pegnato 1997). 
 
One last point on building trusted institutions needs to be made. The theory of cognitive 
inertia predicts that once a citizen generates an explanation, that particular explanation 
will be relatively intransigent despite new evidence to the contrary. However, the data 
suggest that the relatively innovative nature and tangible benefits of new e-services 
constitute a discontinuity from past activities of the government. With ChileCompra, for 
example, suppliers engaged with the new technology with a positive outlook and high 
expectations. They were open to idea that the public sector procurement market had 
fundamentally changed. Depending on how it worked out, the suppliers quickly formed 
new beliefs, both positive and negative (“nothing has changed”, “now we have more 
opportunities”), indicating that while e-services have the chance to alter perceptions, after 
a while that chance can be lost. What the window of opportunity is, and how intransigent 
                                                 
426
 Bellamy and Talyor (1998) wrote, “… this shift can also be perceived as a retreat from the traditional 
values of public bureaucracy, namely a commitment to consistency, predictability and impersonality in the 
disposition of its powers”  (p. 89). 
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people’s opinions are, is most likely highly dependent on the person and a matter of 
future research. 
 
9.3  FUTURE E-SERVICE AND TRUST RESEARCH  
As typical of research, this thesis opens up many more questions than it (however 
tentatively) answers. This section briefly lists a series of standing questions that would 
both help to solidify the findings and to improve the general knowledge of the 
relationship between e-services and institutional trust.  
 
The first set of research questions are stated in terms of testable hypotheses. These are 
hypotheses that stem from this research and would help to test and refine the findings of 
this thesis: 
1) Independent measures of institutional trustworthiness will not necessarily 
correlate with levels of trust by the public of the institutions. The institutions that 
deliver services with higher user benefits (as opposed to costs) will tend to be 
trusted more. 
2) Trust will tend to be built better through e-services where a direct benefit to the 
user is delivered over government agencies with less direct, or potential, user 
benefits. For example, online services that allow for participation will bring less 
direct benefits and therefore have less of an impact on trust than, say, a good e-tax 
system. 
3) Trust in automated services will tend to be based on competence judgements 
rather than interpretations of the value/motivations of the service. Conversely, 
with services that are highly discretionary, value and motivation considerations 
will gain in importance. 
4) For citizens who have a greater focus on self-interested values, user benefits will 
prove a more effective trust builder than for those with a more communal value 
system. 
5) Power asymmetries are negative for trust when they bring about negative 
consequences. Public sector agencies with a lot of power that manifests negative 
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consequences that are perceived as greater than the perceived benefits will tend to 
reduce trust. 
6) Explanations for the outcomes of e-service interactions will tend to fall on either 
side of the value conflict dimensions inherent in the technology-democratic 
government dynamic. 
 
As discussed above (9.1.2), the generalisability of the findings is limited given the 
specifics of the e-services and Chilean context. A second set of research questions would 
help to refine the findings and see if, how, and for whom, the findings extend the findings 
beyond the study population: 
• Would another type of e-service, such as online health or education services, 
appeal to different values and therefore impact on trust differently? Would 
another manifestation of trustworthiness cues, such as performance indicators, 
feedback, or user service outcomes be more salient? 
• A crucial question that was not considered here is if and how e-government builds 
trust when embedded in a non-trusted agency. Avgerou et al. (2007) conclude 
from their case study of Brazilian e-voting that “e-government requires active 
trust formation in ICT and government institutions, rather than overcoming their 
perceived trustworthiness deficiencies.” In other words, e-government itself is not 
a means to build trust, but rather that e-government requires trust to be successful. 
If this is correct, then perhaps the role of building trust with e-government is more 
limited than is supposed here. Arguably, however, their case does not demonstrate 
what they conclude at all, for two main reasons. First, the conclusion does not 
logically follow from a single case study of an e-government application within 
an already trusted set of institutions. Their study simply does not speak to the 
ability of e-government to build trust in non-trusted institutions. Second, they do 
not collect citizen data to understand if the system does build trust at all. Overall, 
there is a continued need for micro-level studies of the institutional trust building 
potential of e-services in non-trusted institutions.  
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• Do those with higher incomes change their values and thus will they be less 
subject to self-interested concerns?427 Do people with higher education levels 
focus more on theoretical trustworthiness cues?  
• Given the bias of this research towards how e-services build trust the issue of how 
e-services might erode trust was mostly ignored. It was assumed that the absence 
of trust building mechanisms meant no change and that if the opposite of a trust 
building mechanism existed (i.e. interests actively not aligned) that this eroded 
trust. Is this the case? It is crucial that research on distrust and mistrust be done to 
understand the types of interactions that actively destroy any trust relationship to 
learn to mitigate these effects.  
• How do changing expectations of e-services alter trust through time? If the quality 
of e-services stays the same rather than changes, does that reduce, maintain, or 
build trust? Do services need to constantly improve to maintain trust? Will 
currently salient trustworthy cues become less relevant as they are experienced 
more often? Would new cues take their place? If one area of the government has 
radically improved their service, does this decrease trust in other areas of the 
government? Is that necessarily a bad thing? Finally, what is the role of all the 
hype surrounding new ICT and citizens’ expectations? Could this be raising the 
bar too high only setting up an expectations gap that virtually ensures government 
failure in the eyes of the citizens? 
 
9.4  THE FINAL WORD  
While the two e-services studied in this thesis are state-of-the-art, they represent only the 
beginning of the e-government wave. Governments around the world have not yet begun 
to implement more radically transformative e-government applications. The extent to 
which e-government will bring such transformations is, however, highly questionable. 
Two future directions come to mind: pushing efficiencies through increased 
automatisation courtesy of new artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms, and increased 
citizen participation through new forms of Internet enabled interaction. 
                                                 
427
 Inglehart (1997) argues that as incomes rise and basic necessities of life are met, then people shift from 
authoritarian values to postmaterial values. 
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9.4.1 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES 
It is still an open question as to the extent that new developments in software can codify 
and automate “non-legal, non-routine, street-level interactions, such as teaching, nursing, 
and policing” (Bovens and Zouridis 2002, p. 180). As new forms of artificial intelligence 
algorithms are developed to find optimal solutions in highly complex solution spaces, it is 
reasonable to postulate that more and more of these non-routine interactions can be 
implemented. Considering this hypothetical, what might happen to trust if new advances 
in AI allow for the automation of many non-routine interactions?  
 
This thesis provides some insight into this question. First, AI solutions are just as 
problematic, if not more so, in terms of transparency and accountability. AI algorithms 
are not amenable to transparency as they are dealing with necessarily large and complex 
solution spaces.428 Also, implementing institutional processes in software raises 
accountability issues. New models of accountability need to be developed to deal with the 
increasing computerisation of governments. Ultimately, people are held accountable, not 
computers and software. Second, there is a question as to how a person might react to the 
cold rationality of computer logic. Why would people have any more or less trust in a 
decision they disagree with, whether it comes from a person or a computer? At the end of 
the day, will it matter whether or not it was a person or computer that made the decision? 
 
9.4.2 NEW FORMS OF PARTICIPATION 
One great hope for revitalising democracy is the interconnectivity and communication 
possibilities inherent in the Internet and new technologies. Theoretically everyone can be 
involved at the click of a mouse. It is not clear, however, that new technologies by 
themselves can alter the fundamentals of these democratic deficits. It is true that new ICT 
make a difference. ICT potentially lower access barriers by enhancing political resource 
equality and expand the scope of potential democratic innovations with new modes of 
                                                 
428
 For example, non-symbolic AI techniques such as genetic algorithms or neural networks have no 
explicit symbolic representation and thus the only form of transparency involves a mapping of the learned 
‘weights’ that, to the untrained eye, does not have much meaning.  
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communication and collaboration. However, recent experiments in new forms of 
democratic participation, including online tools, have shown that truly participatory 
innovations are highly costly, time intensive, and are only one component of more 
traditional forms of engagement (Smith 2005a, p. 104). This is because e-participation 
still requires citizens who have the necessary resources (e.g. time, appropriate expertise, 
incentive, access, awareness, trust) (Smith 2005a, United Nations 2003). New ICT do not 
resolve these underlying issues.  
 
It is conceivable that new e-participation schemes could have positive outcomes on trust 
for those involved. The findings of this thesis suggest that one particular component of e-
participation is decisive in the citizen-government trust equation: the outcome of e-
participation in terms of government responsiveness producing tangible results for the 
participating citizen. Indeed, government responsiveness is the “ultimate reward and 
incentive” of e-participation (United Nations 2003).429 However, this thesis did not put 
truly participatory e-services to the test. It would seem that a truly participatory process 
enabled in part by new ICT holds the potential to change the fundamental trust building 
equation, enabling a direct engagement with the decision making processes and thereby 
making the fairness of the process a highly salient trustworthiness cue. In such a 
situation, it seems entirely plausible that this provides at least some counterweight to self-
interested considerations of those involved. This, of course, remains to be seen. 
 
------------ 
Clearly, the future direction of e-government is still an open question, as well as its 
impact on trust. This thesis attempts to get a glimpse of understanding of this future. In 
the larger scheme of things, the direct impacts of e-government services on trust may 
play a minor role, making relatively inconsequential changes within wider and much 
more powerful socio-political forces. However, understanding the nature of the impact of 
e-government applications on the trustworthiness of the public sector and citizens’ 
                                                 
429
 This would suggest that democratic innovations such as participatory budgeting are the best of worlds, 
providing participation and potentially direct benefits. 
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reactions to these changes may help us identify ways to try to move towards the larger 
goal.  
 
It is clear that the introduction of new ICT in government is inextricably tied up with 
political considerations, constraints, and processes. For a variety of reasons, it is not 
reasonable to expect governments to willingly engage in disruptive transformational 
reform fundamentally changing the citizen-government relationship, nor would it be 
necessarily desirable. Neither can ICT independently bring about this change. ICT only 
provide new potentials for communication and interaction, and unless the fundamentals 
of public sector bureaucracies change, then these fundamental communication and 
interaction patterns will not change. 
 
So how do we move forward? The starting point is the fact that the spread of e-
government implementations is not going to stop. Governments will naturally look to 
take advantage of the natural synergy between ICT and public sector activities. As the 
head of society, however, the onus falls on the government to direct these changes 
towards deepening democracy rather than to increasing power and control of the citizenry  
(Castells 2001, p. 185). Rather than expecting transformational change, perhaps focusing 
on the more mundane will prove more productive in the long run. Governments can focus 
on using ICT to improve the trustworthiness of the public sector while simultaneously 
working to build trusted institutions through added public value and that foster citizen-
government interaction in a manner that is epistemically feasible for the citizen, e.g., 
maximising the citizen’s position as service recipient. This thesis has provided some 
insight into how to move in that direction. Such an approach, while not radical, does 
constitute one in a series of incremental steps that eventually can lead towards a more 
transformational deepening of democracy. 
-- The End 
AFTERWORD:  REFLECTING ON RESEARCH 
 
 379
The first two years of this research were spent trying to develop a solid grasp of what I 
believe to be good social science research. There are different approaches to research, 
each of which brings its unique benefits and problems to the table. Perhaps due to my 
prior training in the natural sciences the approach that ultimately appealed to me was 
analytical rather than descriptive. I struggled against approaches that appear to reject the 
possibility of gaining knowledge through a scientific process. In my mind, there has to be 
theory and theory has to be tested or refined in some way. However, I also did not want 
to uncritically accept these notions of theory and testing without more fully 
understanding the difficulties and realities of social science research. The result of my 
exploration was the adoption of the methodological underpinnings, spelled out in Chapter 
2, and subsequent research approach. While the arguments espoused in support of my 
assumptions and research approach were drawn from philosophers and researchers with 
much practical experience, for me the arguments were still based on logic and many 
untested background assumptions. As an inexperienced social science researcher, I was 
taking these ideas mostly on faith (or perhaps trust?). Consequently, this research was 
just as much a test of these arguments as they were a test of the fifteen e-government to 
trust hypotheses.  
 
Upon completing this research, and writing up the thesis, I wanted to take a little time to 
reflect upon the experience and take stock of what I had learned about conducting 
research. To make a long story short, while the process of research was filled with doubts 
and concerns, in retrospect I am pleased to report that I still believe the research approach 
to be justified for the research question proposed in this thesis. Even more strongly, I 
have come away from this thesis believing that the fundamental assumptions and 
approach to theorising taken here can greatly aid in making social science research more 
systematic and cumulative.  
 
This afterward has two sections. The first section will briefly discuss the structured case 
approach that was used. Here some of the gaps between research and presentation are 
discussed, as well as the benefits and problems that arose during the research. The second 
 380
section lays out several components of the research that, only in retrospect, did I realise 
were central organising principles. 
 
THE STRUCTURED CASE APPROACH  
The presentation of research generally is much neater than the jumbled reality that went 
into it. This research is no different. The linearity of the end product does not reflect the 
inherently cyclical process. The resultant neat and structured lines of this thesis only 
completely crystallised when I began to write it. For example, while I had done a lot of 
theoretical work before engaging in research and had the benefit of prior fieldwork with 
the IADB study, the organisational clarity of the fifteen e-service and trust hypotheses did 
not emerge until the Chapter 4 was written.  
 
Part of the reason for this flexibility and cyclical process was the relatively 
underspecified nature of the theory going into the research. It was necessary because the 
state of the theory I was dealing with originally was extensive and yet incomplete. The 
connection between trustworthiness and trust was constructed through a synthesis of 
theories from several different disciplines as well as from some direct experience at the 
research site. Without engagement with the particulars of the cases, it would have been 
impossible to determine which hypotheses are relevant to the e-services. Had the e-
services been different (for example an e-participation system), surely the resultant focus 
of the theory would have been different. However, even after limiting the number of 
hypotheses some proved irrelevant to the study. Furthermore, the case-specific 
hypotheses were not established until a complete analysis was done on each e-service, 
after the empirical data was collected. Ideally, it would have been completed beforehand 
and the hypotheses would have been generated. That was a logistical impossibility. Given 
the time constraints, much of the research on trustworthiness was conducted 
simultaneously with the research on trust. Finally, this flexibility was necessary; given 
the newness of the theory I wanted to be open to new possibilities. One of the luxuries of 
a case study is the ability to explore new areas of interest that emerge, and I firmly 
believe that had I more firmly established the theory before engaging in research – as it is 
now in Chapters 3 & 4 – it would have changed again before writing the theory chapter.  
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Maintaining this flexibility and openness has its downsides. The major one is that the link 
between interview questions and theory is not as strong in all areas as it could be. Some 
areas were covered well (transparency and efficiency), some areas were covered that 
ended up being unimportant (security issues, role of the telecentres), and some areas were 
not covered as well as I would have liked (benevolence, stakeholder accountability). Not 
having completely established the case specific trustworthiness outcomes before 
conducting the trust component of the study meant that it was impossible to follow up 
these hypotheses in a more systematic manner, allocating resources appropriately.  
 
These problems were mitigated by the overall approach to the research. The key for this 
research was the theoretically established general framework with abstract categories of 
potential interaction. Each theorised area of interaction was specified in part by some 
general questions but was also left open to exploration during the course of the 
interviews. For example, the prior theoretical work allowed me to focus on 
trustworthiness cues and how they may reflect on competence and motivation. Within 
each of these categories, there were a wide range of possibilities, such as efficiency, 
effectiveness, performance, transparency, and others. In this way the construction of the 
theory in chapters 3, 4, 6, & 7 followed the same path as the research itself. The base 
framework was established with general trust theory that helped to provide the 
boundaries of trust and to figure out what would be the interesting areas of the world to 
explore. The sub-categories were established with the subsequent theory of trust and 
government, and so forth.  
 
As mentioned in a footnote in Chapter 1, the case study approach used here is very 
similar to the structured case method proposed by Carroll and Swatman (2000). I might 
have benefited from finding this article before I was already done with my research.  
 
ON WHAT I  LEARNED ABOUT THE RESEARCH APPROACH  
Here I will comment on what I perceive to be the crucial components of the research, and 
what I learned about them during the research process. There are other aspects that were 
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also central to the research approach such as the use of causal middle-range theory and a 
focus on ontology that will not be belaboured here. Instead, I discuss several other 
features that I did not see as central in the beginning of the research (or did not realise 
that I was doing) but in retrospect were defining. 
 
Analytical approach – The analytical approach to social science research taken here was 
essential in the task of complexity reduction. It was easy to see how researchers can get 
overwhelmed in the field with the complexities of even simple social situations. The 
benefits were truly realised during the analysis phase, as it provided a built-in starting 
structure upon which more complex analyses might be conducted. The obvious risk here 
is miscategorisation – that is, establishing a conceptual framework that has no referent in 
reality. For this reason tight coupling between theory and empirical data is important, so 
that theory can be tested and refined. This makes middle-range causal theories essential 
to research. This cyclical approach is an alternative to the inductive, theory generating, 
“coding” analyses approaches often featured in qualitative case studies (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). Of course, both styles of analysis are equally legitimate depending 
upon the state of theory development and goals of research. However, it seems to me that 
there is no substitute for the importance of causal theory as the basis for analysing the 
world. 
 
Abstract versus concrete – At some point during my studies I discovered what I see to 
be the solution to the common debates between competing dichotomies (e.g. 
deterministic versus non-deterministic, analytical versus description, universal versus 
contextual, etc). One way to transcend these dichotomies is the differentiation between 
abstract and concrete. Fundamentally, this is the difference between having an abstract 
notion of something and the variety of manifestations in reality (e.g. generative 
mechanisms versus concrete instances causality, a theory of structure versus a particular 
social relationship). The abstract notion provides the area of commonality that makes 
comparison possible. Consequently, the dichotomies are seen as just two ends of a 
common dimension, rather than mutually exclusive. It was this understanding that 
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allowed for the development of a research orienting set of theory that was not overly 
constraining and allowed for flexibility according to research site.  
 
Ideal-typical theorising – This is the type of theorising that allows for the differentiation 
between abstract and concrete theories. Ideal-typical theorising involves the analytical 
differentiation between the core (necessary) aspects of a social concept or theory and the 
contingent (contextual) features. This differentiation makes theoretical generalisation 
possible. It then becomes possible to create theory that connects the core components to 
contingent components. This is the source of applied generalisable knowledge. 
 
Relational social structure – Perhaps it is my relative naivety with respect to social 
science research, but I cannot grasp why everyone does not accept a relational social 
structure. Not only does it intuitively make sense, but it brings significant analytical 
benefits. Perhaps the central benefit is the ability to integrate macro and micro theory, 
something that has been problematic in the social sciences in general, and the study of 
trust and government in particular. The theoretical framework used here coherently 
integrates both macro and micro level theories of trust and institutional trust (as well as 
self-interest and normative accounts of trust). Central to this is accepting the notion of 
partial causes so that different mechanisms can be co-active. Another important benefit is 
that a relational social structure promotes social science research that is inherently 
critical. It is not problematic to include relations that are inherently oppressive if that is 
part of the existing social structure. Finally, it provides the two categories (structure and 
agency) of social mechanisms that shape social behaviour and outcomes, and a focus on 
what connects them. Without that understanding, I would not have come to the notion of 
trustworthiness cues that was so pivotal to this research.  
 
------------ 
 
My respect for the inherent difficulty of the social sciences has dramatically increased 
through this research process. At the end of the day, the approach adopted here was an 
attempt to provide me with some much needed order and direction in the face of a highly 
 384
complex subject matter and research question. The hope is that I was able to strike the 
right balance.  
 
Thanks for reading! 
 
-- Matthew L. Smith, 25/09/07 
APPENDIX I  –  METHODOLOGY 
 
METHODS AND ASSUMPTIONS  
There are four main methods of data collection used in this thesis: interviews, focus 
groups, surveys, and documents.  
 
Interviews and focus groups 
The main source of data is from semi-structured interviews and focus groups. The 
concern here is to describe the details of the interviews conducted as part of the 
supplementary research conducted by the author. Details of the World Bank and IADB 
questions can be found in the respective appendices. These questions drew from the 
working conceptual framework (see Table 59 for an example). Some flexibility was 
maintained during the interview process to allow for the exploration of new or emerging 
themes. Furthermore, depending upon responses, particular topics were explored more in-
depth depending upon either the theory or the interests of the researcher. Almost all of the 
interviews were recorded and transcribed. For the few that were not recorded, extensive 
notes were taken and the interviews were written up afterwards. All of the interviews 
were conducted in Spanish.430  
 
Focus groups were conducted out of necessity as a means to maximise the time/number 
of subjects interviewed ratio. Focus groups were conducted of e-service and 
ChileCompra users and were arranged by telecentre. The approach to the focus group was 
                                                 
430
 All transcriptions was completed by the author, which consisted of a simultaneous translating the 
interviews into English.  
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similar to that used in individual interviews. The question form was used and questions 
would be directed to the group with an attempt to always get everyone’s input on any 
particular question. Sometimes the focus groups would involve people who used either or 
both of the services. In these instances, the process would start with one of the e-services 
and then switch when a maximal number of topics were covered while allowing for 
sufficient time for a discussion of the second e-service. 
 
Example interview questions for e-tax system users 
 
Do you have much experience with computers? 
 
What are your experiences with the SII? 
 
Do you trust the SII? Why? 
 
What is the SII’s reputation? 
 
Do you believe that the SII is more efficient now with new technology? Why (not)? 
… transparent …? 
… attentive to citizens …? 
 
Have you had any problems with the new service? Is it difficult? Understandable?  
 
Do you think that the SII is a competent organisation? Why (not)? 
… considers the interests of the citizens … ? 
… has integrity and follows the law … ? 
 
Would you say that generally you can trust in a majority of people or that you can not 
trust in the majority? 
 
Do you believe that new technologies are essential for the development of Chile? 
Table 59  Example interview questions for the online income tax system users. 
 
Several assumptions underlie the questions asked during these interviews:431 
1. Citizens extract political information from direct information from the 
government (Bok 1997, Kumlin 2004, Soss 1999). From this information citizens 
                                                 
431
 The influence of Gambetta and Hamill’s (2005) study are strong here. 
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acquire an idea of the trustworthiness characteristics of the government institution 
with which they are interacting.  
2. Citizens’ assessments of trustworthiness is done through evaluating observable 
trustworthy cues (Gambetta and Hamill 2005) that come through direct and 
indirect (socio-tropic) sources (Kumlin 2004).  
3. Full rationality (complete knowledge) is not presumed – so it is necessary to take 
on a street-level epistemology (an understanding of trust judgements from the 
perspective of the citizen) (Hardin 1993) including how and the extent to which 
irrational reasoning impacts assessments (Gambetta and Hamill 2005, p. 15). 
 
There were two confounding issues that arose during research that provided a problem 
for data analysis. First, the set of questions altered through time. As the research evolved, 
certain theoretical issues did not seem applicable, while others asserted themselves. This 
flexibility of the questioning is part of the responsive and reflexive research cycle that 
consciously went back and forth between the theory and data. Second, it was not possible 
to ask all of those interviewed the exact same questions. Depending upon the availability 
of subjects, which were at times difficult to obtain, the interview time varied accordingly. 
Sometimes, for example, only the major questions could be asked without much follow-
up. The result of these two factors is that the data set is not as complete as might be 
desired. This is where the importance of the other data sources comes into play. In 
particular, the survey data supply another source that provides a different perspective on 
the pervasiveness of particular perceptions. 
 
SURVEYS 
The surveys were completed as part of the World Bank study. The scope of the questions 
covered a broad range of social impacts of the introduction of the e-government systems. 
While the questions were designed for a separate study, many questions were asked 
questions that were highly relevant for this thesis. 
 
Another survey by the author was attempted. The focus of the survey was the connection 
between trust and citizens’ value system. The intention was for an online survey to be 
 387
completed by e-service users who attended telecentres. Unfortunately, despite the 
author’s best efforts, he could not get a significant number of respondents.  
 
DOCUMENTS 
For both cases there was also a plethora of documents available. This includes 
government documentation on the services, data from the service web-sites, surveys 
conducted by the DCCP (the public sector entity that manages ChileCompra) and a group 
contracted by Chilean tax authority on user opinions, research reports, a 2005 Cambridge 
PhD thesis (in part on the Chilean tax system), a 2004 masters thesis (on ChileCompra), 
newspaper articles, and government pamphlets. These data were essential in providing 
both background historical and contextual information as well as insight into the scope 
and impact of the e-services across Chilean society. An essential component of 
documentary evidence is the published statistics regarding citizen use of the systems. 
Underlying the importance of these data is the assumption that the use of a service 
indicates at least a base level of trust in the agency and the service. 
 
DATA SUBJECTS  
Obtaining access to interview subjects proved challenging. The selection of research 
subjects was both theoretically and pragmatically determined. Theoretically, the focus of 
the research was on users in lower socio-economic status, as well as small and micro 
businesses. The research was conducted, for the most part, in and around Temuco in the 
9th region in Chile, as well as in the capital region, Santiago de Chile. The 9th region is 
the poorest region in Chile, and the rural towns around Temuco constitute the lower 
socio-economic demographic profile in Chile.  
 
Telecentre access points were used as the main subject contact point. This access was 
facilitated by the Instituto de Informática Educativa, in the Universidad de la Frontera in 
Temuco who ran a programme coordinating Red Comunitario – a series of telecentres 
across the 9th region. The assumption was that users of the e-tax system and ChileCompra 
would use the telecentre to access these services.  
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Subjects were obtained by several means in the telecentres. The first approach was to 
wait in the telecentres until people were leaving and then attempt to convince them to be 
interviewed. While this was successful at times, it proved difficult, especially considering 
that a majority of the telecentre users were not e-tax or ChileCompra users. The second 
line of attack was to have the telecentre managers arrange interviews with people they 
knew who were users of the e-tax system or ChileCompra. This proved more successful 
(and efficient), resulting in more extensive interview periods. The final approach was a 
result of serendipity. As some of the research was conducted during tax time in Chile, the 
SII was sending employees to the telecentres to help citizens complete their taxes online. 
This provided an opportunity to a) talk to the SII functionary and b) find e-tax users. This 
particular group of e-tax users was in general not very experienced with the technology, 
and many were new to filing taxes.  
 
DATA ANALYSIS  
A comparative case design generally implies two stages of data analysis: within-case and 
comparative. For each of these stages, a separate analysis was done on the two 
analytically distinct sections: E-service to trustworthiness, and from trustworthiness to 
trust. By separating out the trustworthiness and trust analyses it is possible to get a clearer 
look at the causal connections between e-services, their qualitative features and impacts, 
and to trace that to citizens’ perceptions and interpretations of these services.432  
 
Before getting into the details, a quick comment on the nature of the analysis is needed. 
As will become clear in Chapters 3 and 4, key to analysis is the analytical nature of the 
theorised relationship between e-government and trust. The result of theorisation is a 
series of related yet independent hypotheses with a distinct set of independent variables, 
and roughly the same dependent variable (trust). There is a tricky balance between the 
application of these hypotheses as analytically distinct mechanisms, and understanding 
their interrelatedness. Difficulties emerge as citizens’ trust judgements weigh many 
factors across a whole range of variables that move well beyond the limited space of the 
                                                 
432
 This is especially helpful to tease out when a citizen perception might be wrong or otherwise 
misinformed; a distinct possibility. 
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changes to e-services, such as the reputation of the agency, the trusting dispositions of the 
citizens, prior interaction with the agency, etc. The complete reduction of complexity is 
most certainly not the goal here. In fact, given that there is no baseline measurement and 
there are no tools employed to give some objective measure of trust judgements, there is 
no way to make clear – statistically significant, at least – statements about the hypotheses. 
Instead the goal is to try to trace the causal paths hypothesised for each different 
mechanism. This approach celebrates the complexity of the situation as these 
mechanisms interact with other contextual elements to bring about the final outcome. In 
this way it is possible to work through complexity analytically, rather than treating it as 
an irreducible heterogeneous network. 
 
WITHIN-CASE ANALYSIS 
Each of the two cases was analysed as an independent case following roughly the same 
analysis approach. The first stage of analysis was of e-service trustworthiness that asks 
the question: how does the introduction of the e-service make the public sector entity 
more trustworthy? This analysis resembles an evaluation where the evaluation criterion is 
an a priori established objective measure of trustworthiness. This objective measure is 
theoretically established in the conceptual framework and establishes dimensions of 
trustworthiness along which one might expect the introduction of the e-services to change 
the internal operation and outcomes of the administrations that operate them and offer the 
services. Each dimension is then scrutinised systematically using all available data that 
comment on changes to that dimension. 
 
The second stage of within-case analysis is the trust analysis (from trustworthiness to 
trust). In this situation, the analysis is based upon variance between citizens asking: what 
are the variations in individual perceptions and interpretations of the trustworthiness of 
the public sector entity and why do they vary? The approach taken here was motivated in 
part by Gambetta & Hamill’s (2005, pp. 18-19) ethnographic approach where they 
focused on taxi drivers accounts of the signs they use to decide whether to pick up a fare 
or not. It is important to note that this thesis does not try to answer how much, or to what 
extent. Like Gambetta & Hamill’s study, the approach taken here does not allow proper 
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scientific testing of the hypotheses because there is no way to control and measure the 
relevant variables (Gambetta and Hamill 2005, p. 19).  
 
For this analysis, each user constitutes one observation in a small-n controlled 
comparative study (George and Bennett 2005, Gerring 2007). This means that within 
each within-case analysis there are both individual and comparative (between individual) 
components. Each individual represents an example of how interaction with an e-service 
might influence their level of institutional trust. In other words, each individual represents 
one causal path that is a test of e-government and institutional trust theories that 
hypothesise how particular aspects of e-services will bring about changes in the trust 
levels of the citizens. The main technique used to trace each individual’s path was the 
creation of individual user narratives combined with the more analytical technique of a 
selective focus on the established hypotheses (George and Bennett 2005). Tracing each 
individual’s path involves trying to discern how different trustworthiness characteristics 
of an e-service (established in the first phase of analysis) (1) are perceived and interpreted 
by citizens and (2) how they interact with other contextual factors in ways that influence 
a citizen’s trust judgement (see Table 60). 
 
 
The e-service user narratives 
 
Two main orienting questions are: 
A) What features of the technology and experience with the technology do citizens 
perceive and interpret as trustworthiness cues? 
B) How do these cues interact with contextual (personal, cultural, and structural) 
mechanisms? 
 
Question A involves further questions, such as:  
1) How genuine is a cue (Gambetta and Hamill 2005, p. 9)? – i.e., does it really 
reflect trustworthiness? Is it based on misconceptions or inaccurate judgements? 
 
Question B involves further questions, such as: 
1) Who notices what features over others, and why? 
2) What groups/types of people interpret trustworthy features differently? What 
features, and why? 
 
Table 60  The e-service user narratives framework. There were several questions and sub-
questions that were used to structure the development of the individual user narratives.  
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After establishing as best as possible the causal path and the interrelated variables for 
each citizen, the next step is comparative analysis between individuals. The goal of the 
comparative analysis is to compare variations and similarities in the independent 
variables and relate them to variations and similarities in the dependent variable. This 
comparison is aided by the inclusion of causal processes as it helps to avoid mistaken 
inferences (George and Bennett 2005, p. 254). For example, it helps to see if a variance in 
an independent variable between individuals relates to a difference in the outcomes 
(George and Bennett 2005, p. 254).  
 
During the course of the trust data collection and analysis, a few important broader 
themes emerged that help to explain the logical structure of the trust analysis:  
1. In citizens’ responses to questions regarding their trust and interaction with the e-
services, only a few salient features of the e-services stood out. Thus while it is 
conceivable that all of the trustworthy mechanisms detailed above may contribute 
a small part to citizens’ trust judgments it appears as if only a few are highly 
relevant.  
2. While only a few of the trustworthy mechanisms appear highly relevant, which 
factor was relevant appears highly dependent upon the characteristics of the 
individual. 
3. These few mechanisms that are most salient in the perceptions of the individual 
are interrelated and thus defy a simplistic straightforward explanation. To 
understand the impact of one mechanism, it must be understood in relation to 
other contextual factors (such as characteristics of the individual) or other 
trustworthiness cues.  
As a result of these three factors, combined with the goal of the analysis, the analysis is 
broken up into salient and marginally or non-salient cues. Salient cues are those that were 
readily and often perceived by the users and were subsequently interpreted in a manner 
that impacted on trust. The marginally or non-salient trustworthiness cues were vary 
rarely, if at all, perceived and thus appeared to have little impact. Each cue is discussed 
separately, and then in relation to other cues, in an attempt to simply the explanation 
while respecting the inherent complexities (Law and Mol 2002). 
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CROSS-CASE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The comparative analysis stars by looking at the sixteen theories established in the theory 
chapters (3 & 4). As appears in the within-case analyses, several theories are not tested or 
refined in either case, some are tested or refined in only one case, and the rest were 
evident in both cases. The first two types of theory can be considered in terms of why (or 
why not) they were evident in either case, and what we can learn from that. The later type 
of theory can be considered comparatively. Finally, the analysis looks to see if any more 
abstract causal trends can be extracted from a comparison of the similarities and 
variations across both e-services. 
 
OTHER TECHNIQUES 
Several techniques were employed (along with a comparative analysis) with the goal of 
improving the quality of the theory testing and refinement (validity) and the theory 
generation from this study. Two fairly standard techniques were employed: a) drawing 
extensively on the extant literature to compare and contrast the findings of this study 
(Eisenhardt 1989) and b) triangulation using multiple data sources. Other benefits flow 
from the use of causal mechanisms and causal process tracing. The use of causal process 
tracing provides a way of developing theoretical explanation for empirical relationships 
(Gerring 2007) and the use of retroductive inference both help to improve the internal and 
external validity of the study (Tsoukas 1989).433 Also, process tracing also opens up 
possibilities for the inductive discovery of new variables (George and Bennett 2005, p. 
254). 
 
THE RESEARCH PATH:  WHEN ,  WHERE ,  AND HOW  
The research can be thought of as broken up into four distinct stages, of which the author 
was centrally responsible for stages 2-4. 
 
                                                 
433
 Taking the black-box explanation one step further, if the research can move from the theoretical 
explanation of the relationship to an explanation of the underlying structures and mechanisms that make 
that explanation hold (Tsoukas 1989).  
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Stage 1: (October - November 2004) Theory-development and IADB study of the 
links between e-government and trustworthiness. The focus of this stage was on 
the institutional changes resulting from the implementation of the e-services. In-
depth interviews were conducted of prominent stakeholders of the two e-services 
(top government officials, administrators of the tax agencies, administrators in the 
government agency running ChileCompra, NGO activists, international 
development aid organizations, actors in government agencies responsible for 
policies promoting the use of ICT in government and across Chile, and officials in 
various levels of government administration such as in the Chilean Chamber of 
Commerce) The end result is modified theory with respect to the potential links 
between e-government and trust. The author of this study participated in all stages 
of this research and write-up. The rest of the stages constitute a logical 
continuation of the research in this stage that laid the empirical foundation of the 
impacts of e-services on institutional trustworthiness. 
 
Stage 2: (October – December 2005) Extending the IADB study and deepening 
the theory development, twelve interviews were conducted with people who work 
closely with users of the e-services. The goal of this cycle was to both refine 
theory and reduce the scope of the inquiry for the following cycle. This stage was 
entirely designed and conducted by the author. 
 
Stage 3: (March – May 2006) This research stage consist of interviews and focus 
groups with users of the systems. If and when some interesting theoretical issues 
came up they would be pursued in questioning and in subsequent interviews if 
theoretically expedient. This stage also included a series of interviews with SII 
and ChileCompra employees, public sector users of ChileCompra, and more 
telecentre workers. Finally, this stage included a series of eight surveys for the 
World Bank asked of the following group: SII managers, SII employees, e-tax 
users, DCCP managers, DCCP users, ChileCompra public sector users, 
ChileCompra business users, and a wider-society survey asking general questions. 
The World Bank study was conducted by the author with the help of one other 
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consultant, Carolina Seward. For details of the WB methodology, see Appendix 
II. The other interviews were conducted and transcribed entirely by the author. A 
summary of the interviews conducted in stages 2 & 3 can be seen below (see 
Table 61). 
 
Stage 4: (June 2006 – Sept. 2007) In this final stage the goal was to close the 
research loop. This stage contained the concurrent activities of analysis and 
writing of the thesis. During this stage, the overall focus on theory shifted and 
some new theory was brought in (and sometimes discarded) when necessary to 
help understand and explain the data. The most prominent examples of these 
changes in focus, or inclusion of new theory are a) an increased consideration of 
power asymmetry and its impacts on trust, and b) increased focus on individual 
level psychological theories, such as cognitive inertia, and the importance of 
value systems. This stage was completed entirely by the author.  
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Total interviews/focus groups in research stage 2 & 3 by position 
Position # (Interviews/FGs) # subjects 
SII e-tax user 10 (8/2) 14 
SII e-tax and CC private sector user 8 (6/2) 11 
CC private sector user 3 (3/0) 3 
CC public sector user 4 (3/1) 5 
SII Employees (Regional Level) 6 (6/0) 6 
SII Employees (National Level) 2 (0/2) 10 
DCCP Employees 4 (3/1) 9 
Biblioredes TC 1 (1/0) 1 
IIE Red Comunitaria Leader 2 (2/0) 1 
Red Comunitaria TC employees 14 (14/0) 14 
Non-user citizens 2 (2/0) 2 
Total: 56 (48/8) 76 
Table 61  Total interviews conducted by position during research cycles 2 & 3.  
 
ON THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This section briefly continues some of the positives and negatives of the research 
methodology, as well as what the author might have done differently in retrospect. 
 
Advantages, disadvantages, and limitations 
Given the central role of theory in this research, it is not surprising that resultant 
methodology brings with it advantages for theory building (testing, refining, and 
generation): 
1. The interdisciplinary approach allows for the benefit of drawing from other areas 
of research, rather than re-inventing the wheel, 
2. The use of a series of hypotheses has at least two benefits: (1) it aids in the search 
for interaction effects, and (2) it forces the consideration of alternative 
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explanations helping to overcome the tendency to not consider alternative 
explanations and only search for confirming data. While technically the theories 
put forth were not necessarily competing (they could be co-active mechanisms) in 
reality, they were all in a very real sense “competing” for the attention of the user. 
3. Tracing the complete causal chain affords significant methodological benefits 
including improving the internal validity of the findings (Tsoukas 1989), 
4. The tight coupling of theory to reality (from abstract to concrete) allows for a 
clear feedback route from empirical findings to theory.  
5. A comparative study also brings important analytical benefits. Comparative 
studies have several benefits including forcing researchers to break with simplistic 
frames and move beyond simplistic impressions improving the possibility of 
capturing novel findings, and aiding in the confirmation, extension, and 
sharpening of theory (Eisenhardt 1989, pp. 533, 541). 
 
This theory-centric research approach does generate some difficulties, however. The 
foremost problem is that with such an approach a “scholarly knowledge of the subject is 
crucial” (Sayer 2000, p. 23). This often implies a large commitment ex-ante, including 
forays into disciplines where the researcher is untrained. Furthermore, unless the 
researcher can appropriately constrain the scope of the theory, data must be collected to 
comment on a wide range of theory, increasing the demand for data, and potentially 
diluting the findings, making the potential to achieve data saturation. This was especially 
problematic here as conducting two case studies further diluted the amount of research 
possible on each particular e-service. The hope is that the analytical benefits from a 
comparative study outweigh the lost depth obtained by increased interview possibilities 
on one single case. 
 
A major limitation of the use of these methods is that this thesis is not a longitudinal 
study. This means that it was not possible to do trust measurements before and after the 
implementation of the services. However, the use of interviews, new and old surveys, and 
usage data, shed some light on the changes that have occurred over time on two levels 
(structural, individual) as well as the dynamics of the point of interaction.  
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A further limitation was that not all interviews allowed for the in-depth interviews or 
continued interaction with the subject that would be ideal for understanding a person’s 
interpretive scheme (Boland Jr. 1985). However, this study has the advantage of using 
many highly concrete hypotheses so that the questions that were asked are still relevant to 
comment on that particular theory. 
 
With 20/20 hindsight, would I change how I did the research?  
There are (at least three) things that I would have altered about the research approach in 
retrospect: 
1. This research would have been improved by more interviews, and in particular of 
ChileCompra users, to achieve a higher level of saturation. 
2. The analysis might have benefited with an analytical approach such as qualitative 
comparative analysis which bring advantages for small and intermediate-N 
research designs (Ragin Forthcoming, Rihoux 2006). That method might have 
helped tighten the data-theory and to make the analysis slightly more rigorous.  
3. The surveys proved to be quite interesting and useful pieces of research. It might 
have been helpful to introduce a survey-like question to “measure” competence 
and motivation perceptions of several different government institutions that could 
have been asked of each interviewee. This would have provided a potential 
relative measure that would enhance the within-case inter-subject comparative 
analysis. 
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APPENDIX II  –  WORLD BANK STUDY METHODOLOGY 
 
The World Bank study used in this research consists of two case studies (the e-tax system 
and ChileCompra) implemented as part of a larger project attempting to develop a 
methodology to study the social implications of e-government projects. The fundamentals 
of the WB project are relatively simple. The lead researchers developed an assessment 
framework that consists of a series of dimensions of social outcomes that were theorised 
to impact on the different major stakeholders from an e-government project (see Table 
62). Then they proceeded to develop a set of indicators and survey or interview questions 
to assess the indicators, which are subsequently adapted according to the particulars of 
the case under study. The framework also called for data collection of other objective 
project information such as the financial costs of the e-government project. The World 
Bank team did this for eight cases in India. For an example of the framework with 
dimensions, indicators, and questions, see Table 63 below.  
 
Stakeholders Key Dimension of Impact 
Client 
• Economic (Direct & Indirect) 
• Governance (Corruption, Accountability, Transparency, Participation) 
• Quality of Service (Decency, Fairness, Convenience, etc.) 
Agency (Including 
Partners in 
implementation) 
• Economic (Direct & Indirect) 
• Governance (Corruption, Accountability, Transparency, Participation) 
• Performance on Key Non-economic Objectives 
• Process Improvements 
Society 
Other Government 
Departments 
Government as a whole 
Civil Society 
• Economic (Direct & Indirect) 
• Governance (Corruption, Accountability, Transparency, Participation, 
Responsiveness) 
• Development Goals 
Table 62  The World Bank assessment framework linking stakeholders to key dimensions of impact 
from an e-government implementation. 
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Impacts on Clients 
 Dimension Indicator Questions 
1 Economic: 
Direct & Indirect 
Direct cost to user: travel 
costs, travel time, elapsed 
time for service delivery, 
cost of repeated visits 
Number of trips made for the service 
Average travel cost of making each trip 
… 
Extent of reduction of cost 
of paying bribes 
Payment of bribe to government 
functionaries/agents: Yes/No 
Total amount paid in bribes to Government 
functionaries/agents 
… 
Rate of errors and time for 
recovery 
Any errors in the documents which required 
correction: Yes/No 
Number of trips required for correction to be 
done 
… 
2 Governance: 
Corruption, 
Accountability, 
Transparency, 
Participation 
Levels of corruption Measured on a scale 
Need for engaging 
intermediaries 
Yes/No 
… … 
… …  … … 
Table 63  A partial example of the “Impacts on Clients” dimension and indicator table. Within each 
dimension are a series of indicators. Within each indicator are a series of questions. For each e-
service, the indicators and appropriate questions must be altered to fit the context and attributes of 
the service. 
 
The two case studies here followed roughly the same approach of adapting an applying 
the assessment framework. The research on the WB cases was directed and implemented 
by myself, with the aide of my lovely wife, Carolina. We also employed two staff from 
the IIE for translation checks and testing of the surveys. 
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INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY  
The approach to interviews was straightforward (details of the interviews and focus 
groups can be found in Appendix IV). Prior to the interviews, a set of questions were 
developed according to each of the dimensions. For each interview, the goal was to cover 
the different indicators in each dimension of impact that was not well covered by the 
survey work. In other words, the focus was on the more qualitative indicators as well as 
trying to uncover information explaning links between the implementation and particular 
outcomes. The questions were asked in a semi-structured manner allowing for open-
ended responses. The same method was used in both the interviews and focus groups, but 
with the focus groups an effort was made to touch on each participant, and extract 
different perspectives.  
 
The interviewees and focus groups were selected to maximise the representation of the 
different stakeholders. For example, in the SII Managers focus group interview, there was 
a manager from almost all of the major departments in the SII.  
 
Interviews were conducted by me in Spanish, with Carolina taking notes. All interviews 
were recorded and then translated back into English by either Carolina or myself. In total, 
there were thirteen interview sessions, with nine one-on-one interviews, four focus 
groups, and a total of twenty-seven subjects overall. The average length of an interview 
was fifty-seven minutes (ranging from thirty-five to eighty-one). 
 
SURVEY METHODOLOGY  
A total of six surveys were conducted with the following stakeholders: SII managers, SII 
employees, e-tax users, ChileCompra public sector users, ChileCompra private sector 
users, and the society at large (wider society). The development and implementation of 
the surveys went through four stages: (1) development, (2) translation, (3) testing and 
refinement, and (4) distribution. 
 
1. Development 
 401
In April, 2006, I received the assessment framework and the sample surveys applied in 
India. For each of the different stakeholder groups and each project we then went through 
the corresponding indicators and developed similar questions to the ones in the other 
questionnaires (or the same when possible) as well as created new questions depending 
upon the applicability of the indicators to the context of the e-government project being 
studied. The main goal was to stay as true to the surveys we had received from India as 
well as following the set of indicators given to us.  
 
2. Survey Translation  
The questions we used had to be translated from English into Spanish. Mabel Verdi of the 
IIE helped us to translate several of the surveys. Based upon her translations we were 
able to translate the rest of the surveys. We then proceeded to test these translations with 
a variety of native Spanish speakers who also had some experience with the system, and 
all of whom were professionals who worked at the IIE. This was done by sitting down 
side by side with them as they went through the surveys and eliciting their understanding 
of the questions and adjusting them accordingly.  
 
Survey Testing and Refinement 
The surveys were then tested. The majority of the testing consisted of 1) a review by staff 
at the IIE and also at the SII and ChileCompra and 2) conducting pilot tests. Staying 
consistent with the approach in India, there was no systematic testing of concept 
constructs. Rather, the approach was to ensure that those who took the surveys 
understood the questions as they were originally intended.  
  
At this stage we also began to place the surveys online. The online survey service 
SurveyMonkey was used. Upon completion, the final versions of each online survey were 
tested several times by helpful members of the IIE. Revisions were then made based upon 
their comments on language, structure, and content.  
 
Changes were made such as:  
• The surveys were too long, so repetitive or redundant questions were cut. 
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• The phrasing of several questions was changed. This is because several of the 
original concepts proved problematic, such as ‘accountability’, ‘transparency’, 
‘digital divide’. 
• Removed potentially sensitive identifying data questions such as for the RUT, the 
Chilean Social Security number. 
 
By the end of April we sent the surveys to contacts at each institution, the SII and the 
DCCP, for review and to add potential questions that might be of use to the institution. 
We made adjustments according to their comments. This process was repeated for a 
second round of revisions befor we deemed the surveys ready.  
 
We also piloted the wider society survey in the small town of Traiguen. The end result 
was then translated back to English and sent to project head for approval. On the eleventh 
of May we pilot tested the wider society survey twice more on locals in Temuco with 
some computer experience (a secretary and an apartment manager) and it appeared ready 
to go. However, a few days later we tested it again and found that the subject had a hard 
time understanding the survey. At this point it was too late to turn back.  
 
We also decided at around this point that the SII taxpayer surveys must be done by hand. 
Following the more user friendly template developed for the wider society survey, we 
transferred the SII citizen survey to a paper format. This was also reviewed by people at 
the IIE. 
 
4. Survey Distribution 
The distribution was different for the different surveys: 
• Wider Society Survey– Conducted by hand. They were conducted in three types 
of locations: Santiago (metropolis), Temuco (medium-sized city), and small 
towns (Nueva Imperial, Traiguen, and Lautaro). There were several people that 
helped in conducting the survey. Note that the helpers had at least a university 
degree, fluent in Spanish, and were given the instructions to try to reach a diverse 
cross-section of the population. 
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o Santiago: Twenty-six surveys were conducted by me, Carolina, and a 
Chilean friend at the bus and train stations as well as on the street in a 
really nice part of town in Santiago de Chile, the capital of Chile. Three of 
those were problematic (had to leave quickly, did not seem to understand 
e-government, and uncomfortable). Another four were filled out by a 
friend, a friend’s relative, and two friends of a friend. 
o Temuco: Twenty-three were completed by a Masters student at the IIE, 
two were completed by a relative of a volunteer at UTPC a Chilean NGO, 
and one was completed by the person in charge of the grounds keeping at 
our residence. 
o Small Towns:  
 Traiguen (Eleven): Twelve surveys were distributed to the person 
in charge of the telecentres and eleven were completed 
 Nueva Imperial (Fourteen): Ten surveys given to the person in 
charge of the local telecentre and eight were completed. Also in 
Nueva Imperial, six were conducted by hand by me and Carolina, 
two at a women’s textile cooperative and the rest in a bus station. 
 Lautaro (Fifteen): A volunteer from UTPC conducted fifteen in 
this small town. 
• SII Managers and Workers – The SII conducted the survey using internally 
developed online survey software. This was necessary due to internal rules that no 
SII employee could navigate to a web page outside of the SII domain. 
• SII citizen user surveys were conducted by hand by Viktor Aguila an Ecuadorian 
Masters student at the IIE. A total of fifty-five surveys were conducted in the 
cities of Temuco and Pucon (a tourist centre). 
• ChileCompra User surveys (public sector and businesses) as well as SII 
business – were completed online. For these we received mailing lists from the 
DCCP. 7433 emails were sent out to registered businesses (326 responses), 9538 
to public sector workers (654 responses), and 6,879 emails with the SII business 
survey (322 responses) to CC registered businesses. Public sector 6.8% response 
rate, CC business 4.3% response rate, SII business 4.7% response rate. 
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Some Methodological Issues 
There were a series of methodological problems that occurred during the research: 
• Often wording, especially in the Wider Society Survey with people who have 
lower education or no experience with computer had a hard time with the 
terminology. Example problematic words were transparency, e-governance, 
digital-divide, and accountability (which did not translate directly in Spanish). 
• For many questions we changed the set of possible responses from a range of 
(1=Ok - 5=Great) to (1=Very Bad - 3=No change - 5=Very Good). This 
approach includes both positive and negative possibilities that were excluded 
in the Indian versions of the surveys. 
• The DCCP was not targeted with a survey. Rather, employees and managers 
participated in a focus group and interviews. 
• The online response rate was low. This low response rate makes the survey 
data suspect. Consequently, it must be considered as a secondary and tenuous 
data point to support that semi-structured interview data. One problem 
obtaining survey data responses was caused by sending surveys from a non-
WB address made people suspicious. The following set of surveys (of CC 
public sector users) included a WB email address and the response rate was 
2% higher. 
• Survey Monkey was not fully compatible for Spanish. Some of the pop-up 
menus if people did not complete a question or something came up in English 
and they could not be changed.  
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Example World Bank survey 
 
SURVEY FOR CITIZENS WHO USE 
THE ONLINE INCOME TAX SERVICE 
 
The Instituto de Informática Educativa from the Universidad de la Frontera (UFRO) is 
conducting a study on the impact of the online tax system on behalf of the World Bank. 
With the cooperation of the Servicios de Impuestos Internos (SII) we are collecting the 
most useful and up to date information about the electronic services offered by the 
Chilean government. Our objective is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of these 
services for citizens. Your participation in completing this survey helps us to achieve this 
objective.   
 
None of the responses that you choose will compromise your integrity.  
 
Thank you very much!!! 
 
 
 
PART 1: IDENTIFICATION DETAILS 
 
1. Age   
2. Gender  Male=1, Female=2 
3. Educational Attainment 
 
Elementary=1, Secondary School Diploma=2, 
Degree=3, Post Graduate (MA)=4, Professional 
Degree=5, MPhil/PhD=6, Others=7 
4. Indicate where you live 
 
City=1, Town/Village=2, Rural Area=3  
 
5. Occupation   
 
  
 
PART 2: AWARENESS ABOUT SERVICE 
 
6. Have you ever heard of the 
online income tax system? 
 Si=1 
No=2, Skip to 9 
7. How long have you been 
aware of the online income tax 
service? 
 0-1 month=1, 1-4 months=2, 4=8 months=3, 8-12 
months=4, 12-24 months=5, more than 24 months=6 
 
8. How did you come to know 
about the online income tax 
service? 
 Newspaper=1, Television=2,  
Interaction with government employees=3 
Telecentres=4, Colleagues at office=5, Others=6 
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PART 3: DETAILS OF SERVICES USED 
 
9. Please give details of the services that you have used from the online income tax service: 
No Type of Service Have you used 
of the service? 
When did you last used the 
service? 
 
  Yes=1 
No=2 
Specify Month and Year 
 
1 Impuestos Mensuales   
2 Factura Electrónica   
3 Declaraciones Juradas y Nominas   
4 Atención de Denuncias y Condonaciones   
5 Cartola Tributaria   
6 Material de apoyo asistencia tributaria   
7 Registro de Contribuyentes   
8 Boleta de Honorarios Electrónica   
9 Bienes Raíces   
10 Situación Tributaria   
11 Verificación de documentos   
12 ¿Algún Otro? (Especifique)   
 
10. Have you ever used the 
online income tax service? 
 Yes=1, skip question 10 
No=2, end survey after 11. 
11. Why not?  I do not pay income taxes=1 
I do not know how to use a computer=2 
Too complicated=3 
No access to computers=4 
Other=5, please write… 
 
 
PART 4: INTERACTION WITH THE ONLINE INCOME TAX SERVICE 
   
12. How do you access the online 
income tax service? 
 Home = 1, Place of business = 2, Telecentre = 3,  
Cybercafé=4, Other = 5 
13. Do you have broadband access?  Yes=1 
No=2 
14. Is the webpage customer 
friendly? 
 Friendly=1, Somewhat Friendly=2, Neutral=3, 
Somewhat unfriendly=4, Unfriendly=5, No Opinion=8 
15. Is it convenient to complete 
taxes online? 
 Very convenient=1, Somewhat convenient=2, neither 
convenient nor inconvenient=3, Somewhat 
inconvenient=4, Very inconvenient=5, No opinion=8 
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16. If you have used the help desk, 
how did you find the customer 
service? 
 Very good (customer service)=1, Somewhat good=2, 
Neutral=3, Somewhat bad=4, Very bad=5, No 
opinion=8 
17. Did they respond to help 
requests in a timely manner? 
 Always=1, Often=4, Sometimes=3, Rarely=4, Never=5, 
No opinion=8 
 
 
 
PART 5:  COSTS OF USING ONLINE INCOME TAX SERVICE 
 
Please provide the following details about your use of the online income tax service: 
18. Average time spent using the 
Internet in order to complete taxes 
 0-10 minutes=1, 10-30 minutes=2 
30-60 minutes=3, 1-4 hours=4 
4-24 hours=5, 1-7 days=6, more than 7 
days=7 
19. In comparison to the previous tax 
system, have your costs 
increased/reduced?  
 Significantly reduced=1, Somewhat 
reduced=2, no changes=3, Somewhat 
increased=4, Significantly increased=5, No 
opinion=8 
20. In comparison to the previous tax 
system, has there been any change 
in the total work time needed to 
complete taxes? 
 Significantly reduced=1, Somewhat 
reduced=2, no changes=3, Somewhat 
increased=4, Significantly increased=5, No 
opinion=8 
21. Have there been any errors in the tax 
forms that required correction? 
 Yes=1,  
No=2, go to Q.23  
22. How long did it take to get the 
correction fixed? 
 0 – 1 day=1, 1-3 days=2, 3-7 days=3, 1-2 
weeks=4, 2-4 weeks=5, 1-3 months=6, more 
than 3 months=7 
23. Have you ever had a problem to 
resolve with the SII?  
 Yes=1, No=2, next section, Did not know it 
was a possibility=3, next section 
24. Are you satisfied with the process 
undertaken to resolve the problem? 
 
Yes=1, No=2, No opinion=8 
 
 
PART 6: OVERALL SATISFACTION 
 
25. How much do you agree with the following statements? 
 
The rules and procedures of the 
online income tax service are clearly 
stated 
 Strongly agree=1, somewhat agree=2, Neutral=3, 
somewhat disagree=4, strongly disagree=5, No 
Opinion=8 
The online income tax service saves 
work time compared to before. 
 Strongly agree=1, somewhat agree=2, Neutral=3, 
somewhat disagree=4, strongly disagree=5, No 
Opinion=8 
Decision making at the SII is 
transparent to citizens. 
 Strongly agree=1, somewhat agree=2, Neutral=3, 
somewhat disagree=4, strongly disagree=5, No 
Opinion=8 
 408
Do you think the electronic 
administration of tax eliminates 
corruption? 
 Strongly agree=1, somewhat agree=2, Neutral=3, 
somewhat disagree=4, strongly disagree=5, No 
Opinion=8 
Data entered into the online income 
tax service is secure and confidential  
 Strongly agree=1, somewhat agree=2, Neutral=3, 
somewhat disagree=4, strongly disagree=5, No 
Opinion=8 
The SII takes into account the 
opinions of citizens when developing 
its rules and standards/regulations.  
 Strongly agree=1, somewhat agree=2, Neutral=3, 
somewhat disagree=4, strongly disagree=5, No 
Opinion=8 
 
26. Please mark the problems, if any, that you have encountered with the online income tax 
service. 
1. Forgot password  6. Time consuming  
2. Portal (website) downtime (not 
accessible) 
 7. Slow connection  
3. Complication in Procedures  8. Inaccuracy of completed forms  
4. Internet not easily accessible   9. Other? (Specify) 
  5. Complicated terminology   
 
  
27. Has your trust in the SII 
improved/worsened after using 
this application (the online tax 
system)? 
 
Significantly improved=1, somewhat improved=2, 
no change=3, somewhat worsened=4, significantly 
worsened, No Opinion=8 
28. Do you believe now (after 
working with the online income 
tax service) that Information 
Technology can be used to 
improve the management of the 
public sector?  
 
Yes=1 
No=2 
No Opinion=8 
29. Has your image of government 
improved/worsened after using 
this application (the online tax 
system)? 
 
Significantly improved=1, somewhat improved=2, 
no change=3, somewhat worsened=4, significantly 
worsened, No Opinion=8 
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APPENDIX III  –  IADB  STUDY METHODOLOGY 
 
There is no need to go into extensive detail of the methodology employed for the IADB 
study, as it has been described elsewhere (Avgerou et al. 2005, Avgerou et al. 2006). The 
basics are as follows. The goal of the research was to develop a methodology for 
assessing future IADB e-government projects in terms of their trust-in-government 
building potential. Soon after the research began logistical constraints dictated that the 
focus of the research would be restricted to the relationship between e-government and 
institutional trustworthiness. The empirical research involved four e-services, two in 
Chile and two in Brazil. In Chile, the e-services were ChileCompra and the e-tax system. 
In Brazil, the e-services were a public sector procurement system and an e-voting system. 
In this thesis, only the Chilean interviews and experience were used. The total amount of 
Chilean interviews, the positions of the interviewee, and the interview times are all 
detailed in Appendix IV.  
 
There is a bit of information that is helpful to understanding the project that was not 
included in the published pieces. The IADB study consisted entirely of sem-structured 
interviews conducted by various members of the research team. When going out to the 
field, a research framework was developed to maintain consitency across researchers and 
research sites. The following is a copy (with only minor modifications) of the framework 
developed and issued to the researcher team: 
 
“For each country the fieldwork will be directly towards encompassing the following: 
a. A study of the socio-political conditions of the country. Particular emphasis will be 
given to understanding the public administration context, its historical development, 
recent reform efforts, etc. 
b. Selection of two (in each country) domains of ICT use, i.e. e-government application, 
with potential implications on trust. In Chile the chosen domains are online tax and 
electronic invoicing; in Brazil online tax and e-voting. 
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c. For each of these domains the research team will trace the ‘story’ of the ICT 
application development, the accompanying organizational reform, and the 
consequent changes in administrative procedures, services to citizens, and/or 
communication with other agencies. Specifically, for each e-government application 
we will ask for the following data: 
• How did the development of the application start? (e.g. as an initiative of the 
management of a government department, as an externally funded innovation 
project, as part of the IS plan suggested by the IT department, etc); 
• Who was the main sponsor? (e.g. a politician, an international agency, a visionary 
senior administrator); 
• Was this particular innovation initiative linked with a wider 
political/administrative reform effort? if yes, we’ll trace its origin and unfolding; 
• What were the declared aims/objectives of the e-government project? (as stated in 
official documents and as felt by those involved in its implementation); what 
were, more generally, the expectations for changes/improvements associated with 
the e-government project? 
• Were there any dissenting voices, and concerns that the project was inappropriate, 
would not work, etc? 
• How smoothly did the project unfold? 
d. In particular, data collection will focus on identifying the features of trustworthy 
government contact that the system aimed at introducing, or in some ways promised 
or was hoped to introduce (i.e. intended or expected improvements of government 
trustworthiness), for example transparency, simplification of procedure, 
formalization. 
e. Assess the extent to which the e-government innovation had an impact on 
trustworthiness. We’ll try to trace officially intended, informally expected, and 
unintended consequences regarding trustworthiness. To that end our study will: 
• Identify the main categories of stakeholders, for example political authorities, 
civil servants, technology experts, management or public admin consultants, 
foreign donors, categories of citizens affected by the innovation; 
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• Interview representatives of each stakeholder category and record their views, 
concerns, problems, etc. regarding the issue of trustworthiness; in other words, 
examine whether the interventions intended to increase trustworthiness have 
resulted in increases of trust, or have had other consequences; 
• Compile a list of issues of trustworthiness measures and their impact on trust on 
the basis of the information elicited from the stakeholders and our research teams 
theoretical sensitization on e-government and trust;   
• Collect further evidence to substantiate the issues identified above, e.g. if it is 
suggested that the online tax produces documentation for citizens makes them feel 
they have a more accurate and clear information on what tax they owe and how 
they should pay it, we will collect relevant existing evidence; if it is suggested 
that citizens feel that even with the online tax system the procedures of dealing 
with the revenue authorities still have to rely on personal networks to overcome 
bureaucratic obstacles, we will conduct a small survey to substantiate the claim.” 
 412
APPENDIX IV –  INTERVIEWS 
 
This appendix lists the interviews done during all stages of the research. Stage one is the 
IADB study conducted in 2004. In this study, there were a total of twenty-eight 
interviews (with a total of thirty-seven subjects) in Chile (see Table 64). Stage two 
consists of interviews conducted in Oct-Dec. 2005 that were of telecenter employees. 
Stage three contains both the WB study and the rest of the PhD interviews. An overview 
of interviews in stages two and three can be seen in Table 65. This appendix provides 
tables that detail the number of interviews, who was interviewed, and for how long, for 
all the different stages of research. The final section contains the codes used in the body 
of the thesis to reference the interviews. 
 
INTERVIEW TABLES  
 
Stage 1 (2004) : Total IADB Interviews Conducted in Chile 
Position # Interviews # subjects 
DCCP 7 7 
SII 8 9 
IADB 1 1 
Other government ministries 6 8 
NGO 2 3 
Private industry 1 1 
Municipality (CC user) 1 1 
University/Other 2 5 
Total: 28 37 
Table 64  Total interviews conducted in Chile during the 2004 IADB research project. 
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Stage 2 & 3 (Sept 2005-June 2006): Total interviews/focus groups 
Position # (Interviews/FGs) # subjects 
SII e-tax user 10 (8/2) 14 
SII e-tax and CC private sector user 8 (6/2) 11 
CC private sector user 2 (2/0) 2 
CC public sector user 5 (4/1) 6 
SII Employees (Regional Level) 6 (6/0) 6 
SII Employees (National Level) 2 (0/2) 10 
DCCP Employees 4 (3/1) 9 
Biblioredes TC 1 (1/0) 1 
IIE Red Comunitaria Leader 2 (2/0) 1 
Red Comunitaria TC employees 14 (14/0) 14 
Non-user citizens 2 (2/0) 2 
Total: 56 (48/8) 76 
Table 65 Total interviews conducted by position during research cycles 2 & 3.  
 
Stage 2 (Sept. 2005-Dec. 2005): Telecentre employee interviews 
Position Interviews # interviewees 
Red Comunitaria TC employees 10 (10/0) 10 
Biblioredes TC 1 (1/0) 1 
IIE Red Comunitaria Leader 2 (2/0) 1 
Total: 13 12 
Table 66  Summary of interviews conducted during stage 2 of the field research. 
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Stage 3 (Mar. 2006-June 2006): E-service and Institutional Trust 
Interviews 
Position # (Interviews/FGs) # subjects 
SII e-tax user 10 (8/2) 14 
CC private sector user 2 (2/0) 2 
SII e-tax and CC private sector user 7 (5/2) 10 
CC public sector user 1 (1/0) 1 
SII Employees (Regional Level) 3 (3/0) 3 
Red Comunitaria TC employees 4 (4/0) 4 
Other 3 (3/0) 3 
Total: 30 (26/4) 37 
Table 67  Summary of interviews conducted explicitly concerning the use of the two e-services and 
institutional trust during stage 3 of the field research. 
 
Stage 3 (Apr. 2006 – June 2006): World Bank Study Interviews 
Position # (Interviews/FGs) # subjects 
SII Employees (National Level) 2 (0/2) 10 
SII Employees (Regional Level) 3 (3/0) 3 
DCCP Employees  4 (3/1) 9 
CC Public Sector Users 4 (3/1) 5 
CC Private Sector Users 1 (1/0) 1 
Total: 14 (10/4) 28 
Table 68  Summary of the interviews conducted for the World Bank social impacts of e-government 
study. These interviews followed the semi-structured format as dictated by the World Bank study 
and focused on the social impacts of the e-services. Consequently, there were many questions that 
were 1) relevant for understanding the nature and interactions involved with the implementation of 
the e-services and 2) relevant for the building of trust and trustworthiness as social outcomes. 
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INTERVIEW CODES  
This section lists all the interviews done, amount of time per interview, position, and the 
code that is used to reference that interview in the text of the thesis. 
 
  
SII E-tax service users  
Code Subjects 
(#) 
Interview 
type 
Time 
(minutes) 
Location 
SII-1 1 Semi-structured 
plus survey 
15 Nueva Imperial TC 
SII-2 1 Semi-structured 30 Nueva Imperial TC 
SII-3 1 Semi-structured 7 Nueva Imperial TC 
SII-4 1 Semi-structured 40 Lancoche TC 
SII-5 1 Semi-structured 
plus survey 
35 Temuco apartment 
SII-6 1 Semi-structured 51 Triaguen TC 
SII-7/8 2 Focus group 
semi-structured 
30 Nueva Imperial TC 
SII-9/12 4 Focus group 
semi-structured 
15 Puerto Saavedra TC 
SII-13 1 Semi-structured 20 Puerto Saavedra TC 
SII-14 1 Semi-structured 13 Puerto Saavedra TC 
Total: 14 Ave time: 25.6  
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SII E-Tax & CC Private Sector User 
Code Subjects 
(#) 
Interview 
type 
Time 
(minutes) 
Location 
SII-CC-1/3 3 Focus group 
semi-structured 
83 Lautaro community Centre 
SII-CC-4 1 Semi-structured 53 Nueva Imperial TC 
SII-CC-5 1 Semi-structured 60 At residence 
SII-CC-6 1 2 interviews, 
semi-structured 
60/45 At business office 
SII-CC-7 1 Semi-structured 35 Nueva Imperial TC 
SII-CC-8/9 2 Focus group 
semi-structured 
67 Nueva Imperial TC 
SII-CC-10 1 Semi-structured 50 IIE 
SII-CC-11 1 Semi-structured 55 Triaguen 
Total: 10 Ave time: 56.4  
 
 
CC Private Sector Users 
Code Subjects 
(#) 
Interview 
type 
Time 
(minutes) 
Location 
CC-1 1 Semi-
structured  
30 Triaguen 
Total: 1 Ave time: 30  
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CC Public Sector Users  
Code People 
(#) 
Interview 
type 
Time 
(minutes) 
Location 
PS-CC-1 1 Semi-structured 45 Triaguen Municipality Office 
Total: 1 Ave time: 45  
 
 
Regional Level SII Employees  
Code People  
(#) 
Interview type Time 
(minutes) 
Location 
RL-SII-1 1 Semi-structured 22 Nueva Imperial TC 
RL-SII-2 1 Semi-Structured 25 Puerto Saavedra TC 
RL-SII-3 1 Semi-Structured 6 Triaguen TC 
Total: 3 Ave time: 17.6  
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Telecentre Employees 
Code Subjects 
(#) 
Interview 
type 
Time 
(minutes) 
Position 
IIE-1 1 2 interviews, 
semi-structured 
60/45 Manager Red Communitaria 
telecentres in IX region 
TC-1 1 Semi-structured 45 Freire Telecentre employee 
TC-2 1 Semi-structured 45 Pitrofquen Telecentre employee 
TC-3 1 Semi-structured 45 Nueva Imperial TC employee 
TC-4 1 Semi-structured 56 Carahue TC employee 
TC-5 1 Semi-structured 17 Lancoche TC employee 
TC-6 1 Semi-structured 19 Victoria TC employee 
TC-7 1 Semi-structured 29 Puerta Saavedra TC employee 
TC-8 1 Semi-structured 29 Tolten TC employee 
TC-9 1 Semi-structured 20 Lautaro TC employee 
TC-10 1 Semi-structured 50 Biblioredes employee 
TC-11 1 Semi-structured 10 Carahue TC 
TC-12 1 Semi-structured 28 Triaguen TC 
TC-13 1 Semi-structured 42 Nueva Imperial TC 
TC-14 1 Open-ended 24 Lautauro Community Centre 
Total: 15 Ave time: 35.2  
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World Bank Interviews 
Code People 
(#) 
Interview 
type 
Time 
(minutes) 
Position/Location 
WB-DCCP-1/6 6 Focus group, 
semi-structured 
68 DCCP employees / DCCP 
headquarters in Santiago 
WB-DCCP-7 1 Semi-structured 59 Head of Convenios Marcos / 
DCCP HQs 
WB-DCCP-8 1 Semi-structured 81 PMG head / DCCP HQs 
WB-DCCP-9 1 Semi-structured 75 Head of Clients Division / DCCP 
HQs 
WB-NL-SII-1/5 5 Focus group,  
semi-structured 
50 National Level SII employees / 
SII office Santiago 
WB-NL-SII-6/10 5 Focus group,  
semi-structured 
71 National Level SII managers / SII 
office Santiago 
WB-PS-CC-1 1 Semi-structured 52 “El Bosque” Santiago 
municipality employee in charge 
of purchasing 
WB-PS-CC-2 2 Semi-structured 67 FONASA / Santiago 
WB-PS-CC-3 1 Semi-structured 62 Ministry of Education in charge 
of purchasing / Santiago 
WB-PS-CC-4 1 Semi-structured 25 FONASA / Santiago 
WB-CC-1 1 Semi-structured 45 Large office supply business 
manager / Santiago 
WB-RL-SII-1 1 Semi-structured 37 Head Income Tax / Temuco 
WB-RL-SII-2 1 Semi-structured 45 Head Auditing / Temuco 
WB-RL-SII-3 1 Semi-structured 35 Taxpayer services / Temuco 
Total: 28 Ave time: 55.1  
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IADB Interviews  
Code Subjects 
(#) 
Interview 
type 
Time 
(minutes) 
Position/Location 
IADB-1 1 Semi-structured  90 DCCP Manager Administration 
Management / Santiago 
IADB-2  1 Semi-structured 170 IADB Representative / Santiago 
 
IADB-3 2 Semi-structured 80 Subdirector of Control, SII 
/Santiago 
Project Head of Subdirection of 
Control, SII / Santiago 
IADB-4  2 Semi-structured 80 Manager division of small and 
medium enterprises, Chamber of 
Commerce / Santiago 
Manager of Studies, Chamber of 
Commerce / Santiago 
IADB-5 1 Semi-structured 
plus survey 
60 Governmental Coordinator of 
ICT/Santiago 
IADB-6 1 Semi-structured 115 Executive Director NGO/Santiago 
IADB-7 1 Focus group 
semi-structured 
45 VP Sonda / Santiago 
IADB-8 2 Focus group 
semi-structured 
75 Division Boss, Universal Access 
to Information Society, SUBTEL 
/ Santiago 
Telecommunications Assessor, 
SUBTEL / Santiago 
IADB-9 1 Semi-structured 75 DCCP / Santiago 
IADB-10 1 Semi-structured 45 DCCP / Santiago 
IADB-11 2 Semi-structured 105 Sercotec / Santiago 
IADB-12 1 Semi-structured 45 Chief of Operation Income Taxes, 
SII / Santiago 
IADB-13 1 Semi-structured 100 Chief of Taxpayer Assistance, SII 
/ Santiago 
IADB-14 1 Semi-structured 70 Subdirector of Information, SII / 
Santiago 
IADB-15 1 Semi-structured 110 Manager of purchasing, DCCP / 
Santiago 
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IADB-16 1 Semi-structured 80 PROCHILE / Santiago 
IADB-17 2 Semi-structured 40 Local Office Interview, SII / 
Santiago 
IADB-18 1 Semi-structured 55 Manager Clients Division, DCCP 
/ Santiago 
IADB-19 2 Semi-structured 70 Encuentro (Telecentre), Santiago 
IADB-20 1 Semi-structured 150 Manager of Digital Literacy 
Campagin, Min. of Ed. / Santiago 
IADB-21 1 Semi-structured 75 Regional Director IX region, SII / 
Temuco 
IADB-22 1 Semi-structured 75 Sales Executive, IX Region, 
DCCP / Temuco 
IADB-23 1 Semi-structured 45 Project Engineer, ICT and Social 
Development, IIE / Temuco 
IADB-24 4 Semi-structured 90 Sociologists / Val Paraiso 
IADB-25 1 Semi-structured 75 Chief Officer, E-invoice, DCCP / 
Santiago 
IADB-26 1 Semi-structured 100 Chief Officer, Operation IVA, SII 
/ Santiago 
IADB-27 1 Semi-structured 50 CEO, SII / Santiago 
IADB-28 1 Semi-structured 75 Chief Procurement Officer, 
Valaraiso / Valaraiso 
Total: 37 Ave time: 80.2  
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Non-user  
Code People 
(#) 
Interview 
type 
Time 
(minutes) 
Location 
NU-1 1 Semi-structured 10 Nueva Imperial TC 
NU-2 1 Semi-structured 10 Nueva Imperial bus-stop 
NU-3 1 Semi-structured 46 Nueva Imperial TC 
Total: 3 Ave time: 22  
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